Meaning-making in visual culture : the case of integrating Ganda indigenous knowledge with contemporary art practice in Uganda by Kabiito, Richard
Meaning-Making in Visual Culture:  
The Case of Integrating Ganda Indigenous Knowledge  
with Contemporary Art Practice in Uganda
The Case of Integrating Ganda Indigenous Knowledge 
with Contemporary Art Practice in Uganda
Meaning-
Making 
 in 
Visual 
 Culture
Kabiito Richard
Aalto University
School of Art and Design
Art Department
Tutor:
Professor Helena Sederholm
Dr. Kyeyune George (PhD)
Dedication
Wherever you are, I know you know, and proud of my life 
that you decided, with utmost joy and dignity, to uphold. 
You remain my inspiration, my strength, and my model. 
Maria Lwiza Nakalema, rest in peace.
Aalto University
Publication Series of the School of Art and Design A 95
www.taik.fi/bookshop
© Richard Kabiito
Graphic design: Arja Karhumaa
ISBN 978-952-60-0001-5 
ISSN 0782-1832 
Printed at WS Bookwell Ltd. 
Jyväskylä 2010
Contents
Acknowledgement 10
Abstract   12
Preface   14
 
1  / Introduction 20
 Preamble 20
 PROVISIONAL ASSUMPTIONS AND JUSTIFICATION 21
 Research questions 23
 METHODOLOGY  24
 Phenomenological method 24
 Artist as both inside and outside 35
 Investigating the narrative 40
 
2 /  Indigenous knowledge,  tradition, and meaning 44
 Preamble  44
 Indigenous Knowledge 44
 Tradition 47
 Meaning 53
 Narrative tradition and meaning 58
 Narrative theory 62
 Metaphors and idioms 66
 ART AND MEANING  76
 Tradition  76
 
3 /  Artistic Traditions and Narrative in Buganda 76
 Meaning  79
 Ganda art practice 81
 Narrative Traditions  88
 Preamble  88
 Separating myth and history 88
 Genesis of stories 91
 Evolution of Ganda folklore 93
 Distinctions between idioms, proverbs, and stories 95
8 / Interlude 187
 Headgear  190
 YEAR II PROJECT 192
 Dominant attraction, autonomy, and decision-making 194
 Metaphor 196
 Scene 199
 Lead-on 199
 Repetition and intensity 200
 Objective transformation 202
 Patch-ups 204
 TYPES OF REPRESENTATION 208
 The verdict 209
 THE WAKALIGA EPISODE 212
 Intimacy of stories 212
 
9 / Epilogue  212
 Remote ordering and goal-directed actions  214
 Evolution of Stories 216
 Traditional referent and familiarity 219
 Imagery and imagining 222
 MAKERERE EPISODE 225
 Character 225
 Traditional referent and the action token  229
 Visual adaptation and inquiry  232
 Wonder and other emotions 237
 The Breakthrough 239
 
10 / Conclusions 243
 Summary 243
 Conclusions  246
 Ability to see what we see 249
 
References  252
Appendix A 263
Appendix B 265 
 A Story about the Wild Nuts (Nkoliimbo) 265
 Kato Kimera comes to rule Buganda 266
 Kintu the Legend 266
4 / Narrative Application 100
 Preamble 100
 PERSUASION 100
 Role of characters and personification 101
 Idioms and imagery 105
 AFFECT AND ORGANIZATION 109
 Musicality as interlude 110
 Prolepsis and primes 113
 Filmic dependencies as a case scenario 114
 
5 /  Post-Independence Art   in Buganda 119
 Preamble 119
 FOUNDATIONS OF ART IN BUGANDA 119
 A living legacy 119
 THE PLIGHT OF ART IN UGANDA TODAY 121
 Creativity and originality 121
 Effects of the dichotomy  125
 Title against content 131
 Sharing ideas  134
 Relevance and interpretation  137
 
6 / Remix Aesthetics  139
 Preamble  139
 ART AND THE ARTIST 140
 Practising remix 140
 Balaalo  144
 Mulere 152
 Greetings from Uganda Unconscious Imperative 155
 NAGGALABI   162
 
7 / Prologue 162
 AFRICAN HOUSE  165
 BUGOLOOBI PROJECT 167
 Search for meaning 170
 Mood and emotion 175
 Familiarity and specificity 178
 Expression and experience 179
 Myths and reality 181
 Auxiliary narrative 182
 OPEN-ENDED TEXTS 187
 Karimojong  187
 
10 11
Acknowledgement
To begin with, I seize upon the chance to acknowledge Professor Pirkko Pohjakallio-
Koskinen who was instrumental in my decision to pursue a doctoral degree at 
the University of Art and Design Helsinki (TaiK). It is because of her that I am a 
proud student of TaiK and thus I wish to thank her and recognize her contribution. 
Immeasurably too, I wish to thank my supervisor Professor Helena Sederholm 
for shaping and overseeing this research process. Professor Juha Varto was, and 
still is, a role model in everything I have vied for in this study and I wish to thank 
you for your wisdom, optimism, and strength you gave me when I seemed to 
despair. Doctor George Kyeyune could not have been any more important to me 
than the explicit discussion and open but constructive criticisms we had during 
my artistic project in Uganda. On this note also, I would like to thank Professor 
Ilpo Koskinen from the School of Design who was instrumental in my attendance 
of the Summer School of Design that took place in Suomenlinna, 2006. It was 
instrumental in revitalizing my conviction to pursue narrative as a basic concept 
of art practice. Especially so, I would like to thank Maria Hellström who introduced 
the functionality of narrative discourse. Birigitta Höijer, your contribution cannot 
be overlooked at the slightest opportunity for you gave me the light: I had no idea 
about the deeper structure of narrative functionality, but with your willingness to 
share, I was able to obtain the required literature that later became a cornerstone 
in my research. Kim Schroeder from Rochdale University who coordinated the 
Doctoral Conference for Multidisciplinary Research in Koge, Denmark that later 
became a significant contribution to my own study. In addition, I wish to thank 
Associate Professor Philip Kwesiga who assisted me in developing my research 
proposal. Dr. Kizito Maria Kasule you have been a friend and a mentor and your 
contribution to my research proposal development was immense. 
My heartfelt gratitude also goes to all persons who participated in this study. 
I wish to thank the group of students I worked with in the African House Project 
and the Year II Project. Michael Barigye my dear cousin was also involved in the 
Mugalaasi Project. Members of the Wakaliga group thank you for the tireless ef-
forts you exhibited in executing the artistic project. Lastly, many thanks go to Mrs. 
Mukasa Josephine who, in her prerogative, availed funds for travel and settling-in 
when I had just started this course. Your financial and moral support was crucial 
in my stay in Helsinki. In addition, I would like to thank the mtsifa Finance Com-
mittee for the support you offered me when you realized it was necessary that I 
pursue further studies. I wish also to thank the Directorate of Human Resources’ 
Makerere University that provided funds for my second trip to Helsinki. Staff of 
the bursar’s who worked tirelessly to make sure that I had my finances in time 
your contribution cannot be over looked. School of Graduate Studies, Makerere 
University and SidaSarec Research Grant I wish to recognize your support towards 
my research activities: it would have been unexplainable if I had not dwelt on your 
support and funding. Not to forget the most important part of the study: Mar-
garet Babirye who tirelessly typed my research findings and literature of ‘a thou-
sand’ pages I could not imagine the pressure I put you under, but it was certainly 
crucial. Finally, academic support cannot suffice on its own: I wish to thank my 
friends Pito, Joseph, Paddy and Sammy for making my life more lively and adapt-
able to the strenuous whims of the academia. My family: Louise, Milcah, and Rose 
I love you with all my heart. My siblings J.B, Andrew, Fred, Anna, and Michael you 
have always offered me support whenever I needed it to keep going. Everyone who 
contributed directly or indirectly to this study you are worth the mention. Thank 
you very much and may God bless you all.
12 13
ABSTRACT 
It is apparent that in Buganda, art produced in the studio is detached from its 
community. This realization undermines the basic tenets of the indigenous systems 
of knowledge generation, acquisition, and practical usability, which enabled Ganda 
society to enjoy the benefits accrued from its cultural constellations. Any culture 
comprises unique and specific sets of beliefs, values, and norms that distinguish it 
from other cultures, and within these a priori institutions, individuals and groups 
adroitly realize their own physiological, psychological, and social needs. One of the 
requirements that humans rely on to cater for their needs, is art, which is fundamental 
at all levels of human development. Roger Fry, (cited in, Howells, 2003) notes that 
people have two kinds of life: “the actual and the imaginative, and the work of art was 
‘intimately connected’ with the second” (p. 35). The Baganda in order to satisfy this 
set of human requirements developed an art form, which was mainly instrumental 
in satisfying functional needs as well as spiritual concerns. The Baganda, out of dire 
need to fit into the social and psychological worlds, established strategic systems 
of bodily practice and oral culture that they used for pedagogy, communication and 
propagation of knowledge structures across generations. Having survived since 
the 14th century when Kato Kintu reportedly first came to Buganda, these strategies 
could not last long especially when the Ganda people adapted to new ideologies that 
missionaries, Arab and Indian traders, and explorers brought to Buganda.1 Roscoe 
(1921) writes: “…the beautiful bark-cloth dress of the women has also given place 
to tawdry blouses and skirts introduced by Indian traders.…” (pp. 100-101). Further, 
“Arab traders taught the locals to read Swahili in Arabic characters; “Before this, 
no Muganda knew any system of transmitting his thoughts to writing or of making 
any permanent records…” (Roscoe, pp. 100-101). Father Lourdel through Mackay 
persuaded the king to sanction the worship of pictures: “Hence arose the enthusiasm 
of the Baganda for medals, scapulars, and other images distributed by missionaries” 
(Lugira, 1970, p. 155-157).2  This enthusiasm arose as a result of the king’s as “master 
and center of everything in Buganda” was in favor of the pictures. By so doing, many of 
the local systems of perpetuating life within communities gradually slid into oblivion, 
giving way to alien tenets that accelerated local histories.3 Communities became 
increasingly detached from their indigenous ways of life and among those values 
that suffered the alien invasion was art. This study therefore, attempts to rediscover 
some of the effective tools that the Baganda used to maintain all faculties of their 
society functionally together. This study proposes Oral Culture as a tool necessary 
1  Ssekamwa (1995, p. 9) insists that Kato Kintu first came to Buganda around the year 1314 from 
Mountain Masaba, in Bugishu, present day Eastern Uganda.
2  These included crucifixes, pictures of the Sacred Heart, Our Lady, St. James, and others, mostly 
imported from Europe, held the devotion and admiration of the Baganda (Lugira, 1970, p. 157).
3  ‘Accelerated History’ overwrites indigenous histories: “We barely have time to reach maturity be-
fore our past has become history; our individual histories belong to history writ large. History is on our 
heels, following us like our shadows, like death,” (Augé, 1995, pp. 26-28).  
to redefine the links between art and its community. It further proposes Remix as a 
means of reemphasizing the oral. The overall purpose in this study is to describe the 
ways in which narrative and remix aesthetics could aid in the constitution of meaning 
in plastic arts, which would in turn continue indigenous knowledge. I will argue that 
since narrative is an effective communicative tool, then it would be vital in forging a 
relevant and understandable visual culture to its community. In support, I will also 
argue that since Ganda material culture is familiar and locally accessible, then it will 
be influential in constituting visualization of narrative representations specific and 
thus adapted to their own locales.
Although I do not level any claim against significantly changing something, in 
my study, people’s perceptions find renewed hope: the frames that once made gates 
turned out fully pledged and autonomous artworks; the doors mutated into nar-
ratives; and cloth became drapery–no longer off cuts. Tradition is dismantled and 
waist beads worn as necklaces. Questions flare. Ganda artifact is used in new situa-
tions but still in its old casing: this attracts attention of the passersby, while stories 
mutate into tangible ‘things’–for those who never had a chance of ‘seeing’ them. Re-
flection becomes part of process: Kato Kintu reflects history while Kintu maintains 
legend; Kaleeba emphasizes tradition while Matyansi Butyampa and Sewandeku fo-
cus on reality. Many reflections from various viewpoints that I cannot conclusively 
recount in this short text, form part of the transformation experienced in artistic re-
search most of the time missed by ‘scientific’ methods. In general, the artistic project 
breaks with tradition and plies its own route. I received comments of uniqueness 
and novelty as a result.4 
4  The implication is that the artwork or the artistic process reflected a change in people’s view of 
what should be and what is possible to be. To demonstrate this effect, the explanations given about the 
work do not depend on what I anticipated to achieve, but rather what I learn from the artwork itself. As 
I work, I have a project of searching for meaning through narrative texts. I proceed through the artistic 
process as I keep on discovering new phenomena and at the end, I begin to search for the qualities that 
make the artworks stories and how we achieve such feeling. Hence, my assessment of the artwork in 
the epilogue is comparable to that of an outsider: the difference was that I had learnt about certain 
narrative mannerisms that I had no idea whether I had achieved them. At the end, I started to search for 
them and share them with the public. As such, even my own analysis is subject to contempt and even 
criticism, however, in such an event, the artwork stands liable for misinforming me.
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In July 2004, I embarked on constructing a series of copperplate artworks as 
part of the interior décor for Ivys Hotel Kampala in which I sought to integrate 
aestheticism and functionality.5 The artwork would be most conspicuous during 
the daytime and more functional at night when the subtle red light pierced through 
the patterned openings of the dome-shaped lamp holders.6 Ivys Hotel Kampala 
being located in Buganda, I thought of an idea that would introduce locality within 
the design and the artwork to make it well adapted to the community. I sought to 
align such a thought with Vakeva’s (1990) realization that the meaning of objects is 
a result of their use through anticipated utility, derived from their context of use 
of which they are a part. I opted for a narrative about the coronation of the King 
of Buganda at Naggalabi because it was a common event within the community. 
This suits the notion that social conditions and their possibilities form a concrete 
language as public discourse and makes use of the vernaculars within its circulatory 
space (Warner, 2002). In contradiction, when constructing Naggalabi, I relied on 
unfamiliar and unconventional (as I came to realize) methods of representation 
within the Ganda community and consequently it did not attract as much attention 
as I had anticipated. Indeed, in every individual, we do not feel pleasure equally, as 
suggested by Hume in his article ‘Of the standard taste’ (cited in, Korsmeyer, 1998) 
although structurally, we expect the mind to derive pleasure from some objects a 
notion to which Naggalabi does not conform.7 Incidentally, I discovered a mental 
reconnection of the various episodes to one another when installing Naggalabi that 
compelled me to investigate this phenomenon further; this connectedness implied 
that stories contained a special ‘thing’ I was yet to establish. 8  
5  Here in this research I refer to this undertaking as the Mugalaasi Project.
6  I assumed that by so doing, I would not only transform the bare pillars, but to also make, the same 
space usable during day and night. Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) note “Pictorial structures do not 
simply reproduce the structures of ‘reality.’ On the contrary, they produce images of reality which are 
bound up with the interest of the social institutions within which the pictures are produced, circulated 
and read” (p. 45).
7  The idea that my artwork had not attracted much attention from the public lingered on though, 
even if I thought that being a unique form of art, many people would associate with it. More still, this 
confirmed my conviction that a gap between the community and contemporary art in Buganda was not 
a mystery, prompting an insight into some of the possible causes of this disconnection.
8  The mental reconnection imposed a virtual continuity and eventually dependency, due to the man-
Preface I instead searched for an inner knowing of subjective mechanisms in compre-
hending visual images since communication made a great difference in connect-
ing the other with the self according to my conviction. Particular mechanisms of 
communication on the other hand, would provide me with an intimate knowing of 
how we interact with artistic material. In turn, I would aptly explain the discrep-
ancy between art and community today especially in Buganda where art, despite 
its previous role in shaping its own society, had assumed peripheral significance. 
Notwithstanding, as Anderson (1997) describes it, tradition values and propagates 
continuity as an integrationally inherited pattern.9 Convinced that one of the rea-
sons arts suffered a blow in contemporary society centered on meaning, I identified 
Phenomenology as a method that allowed an open investigation into psychological 
issues by purely relying on interpretation of observed, heard, or experienced phe-
nomena.10 There is also the dilemma that the aesthetics of embodied sensual sat-
isfaction renounced by Kant reinforced the division of art and life (Shusterman, 
1998). With this realization, the reconnection that I seek is achievable, first, if we 
know what people expect, and second, how they make use of what they expect. 
Without considering what the others’ expectation comprises, we ebb considerably 
from putative canons of society.11 
Although Bell (1989) believes that ‘significant form’ is the only quality that evokes 
our aesthetic emotions, and thus the only means by which we recognize a work of 
art, this is not true with the Baganda. Instead, they produced and consumed art from 
dire need and indeed its artistry emanated from delight, decency, functionality, and 
excellence, not in the achievements beyond the art object (Lugira, 1970).12 Collective 
living and communication come from patterns provided by tradition, and thus, the 
ways in which one thinks, depend on the culture in which one is immersed (Ander-
son, 1997). Society, as it stands now, faces gross distortions in many ways and thus, 
reverting to old ways is practically impossible. However, we can reuse the past as a 
gateway to what society requires and the relation this engenders. Much of the art pro-
duced in Uganda today, and Buganda particularly, reflects societal values. Art in the 
galleries does not address societal issues at close range; it does so from a point of view 
disconnected from the people. Modernists considered art as an apparition or pure ap-
pearance judged by beauty and not utility (Bauman, 1999). Unfortunately, society in 
Buganda today thrives on modernism’s principles of exclusivity. Artists produce art 
not for themselves alone, but for the others too; that is, my method of work should 
reflect the values that accommodate the other if I have to reconnect with society. 
ner in which I had designed the artwork for one to lead to the other in a sequential manner.
9  See, From Calliope’s sisters, in Hutchens & Suggs, p. 66.
10  My own experience, combined with the others’ experience, in the case of this research, would 
concretely propose the kind of art we should produce that is meaningful to the larger community.
11  Additionally, I inevitably needed an artistic production for societal, artistic, and subjective goals. I 
vehemently seek to differ with Bell’s view that we have no right or necessity to pry behind the maker of 
an object in pure aesthetics but only consider our emotion and its object (op cit, p. 11).
12  To deny them these privileges abrogates their right (as disenfranchisement) to, especially, delight 
and utility that significantly contributed to their livelihoods.
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Artistically, working with art to reveal issues affecting society draws art even 
closer to the communities from which it comes. On many occasions, artists, es-
pecially in my own community, use art for commentary, not as a transformative 
or investigative tool. Art, thus, only reflects rather than investigates underlying 
factors that influence such societal dynamics. Instead, I have addressed the issue 
of art as an investigative tool to understand society. I attempted, during the pro-
cess of art making, to understand how we make use of the messages, for example, 
grounded in images. By the mere fact that we occupy different physical and psy-
chological points in space and time, we are bound to perceive a different aspect 
of reality from our neighbor (Saint-Martin, 1987). Nonetheless, as an individual 
and community member, my method of understanding an image does not differ 
significantly from how others make sense of the same image. Through a reflective, 
reflexive, and phenomenal disposition, I come to terms of self-understanding and 
my relation to others as an artist. 
In the midst of self-understanding, I reflect on the factors that affect my com-
munity members and me as an individual in order to draw a general picture. My 
lack of understanding of ways that art functions in society, especially as an in-
vestigative tool required an artistic approach to this study. Studying other indi-
viduals’ artwork as a basis of self-realization did not appear to transform me as an 
individual, and my experience thus, in this study drew a comparative line between 
what I am able to know as an agent in the process of art making and what others 
know. Saarnivaara (2003) also knows that the ability to understand others is born 
out of the ability to understand oneself. Mirroring Saarnivaara, Bruner (1986) sug-
gests that our sensitivity to narrative is a major link between our own sense of 
self and our sense of others in the social world. In conclusion, given the nature 
of the problem, I set out to investigate, only rigorous and practical tools would 
provide a backdrop to a meaningful end. Goldie (2009) suggests that our lives are 
inescapably narrative in structure and as such bear close similarities to literary 
narrative. In effect, the lived narratives of which we are the authors highlight the 
nature of exploration we face in this research. Before, getting to the details of the 
study, there is one important note to make. 
Layout
This publication comprises ten chapters inherently linked to each other. Chapter 
one (1), the introduction, outlines the justification of this study opening up the 
door into further reading of the text. Under this headline too, research questions 
appear, preceded by the overall goal of the study. Two questions seeking personal 
understanding of the role of narrative and remix aesthetics in constituting 
meaning making in visual culture arise, while a third question seeks synthesis of 
the two constructs. Further, the chapter introduces Interpretative Phenomenology 
Analysis as forming the backbone of the study both in data collection and analysis 
of findings. The reasons for its adoption are its sensitivity to hermeneutic methods 
driven by sense-making in lived experience and providing lee way to applying the 
method of ‘appearing’ as a key concept in collecting data. As a supportive method, 
artistic research gains its way into the study as a way of creating conducive 
situations for data collection, and thus, extensively discussed in this section.
Chapter two (2) introduces theoretical dialogue in line with the methods used 
in data collection. Key constructs of the study namely, indigenous knowledge, tra-
dition, meaning, and narrative receive attention in this section. The study links 
the key concepts of tradition and meaning to narrative theory. Metaphors and 
idioms as emergent constructs form the backbone of narrative input in mean-
ing making as per the proceedings of the study. In chapter three (3), the reader 
meets artistic traditions in Buganda. This region being the central concern of the 
study, understanding of its artistic traditions would substantially contribute to 
the relevance and applicability of the findings. This chapter recounts, in part, art 
practice in Buganda, narrative traditions, the distinctions between idioms, prov-
erbs, and stories as emergent constituents of narrative structure. Chapter four (4) 
bears close relations with chapter 3 in that it is a direct descendant of the later. It 
presents application of narrative within Gander society by discussing, in detail, 
idioms and imagery, affect and organization, musicality and primes, and filmic 
dependencies. Much of narrative theorizing takes place at this stage in the process 
of data analysis.
Chapter five (5) takes on a different trend, sort of detached from the other chap-
ters, but inherently connected to them. It presents the contempraneous situation 
in on the Ugandan art scene in regard to production and utility or appreciation 
so to say. In its detailed probe, it considers history of contemporary Ugandan art, 
the plight of art in Uganda, while creativity and originality emerge as contentious 
issues in art production today. The chapter discusses the effects of dissecting art 
into realism/abstract and the implication of this dichotomy on the Ugandan popu-
lace in general. This chapter, thus, contextualizes the study scope and provides it 
with a historical background. Chapter six (6) bears close association with chapter 
5 as it still veers into what artists on ground, apart from the researcher, are doing. 
It features several practicing artists discussing their work methods and scopes by 
probing their views on what reasons and goals artists should produce art. Specifi-
cally, three artworks produced in line with the interests of the research, particu-
larly remix aesthetics feature in this section, backed up by several scenarios that 
explain the researcher’s experience of episodes of meaning making in the context 
of Buganda and Uganda. 
The prologue comprises chapter seven (7) signaling the first major art produc-
tions directly tied to the research. An artwork comprising of five copper plate 
panels comes as the first presentation that instigates the exploration of narrative 
structure. A study involving students from Uganda, Finland, and USA follows, 
closely ascended by a project executed in Bugoloobi, a Kampala suburb. Other sub-
jects that feature include the search for meaning, mood and emotion, familiarity 
and specificity, myths, and auxiliary narrative among others. Mainly, the artwork 
discussed in this chapter acted as pilot studies or precursors to the major artistic 
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project, although they yielded significant results that later formed part of the data. 
Closely related, is the interlude, chapter eight (8), reliving a time period when the 
researcher concentrated on prompted art productions by co-opted participants. 
During this period too, many of the interviews take place and visits to galleries 
ensued. The year II project comes under the spotlight for discussion, comparative 
drawings about Karimojong dress, appearance of the dominant attraction (salien-
cy) as a subtheme, metaphor, scene, repetition and intensity form the discussed 
topics. This chapter also relays various types of visual representation evidenced in 
the research process.
Containing the major artistic production is chapter nine (9) codenamed the ep-
ilogue. This section represents the climax of the research, split into two episodes: 
the Makerere and Wakaliga episodes respectively. Several themes emerge strongly 
in this set of data including traditional referent, dominant attraction, and un-
conscious imperative. These feature alongside subthemes that include emotion, 
imagery, leveling, visual adaptation, and intimacy of stories. The researcher ex-
pounds his experience of both as an artist and abstractionist. There is too, men-
tion of the dynamic picture, an idea solely encountered during art making. The 
final chapter ten (10) presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
A summary of findings is part of this chapter and concluding remarks. It features 
too, an interview conducted during an exhibition by students in secondary school 
working with local accessible materials, but in a way unique to them exhibiting 
artists’ ability to see what they see.
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1  / Introduction
 
Preamble
In this study, I define contemporary art as plastic art produced in Uganda during 
the post-independence era to the present day that includes painting and sculpture 
as classical art forms revered in the Western ideology of academic art. On the other 
hand, visual culture designates a pedagogic project that “opens the field of visual 
studies to include vernacular images, mass media, and traditional art images” 
(Tavin, 2000, p. 188). On its part, meaning-making (making meaning) will refer to the 
practice of engaging with visual culture in regard to deciphering the underlying 
meaning therein contained whereas, sense-making (making sense of ) will indulge 
with the attempt at gaining personal understanding of an experience with a 
given phenomenon. Practice designates thus, our indulgence in both ideology and 
production of such art forms and the value attached to them by the producer and 
his/her audience.1 I presume that when things are accessible, they become familiar; 
on the other hand, local things tend to become specific to their locales.2 I present 
primary arguments that include the significance of narrative, remix aesthetics, 
and the idea of integrating the two systems of knowledge–from Western fine 
art academies, and Buganda pre-West invasion history into contemporary art 
practice. Choosing a method is one of the important and defining moments of 
any research project that seeks to yield dependable and commendable results. 
Two strategies characterized the research process: the phenomenological method 
formed the backbone of the study supported by the artistic research methods. The 
artistic method, in alliance with phenomenology, involved my participation and 
that of others in generating vital information by producing artwork, carrying out 
self-studies and assessments. Since the researcher is targeting the understanding 
of visual representation both in construction and reading, then it was imperative 
that he got involved in the process for a personal understanding. I discuss in detail 
1  Howells (2003) defines Ideology as simply the study of ideas, thoughts, and systems of beliefs, 
which tends to focus on “the way these ideas thoughts and beliefs influence the way we organize and 
lead our lives, especially at a social and political level”    (p. 71).
2  Stereotypes, bias, and social expectations too, create identity. Locality and personal are within 
overlapping webs of political, environmental, legal, and social issues–isolationalism is rare.
issues of method by outlining the processes undertaken in the research and reviews 
of literature about phenomenology and artistic research methods in the remainder 
of the chapter.
Before delving into the detail of the research process, it is useful to present 
briefly the findings of the study. The research discovered a relationship between 
meaning-making and a preferred condition that availed itself whenever one en-
gaged in the act of understanding an element of visual culture. The study further 
discovered that several conditions led to this phenomenon especially when the 
process of art making included narrative forms and remix aesthetics as tools for 
creating meaning. On its part, narrative form contrived a condition construed as 
an ‘enduring emotion’ mentioned by one of the participants. This condition linked 
directly with the ‘Unconscious Imperative’ leading to its interpretation by the 
recurrent condition as a tradition functioning below the threshold of conscious-
ness. In the case of narrative, metaphor and idioms were crucial in contriving this 
condition. Remix, by critiquing existing traditions, provided evidence of the con-
dition of recurrence that made it virtually impossible to separate tradition, as an 
epistemological norm, from the process of meaning-making. This led to the find-
ing that the process of meaning-making heavily relied on tradition as a tool for 
interpreting visual culture. This was so because several participants expected to 
see some things as making part of their experience of understanding an element 
of visual culture. Further, participant picked more interest in experiencing the el-
ements of visual culture that were more meaningful to them. This understanding 
came because of having something they already knew in the context of the visual 
cultural element.
PROVISIONAL ASSUMPTIONS AND JUSTIFICATION
When people realized that ‘modern art’ was not a universal language, and instead 
only catered to a few, drastic and pragmatic changes took place to ensure that 
society was not detached from art (Jenks, 1996). Gauguin (cited in, Chipp, 1968) in 
a letter to J. F. Willumsen provides evidence of the detachment that ensued at the 
time: “In art one is concerned with the condition of the spirit for three quarters of 
the time; one must therefore care for oneself if he wishes to make something great 
and lasting” (pp. 60-65). Hutchens and Suggs (1997) reflect this notion: “Modern art, 
especially post-world war II art, had significantly separated art from the masses” 
(p. 9). This realization gradually bore the fruits of postmodernism as a condition 
that would counter the art of the non-living: art is a condition of life and therefore 
we cannot detach ourselves from it. Hannula (1998) commends postmodernism 
opening up “many different and many other ways to express ourselves, to find a 
voice through culture, through a civic corpus, through politics and discourse” 
(p. 15). Art being an integral unit within our biological, psychological and 
social needs, should be accessible, not an up-market rarity. Spirkin’s Dialectical 
Materialism (1983) considers an undisputable function of art as grounded in its 
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profoundly communicative ethos.3 Society forms art, and likewise, art can help to 
form society. Contemporary art in Buganda today seems to have lost its roots of 
complementing and supplementing society’s needs as art assumed the status of a 
commodity only understandable to the artist and those for whom s/he produces, 
namely, the expatriate community and art collectors. 
If narrative is a communicative tool in everyday speech, then we should integrate it 
into art production to enhance communication in visual images. Stories were, and still 
are one of the oldest tools of communication that have stood against time narrated 
verbally or visually. In Buganda, the base of this research, stories bore part of the 
social, cultural and psychological life, evident today among the rural communi-
ties that still practice communal and traditional ways of life.4 Documentation of 
the stories, coupled with other factors, eroded the traditional ways of accessing 
them. The lifelikeness of these narratives makes them believable, associable and 
understandable, which create dependency. This justifies the study considering 
that stories from Buganda constitute a solid history, which forms a credible foun-
dation for academic consideration.
When we juxtapose stories with locally available material elements in art making, 
not only do we attain holistic meaning and enhance visual readability: we continue indig-
enous knowledge in both material and immaterial terms. The Baganda, to create under-
standability and dependencies in their narratives, they created a mix of real and 
non-real things.5 Such articles became part of the Ganda way of life and hence sig-
nificant entities, which led to their presence in associated stories.6 As Korsmeyer 
(1998) notes, people always harbor specific meaning and understanding of articles 
within their own environments, and only ask questions when one uses such ar-
ticles unconventionally. We also realize that there are many articles of daily use 
built within Ganda stories to make them more practical, plausible, and specific to 
the Ganda community. Justifiably, in instances where oral tradition is a means of 
communication and preservation of cultures, we need a material form of continu-
ing such knowledge because materiality embodies meaning that is abstract and 
elusive. This is in agreement with Bush’s (1990) historical account: 
 
 
3  Through it, people communicate to one another their feelings, their most intimate and infinitely 
varied and poignant thoughts Spirkin explains.
4  Elders and village children congregate and share stories where each member is obliged to tell a 
story in turns as well as listen to the others. Adults still tell stories to the young, to a small extent, as an 
alternative way of instilling traditional values and as entertainment. Parents seize upon such sessions 
to pass on information to their children; likewise, the children find it an opportunity to interact with 
their elders. Apart from interaction, children also learn new things from some of the stories which go on 
to guide their individual lives.
5  The non-real things kept the mind wondering while the real things kept it in balance. Hence, when 
they talk about Gulu, in the ‘Kintu’ myth, they also include real things such as Musoke, grain, chicken 
and plantain as familiar things that make the story real and keep the mind in balance.
6  Incidentally, Ganda material culture is wide and very close to its community because of its utilitar-
ian nature.
[Hum]ankind delighted in the incorporation of human and animal forms in the objects 
of daily use, and that a shared system of such animated forms re-affirmed an under-
standing of the users’ place in Nature’s scheme and the role of these objects in the 
rituals and routines of a natural life. The useful objects communicated shared beliefs, 
values, and interest. (p. c.3)
Reusing accessible and specific material cultural entities in art production accelerates 
meaning making in visual images and thus propagates indigenous knowledge.7 Rutherford 
(2005) holds that the degree of integration of the entity representation determines 
familiarity. Videlicet, items, which feel more familiar, facilitate subsequent 
processing of the same or similar items with deeper integration. A combination of 
the material and immaterial improves visual reading in such a way that the mind 
drifts from ethereal categories of perception to more corporeal categories that are 
easily accessible by our senses. 
Research questions
The study focused on how people experienced and constructed meaning in the 
plastic arts within predominantly traditional communities. Specifically, I focused 
on narrative as a meaning-making tool in human understanding. This is because, 
through an in-depth reading of personal and social settings, activation of oneself 
through memories identification and recognition, audiences get involved in 
narration. Working within personal dilemma of contradictory identity, narrative 
mediates between the individual and cultural identity when the outer and inner 
reality meet (Hoijer, 1998). The nature by which audiences get involved in narrative 
was crucial for this research. Thus, focus on understanding the structure of 
narrative was imperative in this study. Further, material culture, as an already 
known and physically accessible element, enables meaning-making by local or 
indigenous members of the Ganda community. Indeed, one of the principles that 
help us recognize shapes and give them their semantic dimension is familiarity of 
something we already know (Zimmer & Zimmer, 1978). 
A distinction between the indigenous way of understanding and a ‘world view’ 
of essences was necessary to draw comparisons and focus on the generalities or 
differences. These would provide a general framework for approaching visual or 
plastic arts within a predominantly traditionalized society. It is crucial to under-
stand the mechanisms of narrative in order to understand how such phenomenon 
creates meaning and the kind of meaning it presents. Through theoretical under-
standing of how we arrive at meaning and make use of it, the study embarked on 
7  When objects are local in a community, they are accessible in material and abstract thought. Usu-
ally, familiar objects are meaningful although such objects attain their familiarity partly because they 
frequently occur in standard orientations (Best, 1986). Because they are familiar, we tend to associate 
with them and attain specific attributes that become common or conventional. “A number of other stud-
ies have keyed into the power of familiarity to raise preference, revealing that repeated exposure to an 
object will result in a more positive attitude towards it, even without integrated awareness,” indicated 
Barry (1997, p. 27).
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a larger ideal of a search to continuing such indigenous knowledge beyond being 
only meaningful; it would also continue in space and time: it would reveal itself 
in new or alternative ways in conformity to difference and generality. To achieve 
this goal, the study explored ‘remix aesthetics’ as a strategy that enabled locally 
grounded visual qualities to appear as art productions during the research. En-
graining local visual qualities within works of art, in turn, continues indigenous 
knowledge systems. Further, the dictates of remix allow reuse of texts whether 
or not they belonged to the user without significantly altering their immediate 
state.8 De Baere (1999) is convinced that “[a]rtists can appropriate any moment of 
resonance as their own, including those which are traditionally considered only 
an echo of what tradition and the market expect artists to produce” (p. 118).
The overall goal of the study is to establish how narrative and remix aesthetics 
could both improve visual reading and continue indigenous knowledge in specific 
locales. It does so by gaining personal understanding of how an individual or a 
group of people makes sense of artistic images produced with stories and material 
culture within a specific locale. To achieve this goal, the study poses three ques-
tions:
How do individuals construct meaning in visual images (plastic arts) and • 
how does narrative as a temporal construct contribute to such a process?
How does remix aesthetics, as a spatial construct, contribute to meaning-• 
making in an indigenous community? 
Does the synthesis of narrative and remix aesthetics improve visual read-• 
ings and continue indigenous knowledge in a predominantly traditional 
society? In addition, how does the artist as both a local and familiar thing 
influence such a process?
METHODOLOGY  
 
Phenomenological method
In the Mugalaasi Project, I dealt with several exhibits including Naggalabi as part 
of the interior décor. Significantly, one image that showed a woman sensuously 
leaning against a wall and skimpily draped drew mixed reactions, yet another 
image depicting a nude woman splashing water on her body from a horse pipe (see 
figure 1) attracted less attention. I hanged the artworks in a place having dual roles 
of a bar and restaurant; the sensuous image excited night revelers particularly men 
after consuming alcohol. 
Conversely, the artwork drew little admiration from restaurant users because 
of its ‘pornographic’ content, especially so that they always came during daytime 
8  ‘Immediate state’ here refers to the condition in which an object manifests before transforming it 
into a new or alternative entity such as altering its visual qualities (that include color, texture, shape, 
and form) for a desired effect outside its normal context of meaning or use.
and sometimes with young children.9 
This led to questions in my mind: why 
did Naggalabi fail to attract as much 
attention yet I personally valued it so 
highly from an artistic point of view? 
Was it informative enough to the pub-
lic or only served the artist’s role of 
self-fulfillment and self-realization? If 
so, was the information at epistemo-
logical level or merely ‘use’ object im-
posed on the public as an art form? In 
answering these questions, it was in-
evitable that I required a personal un-
derstanding of the indifference Nag-
galabi received from the public. Simi-
lar to Plotkin’s (2008) suggestion, like 
a child, I allowed myself to become a 
naturalist, something I found easy by 
letting myself become curious. This 
research considered the process of meaning-making as critically personal render-
ing the study of experience vital.
Phenomenology studies human experience and the way in which people per-
ceive things as they appear in consciousness (Langdridge, 2007); discovering the 
meaning of life experiences (Byrne, 2001); understanding of how others view the 
world (Trochim, 2006); enlargement and deepening of immediate experience 
(Speigleberg, 1994). The focus thus, is on “people’s perceptions of the world … 
their perceptions of the ‘things in their appearing” (Langdridge, p. 10). In collect-
ing data for this study, I focus on understanding my experience of meaning-mak-
ing in visual culture. The central thesis in this is that I do not probe other par-
ticipants’ experience of meaning-making; rather, their meaning-making becomes 
my experience of them making meaning in artistic images. There are two levels of 
me in the study: (1) the researcher who attempts to make sense of (2) me trying to 
make sense of meaning-making. This aimed at entering a life-world “to better un-
derstand and describe it, while still maintaining a critical (hermeneutic) distance 
to enable reflection on the experience” (Langdridge, p. 79).10 I adopted the Inter-
pretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) as a method for data analysis sharing 
9  Although it was not part of this study, it seemed to me that there was a correlation between 
alcohol consumption (that increased during in the night) and admiration of the nude images. Secondly, 
I painted the pictures using ultra violet paint, which of course glowed under ultra violet light. This made 
the pictures more conspicuous at night than in the day. In my opinion, it was only sensuous and not por-
nographic. Due to public outcry, management removed it and never replaced it anyway. Nevertheless, 
the sense of decency and privacy in Ganda culture abhors exposure of the female body to the extent of 
this artwork, and in this context, it is pornographic.
10  “The idea of ‘life world’ is that we exist in a day-to-day world that is filled with complex meanings 
which form the backdrop of our everyday actions and interactions,” explains Finlay (2008).
Figure 1. Picture of a woman splashing water on 
her body. Photo: Kabiito Richard, 2005.
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the view that “human beings are sense-making creatures, and therefore the ac-
count which participants provide will reflect their attempt to make sense of their 
experience” (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 3).11
 
Method 
The researcher created, by making art, situations that would contrive sense-making. 
“The primary aim is to examine ‘the thing itself ’ as it appears to show itself to us. 
So the phenomenon appears, but the phenomenologist can facilitate this, and then 
help to make sense of that appearing,” contends Smith et al (2009, pp. 24-25). This 
is where artistic research intersects with the phenomenology. By creating artistic 
probes, phenomena of meaning-making appear to me and others involved in the 
process of artistic consumption. As a producer, who also involves others in the 
artistic process, I make choices that are inherently sense-making in construct and 
such choices may be purposive or could as well just ‘appear’ as meaning-making 
units. This was much of the case in art making where the study took on a life of its 
own. Secondly, Heidegger (cited in, Smith et al) thinks, “Whenever something is 
interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon the 
… fore-conception” (pp. 24-25). This observation leads to the realization that when 
encountering a text, I do not necessarily know which part of my fore-structure is 
relevant. However, by engaging with a text, I may get in a position to know better 
what my preconceptions were.12
In this phenomenological study, I relied on Heidegger’s notion of ‘appearing.’ 
Smith et al (2009) consider Heidegger’s view of phenomenology as “concerned in 
part with examining something, which may be latent, or disguised, as it emerges 
into light” (p. 24). However, “it is also interested in examining the manifest thing 
as it appears at the surface because this is integrally connected with the deeper 
latent form–which is both a part of, and apart from”13 (Smith et al, p. 24). In my 
artistic and conversational probes, I pay particular attention to what appears to me 
as a sense-making unit during the reading of visual images. Two underlying con-
11  “IPA aims to allow the researcher to develop an analytic interpretation of participant’s accounts 
which should be prompted by, and clearly grounded in, but may also go beyond, the participant’s own 
sense-making and conceptualization,” observers Smith et al (2009, p. 183).
12  “The fore-structures” according to Smith et al (2009), “seem to be always there, and it is in danger 
of presenting an obstacle to interpretation. In Interpretation, priority should be given to the new object, 
rather than to one’s preconceptions. …here the suggestion seems to be that one makes sense of these 
fore-structures in terms of the things themselves” (p. 25).
13  Smith et al insist that appearance has a dual quality for Heidegger–things have certain visible 
meanings for us (which may or may not be deceptive), but can also have concealed or hidden mean-
ings (those that are apart from it). For example, at one level, the song in ‘Kaleeba’ (see chapter 4) is not 
about meaning at all, yet one could consider it a meaning-making unit; it is the departure point into our 
making sense of the image. Therefore, the apparent content suggests the phenomenological impor-
tance of the song; then again, its latent force appears or emerges during the process of analysis. Several 
other appearances come to the fore during the dream about the earring, the Louie’s story of ‘Baby koko’ 
(see scenario2), Freddie’s ‘Lukomera’ (see chapter 7), and even Ssekamwa’s analysis of tropes (see 
chapter 3). Further, the song in ‘Kaleeba’ acts as a ‘part’ to the ‘whole’ of the case study. The song in the 
story is powerful by itself, yet its meaning becomes stronger when one recognizes it as contributing to 
the whole–the understanding of recurrence as contributing to meaning-making. 
cepts premised as accessibility and specificity is the basis for integrating indigenous 
knowledge as material for enhancing meaning-making.14 Nevertheless, I have not 
tested these two concepts as such, and these grounds, they qualify for providing 
phenomenological data. In the study too, I used material gathered to dialogue 
with a strong theoretical framework to guide and support my findings. This pro-
vided a theoretical background for my phenomenological data. I adapted the texts 
to Dale’s (1996) theory of meaning as representations of condition C* discussed in 
chapter two. This is because tradition, in relation to Drout’s (2006a) ‘traditional 
referent’ emerged as a super-ordinate theme in meaning-making. Specifically, re-
currence was a basic component of tradition, which strongly features in and un-
derlies the proposition that things meaning what they do whenever condition C* 
presents itself, whereby, ‘whenever’ as a state, represents a repetitive pattern.
In trying to conform to Dale’s proposal of meaning, the study adopted an ex-
ploration into condition C*, which it names as providing a recurrent condition 
that forms ground for an expression to mean what it does on each iterated appear-
ance. To conduct this exploration, the study chose narrative supported by remix 
aesthetics as means of providing grounds for a recurrent condition leading to a 
meaningful expression. In particular, the study would focus on idioms metaphori-
cally expressed to provide tools of ascertaining the factors leading to the recur-
rence. Kant’s metaphor theory as explained by Gibbons (2008) provided a theo-
retical framework, while the Relevance Theory advanced by Pietarinen (2005) sug-
gested ways of creating favorable contexts for a recurrence of the condition under 
investigation. In the field, the researcher considered the historical background 
of storytelling and art production and consumption in Buganda, whereas, at the 
same time considering the situation of contemporary art in Uganda today. 
The concept of meaning promoted in this study thrives on social interaction 
between an individual and other individuals. In order to contextualize meaning 
with its proper significance to the individual or self, I placed myself in a social 
world where my lived experience is, in part, with other beings–what Heidegger has 
referred to as being-in-the-world-with. “For Heidegger, we are inescapably social 
beings, always in relation with the other, always being-with,” posits Langdridge 
(2007, p. 32). Dale’s (1996) theory of meaning contains a central premise grounded 
in the social where the study realizes its significance. The notion of ‘traditional 
referent’ as an emergent super-ordinate theme highlights close ties with tradition 
and meaning, both grounded in the social world, but also only understandable 
14  I premised this in turn, on the possibility that one could be conversant, knowledgeable, and close 
to locally available, thus accessible things. Such possibility–although not guaranteed–would seem to 
create a situation of familiarity with specific objects of interest to given locales. Although I anticipated 
that familiarity with expressional objects would increase readability in visual culture, I had no expecta-
tions of how such objects would influence meaning-making. I was ready to learn from the process of art 
making, the things that I always took for granted, namely tradition, that emerged as vital in the process 
of meaning-making. In line with this, I drew inspiration from my earlier study that only emphasized the 
expressive qualities endowed with Ganda material culture. My thinking lay in the prospect that I would 
further develop the idea of working with locally available and familiar objects and material to enhance 
visual reading. On the other hand, I had identified storytelling as a valuable tool in communication and 
as such, its qualities would serve well in a project of understanding the experience of meaning-making. 
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through experiencing them with social beings. Heidegger’s concept of phenom-
enology, Dale’s idea of meaning, Drout’s (2006a) theory of tradition, and Gibbons’ 
(2008) interpretation of Kant’s theory of metaphor fall within a social context that 
comprises this study. 
During the process of data collection, specifically art making, conversations, and 
watching TV narrative, I was always inside and outside of my experience of making 
sense of myself and others’ sensibility of meaning-making during the consumption 
of visual culture. On other occasions though, I am both in and out at the same time.15 
Jumping out of the experience occasionally allowed me to reflect on such an experi-
ence and also to record and analyze its properties. In assessing the experience, I gain 
out of others who try to make sense of visual artistic productions–in other words 
who consume visual culture–I form a general notion of the factors that influence 
my own experience and that of others during meaning-making. During my assess-
ment, I pay particular attention to detail of both formal interviews and impromptu 
statements made in conversations or comments made about my artistic productions 
during and after their completion. This sensitivity to detail forms a hermeneutic 
circle which stipulates, according to Smith et al (2009), having a general overview of 
the outcome, but also paying attention to detail at individual level.16 
I had a general theme in mind, during art making, by being attentive to the 
presence of a story [structure] and meaning-making. This also extended to other 
forms of data collection. Many of the art works in the study though, got titles af-
ter the production process ended. This was in attempt to escape from the world 
and ‘engross’ myself within the experience itself, which Pietersen (2002) calls ‘ob-
tuse immersion.’ Nevertheless, my knowledge of the world maintained allegiance 
to the major themes in line with Heidegger’s views on bracketing.17 Orleans (2008) 
considers bracketing as a technique relying on theoretical discourse and digging 
into foundations of knowledge people always take for granted.  Smith et al (2009) 
think that Heidegger’s complex and dynamic notion of fore-understanding “helps us 
to see a more enlivened form of bracketing as both a cyclical process and as some-
thing which can only be partially achieved” (p. 25). Maintaining my knowledge of 
the world would allow me in a way to experience my sense of meaning-making. 
‘Reflection’ was much evident in the process of naming, artistic production and 
analysis of the exhibits. Most of the time, issues of contemplation, choice, judg-
ment, and decision-making formed part of my reflective experiences. I looked out 
for clues. I created links between pictorial elements and events outside the picture 
as part of my own knowledge from history or lived experience.
15  Sometimes I undergo an experience with no notion of being a researcher and I only reflect upon it 
after I regain my conscience and position as researcher. On other occasions, like formal interviews, I am 
aware as I undergo the experience that I am a researcher too.
16  “Idiography does not eschew generalizations, but rather prescribes a different way of establishing 
those generalizations” (Harré, 1979, cited in, Smith et al, p. 29).
17  Langdridge (2007) refers to bracketing as epoché. “The epoché,” he writes, “is a Greek word used 
by Husserl (1931, 1967) to mean the process by which we attempt to abstain from our presuppositions, 
those preconceived ideas we might have about things we are investigating” ( p. 17).
Worthy of notice too is the idiographic consistency and adherence to phenom-
enological methods. Although I work with theories of metaphor, narrative, mean-
ing, and tradition as substantive literature, these are derivatives of my personal 
engagement with the experience of meaning-making. Langdridge (2009) cautions: 
“It is important to stay close to the data and meaning that emerges there, rath-
er than to constrain the meaning by engagement with any particular theoretical 
perspective” (p. 90). This is also evident in my always-phenomenal application of 
metaphoric expression during art production discovered later on while trying to 
make sense of my experience of meaning-making in artistic productions. It is due 
to personal insight, contemplation, judgment, and choice of articles as units of 
expression that form metaphors and idioms before and during the analytic phase. 
Further, my analysis of the artwork after its making is consistent with the induc-
tive technique of interpretative phenomenology: Rather than impose external 
sources onto it, the artwork provides me with material to explore and interpret the 
meaning of my experience. In so doing, my study remains grounded in a phenom-
enological paradigm due to its sensitivity to idiographic material grounded in the 
‘thing itself.’
Sample
As a key participant, I relied on self-assessment, diary notes, and reflection to make 
sense of my meaning-making as I produced and engaged in appreciating my own 
artistic productions and those made by others. This provided detailed idiographic 
data, for example, the scenarios that we encounter during data analysis, formed 
specific units of experience. Further, I relied on co-opted participants as secondary 
sources for additional information including three focus groups and assorted but 
purposively chosen samples.18 I interviewed twenty (20) individuals during the 
course of the study, one individual from each of the nine (9) groups, and specifically 
observed eleven (11) participants. The rest of the participants mentioned in the 
text were not subject to interviewing and thus contributed to the research data 
mainly through commenting and spontaneous reactions. Through my experience 
of others making sense of visual culture, I provide a window through which we 
access the world of meaning-making in visual culture. Co-opted participants in 
the study are part of my objects of experience since I am the one experiencing their 
meaning-making, and not focusing on their experience of meaning-making: what 
the participants say and do, become part of my experience of them engaged in the 
practice of meaning-making.
Having confirmed myself as a key participant due to fact that I am an artist and 
hail from Buddu in Buganda, my major task or goal was to identify a small group 
of artisans to work with in line with a purposive homogenous sample. These young 
men hailed from Kyamuliibwa, Masaka; I hail from Bbaale, Kalisizo. Nevertheless, 
we all hail from Buddu where we find these two locations, which provides homo-
18  Smith et al (2009) note, “Focus groups allow multiple voices to be heard at one sitting, drawing a 
larger sample into a smaller number of data collection events” (p. 71).
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geneity to the sample by sharing the same cultural background and as such, our 
general thinking became homogenous. Emma another co-opted participant hails 
from Kasese, in Western Uganda. In this case, there is no ethnic cultural homo-
geneity, but we share professions as trained artists. The third set of participants 
is not involved in making art with me; instead, it creates artworks external to my 
own art making, but in alignment with the goals of the research. The fourth set 
of participants is quite open with assorted individuals or groups. They included 
people who made comments about my work directed at meaning making, those 
I specifically interviewed for gaining specific data or those I encountered in open 
conversations. Although some participants discussed issues of ‘causality’ or ‘ve-
racity’ (wondering how this happened) that could have interrupted my sense-
making (which is where our focus should be), their input highlighted processes 
of meaning-making, namely, how enabling or deficient aspects of visual images 
could become in the due course.
My choice of participants from the same locality based on the desire to un-
derstand how people from the same locality share and use common knowledge, 
and how they would react to familiar concepts and objects derived from their own 
environments when used in different contexts and especially for artistic disposi-
tions. This would represent a typical grassroots Ganda community. Secondly, it 
was also not clear whether having common knowledge would lead to production 
of common meaning to classify the communication as specific. Lastly, it was im-
perative to acquaint myself with the mechanisms people of these artisan’s socio-
cultural and academic backgrounds associate with and create meaning during ar-
tistic experience, both in production and viewing. At completion, I displayed the 
two artworks for public viewing. Several views were gathered from gallery goers 
mainly on how artworks depicting stories would differ from those dealing with 
general themes; and, in addition, to understand how people or ‘others’ construct-
ed meaning from these artworks generally basing on objects, concepts, and action 
within the stories. I displayed written texts of the story besides the artworks so 
that people were able to read the story in sync as they view the artwork. The main 
aim this was to build an implied familiarity with the visual texts to establish the 
significance of familiarity in meaning making processes.  
Convergence and divergence was imminent in this study. I relied more on my ex-
perience of the narratives I elicited from groups and individuals to make interpre-
tations of that experience. Although I did not probe each individual at group level, 
I asked group leaders to tell me their group’s experience of working with stories. 
Secondly, consistent with IPA, I quoted specific responses to maintain the idio-
graphic importance of the group to the study. The key element in the interviews 
was to identify their sense of meaning-making rather than their mere engagement 
with narrative texts. I chose artwork that bore qualities that could contribute to 
the study from only four groups (out of the nine). The study did not focus on the 
detail of the co-opted participants’ experience to construct a full account of ‘an 
experience’ on any single case as stipulated by IPA, although I asked them about 
their experience in some cases. Nevertheless, phenomenological method consid-
ers any data deemed vital for the study at hand. Speigelberg (1994) writes: “What 
is important in phenomenology is that we consider all the data, real or unreal 
or doubtful, as having equal rights, and investigate them without fear of favor” 
(p. 709).
In the case of interviews, many of the participants appeared once; on one oc-
casion though, I interviewed or interacted with the participants more than once, 
but mainly about different themes in the study.  I treated each case on its own 
merit to maintain the rich diversity of the data. Most of the time I obtained data in 
the process of art making, engaged in conversation, and being-with participants. 
Heidegger’s (cited in, Smith et al, 2009) concept of ‘appearing’ or ‘encountering’ 
as expressed by Ebree (1997) were most at work in such situations. I studied reac-
tions and commentary, attitude expressed by both body and word, and my per-
sonal sojourn in the world of artistic production. Through self-assessment, con-
templation, and interaction with people addicted to storytelling (in TV series and 
conventional film), I observed and experienced immersion into narrative. I also 
studied a child’s utterances and actions, which provided me with additional ex-
perience on narrative and meaning-making in its consumption of visual culture. 
I retained actual names of participants who discussed their own artwork that ap-
pears in the resultant dissertation. Where I did not inform participants that I was 
watching or recording what they had said, I altered the names for confidentiality. I 
also altered names of those participants that offered sensitive data.
Analysis 
The study was inductive. Although I had knowledge of Bruner’s (1986) idea of 
virtual texts in narrative comprehension, I had no expectation of how my approach 
to data would manifest meaning-making in visual culture. In this case, I was 
ready to accept any information that came my way. The study too, had recourse to 
theoretical constructs during data analysis as a way of fitting the data together and 
providing it with existing knowledge. In this instance again, IPA works creatively 
where first order case studies were wholly inductive in an IPA style. Moving to the 
second stage, the analysis required typical external theory, which came at a later 
stage, typical of IPA. Crucially though, the dialogue with theory still adheres to IPA 
standards since it promptly arose from attending closely to my own experience of 
myself and that of co-opted participants. In effect, theorizing is still ascends ‘from 
within’ rather than being imported ‘from without.’ The theoretical statements 
regarding meaning, metaphor, and tradition came to life via this process; art 
making too, thrived on induction.
I took particular interest in the principal task of turning notes into themes 
by producing concise and pithy statements of important aspects of comments 
attached to a piece of transcript. As I attempted to understand indigeneity and 
meaning, the ‘traditional referent’ and ‘enlargement of being’ emerged as a super-
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ordinate themes.19 This appeared to make sense of my experience and therefore I 
organized the analysis in terms of this concept.  The ‘dominant attraction’, ‘first 
impression’, and ‘unconscious imperative’, emerged as subthemes in the process 
of data analysis. Prompted by the central concern for a social construct of meaning, 
during this cross case analysis I consulted literature in this area that could provide 
useful theoretical underpinnings of socially grounded accounts of tradition and 
meaning. I also created a dynamic relationship between the comparisons of indi-
vidual case studies with the writings of the various authors named above, which 
provides an overall theoretical platform for second-order analysis, though the 
analysis itself and specific content built on material from the cases. Inbuilt within 
the data presentation, are scenarios as units of experience in the study. These pro-
vide episodes of my personal experience, as standing out in relation to secondary 
source data from co-opted participants and other sources such as literature.
Smith et al (2009, p. 109) note: “The most orderly sequence is to take each 
theme in turn and present evidence from each participant to support each theme 
in turn and present evidence from each participant to support each theme (case 
within theme).” That said, “[s]ometimes, however, it could be that one favors an 
idiographic presentation where the participant is prioritized and themes for each 
person are presented together (theme in case).” This study favored a ‘theme in 
case’ sequence due to ‘rich’ nature of data each case presented avoiding the risk 
of losing vital information. In many cases, a single case highlighted more than 
one theme although main data clusters came in their order of appearance. There 
is no regular sequence of analysis by considering individual data cases although 
patterns of themes develop during data collection.20 “The sequence of analysis is 
important as it points to how the subsequent second-order analysis was prompt-
ed by, rather than pre-emptying the researcher’s response to the material in the 
individual cases,” notes Smith et al (p. 166). Three phases of fieldwork classified 
as prologue, interlude, and epilogue formed the structure of presentation of find-
ings. A chapter discussing contemporary Ugandan art in general ‘appeared’ as it 
was inevitable to provide a context under which the data collected from the field 
was relevant to its source, as well as, exhibiting its unique functionality. Without 
strict adherence to the formation of the ‘appearance’ of information, much valu-
19  Emergent themes later served as descriptors for my presumption of accessibility (and thus familiar-
ity with) local material that would later become specific (and thus local) to such community. The most 
important point of reference in the study stems from several participants who wish to see things that 
would instigate their meaning-making process. ‘Traditional referent’ comes to my attention through 
Freddy and Joy who are searching for what they need to see in order to achieve meaning. Joy would like 
to see traditional local jewelry in ‘Njabala’; Freddy would like to see ‘akambe’ in ‘Kaleeba’ as a feminine 
implement and thus defining gender-based properties of meaning-making as a cultural concern (see 
chapter 7). Rosa and Kirui prompt my insight into the ‘enlargement of being’. Louie also contributes 
immensely towards this understanding especially during the tour of the exhibition where she seems to 
connect with several exhibits, and not with others. Drout (2006) refers to these landmarks as ‘traditional 
referents.’ Remix denotes the ‘traditional referent’ so strongly whereas narrative highlights the condi-
tion described by Giovanelli (2009) as ‘enlargement of being.’
20  “Phenomenological themes in this context are understood as the structures of experience, experi-
ential structures making up the experience,” writes Langdridge (2007, p. 123).
able data would lose value during analysis. Secondly, it was crucial to present data 
within its context of appearance to be able to trace its significance to the study.
To keep confined within IPA, or phenomenological method during the data 
analysis, I draw reference from a case cited by Smith et al (2009) that works with a 
cross case analysis involving “a form of micro theory development drawing on ideas 
from analytic induction whereby provisional hypotheses are modified in the light 
of checking each case”21 (p. 166). They further contend that developing theory “is 
itself idiographic as each case is used to refine it” (p. 166). This aims at producing, 
Smith et al continue that “theoretical statements which are true for all cases in the 
data set or every case with clearly articulated exceptions, rather than the actuarial 
claims of orthodox psychological methodology” (p. 166). Practically, Smith et al 
note that this would require continuously moving between “the individual cases 
and between levels of analysis, drawing on the complete studies, detailed sub-sec-
tions, and abstracted comparison matrices”22 (p. 166). Under the same pretext too, 
super-ordinate themes develop and promptly referenced in this text wherever ap-
plicable. This is evident in the variance of expression or statements whereas logic 
remains the same. Additionally, theoretical perspective applies to all participants 
that generate similar themes coinciding with theory, although their statements 
and perspectives varied substantially between participants. The study in this case 
now, shows “both convergence and divergence, patterning but also individual nu-
ance, as the write-up points to what participants share at the same time as illus-
trating their individuality” (Smith et al, p. 166).
While analyzing data, I presume myself completely outside the experience 
because this is when I reflect back on the material I had gathered both through 
art making, interacting with and observing other participants. In principal, these 
were never research questions at the beginning of the study and as such, my inter-
view schedules and conversational prompts did not contain questions or leads ad-
dressing tradition. Nevertheless, resonating with the hermeneutic phenomenolog-
ical insight, I was the experiential expert and the inductive methodology allowed 
me to include tradition as a core element of the study “and one which featured 
strongly in the individual case studies” (Smith et al, 2009, p. 166). The write-up 
lacked a chronological narrative organization due to its sensitivity to idiographic 
presentation. It is evident at this stage that such a process is time consuming but 
significantly unpredictable and as such, much self-censuring and scrutiny of texts 
is quite important. Because of the social nature of narrative, I envisaged a social 
construct of meaning, if narrative were to represent a meaning-making entity. In 
21  See sub-heading ‘Justification’ above for a glance at the provisional hypotheses.
22  Abstraction is a basic form of identifying patterns between emergent themes and developing a 
sense of what can be called a ‘super-ordinate’ theme that involves “putting like with like and developing 
a new name for the cluster” (Smith et al,2009,  p. 96). “A super-ordinate theme,” according to Smith et al 
(p. 166) “is a construct which usually applies to each participant within a corpus but which can manifest 
in different ways within the cases. For example, some of my terminology is consistent with ideas or 
technical reference by other researchers. Within participants too, similar themes occur especially when 
discussing issues of abstract/realism dichotomy – an emergent theme.
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line with a phenomenological approach, all my experiences are quite idiographic 
although at the same time, they keep focus on the overall construction of the total 
experience. A statement of the theories this study worked with for data analysis 
comes later on in the literature review.
In conclusion, phenomenology consequently, concerns “the study of experience 
from the perspective of the individual ‘bracketing’ taken-for-granted assumptions 
and usual ways of perceiving,” remarks Lester (1999). Based in a paradigm of per-
sonal knowledge and subjectivity, phenomenological approaches emphasize the 
importance of personal perspective and interpretation epistemologically.23 Once 
added to phenomenological research, interpretation enables the use of results as 
basis for practical theory, information, informative, and supports or challenges 
policy and action. To be non-directive during questionnaire administration and 
interviews will present an opportunity of people describing their experiences, or 
self-reports and aesthetic expressions (Waters, 2009). Abstracting and presenting 
themes fully considered as essential to the unique experience, will ably find their 
way into presentation in an understandable way and clear how such an experience 
would vary from other similar experiences.24 Similarly, “Phenomenologists do not 
view human experience as an unreliable source of data, rather they see it as the 
cornerstone of knowledge about human phenomenon” observes Morrissey and 
Higgs (2006, p. 162). 
Morrissey and Higgs (2006) further point at phenomenology as resting in the 
premise that everyday world can yield knowledge from which we can learn about 
ourselves and focus into the nature of an event and how it comes about in our ev-
eryday life.25 For example, by employing the phenomenological approach, Paton, 
Martin, McClunie-Trust, and Weir (2004, p. 177) were able to realize their goal of 
“supporting and facilitating student’s learning by a medium commensurate with 
the student’s perceptions of clinical practice and how the students made sense 
of particular situations.” In other words, they relied on descriptions of the par-
ticipants’ “lived experiences” always considered credible. When Groenwald (2004) 
wanted to conduct a research into aspects of cooperative education, that he always 
found misunderstood or poorly practiced, he required a suitable explorative strat-
egy that “would prevent or restrict” his own biases, and eventually had to settle 
with phenomenology (p. 2). In light of the lengthy discussion of phenomenology 
and its characteristics, it is clear that this method deals with subjective experi-
ence and that its data is as reliable as any other scientific or sociological research 
23  Although pure phenomenology would suggest a strategy that begins without any preconcep-
tions or ideas, humanist and feminist research do not agree. Instead, they advocate for clarity on how 
“interpretations and meanings have been placed on findings as well as making the researcher visible in 
the ‘frame’ of the research as an interested and subjective actor rather than a detached and important 
observer” maintains Lester.
24  It is apparent in phenomenology that we deal with what is unique in knowing. Secondly, being non-
directive presents one with the opportunity of phenomenological data.
25  Rather, other than learning about ourselves from a distance, we are able to experience our own 
ways of life and learn about them in a subjective way. Thus, phenomenology as a subjective strategy is 
best suited for learning about the influence of images on the intellect and ways we appreciate them.
method. Similarly, depending on the nature of the study, I set out to understand, 
phenomenological approach was the most suitable, supported by the artistic 
method.
Artist as both inside and outside
The second and supporting method to the phenomenological approach was of 
artistic tools. Artistic research draws attention to the likes of action research in 
the social sciences and the search for “fundamental understandings of specific 
phenomena” characteristic of humanities (Borgdorff, 2007, p. 12).26 Simply 
portrayed, action research designates ‘learning by doing’ where one identifies 
a problem, attempts to resolve it by assessing how successful his/her efforts 
were and would try again if not satisfied (O’Brien, 1998). All through the artistic 
process, I left all texts open-ended, which helped to disrupt pre-determined ways 
of seeing and doing. On the other hand, existing texts (namely stories and cultural 
implements), prompted ideas specifically for research. The phenomenological 
method continues to unfold in the artistic process: the artwork I produced took its 
own pattern of construction away from the sketch work with which I set out. Lilja 
(2004) acknowledges the experience of knowledge through dance “Working with 
movement until it can convey its own expression and honesty is a process which, 
of necessity, has to expose the ego and make use of it” (pp. 13–14). In other words, 
other than sticking to my own pre-conceived plan, I discovered new features from 
either the material or technique that gave the artwork a different life from what I 
had anticipated. I needed to make sure that my interpretations had grounds for 
phenomena. Routio (2007) specifically indicates that we carry out artistic research 
as a goal purposefully to assist the creation of art.27 In terms of the artistic inquiry, 
process became a major tool in this study. Studio experience, as seen by Sullivan 
(2005) can yield research knowledge that is socially and culturally relevant to 
society. In addition, Barrett (2005) considers studio production as research a 
predicate of an “alternative logic of practice often resulting in the generation of 
new ways of modeling meaning, knowledge and social relations …”28 (p. 2).
26  What artistic research seeks to incept is the development of talent, articulating knowledge and 
understandings embodied in artworks and creative processes; broadening and shifting our perspec-
tives and horizons; constituting and accessing uncharted territories; organized curiosity and reflexivity; 
connecting knowledge, morality, beauty and everyday life; disposing the spirit to ideas through artistic 
practices and products. “Hence, in addition to producing artifacts, in the form of artworks and artistic 
practices, artistic research also generates fundamental ideas and undertakings which, although non 
discursive as a rule, make the world into which it is or could be. Here lies the performative and critical 
power of research in the arts” Borgdorff insists (2007, p. 17).
27  Whether modernist or postmodernist, or unclassified, I gain my insights through making and only 
realize what I have achieved at the end. Indeed, during my artistic project, I assessed the final work at 
the end to discover what I was looking for during the process. To discard the process is to render the 
entire endeavor meaningless, at least on my part.
28  Thus, artistic research thrives on tacit knowledge in addition to explicit and exact knowledge 
induced by emotional, personal, and subjective concerns: “An innovative dimension of this subjective 
approach to research lies in its capacity to bring into view particularities that reflect new social and 
other realities either marginalized or not yet recognized in established social practices and discourses” 
(Barrett, 2005, pp. 3-4). Barrett is further concerned with hermeneutics that recognizes individual 
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Perhaps as a deeper insight, although I am inside the process as an artist, I am 
outside as an observer eager to shred open the essences therein contained. With-
out much concern with relevance, art must exhibit its own research interest that 
is “specific to and developed by the work” (Schwab, 2008, p. 12). The artwork takes 
over the role of informing us about aspects of the world. My role only becomes 
supportive as an agent that is active and enables change to take place. I presume 
this is artistic research: we immerse ourselves into the action or we are aloof de-
pending on what the artwork itself has to offer.29 In artistic research, Lilja (2005) 
contends, exist opening up of secret rooms bearing new insights; unexpected 
meetings could suddenly avail what we particularly lacked to continue with an 
idea or something we yet have to articulate.30 The artist is a subject of investiga-
tion as well as investigator in the process of the art production. Immersion draws 
a seamless interface of the artwork itself so that the artist becomes an accessible 
object to artwork by which the artwork defines its own destiny. 
My position as a material, on the other hand, rests on accessibility as a qual-
ity I possess by acculturation and localized destiny; the artwork makes visible 
or tangible my own acculturation to suit its own environment of creation, audi-
ence, installation, and dissemination. During immersion, the artwork probes me; 
it squeezes me, rips me open to the bones in search of what it desires to be by 
controlling me. As an active agent, who offers it material and solicits for more 
material–other than me–that suits its demands, I dig deep into my conscience and 
sense of judgment to provide what the artwork requires of me as acculturated and 
learned experiential knowledge sensed as requirement of which I am in control. In 
the process, I construct my own mind as the artwork too, constructs its own be-
ing. The contemplation, the thought, the creative process results from immersion 
understanding, subjective interpretation and a plurality of views as compared to positivistic or empirical 
methods that emphasize universal laws (ibid, pp. 3-4). Through intuitive response, objective rationality 
becomes secondary and “is ultimately relinquished to the material and temporal demands of making 
the work and to finding the means of expressing previously inexpressible psychological states” (ibid, 
p.10). Perhaps I express this subjective and secondary rationality in my own experience of the immersion 
against ordered searching for truths and equivalents.
29  When I produced Kaleeba, I did not realize that my depiction of the action was passive and that it 
only described a tradition preceding the action. When Freddy (one of the group members in Wakaliga) 
sees the artwork as Kaleeba, I begin to look for things that make it Kaleeba by description and associa-
tion. I do not come with this information; I find it in the artwork. I do not realize the condition of reem-
phasis in the actual and implied water pot yet a shape or a pot already existed. The process becomes 
informative and my view of how art should be produced for less ‘Westernized’ communities changes. In 
phenomenology, this is an act of bracketing, whereby I shut out my knowledge about the process and 
leave it to experience as a route into discovery.  It was a pure phenomenon. After all, I learn about my 
own insight from the outside, and in so doing, I am able to assess my own subjective self.
30  At one time, a participant insisted that painting during art making, for example, of any sorts was 
not admissible and that was his opinion. A researcher looking for alternative ways, of reinforcing mean-
ing in the plastic arts with my community, this is a wind of opportunity because my mind becomes free 
and open. The thicket of tradition in the old school was unveiled and a completely new world opened 
up to me: I just would have never imagined cloth and metal as being compatible and later on wonder-
fully elegant and imposing. Cloth and wood come together to create a blend of veins and patterns of 
machinated curves and lines so gracefully embedded in each other. Copper, brass, beads, and animal 
skin coexist as artistic transformations of mundane surfaces graced with a life, yet to be a phenomenon. 
Lilja calls this incorporation of the self in its own mind and creating its own truths.
into the life of another thing, and since I promised myself to provide resources 
for its being, I fulfill my commitment. Thus, I become an accessible object as a 
material and active agent that is familiar, localized, and specific to the artworks’ 
environment: the local within its own environment–serendipity to say. 
Additionally, involvement as material, I also solicit for more material outside 
me, connected to me, by sharing same qualities of a collective living: same space 
and place (accessibility and specificity respectively). The gourds, mats, stories, 
beads, reptiles, and cowry shells are part of me as we share the same environment 
and supplement each other in some parts, and we all form material that shape the 
life of the artwork. My study required the use of such articles in my work. In turn, 
the solicited materials also become part of us. Wilson (1996) examines the perplex-
ity of art in response to intensified importance of scientific and technological re-
search in shaping contemporary culture. One reaction pits artists as consumers 
of the new tools that s/he uses to create new images; sound, and video; another 
requires the artist to emphasize art’s critical functions of distant commentary on 
the development; the critical approach for this study, commits artists to enter into 
the heart of research as core participants.31 
When we immerse ourselves into the life of the artwork, we seize to adhere to 
our own demands and instead yield to those of the artwork; and in process, we 
become objects of investigation. Immersion is some kind of hypnotic adherence 
to a stimulus, which engenders a condition of continuity between the texts–ob-
ject and subject. Continuity rather than unity gives credence to things as a way 
of knowing (London, 2006). In becoming the objects of investigation, we give all 
there is to satisfy the demands of the investigation and at the end we are surprised 
at how much we had inside us that we had never been able to reveal within our 
own lived experiences. Knowledge produced by artistic research is as credible as 
any other form of knowledge domain as people today understand artistic research 
process to evolve from and change with the practice individual researchers un-
dertake (Art Warez, 2008). Artistic research is thus a powerful tool in creating 
knowledge and furthering the academic discipline in light of the artist’s role in 
influencing change. Scholars emphasize the imposing role established by artistic 
research against other disciplines by noting that issues of how close art and sci-
ence are to each other should receive attention at the methodological level (Nit-
gen, 2004; Routio, 2004). Thus, research in art and design yields experimental and 
exploratory ways of working and significantly contributes “to the development of 
methods and the enhancement of individual and institutional knowledge” writes 
Karlsson (2007, p. 166).
31  Much as the sciences boast objectivity in their approaches, they too deal with subjectivity most of 
the time. To this effect, Wilson (1996) thinks that scientists and technologists strive toward objectivity 
well as artists cultivate their idiosyncratic subjectivity as a major feature of what they do. Traditional 
research will most likely look different from that created by artists by provoking and moving audiences 
through its communicative power and unique perspectives. Tomah (personal communication, April 26, 
2008) tells me a story about an embellished club in his culture that I had myself never set out to know 
not even thought of ever knowing.
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Art production 
In this study, there are six distinctly observed stages of art production that include 
the Mugalaasi Project, Bugoloobi Project, African House Project, MTSIFA Year 
II Project, and the Makerere Episode and Wakaliga Episode, which followed each 
other chronologically. These projects and episodes further fall in three groups 
designated on periods: prologue, interlude, and epilogue. The first three projects 
primarily established pilot studies that led to the main art project executed under 
the Makerere and Wakaliga episodes. The African House Project constituted a 
triangulated workshop that included students from University of Art and Design 
Helsinki (taik) in Finland, Pennsylvania State University in the United States, and 
Margaret Trowell School of Industrial and Fine Arts (mtisfa) in Uganda. The topic 
of the workshop was code named ‘House’ and each participating group was free 
to adopt any style of work; on our part, I prompted students to work with stories 
derived from their own life histories. The art productions depended entirely on 
their choice of medium. This intended to familiarize the researcher with how 
narrative could directly influence visual representation and whether the organizing 
element I had discovered in the Mugalaasi Project was not a one-on case that was 
not recurrent in other visual narrative texts. I selected two artworks for this study 
because of their profound revelation of organizational qualities present in stories. 
Bugoloobi Project required a typical locally grounded tradition and as expect-
ed, I chose to work with stories because of their endowment with cultural artifice. 
The artworks produced during this project based on two local stories, which had 
family ties: Nkoliimbo and Kato Kimera I (see figures 27 & 28 respectively). This proj-
ect closely followed the African House Project in chronology but unlike African 
House, I exhibited both Nkoliimbo and Kato Kimera I at the Makerere Art Gallery 
for the wider public to view and provide their opinions about the artwork through 
unstructured interviews. This was to establish roughly how often a work of art 
communicated in the same way as the artist intended. Alongside the exhibits, I 
provided a written story that acted as a virtual familiarity to enhance the readers’ 
abilities to interpret the story. It would assist in identifying whether a discrep-
ancy or improvement would accrue to determine the intensity of narrative biases 
in visual readings: whether there is a marked difference between reading narrative 
texts and non-narrative thematic texts.
The Year II Project extended for fourteen weeks, during which, I prompted 74 
students from the painting class to work with locally available stories from their 
individual backgrounds or simply existing traditional and cultural narratives. This 
targeted the tendency to work with learned experiences and how it could affect the 
artist’s course of action. Further still, I aimed at understanding the transforma-
tive process of Bruner’s ‘virtual text’ and how this in turn, transforms the artist’s 
sensibility in artistic production. On the other hand, coauthoring that took place 
within the groups would provide a clue on whether collective meaning would be 
achieved in a culturally diverse group. I mainly utilized the method of prompts 
during this phase in order to gain a clue on whether a narrative approach would 
be viable for a wider study. Prompts would further enable me acquire desired in-
formation unobtrusively as my target was to minimize extensive influence or in-
terference with the data obtained. I visually analyzed the artwork produced during 
this project through observation and an analysis of questionnaires administered to 
the students; in addition, I studied responses in course assessment forms for any 
vital information. This was in a bid to identify narrative traits in the visual art-
works in an attempt to gain insight of the nature of visual narrative: how a reader 
interpreted it. 
Phenomenology evident at all stages of the research is most conspicuous at the 
art production stage and individual studies of TV viewers, film lovers, a child’s ac-
tivities, conversations, and interviews. The Makerere and Wakaliga episodes com-
prised the greater part of the artistic stage of the research where my greatest inter-
est lay in self-studies that would reveal how stories influenced my course of ac-
tion. However, much phenomenological data came-my-way or ‘appeared’. I would 
further obtain crucial information from viewers and actors with less interference: 
I did not ask questions on how they interpreted such images but rather waited for 
incidental comments during readings by viewers, which I recorded periodically 
and later analyzed.  Visual citation and coauthoring were key methods I employed 
during artistic production where I worked with other people’s ideas to gauge the 
instinctual and intrinsic coordinative qualities in stories that enable perpetuation 
of indigenous systems. This process was responsible for multiple experiences in 
both making art and understanding it. Specifically, I worked with Emmanuel’s 
ideas in two artworks discussed later in this text. Because of my participation in 
art production, I was able to track the organizing power of narrative in images and 
its inducement of meaning making. At the end of the Wakaliga episode, I inter-
viewed one of the actors in the research about his overall experience. 
In addition to art production, the study also considered local Ugandan art in 
general; by virtue of the fact that Margaret Trowell School of Industrial and Fine 
Arts (mtsifa) produced most art in Buganda, I studied several exhibitions to es-
tablish its nature and relevance it has to society. This was to sustain the argument 
that most of the contemporary art produced in Buganda today is detached from its 
community. There were interactions with various artists of different age groups 
to gain insights into their reactions to remix in particular and their general views 
about meaning in art in the context of Buganda and Uganda generally. In the Year 
II Project, I conducted non-scripted informal interviews, open-ended question-
naires, and course assessments that I structured towards the understanding of 
narrative functionality. The study administered 64 open-ended questionnaires to 
year II students to gain information on general views about art in Uganda today. I 
analyzed the data quantitatively in order to draw general patterns of occurrence.32 
32  The questionnaire administered to the Year II students–of which I present the results in a quantita-
tive format–does not contradict phenomenological methods. Rather than quantify an experience, the 
study–in particular of gallery goers–sought to identify patterns in artistic engagement that revealed 
difference and generality (divergence or convergence). In fact, instead of contradicting IPA standards, 
this inclusion of a quantitative analysis confirms IPA’s commitment to detail and or parity when dealing 
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I also studied 36 questionnaires responded to by gallery goers during the ‘Wom-
en’s Day Art Exhibition 2007’ as part of the Makerere Art Gallery’s programs of 
ensuring better services to both artists and viewers of its art shows. I particularly 
looked for specific comments pertaining to views about the exhibits in relation 
to the audiences. Conversations, interviews, and TV programs reviewed to gain 
an inner insight into artists’ views and the public about the state of the artwork 
produced in Uganda today. 
Art does not remain in one place; it spreads out further to reach other people 
within our multidimensional universe. In the process, usable knowledge and the-
ories by other artists gets into being, based on work produced by deeper analysis. 
Craig (2003) has pinpointed artistic research as an alternative to community based 
research that she thinks infringes on people’s enthusiasm: “If community-based 
states ‘benefiting the community’ as one of its main objects, art can surely fill this 
role, both in terms of economic payback and in building on social capital net-
works” (p. 3). Chenial (2008) thinks, “in order for arts-based approaches to achieve 
greater acceptance or at least appreciation, there needs to be a commitment to 
transparency like has been encouraged in the quantitative and qualitative research 
worlds”33 (p. 9). In artistic research rather than identifying or quantifying data, 
“artists rely upon their individual perceptions of the natural and social world; e.g. 
focusing on the appearance of objects or their interpretations of feelings, beliefs, 
attitudes, and values associated with objects or events” writes Silverman (2001, 
para. 4). ‘Democracy of experiences’ allows a “non-hierarchical research environ-
ment whereby ‘art is free to criticize science, philosophy to criticize religion, re-
ligion to criticize science and so on,” concludes Ranciere (2008, p. 4). In conclu-
sion, artistic research has come a long way in establishing itself as a force whose 
structures and pillars require strengthening and reaffirmation while the synthe-
sis of time and space becomes a strong point in artistic research. Sullivan (2005) 
strongly believes that the artist is the key figure in the creation of new knowledge 
that has the potential to change the way we see and think.
Investigating the narrative
I analyzed narrative as a figurative entity in view of its communicative qualities. 
Discussion of the mechanisms by which narrative texts help in instituting 
communication in general were part of the study. After realizing that my core craving 
in the study was ‘meaning’, I picked interest in Louie’s daily activities.34 In so doing, 
she became one of the key co-opted participants in the study on two fronts: narrative 
and cognition. In studying her daily activities, her initiation into speech and language 
with data sets.
33  Transparency in this context is the sharing of artist’s choice-making process that institutes the 
work. This helps in appreciating the “compelling authenticity claimed by arts-based researchers and val-
ue evocative political, consciousness-raising, emancipator re-representations” found in stories, images, 
sounds, and scenes. This in turn would facilitate a contextual basis for process and product that would 
develop a language for trans-disciplinary research and evaluative practices.
34  Louie was one year and eight months when I picked interest in her behavioral characteristics.
coupled with her cognitive revelations, I was able to obtain raw data that led to vital 
findings and explanations to cognitive and narrative processes. Specifically, the child 
was vital to my understanding of narrative formulation and linguistic applications. 
I studied her responses to, and methods of interpreting narrative situations derived 
from cartoon viewership (see figures, 45a & 45b) and day-to-day speech. 
From another front too, I got involved in a Television (TV) series titled ‘When 
you are mine’ that I followed from January 2007 until May 2008 to specifically 
study narrative functionalities. I worked with the action research method for the 
self-studies and observation of partners in the viewing process. More still, I re-
lied heavily on diary notes to record events that such as comments by fellow view-
ers and self-analysis. Specifically, I set out to understand narrative dependencies 
and attractions during TV viewing. This was vital to the research in that it would 
make my argument for narrative adoption in visual constructions commendable. 
The quest for narrative insights extended to understanding attractions from other 
viewers related to very different texts such as cinema. I sporadically studied two 
movie addicts who explained to me their experiences. I was thus able to further 
understand how narrative, which I deemed vital in visual readings. This stage 
of the research assisted me in building several provisional hypotheses that guided 
my research and strengthened my core argument that narrative endowment with 
meaning-making qualities was vital for art production and reading within specific 
communities. Perhaps the most exciting but vital revelation was that narrative is 
addictive that naturally biases humans towards narrative situations: as a research-
er, I fell into entanglement with the soap such that apart from studying its func-
tionalities, I could not as a human, afford to miss any of the episodes.
Funny, is it not!
I undertook an extensive analysis of the Ganda folklore to establish its inherent 
qualities that has made it survive the times after the completion of the practical 
work. The discussion aims at shading light on the true nature of Ganda folklore, 
and narratives in general so that it may become a supporting factor for the choice 
of narratives as a basis of this study.  This was because I wanted to compare the 
findings of the practice and the theory to make solid conclusions by further quali-
fying the instinctual qualities of organization and biases. I studied twelve stories 
of different genre and construct to extract qualities commensurate to the practical 
research findings. The research opted for narrative because of its psychological 
and social relevance to society. However, in the study, I opted to exclude the affec-
tive part although implicitly highlighted it in the musical discussions as a denom-
inator of narrative texts. This further enhanced by reliance on material culture as 
a spatial construct to perpetuate continuity of the oral and the visual: both reem-
phasize the other’s position for a stronger result. Thus, on the conceptual basis, 
the study had two major insights: narrativity and remix aesthetics, which aimed 
at integrating indigenous knowledge with contemporary art practice in Buganda. 
This would offer alternative ways of meaning formation in visual readings so that 
art produced in particular communities bears relevance. 
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The case of metaphor and idioms
The information I gathered about narrative mainly focused on narrative 
apprehension and not its constitution. Thus, literature that stipulated what a 
story is in visual images was necessary to create a distinction between narrative 
and non-narrative texts. I sought literature in line with IPA principles prompted 
by attending to both Sekamwa’s (1995) writings and my own artistic creations. 
In addition to studying narrative theory, specifically Nanay’s (2008) thoughts on 
what constitutes a narrative, I too studied local literature and carried out an in-
depth analysis of particular narrative texts. I scoured folk Ganda tales personally 
known to me from childhood and those written/inscribed by various authors. I 
considered authors such as Ssekamwa, Masembe (2002) and Nsimbi (1996) as key 
authors of Ganda literature. Of key importance, Ssekamwa’s dialogue with stories, 
idioms, and proverbs was a key attraction in the course of the study. It emerged 
in his storytelling and that of Masembe, that idioms and metaphors–and from 
specifically Ssekamwa’s own assertions–aid comprehension in storytelling. 
In probing and analyzing my artistic productions, I sought to identify and take 
a closer look at the two items specifically to explore ways in which they could as-
sist in comprehending visual narratives. In studying my exhibits, several idioms 
and metaphors appeared to me that I had phenomenally used in narrating my sto-
ries and indeed, were catchment points in my overall reading of the images. Since 
these two items were emergent sub-themes during the process of analysis, I had 
no particular probes of other participants’ experience of them, although the items 
I used that triggered such analysis or labeling them as idiomatic or metaphoric 
were apparent during the data collection process. I thus relied on my personal ex-
perience with them as I tried to understand their metaphoricality or idiomatic-
ity during analysis of my exhibits. Indeed, as I analyzed my exhibits, I continued 
to gather data for the study. My alliance or dalliance with specifically Kant (cited 
in, Gibbons, 2008) and Lakoff (1992) emerged with my experience of working with 
the articles of metaphoricality and idiomaticity, which I found quite socially and 
linguistically grounded. They in turn became tools for probing my conscience on 
why and how they could be semantically enriching. My understanding of them 
became a phenomenon of experience as narrated later in the full text.
Delimitations: the study delimited itself to the study of Ganda art as a case in 
the Ugandan context. This bore in mind that Uganda is a diversely multicultural 
group comprising over 65 indigenous communities, each with a set of cultural 
ideologies (MGLSD, 2006). Specifically, art making took place in Wakaliga and 
Makerere, both located in Buganda, 5 km apart. Due to the method employed in 
the study, it was inevitable that a sample population, located and residing in Bu-
ganda, would participate in the study. Conceptually, the study concentrated on 
how narrative could influence meaning-making in visual culture. Remix aesthet-
ics would provide a concrete critique of historical and material constructs to both 
augment meaning-making and continue indigenous culture. In terms of meaning, 
the study explored an aspect contained within Dale’s (2006) theory of meaning, 
which sought to understand the process of meaning-making. The study did not 
engage in defining meaning nor did it engage in constituting or reconstituting 
theory. Coupled with literature on tradition, narrative, remix, and metaphor, the 
study did not attempt to define or rephrase any of the concepts advanced in the 
literature review. The literature dialogued with method and data for analysis and 
presenting findings.
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2 /  Indigenous knowledge,  
 tradition, and meaning
 
Preamble 
In this chapter, I discuss issues pertaining to Indigenous Knowledge, tradition, 
meaning and the ways in which these concepts link with narrative and remix as 
working strategies. In my review, I maintain the build up to the various views and 
arguments presented to keep abreast with the specific ideas advanced with the 
use of different systems of argumentation. This provides one with a broader view 
of particular arguments and minimizes information loss. Having noticed IK as 
form ing the backbone of the present study, I delve into the notion of tradition and 
meaning before finally linking it to narrative as a communicative system supported 
and facilitated by tradition. I also show that, apart from support by tradition, 
narrative forms tradition in turn. Cultures, of which orality and materiality are a 
part, evolve from tradition and thus our understanding of tradition will go a long 
way towards introducing us to various cultural systems. This too, sheds light on 
the conflicts regarding culture and cognition that formed part of Horshemke’s 
concerns. I demonstrate in the first two biological explanations that meaning 
depends largely on context and that meaning could thrive in and by the body. 
Secondly, with Dale’s (1996) account, I show that things generally mean for the 
same reasons as a basic concept or understanding meaning. Pietarinen, on his 
part, demonstrates one of the ways in which we can make things mean what they 
do by providing both a pragmatic and intention based account. All the ideas 
advanced, crucially, show one major concept common to all, namely, context. This 
means that context is central to meaning. Next, the Implicature account fuses 
into Relevance Theory (RT) by being intention-based, while on the other hand, RT 
takes us another step towards describing conditions why things mean what they 
do in certain situations. This study adopted the concept of meaning suggested by 
Dale as a framework for guiding data analysis by exploring the condition proposed 
therein. 
Indigenous Knowledge
Although several changes have taken place within the Ganda tradition to date, 
most of the significant entities still lay claim to the past and as such, I will discuss 
Indigenous Knowledge (IK) in this text as an ancient tradition. To gloss over the 
aspects of meaning and traditions we need first to place the discussion in the 
context of this study. The core concept behind all the several ideas expressed in this 
study is IK. This concept derisively but inevitably implies a system representing 
linear succession practiced by individuals or groups stuck in traditions that no 
longer bide time, but indubitably, IK is an emerging field in the West and the Third 
World in all fields of human activity. Smylie, Carmel, Kaplan-Myrth, Steele, and 
Tait (2003) attest to increasing ways of generating and translating knowledge at 
community level in social science, native studies, and law extendable to the arts and 
humanities. IK is systematic, covering both observable phenomena and abstract 
thought comprising the rural, urban, nomadic, original inhabitants and migrants 
(Battiste, 2005).35 More specifically, any kind of scientific, agricultural, technical 
and ecological knowledge, inclusive of cultigens, medicines, and the rational use 
of flora and fauna pertaining to a particular people or territory, transmitted from 
generation to generation constitutes IK (Daes, cited in, Battiste). The implication 
is that the methods of generating and applying IK “are participatory, communal, 
and experimental, and reflective of local geography” (Smylie et al, p. 141). It thus 
follows that IK is integrally part of the cultures and histories of local communities 
(Wolfensohn, cited in, Gorjestani, 2000). Gorjestani acknowledges that because IK is 
a locally owned and managed, resource, building on it can be particularly efficient 
and effective since it is often the only asset local communities control, and certainly 
one with which they are familiar. Consequently, communities are in control of their 
own knowledge because they are familiar with it. More importantly, apart from 
empowering local communities, IK offers mutual learning and adaptation. 
Horsthemke’s (2004) approach is a cautious one when handling the concept of 
IK.36 In the realm of ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’, often, one identifies three main types: 
knowledge-that (factual knowledge), knowledge-how (practical knowledge), or 
knowledge by acquaintance. There is no controversy, he claims, if we discuss IK in 
the context of the third category of knowing; he finds a problem though, with the 
second category of tackling IK, on which he suspects most projects dwell.37 Philo-
sophically and traditionally, arguments cite knowledge-that (sometimes known as 
propositional knowledge) to constitute three necessary and logically independent 
35  Other names for IK or closely related concepts include traditional, folk or local knowledge or wis-
dom, non-formal knowledge, culture among others. For more information about IK on this matter, see 
Battiste (2005).  
36  Accordingly, some writers prefer a contrasting position that pits IK against Knowledge from 
abroad, global, cosmopolitan, Western, formal or world (system) knowledge. Horsthemke (2004) com-
plaint and criticism of the concept ‘IK’ stems from the fact that the constitution of ‘knowledge’ takes 
little accreditation from explanation and consequently always misrepresented. “Without ramification of 
the concepts of ‘knowledge’ and ‘epistemology’ always used liberally, IK is unquestioningly employed as 
an umbrella concept to cover practices, skills, customs, worldviews, perceptions, as well as theoretical 
and factual understandings” (pp. 32-33).
37  For example, a traditional healer knows how to cure people, notes Horsthemke (2004), implying 
that she presumably knows that certain roots, berries or barks have the requisite disease curing proper-
ties. There is a problem if know that and know how knowledge systems treated as one or at least as 
mutually dependent.
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components: belief, justification, and truth.38 On many occasions, proponents of IK 
portray it as covering all kinds of beliefs, with little or no reference to truth or 
justification, insists Horsthemke, which elevates mere assumption, superstition, 
divination, and sooth-saying to the status of knowledge. “In the absence of any 
explicit mention of truth, then, the applicable idea would be that of ‘indigenous 
beliefs’. Horsthemke further notes, “Given the philosophical definition of knowl-
edge, belief–even justified belief–does not amount to knowledge” (p. 36). The over-
all implication of Horsthemke’s thesis is if anything should bear the identity of 
IK, that thing should–in the sense of factual or propositional knowledge–meet the 
requisite criteria of belief, justification, and truth. I argue that not all knowledge 
springs from or hinges on fact. Secondly, IK is not about epistemology per se; com-
munities resort to their knowledge systems for recreation, psychological maneu-
vers, and physiological entitlements.39 After all, philosophy by which Horsthemke 
prefers to define knowledge thrives on belief not fact, yet ironically, philosophy 
falls in the mainstream of contemporary knowledge.40 If he agrees, as he does, that 
belief is part of knowledge, he then should also realize that some knowledge sys-
tems or components remain at the level of belief, and thus function at that level as 
things we know and to which we adhere.
Eurocentrically, scholars attempt to reduce IK to taxonomic categories by 
claiming stagnation, empiricism, and spirituality but none of these approaches 
can adequately explain the holistic nature of IK or its basic significance to its 
people (Battiste, 2005). Yielding to the above generalities, we thus consider IK as 
‘traditional knowledge’ comprising relatively old data handed down from genera-
tion to generation essentially unchanged. “Indigenous Knowledge is an adaptable, 
dynamic system based on skills, abilities, and problem-solving techniques that 
change over time depending on environmental conditions, making the taxonom-
ic approach difficult to justify or verify,” insists Battiste (para. 34). Further still, 
treating local knowledge as simply empirical undermines its significance to indig-
enous peoples. Mostly so, in indigenous communities, people differ in what they 
know and do, and in this way, a purely spiritual system cannot uphold the defini-
tion of IK.  In effect:
38  “In order for a person to know something (p), she has to believe that p, she has to be justified in 
believing that p (i.e., she has to be in a position to know that p), and has to be true,” (ibid, pp. 32-33). 
Because his preferred definition faced and still faces challenges, Horsthemke prefers to include another 
condition: “a person’s justification for believing that p must be suitably connected to the truth of p” (pp. 
32-33).
39  Although Horsthemke (2005) acknowledges at the end that common ground arises in not only 
factual knowledge but also values, his emphasis on factuality as a general concept behind knowledge is 
misguided.
40  Horsthemke’s (2004) argument is extensive and he gives reasons for his arguments. Nevertheless, 
I should also acknowledge that my argument is not a misrepresentation of his idea. What I am arguing 
against is his assertion that without facts or truth, then IK should become mere ‘belief’. Indeed, he 
acknowledges IK as supplemental to conventional Western knowledge systems.
Indigenous Knowledge thus embodies a web of relationships within a specific ecologi-
cal context; contains linguistic categories, rules, and relationships unique to each 
knowledge system; has localized content and meaning; has established customs with 
respect to acquiring and sharing knowledge (not all indigenous peoples equally recog-
nize their responsibilities); and implies responsibilities for possessing various kinds of 
knowledge. (Battiste, para. 45)
Tradition
In my build up to an account of tradition, I will present various views on tradition 
with minimal commentary or critique and I will finally present my personal views 
in the discussion. Perseverance of traditional knowledge, according to Gorjestani 
(2000), ensues orally and demonstratively as opposed to documentation while, on 
the other hand, it emerges gradually rather than in distinct increments. Similarly, 
knowledge generation commences with ‘Stories’ as base units of knowledge, and 
then continues to ‘Knowledge’ as an integration of the values and processes described 
in the stories; ‘Wisdom’ as an experiential distillation of knowledge is the end result 
of the process (Symlie, et al). One feature of IK then is how one disseminates it. As 
suggested above, it comes up in form of stories and culminates into Wisdom. The 
process of dissemination then takes on the form of Oral Tradition, which means 
that tradition becomes a key feature, among others, in characterizing the indigene.41 
Let me begin with an attempted distinction between theory and tradition. Some 
individuals tend to do things the way we always do things, while others have a new 
idea of how we should do things. Reardon (1993) understands tradition as ‘inherited 
practice’ whereas theory is ‘an abstract body of thought’ directed towards future 
practice. Distinguishing tradition and theory this way, invokes a feeling of a rigid, 
repressive, outmoded system of thought and action, while portraying the theorist 
as reformative, dynamic, and focused well into the future. There is a general feeling 
portrayed by Reardon of theory succeeding at the expense of tradition in practice to 
which this study does not subscribe. This study, instead seeks to employ tradition 
as practical knowledge.
Popper (cited in, Dioguardi, 2005) takes a moderate route by being critical of 
both rationalists and determinists in his attempt to provide a social theory of tra-
dition. By dismissing conspiracy theories of society, Dioguardi portrays Popper as 
arguing that in social life, nothing is predictable, and thus things do not always 
come exactly the way we want them.42 Social science purposefully or solely studies 
41  “IK like any other form of knowledge, needs to be constantly used, challenged, and further adapted 
to the evolving local contexts,” concludes Gorjestani (2000, p. 7).
42  Although we always work with specific aims in mind, there are those unheralded consequences that we 
cannot unfortunately, eliminate. This view squares up with Burke’s: “In states there are often some obscure 
and almost latent causes, things which appear at first view of little moment, on which a very great part of its 
prosperity or adversity may most essentially depend.” In light of this claim, Burke proceeds to distrust any 
form of dismantling existent structures that have stood against time and replace them with those that have 
no proven record. Similarly, F. A. Hayek, according to Dioguradi (2005), encourages us to accept confidently 
all the old traditional value because science will always question even moral principles: “Complete abandon-
ment of all traditional values is, of course, impossible; it would make man incapable of acting” (para. 20).
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unintended consequences that arise only out of “our wish to know the unintended 
consequences and more especially the unwanted consequences which may arise if 
we do certain things” (paragraph, 21). In light of social theory, its task is to explain 
“how the unintended consequences of our intentions and actions arise and what 
kinds of consequences arise if people do this, that or the other in a certain social 
situation”43 (Popper, cited in, Dioguardi, para. 22). Popper raises a view reminis-
cent of rationalism and at the same time irrationalism; like rationalist, we should 
question things, but as traditionalists, we must respect and guard our traditions: 
“What we call a social life can exist only if we can know, and can have confidence, 
that there are things and events which must be otherwise” (cited in, Diogurdi, 
para. 22). As regularities, we need them and therefore we should hand them on as 
traditions, even if they are rational, necessary, good or beautiful: “There is need for 
tradition in social life” (Diogrardi, para. 44). The point Popper advances elevates 
tradition, whereby in its absence, rational action would be impossible, just as it 
is with language itself. Thus to know how other people will respond to us, there 
must be some form of rule, at least, to which we all subscribe. Popper, (cited in, 
Dioguardi 2005), makes an important distinction between institutions and tradi-
tions and shows that both entities need each other. More so, that, institutions sim-
ply cannot work without traditions. He visualizes a theory of tradition through 
social order in that for anything to be social, it must function under the auspices 
of tradition.44
A look now at the Romish Tradition as presented by Collette (1886) introducing 
two competing traditions: one rational, the other irrational. The idea here is that 
this kind of account will provide us with an insight into traditional mechanisms 
laid into their own context without particularly relying on argument to validate 
them. Paul in his instructions to Timothy asserts that God gives all the Scripture 
by inspiration, and is profitable for doctrine, proof, correction, and instruction 
in righteousness. In Rome’s view, the Church alone has the right to interpret the 
scriptures: “Indeed one article in her Creed prohibits the assigning any interpreta-
tion to any given text, contrary to the sense which that church has held and does 
hold,” writes Collette (p. 51). One may correct traditions, in other words, in the 
light of righteousness but the Church becomes authoritative in imposing a hier-
archy barring any interpretation of the doctrines apart from her. Building on the 
case of interpretation or private Judgment, the ‘Protestant rule of faith’ takes a ra-
tionalist approach by dismissing priests as bearers of the Bible. Instead, each one 
is entitled to individual judgment of the Bible’s teachings, in collaboration with 
43  Conspiracy theories generally assume that someone out there plans everything such that someone 
is aware of all that is going on. However, given that no one can know all the consequences of their ac-
tions, such control is simply not possible. 
44  Popper (cited in, Dioguardi, 2005) distinguishes a first order tradition–that of passing down expla-
nations of the world that consists of critical discussions in regards to the myths. In Popper’s belief, the 
second myth was entirely new, which gave rise to scientific tradition. Observation, henceforth, took on 
new meaning and used to test some myths against others. In arguing about which myth best explains 
observations, observation became a way of testing myths against each other.
external aid at one’s disposal and being sincere to one’s objectives of attaining the 
truth, one would find it. 45 
Catholicism, in turn, shuns the Protestant rule of faith because its interpretation 
is individual; yet, they would best interpret tradition collectively, that is, includ-
ing all the Fathers. Collette (1887) noted that, the Roman Church did not expect 
any possible interpretation of the Scripture by the Church or any priest, unless 
all Fathers unanimously accented to that scripture.46 Further still, that since Tradi-
tions transcended Scripture, then Tradition should interpret Scriptures; “and that 
Tradition being entrusted to the keeping of the priests of the Roman Church, they 
alone have a right to interpret Tradition” (Collette, p. 70).47 Reacting to Cardinal 
Wiseman’s assertion, the Reformed Church expressed concern over the fact that if 
tradition is proven on authority of Scripture, yet the Catholics believe that Scrip-
ture should be interpreted on the authority of Tradition, it becomes very much 
like the logician’s ‘Vicious Circle’ (p. 70).48 Mindful of this view then, Tradition is 
blinding, a renunciation of judgment, reason, and common sense, and by doing 
so, we adopt the degrading submission: “I believe whatever the Church believes,” 
concludes Collette (p. 73). This is how tradition worked in the Ganda society where 
the king was the bearer of tradition and as such, what he believed is what his sub-
jects believed. He alone and his chiefs could change tradition. 
There is need too, to know what tradition really is in accordance to the struc-
tural mechanisms defining its constitution and reconstitution. An application, 
qua application, is the ‘end use’ of a traditional text similar to application of the 
law to a case (Szabo, 1996). In addition, application also constitutes a new inter-
pretation–“a new construction of the tradition.”49 Deconstruction tries to explain 
how new traditions come about or how they evolve by accumulating construc-
45  Furthering the argument, Protestants insist that there is no possibility of preventing a sensible 
man from exercising the reason and judgment implanted in him and as such citation of texts to prove 
the authority of Tradition, inherently appeal to private judgment. Thus, Collette (1887) writes, “depriv-
ing one of judgment is depriving him/her or reason; and, depriving one of reason is denying one sensible 
religious belief” (pp. 66-67).
46  Indeed the Roman Church ‘misread’ the essence of tradition to refer to the unwritten in order to 
avoiding discordance. In Paul’s sense, Collette further depicts to traditions as truths: “Here Paul no 
doubt refers to the Thessalonians to the truths he had spoken, and subsequently written in a former 
epistle, commanding them too ‘hold the Traditions’, or ‘ordinances’, for this is the word used” (ibid, pp. 
45-46). Here again, Tradition is referred to as ordinance, moral teaching, discipline, and conduct. 
47  This was because it was only Tradition that could give with “authority and certainty the right 
meaning of Holy Scripture,” without which, the Holy Scripture could speak in many discordant ways and 
thereby destroying its authority altogether (p. 70).
48  Cardinal Archbishop Wiseman in his third Lecture on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the 
Catholic Church (London, 1851) explained the twofold Character of the Roman rule of faith.
49  This claim is analogous with a judge using an existing law to resolve a novel case thereby setting 
a precedent or a preacher using religious doctrine to counter a novel contemporary moral problem, and 
thereby change the very doctrine in the process of its application. Viewed in this sense, we arrive at the 
popular epithet of ‘deconstruction’ a derivative of hermeneutics. Popularized by Derrida, it destructively 
ebbed from its original application by Heidegger while studying Greek philosophy and noted that trans-
lators always added their own interpretations to the texts. Heidegger argues that such interpretations 
accumulate over time and soon, as constructions, fill a doctrine even when we reinterpret it and thereby 
becoming a new doctrine.
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tions including a methodology for chafing out constructions deemed to be no 
longer desirable.50 Specifically, Szabo’s view of tradition represents a Darwinian 
Social theory well explained by evolutionary biology and meme-based traditions. 
Noticing Darwinism, Natural Selection concerns survival of the fit, and not the fit-
test, or in other words, survival of those that are able to survive (Ewins, 1995).51 In 
his view, tradition is a form of knowledge about particular beliefs and practices 
put together spreads out to from the individual to the group. To explain this phe-
nomenon, Ewins cites Gerald M. Edelman’s work on the human immune system 
showing that it develops in a selective manner. Edelman’s simple argument bears 
that our information about the world and how to behave in it does not conform to 
the idea of a pre-programmed computer: “Rather, our billions of neurons … work 
in competition, testing out different behaviors and thoughts and those which suc-
ceed are favored thereafter over those which do not,” he explains (para. 20).52 
Interpreting Edelman’s findings, Ewins posits that in the same way do humans 
become the idiosyncratic individual humans they are and why they find difficulty 
in adjusting to sudden changes in environment or our personal circumstances. 
Human brains are chemically prepared for an individual’s previous surroundings 
and thus it takes time to adjust to new ones. Ewins’ major thesis is mainly that 
learning in itself is evolutionary; thus, an individuals’ knowledge evolves through 
a selective process by identifying ‘tried and true’ from our environment.53 To find 
out what works, one considers what works for others within our midst, and not 
only from our contemporaries, but also our predecessors on assumption that the 
environment has not changed. Because tradition is ‘knowledge vested’ in a group’s 
beliefs and practices that worked–and still supposedly work–for the group mem-
bers, it becomes useful in this sense.54 Logically so, we can only adopt a lot of 
knowledge simply on trust, rather than a great deal of trial and error. In this pro-
50  Gadamer (cited in, Szabo, 1996, para. 11), a student of Heidegger, discussed tradition as a broad 
normative concept denoting a “cumulative preservation that, through constantly improving itself, al-
lows something true to come into being.” Thus in terms of evolutionary hermeneutics, its propagation 
depends on its useful application and its useful application constitutes its use.
51  “It is not just the strongest of the smartest of any particular species that survive to pass on their 
genes but the strong and stupid; or the average; or even, in a lot of cases, the relatively funny and stu-
pid. A supposedly ‘weak’ individual might live long enough to reproduce just by luck, and a supposedly 
‘strong’ one may get struck by lightning and killed before it has a chance. And as the environment can 
change, what may be a reasonable fit at one point in time may no longer be a fit at a later time, so the 
question of what is ‘fittest’ in any absolute sense becomes moot” (Ewins, 1995, para. 5).
52  When a baby girl first tries to grasp an object, she randomly moves her arms and legs around in a 
wide variety of ways. By chance, one of these ways eventually brings her into contact with the object. 
When the baby achieves this goal, Edelman argues, it chemically reinforces the neural pathways leading 
to the action in her brain making it more likely that she will act the same way next time. Over time, pro-
vided that way continues to succeed, it becomes ‘her way’ of grasping an object. Her brain has selected 
for that behavior by testing a wide range of behaviors in a given environment. Moreover, the chemical 
process seen in this simple example occurs whenever she learns something new.
53  We learn by trial and error–that is, by testing for what works (fits) in our physical, social, and intel-
lectual environment. 
54  And ‘Work’, in this context, is potentially as wide in scope as ‘fit’ in the context of biological evolu-
tion; it makes about as much sense to worry about whether a practice ‘works best’ in order to be a tradi-
tion as it does to worry about whether an individual is the ‘fittest’ rather than simply ‘a fit’.
cess, a tradition will persist over time and it may not simply disappear overnight, 
and after all, with unanimous consent of all members of the group to which the 
tradition belongs: “Even though tradition is knowledge shared by the group, the 
active agent in the process of change in tradition are individuals.”55 Via the pro-
cess of selection by individuals, traditions evolve. This process also explains why 
it so obviously seems a contradiction: Ideally, it would be plausible for us to think 
that traditions are ‘tried and true’ after handing them down to generations so that 
we have reasons to favor them over an alternative practice. Analogously, adapting 
to environmental change, traditions must be flexible and open to change, which 
change is, inevitably contestable among opposing members of the group on what 
should change and justifiably why. Ewins’ evolutionary theory provides us with a 
biological account, clearly places the individual at the heart of tradition, and dem-
onstrates our human propensity to adjust due to natural selection.
Unlike Ewins’ evolutionary theory based on neuroscience, Drout (2006a) bases 
his understanding of tradition on evolutionary biology showing that the key unit 
to the development of a gene is a replicator or something that can ably copy itself.56 
Dawkins, according to Drout, suggested that there existed an exceptionally pow-
erful replicator on earth with indirect biological effects conceived as a meme. A 
meme manages to replicate itself and get copied from one person to another when 
someone imitates some behavior; it “is a logical construct that, while we don’t 
know what it is made of, nevertheless represents reality quite well for purposes in 
which it is being used” (Drout, p. 5).57 Thereupon, Drout defines tradition as “an 
unbroken train of incidental, non-instinctual behaviors that have been invariably 
repeated after the same recurring antecedent conditions” (Drout, p. 9).58 Meme-
55  Ewins explains: a few individuals, at first, might decide that a certain traditional practice no longer 
works for them, and that they will flout tradition and do what they think is better. If their new way 
catches on with enough people, that particular tradition begins to fade–perhaps accompanied by the 
protests of those who still prefer the old practice to the new–and eventually, it may die. Then in time, 
the new practice can take over the mantle of the tradition.
56  In the case of living things, this replicator is the gene. Similarly, Dawkins (cited in, Drout, 2006a) 
notes that all living things are simply vehicles for the genes to get themselves copied: “those genes 
that are differentially better at getting copied will make more copies of themselves than other genes, 
eventually gathering resources to themselves at the expense of genes that are less good at copying 
themselves. In many cases however, the most effective way to ‘selfishly’ copy oneself is to ‘generously’ 
cooperate with other genes: say for example the other genes in an animal’s genome. The process of 
competition, genetic inheritance, and differential reproductive success are, as Darwin saw, sufficient 
cause to produce complexity and design out of otherwise random stochastic processes.” (p. 3)
57  Contextually, within a culture, some memes will replicate much better than others will. Normally, 
those memes better at getting themselves copied will be the most effective at combining with other 
memes. A condition of ‘Universal Darwinism’ will occur in the presence or replicators, variation, and 
competition. This ensures that the process of natural selection differently favors those memes good 
at replicating and thus will outnumber the lesser ones because, all the existing memes depend upon 
the same pool of resources, and fecund, they certainly end up competing with each other naturally. 
Competition drives a process that increases the local ‘fitness’ of the entire meme-pool. Eventually an 
ecosystem, Drout notes, of competing and cooperating memes (a culture) ushers in memes exquisitely 
adapted to the culture; “that is, they are very good at getting themselves reproduced” (ibid, p. 7).
58  Characterized mathematically by Markov Chains, the successful practice of a traditional behavior 
and the continued maintenance of the tradition depend upon a series of successful enactments of the 
behavior in question. The first time one enacts a behavior cannot in and of itself be a tradition, but 
the second time can be, and the first enactment one then retrospectively defines as the origin of the 
52 53
based explanations of tradition are not immune to criticism though. Bowers (2009) 
is not comfortable with memes being used to explain cultural patterns because the 
root metaphor of evolution that could exacerbate ecological crises by referring to 
natural selection to support the market liberal ideology. Memetic tradition seems 
to accommodate other approaches that do not derive explanations strictly from 
evolutionary sources such as Popper’s social theory. 
Technically, a meme-plex constitutes a combination of several smaller memes 
that form a tradition in memetic terms, but whatever behavior it is, we see it as 
one meme.59 An antecedent meme triggers the traditional behavior meme, there-
by rendering the tradition a combination of two memes. Adding a third meme 
converts a simple response to a condition into a tradition. Drout (2006a) provides 
an example, meme a: every seven years, b: replace your regular crops with clo-
ver, c: because planting clover every seven years renews the soil. As a measure for 
clarity, Drout introduces, three Latin terms to represent the three memes: rec-
ognitio, which recognizes the antecedent condition; actio, the actual behavior of 
the meme; and, justifocatio, the explanation of the meme. Drout’s analysis of the 
meme-plex indicates that a culture could easily arise as ‘trial and error’ eventu-
ally becoming widespread. This is so because humans generally find recourse in 
apparently successful actions, imitate others’ success, and hand down valuable 
information to younger generations. On its part, justificatio adjusts and changes 
to fit the world for the words in the meme to fit the world that they describe a pro-
cess here referred to as the Word-to-World Fit condition creating the ‘Universal 
Tradition Meme’ (utm)–‘because we have always done so’.60 Owing to its refer-
ential nature, the utm logically supports any meme-plex with which it connects. 
Justificatio–“we have always done so”–could evolve to sublimation until we cannot 
question the traditional behavior so that we begin to see the tradition as part of 
the cultural identity of those participating in it (Drout, p. 22). This unconscious 
sublimation known as the ‘Unconscious Imperative’ is the ultimate telos (goal) of 
the utm.61 Putatively, favored traditions seem to spread and continue hereof. All 
tradition. Alternatively, put another way, any behavior can be the start of a tradition, but it can only be 
so identified retrospectively (pp. 9-10). Drout disagrees with Shils who argues that a tradition must be 
a result of a pattern of behavior repeated three times: it is not clear whether an additional repetition 
makes something a tradition that would not have been one.
59  A meme-plex is an abbreviation of Dawkins’ (cited in, Drout, 2006a) “Co-adapted meme complex” 
(Selfish Gene, pp. 212-13).
60  This becomes a key concept in understanding tradition and memetics, because (a) it implies 
existence of a world with which tradition interacts. That world includes the physical world as well as 
social and cultural worlds, and it must include the conception of the world, the Weltanschanung, held 
by individuals by whom the tradition meme is attempting to replicate. (b) Incidentally, if justificatio is 
adequately vague, it will on many occasions, fit the world than when it is precise. This means that the 
meme should not be abundantly vague or strictly precise: there must be a balance to ease the selection 
pressure on both ends. For a detailed discussion of the ‘Universal Tradition Meme’ and the ways in 
which it mutates and works, see Drout (2006a, pp. 18-22).
61  Nevertheless, we can reinstate the UTM, if the Unconscious Imperative fails, back to “we have al-
ways have done so.” This implies that while we many access traditions unconsciously, we may flip back 
to being self-conscious at any moment and using their justificatio as the UTM.
said; the study adopts Drout’s explanation with regard to the notion of tradition in 
this text to guide analysis of data by placing it in a context of meaning.
How does meaning then interact with tradition, a form that seems devoid of 
interpretation at the level of the group? Perhaps let me not quip into this puzzle 
before I introduce what meaning stands for in traditional cultures. I will refer 
to Drout (2006a) once again: “Even if the denotations of words remain the same, 
from generation to generation, the cultural connotations vary not only from gen-
eration to generation, but even from person to person in the same generation” (p. 
32). Ideally then, “even the most textually bound tradition has some room to adapt 
and change to fit its current environment.” Drout insists that apparently, textual 
meaning is not entirely arbitrary: “There are limits to interpretation, as there is el-
bow room even within the most rigid textual tradition imaginable”62 (p. 32). Here, 
he suggests some freedom of interpretation in order for the survival of tradition. 
We must also take into account the impossibility of a single iteration in a tradition 
being identical to another. Remember also in the Roman Tradition, it was accept-
able to correct and reinterpret tradition in the light of righteousness. Memetics 
though, reveals that excessive freedom of interpretation might lead to speciation: 
“the splitting of traditions into more than one.” Before the speciation still, there is 
room for limited interpretation of texts and thus, a few versions of meaning may 
be available. 
Meaning
Meaning does not reside in words; instead, every conversation suffers from 
information loss between source and destination owing to the nature of language 
itself.63 Secondly, language is an extension of the human mind and sense organs. 
Words are a special kind of signs; they are symbols and as such, most symbols carry 
no natural quality of the things they describe (Richards, cited in Griffin, 2002; 
Hutchby, 2006).64 Richards’ position is that since words are arbitrary symbols, they 
pick meaning from the context in which a person encounters them. Specifically 
so, context is the key to meaning as it is a whole field of experience linkable to an 
event including thoughts of similar events. This makes meaning personal and thus 
found in people rather than words.65 Griffin elaborates Richards’ kingpin claim: 
“The greater the discrepancy in the life experience of two people, the greater the 
probability that words meant to describe feelings and attitudes will create semantic 
chaos” (p. 61). Richards’ argument about meaning points at common experience 
as helping people to make sense of what they hear, thereupon, common language 
62  ‘Elbow room’ introduces the balancing act. For a detailed discussion of ‘elbow room,’ see Drout 
(2006a, p. 32).
63  Griffin notes that this is in agreement with Shannon and Weaver’s views on ‘channel noise’ and 
information loss. See Griffin’s (2002) discussion of I. A. Richards’ ‘The Meaning of Meaning’ in which he 
highlights Richards’ views on rhetoric and meaning, at www.afirstlook.com
64  There is nothing in the sound of the word ‘kiss,’ or anything visual in the letters H-U-G that signifies 
embrace.
65  Context, defined by Richards, is a cluster of events that occur together.
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produces common experience. Richards’ thoughts on why misunderstanding 
occurs during communication may lead towards understanding the phenomenon 
of meaning. The issue of common experience provides us with basic knowledge of 
the contexts and situations in which meaning is likely to occur.
Feldman and Narayanan (2004) offer an embodied account of meaning based on 
a Neural Theory of Language (NTL). The meaning of the word grasp, Feldman and 
Narayanan inform us, involves the motor action of grasping in some way. Under 
NTL, the complex synergy that supports grasping is the core semantics of the word.66 
These two researchers confirm Richards’ (in Griffin, op cit) claims that word mean-
ings reside within its context: “Both the meaning of a word and its defining behavior 
are context dependent–you grasp differently for different objects and purposes”67 (p. 
2).  Central to Narayanan and Feldman’s idea: “the reader interpreting a phrase that 
corresponds to a motion term is in fact performing a mental simulation of the en-
tailed event in the current context”68 (p. 7). Dreyfus (1998) on his part insists, “[…] ev-
ery perceptual habit is still a motor habit and here the process of grasping a meaning 
is performed by the body” (para. 11). Garbarini and Adenzato (2004) advance the idea 
of embodiment basing on affordances: “Instead of abstract mental processes, which 
are describable in formal terms of logic, cognitive processes are considered in light of 
their intrinsic ties to the body’s action and sensorimotor experience” 69 (p. 101). They 
further explain:
 
66  They choose this particular example because there is a great deal known about the intricate distrib-
uted neural circuitry involved in grasping by humans and monkeys.
67  Rizzolatti and coworkers, over the last twenty years, according to Feldman and Narayanan, have 
shown that frontal area F4 contains neurons that integrate motor, visual, and somato-sensory modali-
ties for the purpose of controlling actions in space and perceiving peri-personal space–the area of space 
reachable by body parts (i.e., Graziano et al, 1994). In summary, over two decades of work in neurosci-
ence suggests that cortical premotor areas contain neurons that respond to multimodal (visual, soma-
tosensory, and auditory) sensory stimuli. In addition, the theory further portrays the meaning of a noun 
as depending on its possible uses or affordances. This claim draws support from linguistics and imaging 
data showing that the meaning of a noun depends of the uses of the underlying thing.
68  See KARMA, Narayanan and Feldman, op cit. the KARMA model uses conventionalized metaphor 
maps to reveal how we understand metaphors. Narayanan bases his argument of embodied meaning 
– presumed transferable to other forms of meaning – on children’s word use in both concrete and meta-
phorical senses. He argues that in the NTL, abstract and metaphorical words derive their meanings from 
concrete words. For a detailed discussion of Bailey’s model of learning, on which these two researchers 
base their arguments, see article: Embodied Meaning a Neural Theory of Language, 2004. Available at, 
www.icsi.edu/~snarayan/Btl.pdf
69  “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, 
either for good or ill” (Gibson, in Garbarini & Adenzato, p. 100). See also Gibson’s bottom-up theory on 
perception where he claims that we perceive through data coming to us from the environment. In his 
postulate, “Gibson maintained that affordances are intrinsically part of objects themselves and are 
not constructed from an observer’s needs or intentions” (ibid, p. 100). We can thus directly perceive 
the value to things directly from the environment and since affordances are invariant–always there to 
be perceived–we may or may not perceive or attend to them. The affordance of something does not 
change as need of the observer changes: “an affordance is not bestowed upon an object by a need or an 
observer and his act of perceiving it. The object offers what it does because it is what it is” (ibid, p. 101).
While observing an object, the neural system is activated as-if the observer were inter-
acting with it.70 … Only when by virtually executing the action can we understand the 
relational significance of the object, i.e., the affordance it offers. The concept of simu-
lation allows us to comprehend the relationship between control of action and represen-
tation of action. A motor schema allows us to execute an action as well as represent the 
object the action it refers to; in the first case, there is explicit codification of the motor 
schema, in the second, there is implicit simulation of it. (p. 103) 71
However, Rosch (cited in, Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004) maintains that the 
functional needs of an interacting subject determine the way in which organisms 
perceive different objects. In the case of humans, social as well as biological factors 
determine such needs. Secondly, such biological or social factors that require the 
kind of mechanisms explained above form a small portion of a human’s overall 
worldview. I will argue later that my idea of embodied meaning finds root in the 
social fabric. “All human experience has two faces: one side faces external life and 
social activity, and the other faces our inner mental life and cognitive activity. It 
is in the interaction between these activities that meaning construction–a socio-
cognitive phenomenon–is generated” notes Hoijer (1998, p. 169). Perhaps Dale’s 
(1996) supposed Theory of Implicatures could be therapeutic.72 This scheme of 
study at a glance provides us with a general theory of meaning that attempts to 
answer the question: why do things mean what they mean?  “The main goal of a 
theory of expression-meaning is to say what it is about our marks and sounds, etc. 
that makes them mean what they mean,” insists Dale (section 7.4, para. 3).73 Indeed, 
70  “The most interesting aspect of canonical neurons,” say Garbarini & Adenzato (2004) “is that the 
same neuron fires not only in response to the same object, but also in response to a group of objects 
that have the same characteristics, in terms of the type of interaction they allow. At this level of descrip-
tion, an object can be ‘codified’ ‘on relational terms,’ i.e., we can identify and represented it in relation to 
the type of action that it affords an interacting subject” (p. 102). This means that the type of interac-
tion established with an object is a constitutive part of the representation of the object itself.  In other 
words, different objects can represent one in the function of the same type of interaction they allow. 
What makes this type of object representation possible is a mechanism of as-if neural simulation: while 
observing an object, one activates neural the system is as-if the observer were interacting with it. See 
also discussion on Mirror Neurons (Garbarini & Adenzato, op cit, p. 102).
71  For a detailed discussion on the process of neurons and the way in which they affect the process of 
cognition, see Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004: At the root of embodied cognition: Cognitive science meets 
neurophysiology. Brain and Cognition, 56, pp. 100-106. Available online at http://bci.ucsd.edu/PAPERS/
Garbarini.pdf
72  To have a detailed discussion of Russell E. Dale’s insight see, The theory of meaning (chapter 7), 
Unpublished dissertation available online at www.ressulldale.com/dissertation/TheTheoryofMeaning.
pdf
73  Dale (2006), first, attempts to make a general account of meaning wholly understood in terms of 
propositional-attitudes notions. He studies H. P. Grice, Stephen Schiffer, and David Lewis. Other phi-
losophers such as P. F. Strawson, Jerry Fodor, Brian Loar, and Jonathan Bennet occasionally take on the 
assumption Dale harbors. Dale targets (a) the notion of conventional expressions understood in terms 
of propositional-attitude psychology, which he calls an expression meaning something–the notion of 
expression-meaning. (b) The need for a notion of a speaker meaning something on a particular occasion 
by an utterance to achieve understanding of expression-meaning in terms of notions of propositional-
attitude psychology, which notion he calls speaker-meaning. (c) The possibility that notions of meaning 
that are specifically associated with language and, more generally, communication (expression and 
speaker-meaning) are interestingly related to notions of meaning that do not have to do with language 
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we may reasonably suppose, “the important aspect of our marks, sounds, etc. with 
respect to their meaning is their ability to be used to say things.74 Dale believes 
that the most important thing a theory of meaning requires is “to state under 
what conditions an utterance type can be used by one person to say something 
to another.”75 We note at this stage that Dale is driving at a theory more reliant on 
expression than intention of the speaker. The kind of theory he would prefer, after 
considering the repercussions of both Grice and Schiffer’s notions of meaning, 
Dale suggests as such: “P uses L just in case whenever condition C* is true of a member 
of P who is presented with an L-Sentence, P comes to believe that the speaker said L ()” 
(chapter 7, section 7.5, paragraph, 12). In the process of analyzing data, I explored 
this notion of meaning in representation of the condition therein posited. 
Dale confesses that he is not sure yet of how to state what C* is. Apparently, 
Dale (1996) blends the notion of conventionality although he does not think it 
should take center stage in describing and constituting a theory of meaning. Fur-
ther, Dale retains qualities of intention-based theories of meaning and as such, he 
recognizes the intention of the speaker although he emphasizes the quality of the 
expression itself that causes the resultant behavior of the hearer. This also reso-
nates with ‘the thing itself ’ described earlier in the phenomenological approach. 
Apparently, implicature becomes my idea of describing meaning in Ganda soci-
ety, with embodiment playing a minor role. Although implicature may not rely 
on convention, it seems to suggest a common antecedent condition during com-
munication. I suspect expression to form part of the antecedent condition that 
facilitates implicature. Alternatively, it may be an ‘enabling’ condition closer to 
Drout’s (2006a) traditional referentiality. It is plausible to link this phenomenon 
to tradition as a starting point. Possibly, we will discover as we move along what 
the condition turns out to be. As we cogitate condition C*, it is important to note 
that Dale’s theory also connects with the context based assumptions as well as em-
phasizing social interaction, only glossed over by embodied cognition theories.76 
of communication at all referred to as natural meaning by Grice. This relates to such non-linguistic, non-
communication related notions of meaning.
74  Conventional signs might be tools more ready to hand, requiring less creativity for their availability 
than non-conventional signs, but they mean what they do for exactly the same reasons that non-
conventional signs mean, namely, one person to say something to another can use them both. Neuman 
(2005) thinks that the meaning making process yields as a system’s specific response to an indetermi-
nate signal, and as such, meaning underlines a specific response to a signal.
75  This is a somewhat different project from stating what are the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for an utterance type to mean conventionally what it does since some utterance types can serve the 
purpose of saying things even though they do not have conventional meaning. The notions of saying or 
telling are both notions of communication, to say or to tell something to someone is to communicate 
something to them although the meaning intended may not be meaning interpreted.
76  At this point, I should acknowledge that many systems of perception including language might 
directly succumb to embodied explanations, like Gibson’s research on perception. That said; many of 
our activities and knowledge of the world look to its environment rather than what the brain can detect 
and know. Therefore, whereas a blend of embodied and social explanations would provide a great result, 
my preference is a profound reliance on social perspectives in this study. See Ware (2004) for a detailed 
discussion of Gibson’s Affordance Theory, pp. 18-20. Secondly, although the theory of meaning I propose 
in the study is fundamentally different from the descriptions in this assessment, it is important to note 
the general distinction between meaning and significance, which so often tends to present problems of 
After glossing over why things mean what they do, I need to place such insight 
in context of the idea of meaning advanced in this study. In his Relevance Theo-
ry (RT), Pietarinen (2005) provides a blend of intention and pragmatism adapted 
to ideals of meaning in the context of Ganda artist practice. From the Pragmatic 
Maxim, Peirce (cited in, Pietarinen) developed a pragmatic theory of meaning stat-
ing that “the meaning of a concept is the sum total of its implications for pos-
sible observations and actions”77 (p. 1767). This could account for Dale’s missing 
account of condition C* but also suggests a pragmatic dimension to the notion 
of meaning. In Peirce’s (cited in, Pietarinen) account, “relevant factors or proper-
ties of an expression are those which intrude into the context of discourse.”78 This 
theory recognizes the notion of context as central “since what is relevant is that 
which produces a tangible contextual effect, or which penetrates the context of 
discourse” (p. 1767).79 More so, the idea of commonality exhibited in the RT reflects 
the collaboration instituted by common experience in usurping communicative 
intentions. 80 Ergo, Peirce’s communication theory basically rides on ‘purpose’ and 
full accounts of ‘meaningful intention’ by considering that each utterance comes 
with an intended goal that one tries to grasp, and duly, what is relevant should be 
accounted for. 
In a snapshot view of Pietarinen and his analysis of Peirce’s pragmatic dimen-
sion of his theory of communication, I am obliged to conclude that meaning is the 
goal of communication. This is because, in his criticism of Shannon and Weaver’s 
communication theory, Chandler (1994) insists on meaning as the goal of com-
munication rather than information. Secondly, in his relevance theory, Pietarinen 
(2005) laid a foundation on which to base expressions that mean what they do. That 
is, through purposeful intention to express, we consider what is relevant for mean-
ing. Before I draw a conclusive stance towards meaning, tradition, and IK, we need 
to find a stable, or at least, a credible link between meaning and communication. 
As I intend to show shortly, narrative, metaphor, and idioms are some of the tools 
replication. Hirsh (cited in, Blue, 2002, para. 3) distinguishes between meaning and significance: “Mean-
ing is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign 
sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on the other hand, names a relationship between 
that meaning and a person, or conception, or a situation or indeed anything imaginable.”
77  Pragmatic Maxim: “consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object,” writes Pietarinen (2005, p. 1767).
78  This is an argument from cognitive economy: the goal of communication is to maximize the 
relevance of the phenomena available to language users while maximizing the amount of mental or 
cognitive processing effort. The grounds for believing in cognitive economy have their roots, in turn, in 
evolutionary theory.
79  Apart from cognitive economy, the idea hints at an element of utilitarianism in the definition of 
communicative goals in terms of maximization of something (in this case context relevance). See, 
Pietarinen, (2005, p. 1767).
80  According to RT, the inferential mode of communication attempts to share, distribute, and recog-
nize acts of intention, emotion, and other modalities delivered in communication. These attempts are 
what contribute to the relevance of utterances intended to communicate particular pieces of related 
information. What agents recognize as relevant largely relates to common traces in their experience 
(ibid, p. 1767).
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we use in communication with qualities of the indigene, tradition, and the search 
for meaning. In addition, as we will further notice, these tools depend on context 
and as such, congruous to the notion of ‘relevance’ suggested by Peitarinen. This 
means that even before we attempt to make any communication, some of the tools 
we may use already stipulate what is relevant for meaningful communication. He 
further contends that under situations of communication the interpreter infers 
context-dependency, drawing evidence concerning the intended meaning from 
the utterer. After all, communication is a joint process although most of the time 
we may think that the communicator controls the process (Downs, Linkugel, & 
Berg, 1977; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971). Thus, what is the most appropriate com-
municative strategy we can adopt under the circumstances so far discussed?
Narrative tradition and meaning
Since meaning, as I was obliged to agree, is at the end of communication, then 
we should find a strategy that provides us the most effective and economic means 
of arriving at it. First, I will discuss narrative as a strategy, then break it down to 
essentials and finally discuss idioms in light of metaphor and narrative structure. To 
begin with, Drout (2006b) notes the “ability of the traditional referent to summon 
entire complexes of memes by metonymy means that use of traditional referents is 
an enormously effective means of communication” (p. 278). At this point, we find 
the link between narrative and oral tradition. The reason for this happening is the 
belief that traditional referents have the ability to summon working memory to a 
larger complex or memes enabled by repetition. Drout thusly indicates that “for a 
component part to become a traditional referent it must be a recognizable part of 
some whole, and the best way for the association of the part to the whole to be made 
is for the whole to have been repeated”81 (Drout, p. 278). The point advanced may 
seem apparently farfetched; however, it serves to link us to a wider discussion of 
narrative functionality. Remember also that we have linked the traditional referent 
to the condition C* in Dale’s theory of meaning. This is the best moment of linking 
tradition and meaning. Metonymy is one of the most featured elements of narrative 
structure and as such substantially linked together. Notably too, despite narrative 
being traditional in Buganda, narrative qua narrative, functions intrinsically as a 
tradition.
Drout (2006a) suggests that because of its repetitive patterns, narrative serves 
as a tradition and due to its compounding nature it functions internally like a 
tradition. “The key to monastic stability and to the building of continuities was 
repetition,” notes Drout (p. 167). Not only do we gain stability, “but also, in creat-
ing stability, the Rule and the Concordia enforce the repetition of many actions”82 
81  This traditional referentiality enables some small subset of a larger meme to awaken the referent 
to conscious memory in the mind of a participant in the tradition. Foley calls this process “communica-
tive economy” writes Drout (2006b, p. 278).
82  Drout here refers to Rule of St. Benedict and Regularis Concordia, which programmed nearly every 
minute or every monk’s day. He further reiterates that the purpose of the Rule of St. Benedict and 
Regularis Concordia did not necessarily generate repetition. Repetition arose of the logic of the texts: 
(Drout, p. 167). When we repeat actions, they tend towards the UTM for their jus-
tificatios and “therefore, repeated actions will tend to become traditions”83 (Drout, 
p. 167) This is due to coalescing “fallible distributed long-term memory with the 
ability of individuals to recognize patterns quickly, and with the tendency to re-
peat actions that have had previous success (the ‘stick with a winner tendency’).”84 
Narrative is a tradition because it runs across generations in the same way due to 
the constraints on its actio component. By default, this constraint enacts a prac-
tical rule of retelling it in-the-same-way. At this level, narrative becomes part of 
culture with communication as its main stake. In other words, when we tell the 
same story over and again as a tool for communication, it becomes a tradition due 
to its success rate as justificatio.
Narrative’s internal structure is analogous to tradition’s internal structure, 
first, by metonymy and second, by compounding. Naturally, repetition buttresses 
justificatio by ameliorating its Word-to-World Fit in the process of evolving to-
wards the UTM, as well as recognitio because as we repeat recognitio we are more 
likely to enter or retrieve it from long-term memory. Thus and so, repetition cre-
ates patterns that cannot be missed by the human brains due to its acumen at rec-
ognizing sublime pattern.”85 Mimetically, this process implies that once we store 
a meme in our memory, if the meme is part of a repeated pattern, we can call it 
back into “conscious perception by some smaller critical portion of the meme. A 
complex meme, say, an entire memorized poem, could be invoked by one or two 
lines from the poem” (Drout, 2006a, pp. 168-169).86 Borrowing from Oral Theory, 
Drout refers to the meme that ‘triggers’ recollection, a ‘traditional referent’. The 
traditional referent invokes the much larger meme-plex with which we associate 
it, by the process of metonymy: “the part stands for the whole.” Narrative has this 
character, which I will demonstrate later.
“the stability engendered by the assumption that the Rule and Concordia lay out the one best way for 
humans to live generate repetition as an outcome of its internal logic.
83 This is because the longer a practice continues, the better the Word-to-World Fit of the UTM justifi-
catio will be.
84  Remember Ewins’ “tried and true” concept of stasis. Nevertheless, this tendency continues 
tradition, and not repetition but also identity projected back into the past and forward into the future 
because participants in a tradition also imagine their descendants continuing their practices.
85  The combination of patterns means that in a culture that includes repeated traditions, informa-
tion may be encoded and transmitted in significantly compressed form. Recognizing a pattern means 
being able to see every event in the sequence. Several things happen when we recognize such a pattern: 
(a) the larger sequence must be held somewhere in memory. Then our pattern-recognition abilities 
match the shorter sequence with the appropriate larger sequence, thus calling the larger sequence into 
working memory; (b) if the short sequence does indeed represent the larger sequence, the link between 
these two things (recognition of the pattern and the recognition that the shorter sequence fits into the 
pattern) will be reinforced. “Therefore, next time we see a similar short sequence we are somewhat 
more likely to link it to the longer sequence. The human ability to recognize patterns is so strong, in fact, 
that we often infer patterns where none exist, or we infer the wrong pattern based on our expectation or 
repetition,” insists Drout (pp. 168-69).
86  Drout provides an example: “the phrase “’Twas the night before Christmas” might bring up the 
memory of the entire poem. And in fact, if the short sequence that operates as a cueing mechanism is 
distinctive enough, this triggering meme can be very short indeed. In the case of “’Twas the night before 
Christmas,” for many people “’Twas” is probably enough to trigger the recollection of the entire poem.
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This, Drout (2006a, p. 170) reckons, entails invoking a context “that is enormously 
larger and more echoic than the text or work itself, that brings the lifeblood of 
generations of poems and performances to the individual performance text.”87 
Drout insists that it is important “to note that the combination of traditional 
referentiality with the repetition inherent in traditions and the human brain’s 
ability to recognize patterns leads to an incredibly rich and complex network 
of associations” (p. 171). First, this is proof that Dale’s (1996) condition C* relies 
heavily on context and tradition as it has ability to call into memory, a network 
of associations.88 Second, proverbs (as narratives), communicate something 
more than the sum of their lexical and grammatical parts “because it is difficult 
to decode the meaning of a proverb merely from analysis of its linguistic form”89 
(Drout, p. 230). The difficulty in finding denotative meaning of proverbs by 
deriving it from the words that make it, implies that “a proverb’s meaning must be 
linked associatively not so much to the words to which it is constructed, but to the 
proverb as a whole” (Drout, p. 230).90 Thus, the proverb functions more as a lexical 
entity to ‘be remembered,’ and less so, as a sentence for decoding, implying that, 
we ideally process a proverb more than a mere lexical construction. Credibility 
of this hypothesis implies, rather than the sum of its grammatical and lexical 
components, a proverb is stored as a single lexical unit, and we can (a) explain 
the stability of surface structure of proverbs (b) the principle of compounding is 
at work extensively.91 The same principle of compounding works for both stories 
and idioms as narrative forms and tools for communication in oral cultures. 
Implications are such that proverbs do not contain their own meaning; we must 
interpret the meaning of the proverbs.92 “A person hears a proverb and he or she is 
87  Notwithstanding, “[e]ach element in the phraseology or narrative thematic stands not simply for 
that singular instance, but for plurality and multiformity that are beyond the reach of textualization,” 
writes Drout (2006, p. 170). Drout’s approach differs contrastingly with others working on oral tradition 
and performance as being the ‘enabling event’ that informs readers/hearers that they should “interpret 
what I say in some special sense; do not take it to mean that word alone, taken literally, would convey.”
88  I need to point out here that the idea of the meme and functionality of metonymy in triggering 
traditions works exactly like Nanay’s idea of pictorial representation in narrative artifacts. I will discuss 
this phenomenon more in the next chapter.
89  It is possible though, at times, just as it is possible to decode an unknown word based on its mor-
phology and its similarity to other already known words.
90  A proverbial meme-plex like “don’t count your chickens before they hatch” constitutes of the 
memes that make up each word, the grammatical structures that define the logic of the sentence, and 
the related cultural information about chickens, eggs, counting, and hatching. Further, referring to 
Crépeau, Pierre (1981, pp. 86-110) Drout notes the proverbs function at two levels of signification: “one 
referential or denotative, and the other connotative. The two levels of signification are bound together 
in such a way that the first level is the expression of the second.”
91  That is one can join two (or more) words into a compound word that apparently receives a new lexi-
cal entry (one can use the word “fireplace” hundreds of times and access a mental image of a fireplace 
each time without retrieving the individual lexical entities for “fire” and “place”). This means that the 
proverb compounds its component words into one unit, and this compound unit is the one that associa-
tively links with the culturally conferred meaning of the proverb. The fact that the form of proverbs is so 
stable while the explication is quite variable, in form, if not in content, supports this hypothesis.
92  “This is not to say that there is not some information content implicit in the structure of the prov-
erb that would be available to someone who is not culturally fluent,” cautions Drout (p.232). 
told what the meaning is, or he or she figures out the meaning from the cultural 
context in which the proverb is used: people learn the meaning of proverbs the same 
ways they learn the meaning of individual words,” insists Drout (2006a, p. 232). 
More specifically, other than operating as tradition, in its tripartite memetic form–
recognitio, actio, and justificatio–a proverb has other memetic effects that interest 
this study.93 With our knowledge that the actio variation is constrained in proverb 
situations, (actio of a proverb here is “say y”, where y is the proverb), we repeat it 
in the actual or exact form: “Each time it is repeated, the memory of the proverb 
is strengthened” (Drout, p. 233).94 At the helm of achieving proverbial status, a 
saying’s language will be marked as such and every time we use such language, we 
similarly mark it by association. The implications are (a) we will tend to conserve 
marked language as a proverb, “and therefore it will be mnemonically superior 
to constructions made of unmarked language; (b) the proverb will communicate 
meaning “through the same process as formula: traditional referentiality, traditional 
anaphora, and metonymy.” I will discuss these elements, especially anaphora that 
plays a great role in narrative as we go along. An important remark to make stems 
from this fact:
… because proverbs must be interpreted, and because the constraint on the proverb’s 
existence is not the interpretation but the surface structure of the proverb, changes in 
underlying ideology or perceptions of the world appear to be rather easy to adapt to: 
the aspect of the proverb that changes, the interpretation, has been malleable to begin 
with, because it is rarely articulated and has no specified linguistic form (Drout, p. 
236).95
We may have noted that Drout (2006a) treats proverbs as marked language 
structures. This means in effect that proverbs fall in a category of language use. 
Secondly, interpretation of stories, like proverbs, is flexible since constraints apply 
to their surface structure only. Although stories may not be subject to restricted 
recital, we must maintain their surface structure to recognize them as the same 
stories. Duly, their surface structure can only change to a limited extent that allows 
continuation of the same overall structure. When we consider marked language, 
we realize a significant distinction that stipulates ‘marked consideration’ of that 
particular language. As I will demonstrate, stories, proverbs, metaphors, and 
idioms normally sway from standardized linguistic form because they require a 
93  A proverb in the context of tradition would behave as such: Recognitio–when faced with situation 
x, say the following statement; Actio–say the proverb y; Justificatio–a variant of the Universal Tradition 
Meme: because it is appropriate, or the justificatio component has achieved Unconscious Imperative 
status.
94  This improved memory of the proverb as a whole would extend to some degree to a recognition 
of its parts. Because the repetition of a proverb is the repetition of its component parts, this repetition 
would tend to associate these component parts with the proverb itself.
95  Drout calls the words that make up the poem its Surface Form and the ‘standard’ interpretation of 
the proverb its culturally conferred meaning.
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marked mechanism for their comprehension. Although some stories come into 
place as purely entertainment artifacts, many arise in part as directly attached to 
proverbs or idioms. Further still, stories, take on the character of “interpret me as 
a story,” requiring one to capture their ‘meaning’ in a different way. This is more 
likely especially in situations where storytelling is a common norm. These qualities, 
and more, I will discuss, namely, idioms and metaphor that form a strong point 
for narrative use as strategy for communication in a predominantly indigenous 
traditional society. 
In conclusion, before proceeding to the next section, I would like to point out 
that Pietarinen provides us with an active theory of communication embellished 
with his Relevance Theory. This is a conquering strategy in communication in that 
it raises economic and pragmatic concerns. To control loss of information, we 
need also to consider that rather than focus on distribution models, the art world 
should advance the development of content and form in art that interests people 
upon its own merits and intensifying its own understanding of artistic intentions 
and strategies (Schrofer, 1999). One way of achieving this goal that apparently con-
cerns the present study is through enhancing communication. When someone 
generates a message, the result of interaction or negotiation between the receiver 
and the message contains the meaning of the message rather than the message 
itself (Fiske, 1990). Citing Shannon and Weaver’s Communication Theory, Fiske 
indicates that improving the encoding of a message will increase semantic accu-
racy.96 We must somehow see influence of a message, in behavior of a receiver in 
order for it to perform its communicative function since the message’s basic tenet 
stipulates one party observing actions performed by another party (Bodenhausen, 
Gaelick, & Wyer Jr., 1987). The question I need, or we need collectively, to address 
is thus: do we really have to make art so difficult to understand by making it too 
personal?
Narrative theory
We all agree, or many of us, that some texts are narratives whereas others are not. 
This is an established fact. Secondly, the issue of narrative and the most appropriate 
theory that clearly defines it dominates contemporary philosophical concerns, 
as a definitive ground is yet agreeable. Nanay (2009) opted not to solve this issue 
in his article Narrative Pictures, and I will follow suit. However, I will highlight a 
few contentious points advanced in narrative theory, to lay ground for providing 
my own position. In recounting some of the issues raised by some scholars on 
narrative, I do not intend to carry out a critique; instead, I highlight what possibly 
constitutes, in my case, narrative as a form in this study and thus the conceptual 
scope. In the text below, I summarize some of the most recent views on narrative 
theory and argumentation on what constitutes narrative as a distinct text and the 
manner by which we could experience it including pictorial explanations. In the 
96  Also, see, Kress & van Leeuwen (1996, p. 46) for Shannon and Weaver’s communication model.
last section, I give a personal view on contemporary theory in relation to my own 
work. 97
Velleman (cited in, Currie, 2006) alludes to Emotional Cadence as quintessential 
in the distinction of narrative from other texts.98 Prima facie, Currie, like Velleman, 
disputes the notion of causality as central to distinguishing a narrative from other 
representations by noting that two salient events can constitute a story without 
necessarily bearing a Causal connection.99 Currie does not find, however, causality a 
definitive distinction of what constitutes narrative texts although he finds the idea 
of fully denying presence of a connection quite tasking: “We are prone to a persis-
tent illusion of dependence between certain kinds of events” he explains (Currie, p. 
312).100 An external illusion of narrative stipulates a “carryover of an effect that holds 
in real, rather than represented situations.” Inevitably, internality arises since what 
we believe about the narrative from the world, independently, does not constitute 
the representation of events, “Narratives are communicative artifacts, and the mere 
fact that narrative represents certain events as occurring creates expectations based 
on what we know or assume about communicative acts”101 (Currie, p. 313). Although 
many stories carry causal formation, this condition does not satisfy the constitution 
of a narrative because there are, as many utterances of the kind that do not qualify as 
narrative, pictures inclusive. This counters the general claim that every picture tells 
a story, as we will find out in Monica’s testimony later in the text. 
Currie (2006) though, refuses to concede that narrative is explainable only in 
terms of causation even if a connection seems plausible, except, in guise of Coun-
terfactual terms.102 Having dispelled causality as a key factor in narrative depic-
97  Although some of the issues discussed may appear in other forms of representations, they do not 
refer to, or infer comparison; I considered them as unique in the context and framework of this study.
98  In the build up to their discussions centering on narrative, Nanay (2009), Barwell, (2009), Livings-
ton (2009), and Currie (2006) opt to raise the question on what constitutes a narrative as opposed to 
other texts.
99  Rather he would pick interest in ascertaining whether one text has a greater degree of ‘narrative-
ness’ a condition he refers to as Narrativity. He proposes tests for a theory that clearly defines the 
distinctions of narrative from other texts by (a) constructing cases in which we may vary proposed deter-
minants establishing intuitively whether it could result in a variation the narrativity of discourse and 
(b) positively correlated features with narrative such as the role of agency. He still doubts though that 
agency per se, could provide a vivid example of narrative because it belongs to its nature (narrative), 
however, he suggests probing the variations that make narrative good at generating compelling ideas 
about agency (Currie, 2006, p. 311).
100  He cites an example of the Muller-Lyre illusion where we perceive of the lines as having different 
lengths even though we know that they are or the same length, and as such, even when the evidence 
suggests otherwise, certain events seem to be connected.
101  Generally, beyond any objections unless presumed so, when narrative juxtaposes representations 
of two events to make both of them salient, we expect an implicit representation of some connection 
between them. This is so because “[o]ur interpretive strategies, like our memories, tend to work semi-
automatically and in ways over which we have limited control; they are prone to capture by certain 
vivid memorable ideas,” testifies Currie (313). This connects, as it looks, to the notion of emotion: “Our 
imagining there being a connection would be enough to include the kind of emotional response that 
Velleman points to; imaginings often do have quite powerful emotional effects on the imaginer” (ibid, p. 
313).
102  A and B occurred, but if A had not occurred, the chance of B’s occurring would have been much 
less than it actually was. He disputes this view too, when pinpoints David Lewis’ (cited in Currie, op 
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tions, Currie instead suggests relations of reason as sufficient conditions.103  Ide-
ally, the story world depends on the reason at a fundamental level in that things 
can only happen for a reason with or without an agent, whose thoughts and action 
underpin holding of such reasons. Currie concurs, though, with Velleman that the 
reason-based dependencies we see, or think we see “in narrativized events depend 
highly on the emotional mood or tone of the narrative, and the effect this has on 
the audience,” (Currie, p. 314).104 Currie reckons that the extent to which we inter-
pret events of the story as connected by reason-based relations can depend on our 
affective response to the narratives; “this perception, or misperception, of a con-
nection has further emotional effects on us, and may contribute to our sense that 
this discourse is a narrative, rather than something else” (p. 314). 
Citing recent remarks discrediting causal relations, in his article Narrative Pic-
tures, Nanay (2009) dismisses Noël Carroll’s insistence on causality as a crucial ele-
ment in alienating narrative texts.105 On the contrary, Currie (2009) suggests cau-
sality while Velleman cites a sequence of events as providing narrative material 
if it completes an emotional cadence.106 In turn, Nanay opts to tackle the question 
of the nature of operation our mind goes through when we engage with narra-
tives by exploring the way we experience them or at least, narrative pictures.107 Cur-
rie argues that perception has a temporal dimension in addition to being merely 
momentary and thus capable of temporary extension.108 Thus, instead of seeing a 
picture and attempting to recite its sequence of action, we perceive it in its total-
ity: “rather than saying that we see the man in the air and imagine him landing in 
the puddle, we should rather say that we see him jumping (although we only set on 
one temporal part of this action)” (Currie, 122). 109 Thus, we grossly misrepresent 
cit) premise that this cannot account for causation owing to a general postulate that “counterfactual 
analyses are fundamentally flawed” (p. 314).
103  Thus, “sometimes we think–more often imagining than believing–of these relations of depen-
dence between events as basic facts about the world and not as reducible to facts about the motives of 
agents” (Currie, 2006, p. 313). Nevertheless, Currie maintains a casual dependency in his idea of what 
constitutes narrative texts.
104  Currie seeks to differ because Velleman sticks to our affective response to narrative as mistaken by 
us to have found a substantive connection between events.
105  Nanay proposes the option of looking at the necessary and sufficient conditions or identifying a 
crucial element that would help in understanding what differentiates narratives from non-narratives.
106  What seems universal with these three presumably most recent philosophical accounts is the idea 
that narrative represents two or more events, which Nanay out rightly refutes.
107  Narrative pictures, he insists, for example may or may not represent two or more events. Similarly, 
a picture is capable of depicting one event or more, meaning that a picture can represent a narrative. If 
one event in one picture can represent a narrative then effectively, pictorial narrative differs from literary 
narrative if we concur that relations between events constitute narrative texts.
108  For example, the event of holding up a crown and putting it on the king’s head depicts coronation 
and not the recount of the action itself as depicted in the picture. This calls for individuating events 
represented by the picture. The casual model presupposes two acts of which we see one in the picture 
and the other imagined.
109  Currie (2009) employs a famous analogy from Thompson Clarke that perceiving is like nibbling; 
when we nibble at a piece of cheese, we do not only nibble at the part that we actually touch, but at the 
entire cheese (p. 122). 
a picture if we say that it represents two separate events, one visible in the pic-
ture and another imagined – seeing a one-time slice. Additionally, we still cannot 
rely on the representation of states of affairs suggested by Carroll because still they 
must turn out as more than one state of affairs. 
The remedy thus suggested by Nanay (2009) is action. Naively conceived, a nar-
rative is a text or picture where something happens and a happening postulates 
someone doing something. He argues that action is a–perhaps even necessary and 
sufficient–feature of people’s engagement with narrative pictures in that an action 
of one of the characters in the picture is part of what we are (supposed to be) aware 
of when looking at the picture. In light of this claim, goal-directed actions aim at 
achieving some kind of goal, unlike from non goal-directed actions that do not 
embed an ‘action token’.110 If we assume that an action in a scene is goal-directed 
then we may consider our experience of engaging it as a piece of narrative. Im-
plicationally, we are unlikely to experience a narrative engagement if we are not 
aware of the action in a narrative text as goal-directed. If and only if a suitable 
informed spectator is supposed to undergo the experience of engaging with narra-
tive does a picture form a narrative, concludes Nanay.111 There is a strong connec-
tion between this view and Drout’s idea of ‘interpret me ‘as if ’ characterizing prov-
erbs and Dale’s (1996) idea of ‘implicature.’ Namely, rather than being truly causal 
or un-marked language, the idea of ‘interpret me as if ’ indicates that narrative is 
both ‘marked’ language and takes more than being simply a linguistic expression.
How can we account for instances where we do not know that a text is a narra-
tive, but then we deal with it narratively? Should we claim a higher order external 
to narrative properties, but constituted within its overall goal determining or in-
fluencing our narrative engagements? Nanay (2009) suggest that our experience of 
engaging narrative texts determines whether a text is a narrative or not: “The gen-
eral suggestion in case of the experiential theories of depiction is that something 
is a narrative picture if a suitable spectator is supposed to have a ‘seeing-in’ experi-
ence when looking at it” (p. 127). Additionally, Barwell (2009) indicates that some 
relations are not obviously causal or, at least, not relations of efficient causality as 
in counterfactual relations; instead, they supply reasons for evaluative judgments. 
Barwell insists, “If it is the case that sometimes the counterfactual dependence of 
one event upon another presupposes relations that support evaluative judgments, 
then in these cases at least, causal significance is not the only significance nec-
essary to narrative emplotments. Evaluative significance is also necessary”112 (pp. 
110  For example, Currie notes that although breathing is often not a goal-directed action, some token 
performance of it may be goal directed such as when we have to trudge through thick smoke. 
111  This claim certainly raises issues of a suitable spectator should be suitably sensitive, suitably 
informed, and if necessary suitably prompted. However, Currie (2009) finds such a distinction irrelevant 
since it does not specify appropriateness of response in narrative engagement (p. 127).  
112  Some events presumed counterfactual depend upon constitutive relations yet others call for 
rationalizing relations. Constitutive relations are not obviously causal due to their lack of temporal 
relations between the events they relate normally marked by the propositions used: In singing his song, 
the Owl proposed to Pussycat; by singing it, he obtained her consent to marry him. Thus, they depend 
on conventions, social rules, and norms, not causal laws or laws of nature. Conversely, we presuppose 
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55-56). Constitutive and rationalizing relations between events or states of affairs 
provide reasons for evaluative judgments of subsequent events. The postulate is 
that supplying reasons for evaluative judgment is as basic a storytelling function 
as explaining their occurrence.113
In conclusion, Barwell (2009) insists that evaluative beliefs or judgments are 
key components of every psychological complex constituting an emotion, in 
cognitive theories. The reader is in some sort of psychological state necessary or 
even sufficient to experience a state of emotion if emploting subsumes providing 
reasons supportive of judgment from a person who emplots. Similarly, when and 
only when their objects matter to those who have them, do emotions occur, mean-
ing that we identify how something matters to someone by the behavior express-
ing the affective appraisal. Further, why something matters follows from how we 
perceive it in connection to the subject having the emotion. It is often appropri-
ate for ones feelings about earlier events to be resolved, after all, when someone’s 
evaluation of narrative outcome is an evaluation of something that matters to one. 
My insistence on emotional inclusion is because in my study, expectancy as an 
emotion turned out as a key factor in constituting narrative dependencies. I will 
also consider Currie’s (2006) notion that narrative is a communicative artifact, 
which is instrumental in achieving the main goal of this research.114  Most impor-
tantly, Barwell insists that, “readers or watchers must supply some of the explana-
tory connections, some of the normative reasons, and many of the evaluations” 
(p. 58).115 Although my discussion will include emotion and evaluation, I propose 
Nanay’s (2009) experiential engagements exhibited by the ‘action token’ (hereafter 
that will refer to goal-directed actions), as a core-working concept for this study. 
This is because other explanations will depend on whether our experience of a text 
considers it to be a narrative or not, as the core factor. 
Metaphors and idioms
As suggested earlier, this study has adopted idioms as one of its major strategies of 
explaining narrative’s superiority in communication and retention. Remember our 
rationalizing relations whenever events in a narrative result from actions done for their agents’ reasons; 
they hold between behavior and a conscious agent’s intentional states for example beliefs, purposes, 
perceptions, and preferences. Intentional states are action guiding just because they have content. Nev-
ertheless, like constitutive relations, rationalizing relations do not order events temporally. Additionally, 
“they essentially involve an evaluation or an appraisal.” (Barwell, 2009, p. 56)
113  Barwell (2009) assumes that the ubiquity of stories and storytelling suggests that storytelling ful-
fills key social functions of which telling what happened, we explain both how it happened (explanation) 
and how significant it is (evaluation) as basics.
114  Livingston (2009) warns that whomever advocates for a causal account must successfully defend 
metaphysics of causation or show any prevalent or even universal ‘folk theory’ of causation indicat-
ing difference (scalar) between narrative and non-narrative representations. Other factors rather than 
causality per se, may be responsible, or contribute to the constitution of narrative.
115  Ideally, we know that a story already has a goal although we contribute in constructing that goal. 
Barwell further suggests that temporality does not occur in constitutive relations, in that, one thing 
happens as the other happens. Causality is not evidently present in many visual images, however this 
does not imply that causality is not a component of narrative.
main goals are to improve visual reading and continuing indigenous knowledge. 
As observed by Gorsjestani (2000), since the most common way of disseminating 
and preserving knowledge systems of the indigene were oral, communicative 
and mnemonic devices would conform to tools that aided communication and 
promoted memory. I need to note that our understanding of idioms crucially 
would embrace some knowledge of metaphors. This is because, mostly, idioms 
function metaphorically (Jin Cho, 2009; Cooper, 2000; Gibbs, Jr., Bogdanovich, 
Sykes & Barr, 1997; Strugielska & Alonso, 2007; Sullivan, 2006). In my discussion 
of both narrative and idiomatic applications, I will link these two concepts with 
metonymy discussed in the previous chapter. I will also argue that Kant’s theory 
of metaphor, as opposed to Lakoff ’s, provides a social account that suits the goals 
of this study.
Lakoff (1992) in his ‘Contemporary Theory of Metaphor’ notes that classical 
theory of language always defined metaphor as a purely linguistic phenomenon, 
rather than thought that comprises general mappings across conceptual domains. 
Such general mappings, withal, would also include ordinary everyday language 
as opposed to strictly novel poetic expressions: “In short, the locus of metaphor 
is not in language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in 
terms of another”116 (para. 1). In light of these thoughts, Lakoff believes that our 
everyday conceptual system largely depends on a ubiquitous metaphorical sys-
tem embedded in emotional or abstract concepts as soon as one gets away from 
concrete physical experience. Thus, individuals comprehend abstract concepts 
and perform abstract reasoning through metaphor as the main mechanism.117 
Only when speakers talk about physical reality, do we evidence non-metaphorical 
thinking (Tang, 2007). 
Apparently, because within different cultures the conceptual structures for the 
same elements could be diverse, different languages often take disparate elements 
as sources denoting similar metaphorical targets. “This confirms to the major te-
116  Metaphorical expressions became mutually exclusive with the realm of ordinary everyday lan-
guage: everyday language had not metaphor, and metaphor used mechanisms outside the realm of 
everyday conventional language. To demonstrate his stance against language Lakoff offers an example: 
If metaphors were merely linguistic expressions, we would expect different linguistic expressions to be 
different metaphors. Thus, “We’ve hit a dead end-street”, would constitute one metaphor. “We can’t 
turn back now” would constitute another, entirely different metaphor. “The marriage is on rocks” would 
involve still a different metaphor. And so on for dozens of examples. We have one metaphor, in which 
we conceptualize love as a journey. See more of this argument at http://terpconnect.umd.edu/∼israel/
lakoff-conTheoryMetaphor 
117  Lakoff insists by citing the general tendency to confuse the name of a mapping qua the mapping by 
alleging that seldom names of mappings possess a propositional form, yet, mappings themselves are 
not propositions. LOVE IS A JOURNEY is a name of a mapping. However, LOVE AS A JOURNEY mapping 
comprises a set of ontological correspondences characterizing “epistemic correspondences by mapping 
knowledge about journeys onto knowledge about love.” Instead, linguistic expressions only name 
the mappings, and the metaphor is the set of correspondences: “The metaphor is not just a matter of 
language, but of thought and reason. The language is secondary. The mapping is primary in that it sanc-
tions the use of source domain language and inference patterns for target domain concepts.” However, 
Lakoff’s idea of cross-domain mapping falls short of explaining how the conceptual system builds up 
material for its mappings, later on, his denial that it, too, is comparative in nature by instead preferring 
to call it an ‘ontological correspondence.’ Also see Anderson’s discussion of Linguistic theories of meta-
phor where she posits that metaphor has an irreducible cognitive force (1998, pp. 12-16).
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net of Lakoff ’s spirit that metaphors are matters of thought and not language,” 
resolves Tang (2007, p. 92). This further rests on the fact that words merely reveal 
ideas and perspectives about the world around us. Ergo, by positing that language 
is a result of a set of innate universals specific to language, cognitive linguists 
promote “a universal set of cognitive abilities, which serve to both facilitate and 
constrain the development of our conceptual systems and, hence, delimit what is 
possible to express in language” (Strugielska & Alonso, 2007, p. 2). In objection, 
although we may ably access pre-stored metaphorical mappings, such knowledge 
may not always be accessible and used in any given context (Gibbs et al, 1997). More 
so, Lakoff ’s theory of metaphor seems to centre on the individual, detached from 
his own environment as an accessible acculturated being, by presuming meta-
phoricality as occurring at the level of originator and not the audience or place 
of creation. This view differs from my idea of metaphor where metaphoricality 
ensues within the mind of the audience or at a social level (Linda, 1994).
By excluding metaphor from the mainstream of language, Lakoff provides a very 
narrow account of its (metaphor) role in society because that would be vital in grasp-
ing its internal mechanisms. Bowers (2009) scoffs at Lakoff and Johnson’s argument 
that, philosophy, science, and general knowledge begins with a person’s “perceptual 
and motor systems–that is embodied experience” (p. 1). It is worthy acquiescence 
that no one doubts the origin of some metaphors in bodily experiences as suggested 
by Lakoff and Johnson (in Bowers).118 Bowers, howbeit, argues that this account is 
partially correct because depending upon the culture’s mythopoetic narratives and/
or cosmology some of our concepts lack an embodied origin even though such con-
ceptual schemas are different across culture.119 Besides, the theory also fails to con-
sider that words have a culturally specific history and as such, it cannot account for 
the “linguistic colonization of the present by the past” (Bowers, pp. 6-8).120 
Lakoff and Johnson (cited in, Bowers, 2009), exigently, focus on image (or icon-
ic) metaphors as originating in embodied experiences including those inherited 
from the past and framed according to the prevailing root metaphors of the cul-
ture. Our ability to ratify an ecologically informed way of thinking and behaving 
is contentious because root metaphors, exercise a profound influence on many as-
118  Concepts such as up and down, back and forward, full and empty, and even the old British systems 
of measurement of inch, foot, yard, and mile can be traced back to bodily experience. Also their discus-
sion of how different experiences provide generative frameworks (schemas) for understanding and activ-
ity, behavior, and policy, where the already familiar becomes the model for understanding something 
new has to be taken seriously.
119  For example, Lakoff and Johnson would attribute the concept that underlies the use of the personal 
pronoun ‘I’ to the embodied experience of an individual, they overlook that this is a culturally construct-
ed identity–one traceable back to the writings of post-medieval philosophers and political theorists. In 
Buganda for instance, one expresses individual identify as a lineage of family ties and ancestry. This is 
very evident at introduction ceremonies where as a matter of principal, one provides a personal name 
as a preamble to individual identity and then a string of ancestors dating at least three generations. The 
concept ‘I’ spreads out into the entire background of an individual.
120  For example, the limiting analogs that framed how people understood the word woman in the west 
over thousands of years did not arise out of the embodied/sensorimotor/neutrally connected experience 
of today’s individual. 
pects of culture, including embodied experience. This is due to its meta-cognitive 
explanatory schema that guides thought and behavior at the level of conscious-
ness predominantly taken for granted.121 In a bid to yield a conceptual gateway by 
considering the individual’s culturally mediated embodied experience, Lakoff and 
Johnson consider cultural influence, language in building identity and thinking, 
embodied experience in light of disparate cultures, and ecological overtones of li-
aisons within cultural norms. In addition, the claim that metaphor is a model of 
thought defeats the idea that language is, too, a model of thought that subsumes 
metaphor (Nishimura, 2004). This is because, according to Nishimura though re-
sorting to analogy and similarity, metaphor is “an act of predicating under the rule 
that the metaphorical word must be used as a modifier for the subject” (p. 67).
Thought is a vague uncharted nebula without language since we have no pre-
existing ideas and nothing is distinct before language appears (Saussure, cited 
in, Dale, 1996). For this reason, Saussure thought that it was necessary to empha-
size language as having its roots both in the speech practices of a community and 
somehow in the brains. In this way, the practical nature of metaphor assumes a 
position of pointing to and questioning prevalent limitations on language explic-
itly expressed thus and thus: “metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. 
It is something brought off by imaginative employment of words and sentences 
and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise” 
(Davidson, cited in, Westley, 2004, para. 23). Kant’s aesthetic experience is charac-
terized by a ‘harmonious’ free play of the cognitive faculties (understanding and 
imagination) through the process of ‘animation.’122 Gibbons (2008) presents Kant’s 
theory of visual metaphor (also applies to literary metaphor), to cut the story 
short, thusly: 
 
A visual metaphor is an aesthetic idea presented by a visual work of art that performs 
both of the functions Kant sets out for them, namely (a) they animate our cognitive 
faculties and they (b) act as a surrogate logical exhibition of a rational idea. (p. 147)123 
121  Based on Richard H. Brown’s definition, root metaphors are meta-cognitive schemata taken for 
granted and thus frame thinking in a wide area of cultural activity over years–even centuries. These 
emanate from the mythopoetic “narratives of the culture, powerful evocative experiences that are 
sustained over generations and from the processes of analogic-based theories by writers were able to 
overturn older root metaphors” (cited in, Bowers, 2009, p. 10). Today we have the ‘computer age’ meta-
phor that is deeply rooted in technology but also has a great influence on the way people work and act.
122  Determinate concepts are the ones we employ in cognitive judgments and are the opposite of inde-
terminate concepts–the ones we employ for reflective judgments. Whereas rational ideas are concepts 
of the mind that will never find an empirical intuition worthy of exhibiting them in concrete experi-
ence, aesthetic ideas are intuitions that we can never subsume under any determinate concept. Just as 
rational ideas search in vain for that intuition which will exhibit them adequately, aesthetic ideas search 
vainly for a determinate concept that will be adequate for their subsumption. For Kant, inexponible 
intuitions and indemonstratable concepts are such that they can never become cognition, but remain 
grounded in imagination and pure reason of the subjective and objective faculties respectively (p. 51). 
The free play of the faculties is purely reflective. No full-fledged cognition of the beautiful object is tak-
ing place such that a concept and an intuition are coming together in a determinate way. Instead, we 
continue to hold the beautiful object in our mind’s eye and contemplate it indeterminately, i.e., we never 
subsume the object under any concept (p.34).
123  This presentation brings to light two elements: that not all artworks can be metaphors (b) not all 
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Let me place Gibbons’ analysis of Kant’s metaphor in context of the prison metaphor. 
The literal meaning of the metaphor ‘marriage is a prison cell,’ is the internal 
representation of the imagination that the words in the rendition arouse: the 
beclouding idea of marriage as a prison cell. The metaphorical meaning of the 
rendition becomes the enormous host of representations that indeterminately 
alter inner intuition of the ideas produced.124 In effect, the metaphorical meaning 
becomes the indefinite amount of contemplative thought emanating from 
the animation of our faculties by the aesthetic idea.125 That is, our struggle to 
represent inwardly, a prison of marriage instigates free play of the imagination 
and understanding. I will provide an elaborate discussion of the metaphor later in 
the text. Because we cannot represent such an idea determinately, Kant (cited in, 
Gibbons, 2008) considers such an experience aesthetic and it thereupon, constitutes 
a metaphor. Crucially, many contemporary metaphor theorists would agree with 
Kant that when we take an expression to be a metaphor, we are thereby not taking 
it to be a literal expression at a particular time. Here is Gibbons’ explanation:
 
A sentence like “a squirrel is in the attic” expresses an internal representation that can 
be successfully processed in a determinate fashion. However, “Juliet is the sun” does 
not express an internal representation that can be handled determinately, but rather 
it must be indeterminately processed. This indeterminacy results in an aesthetic idea 
(metaphor) being formed in the mind of a reader/listener, and subsequently the con-
templation that this metaphor gives rise to, is its metaphorical (as opposed to literal) 
meaning.126 (p. 187)
In confronting the idea of ‘deciphering’, as a form of meaning generated through 
a ‘property transfer’ between objects, Davidson (cited in, Westley, 2004) insists, 
“[M]etaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, 
and nothing more” (para. 10). As such, marriage literally means prison. In this 
respect, paraphrasing a metaphor is an attempt at describing, “[O]ur imaginative 
engagement with the metaphor and not a description of some ‘meaning’ contained 
within the metaphor”127 (Westley, para.12). Westley links this observation to Kant’s 
metaphoric artworks are, comparative too. I will present this case when discussing the exhibits. 
124  Gibbons explains Kant’s inner intuition: “Aesthetic ideas are intuitions that a work of art gives rise to 
or suggests to an audience member’s mind. What this means is that aesthetic ideas are intuitions brought 
to mind by a particular work or art, but that are not identical to the empirical intuitions of the artworks 
themselves. This is why Kant refers to aesthetic ideas as inner intuitions, or alternatively, as the internal 
“representations of the imagination” that are brought to mind by experiencing a work of art.” (p. 53)
125  See Gibbons’ interpretation of Frederick’s metaphor, pp. 207-8
126  The literal meaning of “Juliet is the sun” is the bizarre identity it conveys between a teenage girl 
and the star at the center of our planetary system. In Kant’s view, this is precisely what “Juliet is the 
sun” would convey if we were to understand it as determinate. All the words in the expression would 
work together to call to mind a complex internal representation of a star-girl, or girl-star, either of which 
would be strange indeed, and foreign to our stable of determinate concepts. However, if we understand 
Juliet metaphorically, then we begin to ponder the many different possible interpretations of this ex-
pression and we begin to wonder whether we possibly can grasp them all.” (Gibbons, 1996, p. 187-189)
127  Black’s assertion that we may explain metaphor by paraphrase, would mean that we need basic 
own assessment of paraphrase: “Because the understanding cannot settle upon a 
determinate concept, imaginative engagement cannot be formulated into words as 
this would require that imaginative experience be put into propositional form: this 
happens if there is no determinate concept to express”(para. 12). In essence then, 
the content of imaginative engagement lacks meaning because what we notice 
in this process and what the words mean are disparate things.128 There is no new 
meaning at the end of the process in terms of what we intended to mean. 
Nevertheless, when we contemplate a situation of, say marriage as a prison 
cell, this is not exactly the meaning of the metaphor. What it means already lays 
in the words that lead to our contemplation of the imaginative compositions of 
the bizarre relationship. Westley (2004) insists that since meaning is simply a 
property of sentences and can therefore be nothing other than literal then literal 
meaning makes us attend to similarities but this does not result in figuratively 
meaningful sentences. In this case, we do not prioritize meaning of an utterance 
or aesthetic idea as the actual meaning of the metaphor, but rather we find it at the 
literal level, with what we originally receive. What the metaphor does is to prompt 
insight inspired by a literal statement requiring us to see one thing as another dif-
ferently, through different ‘lenses’. Subsequently, metaphor turns out as impor-
tant in drawing attention to “the way in which language is able to communicate 
our experiences.” Westley expresses metaphor thus and so:
On the one hand, it destabilizes our relationship to language by making the idea of 
meaning problematic: it highlights the limitations of language by gesturing towards 
the incongruity between experiences and the linguistic apparatus in place for making 
sense of and communicating these experiences. At the same time, it opens up possibili-
ties for change by introducing new ways of perceiving–and consequently understand-
ing–the world: vital for both poetry and everyday communication.129 (para. 26)
 
cognitive content that remains constant during the process of changing the words used in expressing it. 
The meaning would instead become extra-linguistic. Davidson further claims that metaphorical state-
ments do not contain such cognitive content since truth exists at the level of actual sentences, being 
aware that sentences do not exist somewhere outside language. His argument goes that metaphorical 
meaning stands at sentential level, and not beyond, for, no ‘re-wording’ can express some “underlying, 
hidden meaning, as no such meaning exists within a metaphor.”
128  Although metaphor may cause imaginative attention to similarities between certain things, we cannot 
claim that such attention is the meaning of the metaphor. For example, imagining the possibility of marriage 
being like prison may not be the meaning of the metaphor. “By contrast, a metaphor which has the form of 
sentence identifying two things ‘X and Y’ is literally false, and it is necessary to change the usage of words 
temporarily according to its particular rule which demands using the predicate Y just as a modifier of the sub-
ject X,” insists Nishimura (2004, p. 66). “The point at issue here is not identity between two different things X 
and Y, nor subsumption of X under category Y which is normally contradictory to X, but nuanced identification 
of X by modifying X with certain traits of the word Y” (Nishimura, p. 66).
129  Westley further notes, “It seems, then, that metaphor is a very practical phenomenon and its value 
seems to reside not just in its ability to re-describe (and to be re-described in turn) but also owing to its 
performing in such a way that it exerts considerable power over us in bringing about a certain mental 
state that draws attention both to the need for re-description as well as to the content of this mental 
state itself” (para. 24).
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Paraphrasing a metaphorical construction endeavors to describe what the 
expression arouses, that is, the content of our imaginative experience. Gibbons 
(1996) takes such imaginative experience as metaphorical meaning, although Davidson 
as well as Westley argues in favor of a distinction between literal and metaphoric 
meaning.130 That aside, through this contemplation and the high propensity of 
multivariate assumptions created during such processes, we may eventually 
engender new relationships we have not encountered before, which could lead to 
innovation, comprehension, and retention. That is, contemplating marriage’s 
confinement and that of prison cells, may engender new insight or relationships with 
both marriage and prisons cells not highlighted in the metaphorical construction. 
According to Kant (cited in, Crisp, 1997), the human mind comprises three faculties 
or powers: sensibility, understanding, and reason.131 He tasks reflective judgment as a 
mediator between the empirically unspecifiable ideals of reason and the supposedly 
strictly rule governed operations of understanding. Serendipitously, according to 
Crisp, Kant assigned a sizable epistemological role to aesthetic properties by arguing 
that aesthetic judgment mediated between reason and understanding.132 Central to his 
aesthetic philosophy, Crisp notes, is the contention that “though there are no rules 
of beauty, aesthetic judgments do have objectivity” (p. 252).133 
If aesthetic judgments do have objectivity, it so follows that we have the ability 
to cognize things outside the aesthetic experience itself that Kant (cited in, Gib-
bons, 1996) positions as central to his theory of metaphor and art in general. Kant 
viewed fine art as tasked with social communication and thus, the beautiful and 
the sublime pleasure should accompany presentations that are ways of cognizing 
(Yanal, 2002). In this case, although in my postulate I maintain that metaphor finds 
its basic roots in the aesthetic idea, I also say that we have a cognitive element ush-
ered in by our engagement with the metaphor. What is central to throw at the back 
130  The difference in Davidson’s explanation is that he is intent on achieving the intended meaning, al-
though we cannot guarantee chances that we may arrive. Gibbons, on the other hand, considers mean-
ing in general whereby somehow we many generate some meaning, whether intended or otherwise. 
Indeed, Davidson explains his position from the viewpoint of the author, whereas, Gibbons approaches 
her idea of metaphor from that of the reader.
131  Crisp (1997) attempts a modification of the claim: “Sensibility is the power of sensation; under-
standing comprises the conceptual power, which in light of strict rules, unifies a multitude of sense data 
and as such, gives rise to objective, scientific knowledge; and the highest mental power of all is reason. 
However, it could not attain on its own any objective scientific knowledge in theoretical as opposed to 
practical or moral matters: “Its sole, theoretical, role was to guide and regulate the functions of the 
understanding. What this meant in effect was that just as the understanding unified the sensibility, so 
reason in turn unified the understanding” (p. 252).
132  Kant believed in algorithmic induction in the understanding’s possession of a set of strict rules, but 
in this, he was wrong, in Crisp’s (1997) view. “Once this is recognized however, the epistemological role 
he assigned to aesthetic properties, far from being diminished, is expanded. The distinction between 
reason, following principles, and understanding, obeying strict rules, disappears, since there are no 
strict, inductive rules. When this happens, aesthetic properties rather than mediating between two 
different cognitive powers become a pervasive part of all our cognition. Not only is the role of aesthetic 
consciousness thus expanded it is also deepened in a way totally in accord with the spirit, if not the 
technical detail, of Kant’s philosophy.” (pp. 250-51)
133  For a detailed discussion of aesthetic judgments and objectivity, see Crisp (1997). Aesthetics, 
Cognition and Metaphor–some light from Kant, available online at http://sunzi1.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/
view/9/900049.pdf
of our minds is what Kant expresses in his idea of metaphor, namely, that meta-
phor exists within the mind that contemplates it and not within the objects that 
trigger its contemplation. It is also clear that Kant does not consider metaphor as a 
purely conceptual phenomenon but a linguistic entity. Based on this and other the 
realizations, I argue that Kantian metaphor is more adapted to a social and prag-
matic theory in which my concept of meaning dwells. My thesis is metaphor can-
not be fundamentally our view of the world, by implication or nature. Metaphor 
instead may depend on how we view the world and thus conceptualize it. That is, 
instead of metaphor influencing our thought patterns; it is, the way we fit into the 
social world that creates metaphors. We therefore, in order to achieve metaphori-
cality, have to interact in a social world where language and understanding take 
place. 
How do idioms interact with metaphors? 
“okwanjala engalo” is a Ganda idiom literally meaning, ‘sprawling one’s 
fingers.’ This idiom expresses emptiness in the Ganda concept of possession rooted 
in a metaphor ‘fullness is virtue’. It comes about as a practice of the body normally 
used to portray ‘being without’ or ‘empty hands’ by spreading them out. Expressly, in 
order to figure out this is an idiom, one metaphorically subsumes the relationship 
it engenders between sprawling and emptiness. Applied to literal use, we presume a 
situation whereby Njabala has nothing to show off from her presumed hard work, and 
as such, she can only sprawl her fingers because she has nothing to show. In the eyes 
of the people that expected much of her it is ignominious. Nevertheless, we have a 
complicated situation to deal with; the context in which this situation occurs requires 
a declaration that ‘Njabala is lazy’. Our idiomatic representation of Njabala as a lazy 
person is the ‘sprawling fingers’ that also shows emptiness. Hamilton (2000) notes 
that reliance of metaphors on “their effect on insights based on shared background 
knowledge, their audience must be capable first of identifying the connection being 
posited, and second of making the correct attribute linkages between the different 
domains”134 (p. 254). To conceptualize the meaning, we need to transform it into a 
metaphoric construction ‘Njabala is the sprawling fingers.’ In imagining Njabala as 
‘sprawling fingers’ we create a metaphor since we cannot determinately subsume 
Njabala as sprawling fingers.135 An aesthetic idea develops because of the indeterminacy 
that springs up in the mind of the viewer or listener, and as a result, the contemplation 
that this metaphor raises, is its metaphoric (as opposed to literal) meaning.
Having realized that idioms may function as metaphors, how do idioms then 
link with metonymy and communication in narrative constructions? I should note 
here that metonymy invokes a context much larger and more echoic than the text 
or the work it represents (Drout, 2006b). This is also true with idioms given that 
134  Hamilton also notes that metaphors have assisted designers in conceptualizing interface presenta-
tion requirements (ibid). I should note here that the use of domain in this case is a matter of language 
use rather than specifically in reference to cross-domain mapping suggested by Lakoff.
135  Alternatively, even, we can never fully represent empirically ignominy with sprawling fingers, and 
this case; we have another metaphor within the same idiom.
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some idioms are indeed reflective of proverbs or entire stories, and as such, invoke 
a host of associations. Similarly, meaning that enables metaphoricacility bears ten-
dencies of extending (often indefensibly) to every aspect of the two compared ref-
erents (Black, 1952; Westendorp, Piet, van der Waarde, & Karel, 2007). Apparently, 
the qualities a sender wishes the audience to transfer to the primary subject should 
depend upon context (Anderson, op cit). This assumption gains support from re-
search carried out by Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, and Antos (1978) indicating that 
context rather than literalness determines how easily an audience will process met-
aphors.136 Secondly, second language learners learning idiomatic expressions in the 
target culture and society, boosted their ability to learn and communicate (Jin Cho, 
2009). In relation, research indicates that “adequate knowledge and appropriate use 
of idioms in a L2 (second language) is an important indicator of L2 communicative 
competence” (Andreou & Galantomos, 2008, p. 9).137 In addition, children repro-
duce adult utterances instead of words in their early language development by re-
peating specific combinations of language (Warren 2005). Augmenting the above, 
young children exhibit preference for thinking metonymically prior to thinking 
metaphorically. Everyday language thus, largely builds on a surmountable amal-
gam of prefabricated parts such as idioms: “The most representative type of a pre-
fab structure is idiom” (Andreou & Galantomos, p. 8). More so, research indicates 
that people’s awareness of conceptual metaphors partly motivates how they make 
sense of idiomatic phrases (Gibbs et al, 1997). In the same way, metaphoric thought, 
under many conditions, may have a role in people’s immediate understanding of at 
least some kinds of idioms in everyday language. 
In conclusion, Gibbons (2008), as well as Kant, agree with contemporary theo-
rists who consider content as critical when judging a work of art to be a visual 
metaphor “insofar as both theories place the notion of ‘comparison’ at the center 
of their definition of visual metaphor” (p. 148). In conformity to this realization, 
Gibbons argues that although not necessarily comparative in their content, Kant’s 
aesthetic ideas are typically comparative owing to their formal structure, which 
substitutes determinate representations of indeterminate thoughts and ideas.138 It 
136  This research also dispels the general postulate that figurative language takes longer to process 
than the literal. Further, “[i]n many cases the interpretation is quite unproblematic; the reader or lis-
tener can almost predict what will be conveyed and the target sentence is used, as it were, to confirm an 
already formed hypothesis about its meaning.” Also see, Gibbs, Bogdanovich, Sykes, & Barr (1997, p. 150) 
for the discussion of the results of their research where they note that depending on the high speed with 
which people compute idiomatic speech makes it quite unlikely that people actually compute meta-
phorical mappings each time they read or hear idioms in discourse. This implies that we do not access 
metaphor constructions every time we encounter idiomaticity, but it does not dispel the fact we mostly 
process idioms metaphorically.
137  This type of competence includes a set of abilities, such as skill to decode the various (dominant, 
peripheral, polysemous) meanings of a word, the ability to suspend a literal-referential strategy, to 
produce novel figurative expressions and to construct a coherent semantic representation related to a 
given figurative expression.
138  Aesthetic ideas are not the patches of color or the areas of light and shadow in a picture, just as they are 
not the particular shapes of letters or punctuation in a poem; they are intuitions that a work of fine art gives 
rise to or suggests to an audience member’s mind. See, Gibbons (2009, pp. 67-70), for a detailed discussion of 
aesthetic ideas. What this means is that aesthetic ideas are intuitions brought to mind by a particular work of 
is also true that in her definition, Gibbons acknowledges that the Kantian meta-
phor fits the general conception that a “metaphor is comparison between two ap-
parently dissimilar items, or as an expression that presents one item as if it were 
something else. However, his central point pertaining to metaphoricality centers 
on “the aesthetic idea an artwork presents, and not in terms of its formal struc-
ture” 139 (Gibbons, p. 160). This study thusly, adopts Kant’s theory of metaphor as 
described by Gibbons because of its social base.
art, but that are not identical to the empirical intuitions of the artworks themselves. In short, aesthetic ideas 
are particular mental images that we generate in response to works of fine art. Secondly, for someone to be 
artistically creative in Kant’s view, one must have all the powers of genius, namely, both able to communicate 
aesthetic messages to an audience, and provide them with an aesthetic experience.
139  While analyzing the aesthetic idea presented by Le Voil and Baboon and Young, Gibbons (2008) 
notes that although Jupiter’s eagle “does not contain any obvious comparative visual content (i.e., it 
does not show a comparison in any of its depictions), it does invite us to compare the visual content of 
the painting with what we can imagine a determinate exhibition of ‘mighty king of heaven’ and ‘sublim-
ity and majesty of creation’ might look like.” (pp. 142-143). Ideally, though, it becomes evident that the 
content of a visual artwork partially counts as enabling the status of visual metaphor. Just to clarify (a) 
is a function performed by all aesthetic ideas from all works of fine art whereas (b) arises from a select 
group of aesthetic ideas that behave as basic kind of comparison involving some rational idea(s). In this 
vain, ∼bele’s (2002) discussion or images in her article Revealing and hidden life–landscape as a visual 
metaphor in Lativian art of the Early 20th century, does not constitute metaphoricality. See, discus-
sion at http:// www.eki.ee/km/place/pdf/kp2_13abele.pdf.  To view images of Baboon and young go to, 
http://www.chess-theory.com/images5/24223_picasso_ sculpture.jpg and La viol, http://kujok.dk/
billeder/Rene%20 Magritte/magritte-le-viol.jpeg
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ART AND MEANING 
 
In this section, I discuss Ganda tradition and interpretation, and I say, in 
appreciating art, the Baganda had unified views and thus consensual meanings 
due to their traditional values. This has not changed much especially in the more 
traditional communities where art was removed with no replacement value. I 
also show and explain that, in traditional norms rather than more interpretive 
instances, the Baganda artistry mainly existed in the moment, although Western 
values would seem to extend these moments beyond immediacy. Art will bear 
meaning in people’s lives today if we redefine its institutionalized and academized 
cultural form to have a wider role, meaning, and immediacy in contemporary life 
situations (Halkinhal, 1999). Individuals, in appreciating Ganda art, had personal 
interpretations of these artifacts, yet in many cases, their meaning was tantamount 
to similar experiences due to hierarchy and tradition.140 Further, I highlight the 
argument that since the Baganda reveled in common meaning, it would be grossly 
misconceived to bombard them with new art forms with little or no capacity to 
appreciate them. I also make it clear in this short passage that traditional thinking 
does not mean that people did not engage in interpretive acts, or that there were 
no means of interpretation. Our interpretations in tradition are not significant 
enough to influence the outcome of our thoughts beyond traditional Buganda way 
of learning. 
Tradition  
The proverb, “Siwa muto lugero nga talumanyi” demands that an expert offers 
an automatic explanation to a novice (Nsimbi, 1996). That is, when one applies 
a proverb, or for that matter, any other linguistic trope, figure, or jargon, one 
must be ready to discern the meaning. Similarly, the idiom “Abaana ba Kintu” 
140  Lugira (1970) holds a vital dialogue on hierarchy: “This underlying force pervades all existence in the 
Ganda mind. …we find authority to be a major expression of vitalism that permeates the Ganda Welt-
anschuung. It is liable to decrease and increase according to factors such as power and dignity. It may 
be taken as a Hierarchy of authority. Thus we have it in the order of Deity: Supreme Force (= Lubaale) 
= Katonda, quasi-intermediary forces = Balubaale and their accessories; in the order of Humanity: The 
Ruler = Kabaka, the Elders = Bataka, the Chiefs = Baami and the rest of the people” (p. 18).
is typical of propagation suggested by the Baganda. Lugira (1970) locates Ganda 
philosophy of life in the legitimacy of belongingness. Additionally, as part of the 
vast migrations of the African Bantu, their overriding philosophy was vitalistic and 
conceived the world as of humans and things rooted in the idea of life expressed in 
origin, dynamism, unity, and vital force. Green (2005) locates the above expression 
in “national pride and survival of Kintu’s progeny” through continuity of the clan 
system (p. 8). On a parallel understanding, the concept of meaning in the traditional 
Ganda society is communal and transcended by the concept of propagation: it 
is a priori in many instances and thus things outside the realm of transcendent 
meaning are alien and simply unconceivable. Everyone in the culture had access to 
Meaning as a way of realizing continuity.  
Kasozi (1983) recounts that the commoners venerated the Kabaka’s power to 
such an extent that they believed such powers were God given. Such belief came 
with the feeling that if any of the articles in use by the king were misused, the su-
pernatural force would avenge their destruction or misappropriation. When Kintu 
came to Buganda and established a kingdom, he spelt out the powers of each in-
dividual within his realm thereby consecrating a conceptual hierarchy within the 
minds of his subjects. The king’s supremacy was insurmountable and his word was 
final (Kaggwa, 1905).141 Investigating the mentality of hierarchy, Lugira (1970) digs 
deep to its philosophical roots that he reckons lay in the behavior of the Baganda. 
He traces the principal of vitalism from language use expressed by the words with 
artistic significance: “A Muganda does not draw nor paint a picture, but he beats it” 
(Lugira, pp. 16-17). This too, extends to imagining it. Art production, duly, ensued 
as a practice of exerting energy, mentally and physically beating with the force 
that imbues the Ganda mind.142 
The laborious explanation of Ganda behavior is without consequence consid-
ering Lugira’s (1970) insistence on the ‘underlying force’ that “pervades all exis-
tence in the Ganda mind” (p. 18). The same force, liable to increase or decrease, 
depending on power or dignity for example, signals a hierarchy of authority that 
permeates the Ganda way of life. Its instantaneous manifestation emerges in the 
order of deity that includes the supreme force (Katonda), quasi-intermediary forc-
es (Lubaale), and their intermediaries; in the order of humanity, the ruler (kabaka) 
topped the hierarchy, and then next in order of power and importance are the el-
ders (bataka), the chiefs (baami), and the commoners (bakopi). Architecture, sacred 
141  Whenever the king wished to appear before his people for example, in a meeting or preside over an 
occasion, his subjects observed total respect, and indeed his guards always alert to purge any convict of 
the day. When he desired to take a particular route, it did not matter whether an established pathway 
existed; his entourage forged it immediately.
142  The expression of vitality derives its attributes from the verb ‘Kukuba’ that literally means to beat, 
strike, win, use energy and force, or depict, which in Lugira’s opinion further expresses a philosophically 
underlying element of vital force. In his continued argument, Lugira (pp. 16-17) further suggests that the 
verbs ‘Kusala’ and ‘Kulya’ (respectively meaning to cut and to eat) denote energy and force, strength, 
and vital union respectively. However, “eating Kabakaship” expressed ‘vitality’ similar to that of rais-
ing someone’s rank or stature. In the Ganda mentality, eating food manifests as a source of energy, 
strength, force and unity and as such, any exhibition of raising these qualities is ‘eating’ (ibid, p. 18).
3 /  Artistic Traditions and 
Narrative in Buganda
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ceramics, hoes, spears, shields, bows 
and arrows, canoes, important musi-
cal instruments, and many utensils 
reflect conical or triangular patterns 
(see figure 2).143 Such a mentality, Lu-
gira concludes, seeks “step-by-step, 
to find, to respect, and to render sub-
mission to the One, the Supreme” 
(Lugira, p. 207). Secondly, the effects 
of hierarchy have an imposing pres-
ence on how the communities make 
sense of their environment (see fig-
ure 3). The veneration of the Supreme 
not only imposes itself on the physi-
cal, but also on the non-physical. 
This constitutes symbolism that so 
evidently overwhelms Ganda mental-
ity in two ways: supernatural forces 
or authoritative power from the rul-
ers dictate Meaning of objects or 
things from ‘above’; the supreme, so 
sacred and thus extolled, dictates all 
representations such that his person will not be violated. 
Upon belief, for instance, Lubaale Wamala, a son of Musisi reached Ssingo; 
he had water contained in an animal skin, which he drew from Lake Nalubaale. 
When he placed the skin on the ground to rest, the water poured and formed into 
the now Lake Wamala–today deified by the Baganda. Similarly, Lubaale Kiwanuka 
caused thunder according to Ganda belief. Trees, reptiles, stones, hills, forests, 
wells, and rivers formed deified articles among the Baganda and none of these 
elements contained what they believed: they signified what the people assigned 
to them arbitrarily because they needed accessible things to the human mind in 
place of the superhuman (Kaggwa, 1901). However, such meanings bore no room 
for negotiation; they existed a priori and in the case of recurrence by imagination, 
act, or contact, the same meaning was re-experienced. Meaning comprised of con-
stants alterable only by prior consensus because once accepted, the onus lay upon 
hierarchy to reconstitute it.144 Obviously, the social group as the source of wisdom 
143  Lugira’s (1970) classification of the hierarchy implies that the Ganda social perspective “tradition-
ally relied on hierarchical and pyramidal authority and power” (p. 207), which spinoffs in two ways: “All 
significant artifacts of the Baganda are traditionally conical, pyramidal or triangular (whether stylized or 
not) in design.”
144  Goddie (personal communication, 2008) once narrated a story of Diikuula, a comedian, who upon 
belief that he would amuse his audience, urinated in a beer mug (endeku) only to find himself almost 
lynched. This is because there was no general agreement that one could urinate in a beer mug. How-
ever, within ‘elbow room’, people could use the gourd vessels as containers for gathering grasshoppers 
outside the normal expectations of being beer mugs.
and authority form the core 
of traditional cultures, un-
like the liberal tradition, 
centering on the free and ra-
tional individual (Anderson, 
cited in, Hutchens & Suggs, 
1997; Rogers & Shoemaker, 
1971). Noteworthy, the Ganda 
hierarchy, largely, embedded 
sexism privileging men, in 
the social group, as superior.
Meaning 
The meaning of such objects comprises a deeply contextualized and arbitrary form 
for the insider due to presentiment and continued exposure to the same stimulus. 
This process becomes typical of certain non-negotiable meanings, not even negated 
by the individual, but the group. The outsider on the other hand possesses the 
luxury of roaming free with ambiguities of signs that could mean various things. In 
Ganda norms, we evidence several intermediaries that intervene to create essence 
of the represented. Mediums, priests, and venerated objects replace the direct TV 
signal that once mediated my sphere of knowledge.145 The vital force again becomes 
the supreme power by which meaning avails itself to the individual, which tends 
to affect them uniformly. Remarkably, although actual experience springs from the 
individual then to the group, the intention remains confounded in commonality, 
for example, one who seeks advice from the oracle meets another individual with 
the same intention. The meaning of the oracle to both of them bears no variation, 
at least not external.
Context inevitably, as evidenced in both tradition and meaning, transfigures 
into the medium by which signals express the inherent invariables bound by 
common belief. Our ability to judge social situations and respond appropriately 
without awareness of the condition, underlines the notion of intuition, and lays 
credence on implicit cognitive processes that include stereotypes and mood states 
(Andrade, 2005). Intuition, by no lesser standards, plays a great role in constitut-
ing contexts by which we access phenomena in a traditional setting. Going by the 
possibility of constituting intuition at an earlier stage preceding awareness, it 
thus follows that Ganda knowing is highly intuitive and responds to the whims of 
habituated processes. The ‘Unconscious Imperative’ or ‘telos’ suggested by Drout 
(2006a) operates at this level. Such processes further respond to typicalized me-
diums to become close associates. Typicality thus far defines the extent to which 
145  The Arsenal Vs Tottenham game will no longer don a secondary or prototypical signal; it disinte-
grates into a jumble of signals mediated by third party mediums only related to the game by laborious 
explanations. Similarly, the child watching its favorite TV program can no longer see the images through 
the eyes of Tele-tubbies; mediated texts by a narrator external to the action interprets the child’s own 
visions.
Figure 2. A stool for Kibuuka’s relics reflecting coni-
cal, pyramidal, and triangular shapes predominating 
Ganda traditional artifacts. Photo: adopted from 
Lugira, 1970.
Figure 3. A group of men prostrate before the 
Supreme. Photo: adopted from Lugira, 1970.
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identifications with particular phenomena largely depends upon generalized 
concepts. Musisi in this sense associates with shaking or seismic waves because 
a Lubaale possess the powers to do so. In what is atypical or typical, the Baganda 
disconnect or connect the body, soul, and the outer realms alien in a way generi-
cally acculturated into its own culture. 
Anything could represent anything in Buganda and as such when the king 
died, executioners killed the ‘Omusoloza’ responsible for keeping a symbolic fire of 
the king’s life burning in the palace immediately because the one it burned for, had 
died.146 Friesen (2006) considers a genuine symbol as usually containing a cultural 
and logical foundation. The fire translated into a metaphor of life; a rare case of vi-
sual metaphoric representation.147 ‘Kawulugumo’, a drum forming part of the royal 
battery produced a ‘roaring’ sound that prompted its nomenclature; it announced 
either war, triumph or death of a prince, when sounded. The roaring forms a link 
with might of jungle king–the lion. Other artifacts symbolized or initiated ac-
tion.148 Another form of symbolism contrived acts of artistry: when the earthquake 
146  The roots of symbolism date as far back as the coming of Kintu. Kaggwa (1901) reveals that dur-
ing this period, people throughout the kingdom rested for seven days every time the moon appeared. 
He further reveals that due to this norm from Magonga where Kintu lived, every king thereafter had 
to spend a day without performing any duty other than touching the fetishes (mayembe)  containing 
the spirits he believed had protected him through the month. In Magonga still, virgin boys and girls 
ate cooked plantain obtained from a banana plant–ekitooke known as ‘Manyagalya’ believed to have 
been brought with Kintu. This claim also highlights the Ganda belief in the mythic-historical beginning 
of Buganda royal dynasty. The symbolism cited above works itself through, conspicuously, in Ganda 
rituals, significantly evident during the coronation of a Kabaka. For example: (1) At the ninth stage of 
the ritual almanac, Semanobe (oracle at Budo’s shrine) took the crown prince a tree known as ‘Oluiki’ 
and got one piece–empiki, called ‘Buteba’ that was part of the ‘Mweso’ game  found in an enclosure 
known as ‘Kigango’, ‘Gombolola’ or ‘Masengere-gansaze’. Kaggwa describes the seed as significant of 
the Kabaka’s supremacy in that no one assumes a wiser position than that of the king. If anyone became 
wiser, s/he would utilize his/her vast acumen compared to a wise player of mweso who wins an oppo-
nent with less seeds but tactically playing backwards. The piece (usually a black and smooth hard seed 
that grow on the Luiki tree) ‘empiki eya buteba’ in this example symbolizes the wisdom attributed to the 
superiority of the Kabaka and artistry of mweso players. (2) From Budo, the crown prince would select a 
hill on which he erected a fence–‘Akakomera’ that marked his father’s last funeral rites. The kakomera 
comprised of temporary materials–‘Bikabugo’ and at its completion, the prince became the Kabaka 
of Buganda. The oracle ‘Nalungu’ of the Lugave (pangolin) clan told Kabaka Namugala that: “This hill 
Naggalabi is where your grandfather Kintu overpowered Bbemba Musota, and after killing him he ‘ate’ 
Obuganda” (Kaggwa, 1901, p. 8) He insisted and advised him that when his child and grandchildren ate 
the Kabakaship, they had to go to Naggalabi. They should step on the ‘Jjembe’ (fetish) in commemo-
ration of Kintu’s victory over Bbemba and possession of his country; thus, whoever went to that hill 
became the next Kabaka (ibid).
147  The only ritual with inherent qualities of what it represented comprised the process of extracting 
the jawbone of a dead king. The Ganda never buried a dead king; belief holds that he continued into 
another life. The extraction of the jawbone followed the belief that the king would continue to eat and 
energize his afterlife, so the bearers of the object ensured its maximum protection, suggests Kaggwa. 
Elsewhere, Kasozi (1983) links symbolism in the jawbone to unity since each one of us is bound to eat as 
a source of energy: The people will remain in unison with their fallen king. The jawbone became indexi-
cally representative of the Kabaka and his afterlife, and so far, this forms the indexical signification of 
physical objects yet found in the Ganda mentality.
148  ‘Busemba’ the drum of death sounded only after instigating the death of the first person to notice 
it. The eventual proverb “Ajukiza Busemba, y’agikuba” derives content from the symbolism behind 
the words and acts. Object, action, and name supplement each other to form an interlock of symbolic 
entities in this instance of representation. ‘Ku-semba’ means to ‘come last’ and the first person to 
pronounce that the drum lagged behind after the sounding of Mujaguzo went to the sacrificial table to 
safeguard the king against hostile spirits.
struck the land, it signaled Lubale Musisi, responsible for shaking the earth. After 
the vibrations seized, people alarmed wildly and widely and played musical in-
struments to recognize his authority. 149 The prevalence of Musisi prompted preg-
nant women to paint their abdomens with black soot that indicated the happening 
leaving behind traces similar to what Sabine (2008) calls a ‘physical trace’. This, 
they believed, prevented miscarriages and disease that would affect the child. Such 
experiential meaning relies on qualities that translate into visual signs that, in turn, 
transform an internal belief into a tangible sign. The belief mutates into another 
sign outside its own properties and whether or not this sign contains qualities of 
the belief, the mutation of physical energy into visible signs serves to relieve the 
bearer of the original expression and thereby constituting its meaning. In this 
way, oral cultures make common use of visual metaphors as a way of symbolizing 
their beliefs about the world and organizing knowledge. Culture legitimizes this 
way of knowing and expressed in a tradition of rich imagery commonly referred to 
as the way of the people (Clair, 2000).
Ganda art practice
The Baganda expressed their ideas predominantly through thought exhibited by the 
wisdom they applied in constructing folk tales, as opposed to visual representation. 
This reflects in the minimal prevalence of representational figurative art in Ganda 
traditional art with the ‘Luzira pottery figure’ and Ttimba drum as some of the 
few known anthropomorphic images in Buganda (see figures 4 & 5).150 The lack 
of anthropomorphic design finds root in the inability of people of Buganda to 
distinguish reverential or servile fear from religious representations and fear of 
unknown forces attributed to their attitude towards religion (Lugira, 1971).151 “This 
149  Musisi was the son of Bukulu. Bukulu was one of the chiefs that came with Kintu to Buganda.
150  From my studies, the first zoomorphic art form evident among Ganda impresses a snakelike figure 
of ‘Ttimba’ (python) the main drum in the Royal battery (Mujaguzo), introduced by Kabaka Kimera (see 
figure 6). “A Kabaka was supposed to beat Ttimba at his enthronement to declare publically that he had 
become a Kabaka,” writes Kasozi (1983, p. 15). Kasozi further reports the chief fetish of the king (Mba-
jwe), comprised of a rope and a head made out of clay that likened it to a serpent. Less these two iconic 
representations at first level signification, many artifacts in Buganda symbolized another thing–this also 
included speech and behavior. Fetishes established the first contact with the superior power of mainly 
clan gods entrusted with the responsibility of protecting his clan members; relics such as of Kibuka the 
war god provide evidence of representation by physical objects at the national level (see figure 3). “The 
relics are the links between the living  and the dead, in other words they are the tangible objects to 
which the ghost is said to cling, and form the sacred emblems for worship” notes Roscoe (1921, p. 140). 
Further still, a meteoric object of Mukasa (Neptune), the god of the lake commanded veneration and 
emblematized by a canoe paddle while a serpent with phallus in his mouth represented ‘Mbajwe’ one of 
the most important fetishes (ibid, p. 145).
151  One of their great beliefs was enshrined in spirits ‘mizimu’, in which they believed that the soul of 
a person was the key sustainer of life, and hence, the most venerated of religious objects in Buganda 
considered as forces, vital souls or power. Furthermore, Lugira (1971) mentions reflections of a person in 
an image, name, shadow, water, or mirror as being part of the person, and indeed his/her very soul. This 
belief included portraits believed to contain the soul of the person portrayed. This barred Baganda with 
such beliefs to have their photographs taken because anyone who possessed such portrait would be 
able to control or exercise fatal influence on the portrayed person. Indeed Baganda never disposed any 
of their transitional body parts like hair and nails because they believed wrong people would use these 
parts to manipulate another person’s spirit.
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mythological, magico-religious attitude encouraged aversion towards personal 
images. And as the Baganda usually printed in proverbs what they wanted to hand 
over to coming generations so they seemed to have immortalized this notion in 
the Ganda proverb: “Ekifaananyi kissa”–likeness is a source of death” (Lugira, pp. 
109-111). Inadvertently, this implies that it is not by accident that the Ganda did 
not have representational art, but rather their beliefs did not accommodate such 
activity (Graulle, 1950). The only way Baganda could express themselves–and even 
continue their local knowledge systems–was through oral means such as proverbs, 
sayings, and folktales. Because of this “Ganda thought has been influenced by half-
true, half-legendary traditions,” notes Lugira (pp. 109-111). 152 
By entrusting their life with sacred, the Ganda created a sophisticated network 
of ideologies and beliefs that required material presence in order to realize. This 
meant that they had to produce articles that represented their ideologies and be-
liefs about the supernatural beings. In this, the Ganda created a sophisticated art 
form that was characteristically symbolic in nature and mainly found in sacred 
objects such as the war object seen in figure 5. Prior to foreign invasion, artisans 
were responsible for delivering goods and services to the people having developed 
forging, pottery, leatherwork, and basketry (Mukayiranga, cited in, Melgin, 1998). 
152  The legend of Walukagga explains the Ganda indifference towards anthropomorphic designs. Tradi-
tion recounts that when the king realized Walukagga’s brilliance, he asked for a humanlike sculpture 
produced in iron. Bound by custom, Walukagga could not decline the king’s demand, and he instead 
sought advice from a friend who unfortunately was bonkers. The friend advised him to demand for 
thousands of loads of human hair and hundreds of pots filled with human tears to facilitate the process. 
After attempting in vain to fulfill Walukaga’s demands, the king abandoned the entire project. Based on 
this legend, Lugira concludes with a realization that the mind of the Ganda has since then been inher-
ently mixed up with “fear, admiration, and wonder for artists who produce human likeness” (Lugira, 
1970, p. 112). It is not strange then that the Ganda mindset was not after producing likenesses or images, 
but avoiding them as much as they could. It is not strange either that Baganda considered an artist as 
awesome.
Along these objects, the Ganda developed narratives that described the presence 
of the gods or powers endowed in such objects. Lugira (1970) singles out a Ganda 
style of representational art that emanated from the need by the Baganda to il-
lustrate their “numerous pithy aphorisms”, as ‘Ganda Motto Style’ (p. 114). At the 
time of its inception in 1922 when reading and writing was common, posits Lugira, 
Ddamba an editor of Matalisi newspaper started writing Ganda sayings in forms 
of riddles–Bikokyo. In many Ganda living rooms, were copies on paper of these 
riddles that later became decorations and maxims. Eventually, in 1936-1940, pic-
tures to illustrate the sayings supplemented the written narrative, a practice that 
originated from Bishop Tucker College in Mukono (see figure 6). This remained an 
emphatic and revered practice in traditional communities in Buganda where this 
was the only kind of representational art. The question to ask is, “why were images 
added to the inscriptions?”153
Ganda artistic drive is more of a decorative character than a representational 
one evident by the terminology used in connection with aesthetic activities (Lu-
gira, 1970; Kasozi, 1983). These words are all verbs except kifanaanyi (image). Be-
ing utilitarian and decorative in artistic dispositions, the only words they have in 
their language comparable or near to the Western concept of art are Ku-tona (dye, 
153  It is possible that since the Ganda had no direct representational art, apart from the sacred objects 
that represented their gods and sacred beliefs, mottos were the only forum in which they could express 
their prowess in imagery. Secondly, there was a need to embody the inscriptions of words with mate-
rial elements that characterize what they stand for. In other words, they were trying to make them 
meaningful through materialization of sayings. Furthermore, since their whole life dwelt upon abstract 
thought, they had realized that it was not meaningful on its own; it needed another dimension that 
related directly to life–the artistic input that they lacked for a long time. This also coincides with the 
time when Margaret Trowel begins art classes at Makerere University College, in 1937. Todd (cited in, 
Kingdon, 1961, p. 2) is very clear about the concept of art, “If art is alive as people are alive, it is part of 
life. We are live people and it is part of us.” 
Figure 4. Luzira pottery figure. 
Photo: adopted from Lugira, 1970.   
Figure 5. Ttimba. Photo: adopted from Kasozi, 1983.
Figure 5b. An object from a war shrine. 
Photo: adopted from Lugira, 1970.
Figure 6. Ganda motto style. Photo: adopted from Lugira, 1970.
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stain, apply color), Ku-siiga (smear), Ku-wawula (smoothen), Kwola (engraving, tat-
tooing), and Ku-wunda (fine finish, embellish) which are all verbs. This in effect 
implies that their artistry is enshrined in the concept of smearing–embellishing 
an inert body with another layer presumed to be beautifying. Kusiiga in Bugan-
da symbolized a beautifying act and process and thus the smearing of a bride to 
be with cream (okusiiga omuzigo) in order to modify her appearance on her wed-
ding day.154 As an assumption, by smearing the bride with ghee, the Ganda would 
achieve an accentuated tenderness and glittering of the body, which is altogether 
a concept of beauty among the Ganda. This view echoes Sengendo’s (1997) concept 
of the Ganda aesthetic drive that among others, entails, abstraction, decoration, 
immediacy, spirituality, and excellence. This underlines an aesthetic of immedi-
acy in the Ganda concept of art production and consumption. On the other hand, 
examining human behavior in production and performance of skill in making and 
doing things that stimulate appreciation of objects and activities will provide a 
fuller understanding of the unique events manifesting processes of thought and 
interaction (Jones, 1975).
The body consumed art by experiencing its development and satisfying its 
utility, function, and delight (see figures 7a & 7b above). For example, when Mu-
154  The women enhanced their eyebrows with dark charcoal powder in an act of ‘okuziga ebisige’ 
that literally implies ‘dying the eyebrows’, to enhance contrast and therefore, their beauty. The act of 
okusiiga represented artiness in itself and its product beautification. Unlike her neighbors, the Baganda 
people did not don elaborate jewelry (see figure 9). “The Baganda follow a rule of simplicity in their ap-
pearance” writes Lugira (1971, p. 41). This is also reflected in the fact that “[i]n many African languages, 
there is no specific word for the concept art since this would set the object apart as something without 
utility,” observes Blauer (1999, p. 13). In Buganda, the nearest word to art is ‘ekifaananyi’ or image 
implying that there is no actual word attributed to ‘art’: what they understood as art is the process and 
functionality, and not so much the object. Significant separation of the process and product transpires 
when one considers ‘okuba’ for two-dimensional art.
sisi shook the earth, it instigated an artistic process that became a bodily experi-
ence. This integrates mind and body. The meaning thus, of painting the abdomen 
is that which the vibration of the earth refers to, concerning a Muganda pregnant 
woman; she experiences the meaning with the body, but the narrative that follows 
interprets Musisi’s shaking of the earth.155 Interestingly, Lilja (2006) too notes, 
“We see and experience with our body. All our senses combine to make awareness 
possible” (p. 18). In experiential knowing, we do not need to interpret phenomena 
because the body already recognizes and translates our experience into a mean-
ingful event. We only have to detect a situation that fits our present needs for us 
to exercise the dictates of tradition. Tradition thus, does not allow independent 
interpretation because of things given a priori. However, tradition allows us to in-
terpret a situation as fitting a certain tradition and as such, respond according to 
the demands of that tradition.156 For example, we interpret the shaking of the earth 
as a sign of movement by the god Musisi and we duly respond according to the 
dictates of what its associated tradition stipulates. But that interpretation is not 
our own; it is a priori given by the hierarchy. In the story of ‘Njabala,’ we interpret 
laziness as a vice due to our own experiences and individual input although one 
could base such input on tradition. An important distinction here is that although 
I recognize an embodied explanation of both metaphor and meaning especially 
when explaining Ganda ways of experiencing art, my idea of embodiment struc-
turally differs with many embodied theories. This is because I envision meaning, 
not generated within the body, but experienced by the body as an active agent in 
the process of appreciating it.
The implication is simple and conceivable: meaning from Ganda artistry is tan-
gibly present and thus immediately conceived. Expressed variably, meaning was 
largely experiential since the experience of producing was by and within the body 
(see figure 7). This also implies that whoever used the same object for the same pur-
pose achieved the same meaning. In such a case, the essence or significance of the 
implement is unchanged among the users and consequently, a water-pot will carry 
water, and a beer mug for consuming alcohol. In some cases, for example catch-
ing crickets during their season, gourds of the ’endeku’ category would be used 
for containing the insects. These exceptional cases also meant that the alternate 
utility is still accepted and known in that way, but within limited bounds. Just as 
in Western culture, a wine bottle separates features from a beer bottle by conven-
tion. Likewise, since communally accepted, the Baganda knew and accepted the 
meaning of things communally. Reality in the sense of creating it is, among the 
155  The body mediates the process of meaning-making such that it becomes part of the meaning. In 
Buganda, art traditionally lies in what people do with it. The saying, “Amaaso g’oMuganda gali Mun-
galo,” highlights the link between body and mind enshrined in Ganda artistry. Lately, new forms of what 
the Ganda did with their art, have taken over. In this way, the Ganda no longer have a fallback position 
of artifacts that mean something to them; nevertheless, the belief lives on. Stankiewicz (2001) writing 
about Prang authors notes that the pillars of a good ornament lay in its fitness to purpose.
156  Tradition is not devoid of interpretation in its application; before we can interpret a situation as 
a tradition, we must first understand it as a tradition in order to apply it to our present context  in line 
with Drout’s (2006a) ‘elbow space’ that allows its interpretation. 
Figure 7a. Performance as artistic experience. 
Photo: Internet source, retrieved September, 2009 
Figure 7b. Functionality as artistic experience.
Photo: Kabiito Richard, 2008.
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Baganda, concrete and accessible. If the postulate that meaning is a result of two 
coded events were to stand, then tradition has meaning in itself in that, any coded 
event produces meaning, although it is not strong enough to influence the whims 
of tradition.157 In contrast, Pearce (1976) notes that people are prisoners neither of 
their history or their heredity because they can manage their meanings even when 
they cannot manage their environment or themselves. Effectively, people will al-
ways feel free to re-construe what they cannot deny.
In conclusion, due to the ethnic allegiance, the Ganda eschew of anthropomor-
phic design did not bar the people from the strong urge for imagery and as a result, 
resorted to symbolism. A symbol in Ganda mentality, generically ‘includes all that 
is meant by a sign, a mark or a token’ that ideally stands for something else. Braisby 
(2005) believes that “we can label something with a category word yet not believe that 
it belongs to the category: describing a statue of a lion as a ‘lion’, for example, does 
not indicate that we think the statue really is a lion” (p. 189). However, Braisby’s pos-
tulate that a person’s goal and extent of knowledge may influence how one develops 
categories creates a loophole in human knowing that the Baganda mentality exploit to 
differ considerably from conventional representation. The Baganda traditionally, do 
not only label things with category words; on the contrary, they believe in the labels 
they ascribe to those phenomena.158 Thus, the category of spirits wields insurmount-
able power; Empologoma ya Buganda is power, period. Such blatant belief that Lugira 
labeled ‘blind’, makes Ganda mentality strong to surpass mere language use. Inas-
much as it is true that the Ganda symbol agrees with the conventional symbol, its 
significance nevertheless differs with the mentality of the people.159 That exploitative 
loophole, too, enables the Ganda to revel traditionally in common meaning. Below 
is a scenario as a unit of my experience of how a child links mind with body to make 
meaning.
 
Scenario1
I showed Louie her photograph standing on her bed holding on to the bounding 
woodwork160. When I asked her about this pictorial representation, she responded as 
such: “Baby Louie is sleeping”. My interpretation of the child’s statement was that, she 
did not see ‘baby Louie’ in the picture but what the picture represented. This implies that 
although she may not have recognized her picture as the ultimate goal, the fact that she 
recognized the woodwork representing a bed, she had likened the representation to the 
157  See Barbieri’s (2006) discussion of natural codes and meaning.
158  ‘Word’ in this case conveniently suits all types of references including material and immaterial enti-
ties of human knowing. I would like to note here that this observation is contrary to what Horsthemke 
regards as true knowledge in his objection to the terminology and application of IK.
159  Owing to this fact, Greek symbolon from which the term ‘Symbol’ derives its terminology aligns 
with Ganda of bringing together of things. “This tool is the logical origin of the Ganda meaning. For, 
what the Ganda mind intends to convey through the idea Symbol, is the bringing together of ideas and 
objects, one of which is a certain circumstance, somehow expresses the other” (Lugira, p. 133).
160  The picture only showed a small portion of the woodwork. This took place on November 04, 2007 at 
Makerere.
act of sleeping. The presence of the woodwork overrides the iconic function by giving it 
a third dimension that, in her interpretation of the picture, is the meaning. She does not 
only see baby Louie, she also sees a bed, and the relationship between the woodwork and 
the image, leads to the conclusion that indeed it represents a sleep act: she delinks image 
from what it represents in the process but links the mind with the body. She sees utility in 
the object that she engenders from experiencing the sight of the bed. 
Images do not represent what they are, but instead represent something else of 
immediate importance.161 If images do not represent what they are, then the 
immediate thing of importance to the prospective knower, by some means, should 
be accessible in accordance to Ganda context of art appreciation. In referential 
meaning, some forms become important because of the representations they 
conjure in the mind about objects and events other than themselves (Hershberger, 
1974).162 Further, during the same episode, Louie peruses through ‘African 
Woman,’163 in which she sees a picture that, among other things, included two 
bottles: One of ‘Malan (wine) and another Campari (liquor). The Malan bottle is 
dark while the Campari bottle is clear. She then points at the dark bottle and says 
“beer.” She links the bottle to beer, because it is dark. From her own experience, dark 
bottles contain beer, unless stated otherwise (she recognizes a coke, for example). 
She makes recourse to her tradition. This observation spells out a variation of the 
associationist theory presented by Arnheim (1996) contending that judgments 
of expression depend on stereotypes, whereby interpretation relies on a person’s 
conventions adapted as ready-made from the social group to which one belongs, 
rather than spontaneously or repeatedly observing what belongs together. What 
is interesting though is that, she does not see the bottle as an independent image 
but as a container. She de-links the image from the representation: she is more 
concerned with what a dark bottle contains, than what the image is. For the Modern 
painter, for example, a painting represents itself rather than merely representing 
other things (Clarke & Hollings, 1987).164 Visual representations do not represent 
themselves per se; they are only signs of other elements or objects that they stand 
161  Additionally, an image is what we conceive of an idea or thing in its lived or present state; it re-
mains in the immediate.
162  “Some forms,” according to Hershberger (1974), “are more important with respect to the represen-
tations they bring to mind of objects and events. These forms act as signs of symbols of other objects. 
Perfect examples of such forms are words. The representation of the form of the word itself is trivial 
relative to the representation which it evokes–its meaning” (p.150). On the other hand, representational 
meaning bearing something known and its reference to anything occurs in the human organism as a 
percept, concept, or idea. The forms are not acting as signs, because the representation evoked is not 
of all or any previously experienced forms or various other remote or imagined objects or events, but of 
the observed form itself. It is more likely to be iconic, the representation being structurally similar to the 
observed form (ibid, pp. 148-9).
163  See, African Woman, 2007, Issue 14, p. 90
164  However, revisionist art history sees this as ideology or belief that any possible painting represents. 
A modernist painting may make a viewer represent a city or landscape of a father and so on, even in use 
of abstract forms.
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for.165 Among the Baganda, everything represented something from utility to 
appeasement of the soul and thus useful. Thus if we accept that art is a language, 
then we have to learn to look at images as being representative of other things, not 
their own properties alone.166 This calls for an improvement in the way we express 
our ideas too, in artistic dialects so that we continue to contrive meaningful 
expressions.
Narrative Traditions 
Preamble 
A classical view of narrative definition would state that narrative is a kind of 
representation bearing a sequence of events. However, it extends beyond a mere 
collection; it reveals certain coherency in what happened, configuring causal 
and other connections into a narratable episode or episodes (Goldie, 2009). This 
general definition aligns with my former position on narrative texts at the same 
time providing an insight into the general structure of a narrative. Generally, 
narrative structure appears as a string of events related to each other by a common 
cause or goal. However, as will be discussed, many other formations do constitute 
narrative and the causal or hierarchical construction is only one of them and thus 
not a major denominator. In this section, I discuss the historical and social issues 
affecting and constituting narrativity in Buganda with genesis, development, 
and social significance in focus. I particularly highlight ‘accelerated’ history as a 
major player in shaping the trend of Ganda narrative in colonial Africa. I discuss 
how stories have evolved over time in Buganda in particular the state of folklore 
in post-independence Buganda. I summarize with offering a scenario of narrative 
inception and the nature of stories. 
Separating myth and history
Ssekamwa (1995) identifies two major categories of Ganda narrative: mythical and 
historical narratives. This, he says, has become a terrible blunder amongst western 
writers who dismiss the story of Kato Kintu as mythical. McKnight (1997) during 
a review of Christopher Wrigley’s writings indicates that myth comprises most of 
what passed for ‘history’ in Buganda oral tradition. He further notes that if one was 
to go by the notion that myth constitutes much of Ganda oral tradition, then the 
beginning of Buganda is in the 17th Century. McKnight further posits, “While there is 
wide agreement that Buganda’s oral history incorporates mythical elements, much 
previous scholarship suggests that the mythical over time, was grafted onto real 
165  A picture of my father, for example does not represent itself; it represents my father. When I look at 
it, I see my father, not the shades and forms and their organization that make it look like my father.
166  This is also a belief in postmodern times in Western cultures of any content-based art, which is 
typical of feminist art and most art since the 1970’s in Western art world contexts. 
people and events”167 (para. 4). Cautious in his opening statements, Kiwanuka (1971) 
admits that Sir Apollo Kaggwa, one of the first writers on Ganda oral tradition, set 
out, not to write a history and therefore some of the recorded traditions were pure 
myths. Notwithstanding though, many of them were true histories that require 
unraveling from myths. Because of Buganda’s traditions, Buganda became a source 
of interest to many scholars who on several occasions make gross generalizations, 
based on scanty evidence. Furthermore, Buganda being a centralized state was 
more likely to accumulate traditions because of its social political configuration 
that was also accruing scholars’ interest.168 
Kyazze (2002) locates the clan system from about 400 to 1200 A.D when Tonda 
Kings ruled over the land, but later taken over by the Abalasangeye in the lineage 
of King Kintu.169 To doubt that the Ganda had their own history transmitted orally 
undermines their livelihoods prior to exploration, Christianity, and colonialism, 
which weakened the indigenous religions, myths, and legends of sub-Saharan Af-
rica (Myth Encyclopedia, 2008). It is tantamount to claiming that the Baganda did 
not have a history that belonged to them. Many cultures world over did not have 
documented cultural values, but they managed to create institutions that kept 
them together and safeguarded their interest. How then did the Ganda develop 
their customs and traditions if they had an ahistorical past? Ssekamwa’s testimo-
ny identifies one of the reasons contemporary historians have pinned the Ganda 
kingdom to the late 17thCentury. In the beginning, Kabaka Kato Kintu’s name was 
Kato but he later added Kintu to his name. This is why he is confused with Kintu of 
the legend.  Ssekamwa’s complaint signals a self-generated mixed identity by Kato. 
Because Kato wanted to reign over the chiefs that he found in Buganda, he decided 
to add Kintu to his name and he added Nambi to his wife’s name Nnantunttulu-
lu so that his subjects would consider him as the father of Baganda (Ssekamwa, 
1996). 
Kiwanuka (1971) is, too, discontent with the view that traditions transmitted 
orally lacked historical content, and myths served political situations. Kiwanu-
ka out rightly dismisses this view as unconvincing and betrays a misconception 
about historical writing that creates a fallacious view that printed peer-reviewed 
research as the only probable form of history. Kiwanuka premised his argument 
167 Wrigley disregards a reconstruction of the political evolution of Buganda basing it on oral tradition 
without considering such a tradition as a “myth onto which supposedly real people and events have 
been imposed”. Wrigley’s utmost flaw is, in my opinion, going overboard to scrutinizing Ganda narrative 
in parallel with stories from other regions by supposing that stories bearing counterparts from other 
regions were myths, “the importance of which lies in their meaning and apparent historical content”.  
Those with no parallels but stress “the importance of particular Buganda institutions or events he 
regards as more historical in nature.” 
168  Ssekamwa deprecates this tendency of generalization basing on the matter of scanty information 
claiming that contemporary writers about Buganda are wrong to claim that the first King of Buganda is 
Kimera and that Kabaka Kato Kintu is a mythological figure. They further claim that he hailed in Bunyoro 
from a royal family of the Luo known as Bito who conquered the Chwezi dynasty around the year 1500, 
which ideally implies that Kimera a Bito conquered the kingdom of Buganda. He denounces this claim as 
‘inadmissible’.
169  Kyazze notes that Bbemba Musota was the last king of the Tonda Kings.
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against the notion that, oral tradition lacks documentable evidence for a true his-
tory of a people, on three primary sources of English history heavily built around 
mythical sources. These are the Anglo-Saxon chronicle and Bede’s Ecclesiastical 
History, which he says, bear serious limitations.170 Kiwanuka’s argument builds 
upon the fact that there are significant gaps in the two major English sources, also 
supplemented by information gathered from various sources including the life of 
saints. This historical account reflects in African histories, which one could also 
supplement by clan and family histories.171 Atkinson (1975) embarks on an analysis 
of Ganda history by claiming that Kintu as the first king and Nakibinge the eighth 
king of Buganda is pure myth. However, there is no guarantee either that what is 
written is the sole truth. The question and perhaps the confusion is where myth 
and history begin.
 There is an important issue to address; if customs, traditions, and values that 
govern the ways of the Baganda are scarcely documented and not even passed on 
through formal training (academic so to say), how then and why should cultural 
history be proven by mere documentation? Maurice Merleau-Ponty (cited in, Fly-
nn, 2007) argues that since cultures experience the world differently, their emo-
tional experiences of the world will depend greatly on the differences of language. 
If a custom can persist, a belief or a tradition, then even words can persist and 
continue from generation to generation. This is also evidence that the internal 
structures of the system are well in place to provide considerable consistent and 
reliable accounts.172 Additionally, one cannot detach myths from a history because 
they describe historical events in non-conventional terms. Hence, the claim that 
history is devoid of myth in its instigation or construct may unreliable. There 
is reason to believe that Ganda oral tradition is part of its history because every 
Ganda custom has a reason and explanation behind, corporeal or ethereal; and 
if these ideologies continued in time and space, it is questionable why the oral 
might be overtly unbelievable or unreliable.173 Through kingship, clans, systems 
170  For example, in Bede’s writings, history of the various English kingdoms was never his ultimate 
goal, presumably, because of scanty information on most of them except perhaps North Umbria. Simi-
larly, Gilda’s minor source, did not consider writing a history but a tirade against the sins and excesses 
of the British Kings of his day. Not even the Anglo-Saxon chronicle itself clearly demonstrates that its 
value varies from period to period, because its earlier entries especially are tantalizingly brief: “it can tell 
us that certain kings fought at a given place but it remains silent on the result of the battle” (Kiwanuka, 
1971, p. xiv).
171  “With the scanty and sometime not too reliable evidence, the historians of Saxon England have 
demonstrated that much can be learnt by re-assembling the scattered bits of information”, continues 
Kiwanuka. This demonstrates a gap between an event and when people document it, is not a handicap 
towards creating a history. The reasons responsible for causing disgust in African oral history are lack of 
synthesis and indigestible accounts of oral literature.  
172  For example, the myth of Kintu and Nambi has persisted for generations; does it imply that myths 
are not a part of culture of the people on which they build their beliefs? As observed earlier, some myths 
arose to explain events out of reach by the Ganda material entity and the strong belief they had in 
supernatural forces that required a sort of representation they realized in myths. However, this does not 
suddenly qualify the claim that Ganda deeds and beliefs were all mythical; many of them were daily ex-
periences and some of the myths drew upon them. All such elements come together to make a history.
173  Alternatively, even, it is equally unbelievable that the oral would significantly differ from the practi-
cal since Baganda preserve many of their traditions in the body itself. The Ganda relied heavily on their 
of succession and inheritance, the Ganda effectively preserved their traditions and 
constructed a reliable history.174 In conclusion, while Wrigley is correct to align 
Ganda folklore with foreign tales to extract the true history of the Baganda, there 
is a risk of overlooking the idea that human nature builds upon the same pillars. 
Therefore, values, aspirations, fears, and many issues affecting various communi-
ties become similar because of shared oral histories or shared experiences.
Genesis of stories
Meaning in Buganda capitalized on the rich heritage of oral culture to supplement 
symbolism enshrined in belief and objects. Like any other culture, the Ganda had a 
vast ensemble of folktales transmitted through speech for over 2000 years (Albert, 
2007; Masembe, 2002). Furthermore, “while the surface details in these stories 
bear resemblance to their European and Asian counterparts, these stories are a 
product of the Ganda culture and philosophy, carrying the essence of what makes 
Baganda a distinct people with a long history and intricate folklore and mythology” 
(Masembe, p. V).  Masembe reckons that Buganda culture under the stewardship 
of its peculiarities and idiosyncrasies profoundly receives representation through 
etiological tales, which explain for example cultural norms that bar Baganda 
women from eating mutton, existence of ‘masiga’, or the “origin of animal behavior 
and physical appearance” (Masembe, p. V). Etiological tales explore why the frog 
has no tail, chicken constantly scratch the ground, rats steal from the house and 
many other fauna or flora mannerisms and nomenclatures. Such categories and 
functions that are deeply enshrined in the Ganda way of life then explain and 
support Masembe’s submission that Ganda narratives have their own inherent 
origins despite the resemblance with other cultures. “[E]very human culture in the 
world seems to create stories (narratives) as a way of making sense of the world,” 
explains Agatucci (1998, p. 1). Augmenting this notion, Denning (2001) recognizes 
storytelling as an honored practice in primordial times, and as such, the only 
means villagers could assemble their knowledge and survive.
The most common form of learning before Arabs, missionaries and Europe-
ans came to Buganda was through storytelling, because this was the most effective 
way of transmitting information from the elders to younger generations.175  In-
deed, all literature on Ganda folklore written at the time targeted the young stars. 
This is because the Baganda believed that the most effective way of preserving 
cultural values for psychological and physiological perseverance. “The unusually high quality of the 
Kiganda traditions was not an historical accident. It was the result of the complex political and social 
organization which made the knowledge of history essential to all men in public life,” insists Kiwanuka 
(1971, p. xxii).
174  One could pose a question as to why this study engages in such a dig into the history of oral 
tradition and its authenticity. This addresses Ssekamwa’s concerns that Ganda oral tradition is overtly 
mythical and that its accounts are scanty and unreliable.  This, once proven, would weaken a strong 
reliance on the values dispensed by the stories found in Buganda as not constituting a long tradition.
175  “Missionaries especially became real communicators between people of different countries, lan-
guages, and races,” notes Fischer (1976, p. 6).
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and teaching the young was through oral tradition.176 “In collecting and recording 
these tales for future generations, it is my sincere hope that every child will have 
an opportunity to benefit from the wisdom and richness of our ancestors inher-
ent in our oral tradition,” indicates Masembe (2002, p. IV). The intentions of the 
‘Luganda Language Association’, for example, targeted entertainment, knowledge 
acquisition, and luring pupils in Buganda (Ndagire, 1960).177  Optimistically, (Bas-
tian, 1999) reassures us, today people are reverting to storytelling as way of rein-
vigorating their cultures after discovering that much was lost after the many years 
of oral tradition including its wisdom and techniques. If story telling in Buganda 
culminated into a way of transmitting knowledge and continuing culture, why 
did the Baganda rely on this tool? 
Many stories in their book, according to Kizito, Segganyi, and Mukalazi (1959), 
were meant to respond to questions such as “why does a dog lack horns?” or how 
did the proverb “Oh kawakuzi” come into being? Ssekamwa (1995) reveals that the 
philosophies endowed by Ganda narratives are resourceful and moving with the 
times. The wisdom therein can never be outmoded in that at any one stage, these 
stories will always be useful and applicable to the contemporaneous generations. 
In some of the stories, for example, written by Kizito et al, there are proverbs di-
rectly transplanted from the main story and the advice is that the reader should be 
able to interpret the meaning embedded within such texts. This is evidence that 
the stories were not mere tales for entertainment.178 However, many other stories 
address issues of when, where, how, things happened, whereas other stories sim-
ply develop out of need to tell about a something. Malagala (1961) identifies three 
issues targeted in folktales as we listen to stories we get involved in conversation, 
sometimes humorous, and on the occasions, they create wonder; (ii) we are able to 
know how people in the past lived; and (iii) stories caution us by showing us how 
176   Communities honored storytelling practice in primordial times as people huddled around camp-
fires in small villages and shared stories about the wolves attacking the village, or failed crops or the 
changing weather (Denning, 2001). 
177  Nnaalinya is a title name given to the princesses of Buganda who are biological children to a reign-
ing king. However, it also goes that all women in the lineage of royalty are princesses (Bambejja) and the 
men princes (Balangira). Kaswa (1964) emphatically indicates that his intention of documenting selected 
Ganda folktales engendered by the urge to avail such stories to young children who did never have an 
opportunity of listening to them. Kizito, Segganyi, and Mukalazi (1959), in their foreword, note that 
young children lacked opportunities that would avail them with traditional Ganda folklore and thus the 
very reason they made such a collection. They also urged parents and teachers to encourage young chil-
dren not to concentrate on foreign stories alone but also have a comparison with their own. Important 
to note is the fact that traditional story telling started decaying the moment Western formal education 
set in.
178  Nsimbi confirms that what people are most attracted to is the meaning enshrined in the stories. He 
reckons that the words used in some of the stories equate to ‘wrapping materials’: whatever is inside is 
what we need. Hence, in stories what we needed is the meaning more than the words that constitute 
them. The meaning embedded in the stories is not overly oblivious but hidden and therefore one needs 
to find it (1996, p. IV).  Significantly, though, Nsimbi uses the metaphor of a wrapper as the words that 
construct the narrative. The content of the package is what we need, which is purely upon us to discover 
not the words that communicate it. Heather (2000) contributes to this premise by applauding the study 
of folktales, which offers a view through which the form of culture comes as well as mirroring human-
ity, since world tales reflect universal concerns. The Baganda packaged their stories, as a result, with 
profound meaning that contrived the pillars on which their society ran, organized, and continued.
to behave and fit within our times. In addition, Kasirye (1958) reckons that stories 
assist many people in learning discourse, creative thought, and understanding 
Luganda. 
 
Evolution of Ganda folklore
As time passed by, Ganda folklore began to lose its verve because of new elements that 
came with colonization: Christianity, exploration, and trade. In the process, some 
tales took on new words, meanings, and forms. Mainly this was so because language 
itself is dynamic. Nnamugenyi, Nnamugenyi, and Nnakibuuka (cited in, Kaswa, 1964) 
note that as time goes by, words within stories change through displacement and 
replacement functions due to ‘short memory’. In Kaswa’s testimony, as time passed-
by people ran short of memory, probably due to losing freshness of events in mind 
leading to memory decay. It could also be that as time passed by, the colonizers’ stories 
stopped the telling of Ganda culture and thereby, the Gander oral history was partially 
lost. There is no doubt that an element of spatial-temporal effects and dynamism of 
language is responsible for the transfiguration of Ganda narrative. Other stories have 
developed parallel versions with or without the original characters, the contexts in 
some altered, and in others, the wording has changed considerably. This, according 
to Namugenyi et al, is due to displacement. New words and usage keep on cropping 
up every passing day, and other words dropped from usage due to merging cultures 
and needs.179 Forces of displacement require one to replace the missing words with 
equal or similar words that maintain the essence of the story. Important to note in the 
Archimedes principle is the ‘weight’ element as a constant: weight displaces weight in 
equal terms. Similarly, in narrative situations, words displace other words that mean 
the same thing or eventually meaning may change as the same word can mean many 
things, and also, the meaning of a word often changes over time.180 
Stories in general are bound to absorb several new elements since we mainly 
transmit them orally from one person to another. Since we are not able to recall 
the exact words the narrator used, non-conventional principles require us to con-
tinue with the narrative by maintaining its original framework constituted by its 
essences. In Narrative situations, meaning is the constant element that contains 
the balance.181 However, along the way, several features may appear to mean other 
179  In contemporary urban slang, color has displaced cash. In an instance of narrating a story with 
money in it, one replaces the word ‘cash’ with the word ‘color’. However, color remains in use within its 
own original context although it takes on a new meaning when used in the slung category. Such a trans-
formation is facilitated by displacement mechanisms where by a transplant is replaced by a replica or 
an equivalent to maintain the original structure. In the case of color and money, there is no relationship 
between their functions. Perhaps at the extra narrative, money possesses colored notes.
180  See, Microsoft Student, 2007
181  What is constant in these tales or proverbs is the meaning. When one reads stories or proverbs 
from a long time ago, concerning for example alcohol, deceit, ungratefulness, and other things one 
realizes that the meaning is still the same as at their inception. This observation by Nsimbi is vital to 
this research although he specifically refers to proverbs. In proverbs or engero ensonge, several words 
have changed as well as construction to a certain extent. However, the meaning for which they came 
into place is the same. It is important to learn from other sources that the meaning remains constantly 
preserved within the Ganda folktales just as it has been in bodily and spiritual practices.
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things and thereby arriving at a different meaning–the goal. The stabilizing factor 
or buoyancy in Archimedes terms dwells upon the narrative traits and contexts in 
which one recounts the story. Hence, color will mean cash to its contemporaries, 
and not hue or pigment, although in another context, blood (musaayi) means the 
same thing as cash.182 Athavankar (1990) acknowledges the ability of metaphors 
to review an object in new ways to create a new understanding of the product and 
its categories, and reveal a different viewpoint about the concept linked to it. As 
times change, words gain new meaning, thereby changing the forms and struc-
tures of the stories. One important thing is that although such transformations 
take place, the main essence of such stories remains through viable substitutions 
such as metaphors. On this note, metaphors serve as a means of understanding 
how subtle differences as language could imply variably interpreting identical in-
formation (Ziemkiewicz & Kosara, 2008). 
 The need situation arises when we manipulate the words in the story inten-
tionally to achieve new meaning. This situation does not detach the original 
meaning from the text but it does add extra dimensions still achieved through 
displacement rather than any other means.183 The advantage of displacement is 
that it maintains or controls the level of meaning and at the same time building on 
the original structures. For example, weight replaces weight, which emphasizes 
constancy. Constancy, on the other hand, initiates and maintains continuity, such 
that even when we manipulate words to our own benefit, such words or collec-
tion of words must add-up to what the original narrator intended. Because of the 
Ganda tradition whereby people lacked access to written material, the Baganda 
transmitted stories orally. The implication was that what they heard is what they 
understood as true: the words one used to narrate a story is what they considered 
as being original. Hence, stories with edited or displaced words will appear origi-
nal on their first reading. Eventually the diction and hence the form will keep on 
changing. According to the needs of the narrator, some stories take on different 
forms as, for example, Sekamwa narrates the story of Kintu and Nambi with the 
intention of revealing the rich dialect of Ganda language; Masembe attempts to 
look for interesting words to replace the original ones to make the stories attrac-
tive. Overall, the stories maintain their original meaning, although others take 
on completely new forms, sometimes their meanings change retaining only the 
structures.  
Depending on implements and systems familiar with people is more profound 
within such a locale than relying on external ‘things’. Displacement strategies 
hinge on equality or similarity, in association possibly founded with tropes in lin-
guistic terms. Once displaced, the replacement must seem to enrich the original 
182  In Kiganda slang, “Musaayi’ which means ‘blood’ is used as a metaphor for money: blood circula-
tion keeps the body alive and functional just as money circulation keeps economies functional. When 
somebody talks about musaayi, one means functionality of the money system.
183  The other means of course is replacement. These two functions are cyclic in that the displaced 
requires an equivalent or similar replacement, although the functions are different.
structure or else a disposition goes berserk. Visual dialect should be transformed 
or enhance oral dialect on equal or similar terms. Equal or similar elements there-
fore, should displace processes designed for comprehension and continuity. If this 
kind of transformation is to take place, it must be specific and familiar in the con-
text of its use. A ship for example, as a foreign body on water depends on the prin-
ciple of displacement to maintain its weight although its volume and level might 
change yet its presence modifies the seascape. Similarly, new words and usage 
may appear to affect the structure of Ganda stories, but because of the displace-
ment principle, the stories maintain their original meanings due to the internal 
organizing structures referred to as buoyant forces in Archimedes terms. These 
forces or internal organizing structures keep the story stable: Actors, scenes and 
action are at the center of buoyancy in Ganda narrative and they form the stability 
of the stories even when their structures undergo modification. Such stability is 
responsible for the propagation of the narratives within the Ganda communities, 
for they are the anchors of essences: the timeless essences are stable units in the 
Ganda folklore and therefore at the end of each tale. A detailed study of selected 
Ganda stories conducted at a later stage in this text reveals these principles. Nota-
bly, an energetic intention that is transformational always precedes displacement.
The sophistication in Ganda narrative however is interdependent. Idioms alone 
cannot suffice because they require a context in which to operate. Likewise, sev-
eral folktales led to the birth of proverbs (engero ensonge). Idioms, proverbs, and 
stories are part of a culture’s narrative disposition. Nevertheless, stories are more 
engaging because of their longevity and dialogic entities. With reliance on dis-
placement strategies, the Ganda managed to engage in very sophisticated mecha-
nisms of meaning making and thereby continuing their customs and traditions. 
On the contrary, the stories, unlike the other two categories, are prone to dis-
placement strategies unless the narrative keeps within its particular community, 
and at this point, the principle of specificity and locality arise and conspicuously 
abound. Idioms mainly credit their use to custodians of a language because they 
grasp them easily just as learning their mother tongue and for that matter highly 
specific. This observation is important to this study because it strengthens the no-
tion that specificity and familiarity enhance meaning-making processes within a 
specific locale as I will show later in this text.
Distinctions between idioms, proverbs, and stories
Having analyzed the theory of displacement, there is an important element to 
discuss too, common with Ganda narrative. The aim of this discussion is to shade 
light on the true nature of Ganda folklore, and narratives in general so that it may 
become a supporting factor for the choice of narratives as a basis of this research. 
Kasswa and Sekamwa identify three types of narrative dialect among the Ganda 
folklore: ‘Engero ensonge’ (proverbs), ‘Enfumo’ (stories), and ‘Ebisoko’ (idioms). 
‘Enfumo’ are forms of aphorisms and the difference is that we regard enfumo as true 
events such as that of Kabaka Kintu or Walumbe descending on earth from heaven 
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(Kaswa, 1964). Similarly, Sekamwa (1995) approaches the distinction of ebisoko, 
engero ensonge and enfumo by considering an idiom (ekisoko) as constituting one 
or more words; however, its meaning is always different from conventional use. He 
further refers to proverbs (engero ensonge) as very short with less than ten words 
packed with hidden meanings of all sorts meant for learning purposes.184 My major 
interest in this study is in stories and idioms. I will refer to ‘engero ensonge’ for a 
better understanding of enfumo. In the first category, Ssekamwa further specifies 
that in ebisoko, the words within keep on changing according to people or tense 
and the words could reduce or increase. On the other hand, in ‘olugero olusonge’, 
the words never change and therefore people learn the words in their real state 
according to Sekamwa. I will discuss idioms and stories in detail because of their 
bearing on the present study. 
Sekamwa (1995) inadvertently insinuates that idioms embody meaning claim-
ing that conversation by either written or oral that has an ingredient of idioms 
is more knowledgeable, emphatic and comprehensive.185 He implies additionally, 
that an ingredient of idioms is similar to someone who talks about something and 
at the same time shows a picture of that thing for a person to see. However, he 
cautions that for one to understand fully the interpretation of an idiom one must 
learn its meaning a priori and without learning about the meaning, the chances of 
interpreting its usage are close to nil. A language user may fail to know the mean-
ing of an idiomatic expression while s/he knows everything else in the language 
(Fillmore, Kay, & O’Connor, 1998). In this case, ebisoko seamlessly act on the prin-
ciples of displacement but in a more sophisticated form. Like any other culture, 
the Ganda always tried to find ways of meaning making: what Sekamwa refers to, 
as emphasis, knowing and comprehension are meaning–making processes.186 
Emphasizing something draws interest in the process such that we are able to de-
tect and decipher the essences of our newly acquired interest. “Stories of literacy 
merit, to be sure, are about events in a ‘real’ world, but they render that world 
newly strange, rescue it from obviousness, and fill it with gaps that call upon the 
reader, to become a writer, a composer of a virtual text in response to the actual.” 
(Bruner, 1986, pp. 16-17)
According to Kaswa (1964), narration of efumo took place in light of their truth-
fulness in reference to the story of Kato Kintu, who the Baganda believed to have 
184  On the side of enfumo (stories), he reckons that it is a longer conversation than the former two, 
which involves actors such as people, animals, birds, and trees. These animals, birds, and trees behave, 
and talk like actual human beings.
185  Knowledge and understanding are quite different notions even at a psychological level. The senses 
provide us with knowledge about stimuli; our understanding of what it is, is availed by cognitive func-
tions. Thus in Ssekamwa’s (1995) view, because idioms are emphatic, they facilitate comprehension. 
186  The Baganda, culturally, were keen to acquire knowledge in whichever way they could access it and 
hence a transliterated saying “A metal worker built by the road side to seek advice”. Not only were they 
keen on acquisition of knowledge, they were also keen on remembering whatever they came to know 
and thus the saying that “Emboozi teba Nkadde” (a conversation is never old), meant to re-affirm the 
notion that the more they engaged in the same dialogue, the more they internalized, understood and 
remembered it.
been the first king of Buganda. He further cites the episode of Walumbe descend-
ing on earth, an episode encountered in the story of Kintu, the first person in Bu-
ganda. On analysis, as will be demonstrated, Kaswa refers to two generic stories: 
historical and mythical. My concern, however, at this point is the level at which 
a story is engaged. In his testimony, Ssekamwa (1995) implies that ‘emfumo’ de-
liberated at the level of truthfulness, and therefore believed without doubt. Diehl 
(2009, p. 17) believes that “[t]he prop for our game of make believe is the text of 
the novel, but the prop also serves as an object for our imagining.” Furthermore, 
the birds, animals and trees that the inventors of the stories referred to were dis-
guised people. The sense in which Ssekamwa writes this observation encourages 
the reader to believe the story as being true by eliminating the state of the charac-
ter/actor and take more credence in what the overall goal is. Hence, when we read 
the story, no matter the nature of the actors, what we need is to capture the es-
sence. He further informs us that those who thought out these stories were more 
interested in what the reader made out of the story. 187 
The Baganda wanted to camouflage their mannerisms behind non-humans, as 
earlier noted, to emphasize the overall meaning of the tale. However, in order for 
one to decipher the essence, they have to gain it at the level of truthfulness. This 
implied that we were not to consider the ‘Zzike’–chimpanzee, or Nyonyi Muziinge–
peacock in its firstness, but in its thirdness where association is important. By dis-
placing human characters, the Baganda were in fact demanding that the reader 
elevates him/herself to the level of the narrative itself so that he may communi-
cate with the animals, birds, trees, stones, reptiles, and insects.188 Forest (2000) 
confirms the truth factor about stories by noting that folktales are ‘true’ because 
there is a bit of truth embedded in them, and not because they actually happened. 
The truthfulness hence created depends not on facts per se; its premise lies in the 
capacity of the individual to adjust the levels of signification to make the story 
believable. There is truth in belief; otherwise, we could not have a simplest idea 
of why we perceive fetishes as sacred objects.189 In addition, this is where Ganda 
187  Although our fore grandfathers did not write, they could talk and that is why they were never dis-
traught by re-telling their experiences through stories over and over again; it also implied that re-telling 
did not diminish the meaning (Nsubuga, 1990). Sayings or oral literature in Buganda have been for long, 
a tradition of significance, and that this custom is proof that a long time ago people were extremely 
bright and thoughtful, about various human conditions especially challenges and even advised on how 
to go around them. Nsimbi notes that in all nations many things change such as dress, politics, architec-
ture, warfare, movement, worship, diet, language, and others.
188  In folktales, there was overwhelming evidence of fiction although founded on lifelike experiences. 
Similarly, many of the etiological tales (fables) were fictions and only meant to describe things that were 
way beyond the understanding of the Baganda, like frogs not having tails. When fables, legends, fairly 
tales, or myths were told in Buganda, they always referred to human conditions and therefore believ-
able. This also explains why they can be re-told so many times without losing he essences embedded 
within, although the form my vary from teller to teller. Because of the lifelike conditions that integrated 
within these narratives, the actors become secondary, and the primary element stands at how believ-
able such a tale is. The belief in these Ganda tales derives its energy or power from the expectation that 
meaning will suffice at the end of the narration and whether the characters are animals or birds, the life 
in them maintains and continues reading.
189  Ssekamwa (1995) premises the truth that he advocates for, upon beliefs rather than facts.
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narrative, especially mythical, defers sharply with that considered to be historical 
or put in another way; this is why myth is integral in the ways of life of the Ganda. 
The folktales, idioms, and proverbs, even ‘ebikokyo’ (riddles) formed the psycho-
logical platforms on which Ganda philosophies persevered.
Specifically, engero ensonge (proverbs) proliferated on fact-like scenarios be-
cause their construction directly related to fact. Aphorisms or maxims in form of 
proverbs need recital in their actual sense and hence changing their form distorts 
the essence. People should learn proverbs and known them in that way they were 
constructed and thus static although situations in which they occur emerge from 
lived experiences. A tale may not be a lived experience per se, but might be a de-
rivative of an imaginary experience that lends its attributes to life experiences, for 
example, the fictitious tales about the hare as a comment on cunningness in soci-
ety. Instances of such stories draw a detailed discussion in the following disposi-
tion. As discussed, it is important to note that Ganda narratives are worthy study-
ing and incorporating into contemporary Ganda visual culture.  Most importantly, 
Nsimbi (1990) confirms that what people are most attracted to is the meaning en-
shrined in the stories. He reckons that the words used in some of the stories equate 
to ‘wrapping materials’: whatever is inside is what we need. Hence, in stories what 
we needed is the meaning more than the words that constitute them. The meaning 
embedded in the stories is not overly obvious but hidden and therefore one needs 
to find it.  Significantly, though, Nsimbi uses the metaphor of a wrapper as the 
words that construct the narrative, videlicet, a story is a wrapper. The content 
of the package is what we need, which is upon us to discover, not the words used in 
telling it. The Baganda packaged their stories, as a result, with profound meaning 
that lay down the pillars by which their society ran, organized, and continued. 
 
Scenario2 
 “Have you seen baby Koko (chick)?” “She has a back, she is wearing shoes, 
She has a back, she has kabina (Buttocks)”: “Eh, all that!”190
 
As always, on our evening walk, Louie comes across chicks crossing the road. She 
gets quite excited about them and she narrates her experience to me that way. 
Narrative as an intermediary contrives narrating and story, although reciprocally, 
the narrative must tell a story to gain its own existence and to that effect, narrated 
by someone. Thus, narrative, as a discourse, lives by its relationship to the story it 
recounts and the narrating it utters (Genette, 1980). To express this idea in another 
way: “A story to be a story has to be told,” Smith (cited in, Jerome, Vickery, & Diels, 
2008, p. 10). In Louie’s case, I have no idea what she is going to say next, although 
I am aware of what she is driving at, I do not know how it could end. However, 
her thoughts only become a story after narrating them to me. Another interesting 
observation is that she makes me believe that the chick is wearing shoes and she gets 
190  The incident happened February 23, 2008 at Makerere University Campus.
away with it just because it is a story; truth is not a must in narration and therefore 
not a sufficient condition because we are ready to accept what she considers 
present at that material moment. Artifice is unmistakably present whenever the 
author tells of what we could not possibly know in real life and even though we 
barely know ourselves, it is information we must accept without question if we are 
to grasp the embedded story (Boothe, 1983). One, in other words, should take in the 
story without deciphering its truth or falsity conditions, and that is why it becomes 
part of humanity’s way of self-expression–it shields us from stinging realities. 
Imagining thus, that particular individuals participated in events variably one 
effectively appreciates a narrative work, and is bound to imagine a series of states 
of affairs (Diehl, 2009).191 All said, telling stories is indeed a form art one can access 
by offering incredible opportunities to develop culture, and healing individuals as 
well as community (Bellingham, 2000). Besides, our everyday conversation often 
comprises storytelling (Shepherd, 1990).
191  An important point to make is that, although I am present and the chick is not wearing shoes, Lucie 
says it is. In my absence from that particular scene, I could still believe without question that the chick 
was wearing shoes because I know it is a story. Absence or presence does not affect the truthfulness or 
falsity of the narrative. A story may be ‘real’ or ‘imaginary’ without loss of its power as a story in that the 
sense and the reference of the story bear an anomalous relationship to each other. The story’s indiffer-
ence to extra-linguistic reality underlines the fact that it has a structure that is internal to discourse. In 
other words, the sequences of its sentences rather than the truth or falsity of any of those sentences, is 
what determines its overall configuration or plot. This unique sequentiality is indispensable to a story’s 
significance and to the mode of mental organization in terms of which we grasp it. We grasp narrative 
by a dual act where the interpreter grasps the narrative’s configuring plot in order to make sense of its 
constituents, and inevitably must relate to that plot. However, the plot configuration itself must result 
from the succession of events (Bruner, 1990, p. 44). 
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4 / Narrative Application
 
Preamble
In this study, intensity and familiarity function as underlying factors, rather than 
defining factors that directly affect the observations made about narrativity and 
remix.192  Several issues raised by Nanay (2009) and Currie (2009) suffice: (a) it was 
discovered that affective response is crucially involved in narrative uptake, and (b) 
expectancy with auxiliary emotions in accompaniment such as individuals gain 
completion from within the narrative plot.193 Additionally, it seems we need some 
prior experience of action in a text to read and thus appreciate it narratively. Because 
in narrative we can see the whole with the parts, a higher order as its goal takes 
precedence over its independent reading and thus our experience of such a reading 
is crucial in our consideration of a text as narrative or non-narrative. Barwell’s 
account of counterfactuality appeals to me whereas the inclusion of emotion 
more or less explains my claim that narrative is a psychological entity and thus a 
human condition, necessary for incorporation into artistic practice because of its 
affective nature. This is an experience transferable to the reading of visual images 
by analyzing specific stories endowed with particular qualities. The discussion 
in chapter 4 also includes an analysis of internal structures of narration, namely 
persuasion, organization, and affect. It concludes with a scenario reflecting the 
significance of narrative in communication and pedagogic strategies. 
PERSUASION
 
The picturesque character of Ganda oral tradition is a profound manifestation 
of persuasiveness in their institutional strategy. Persuasion is goal orientated 
192  The main elements discussed fall under persuasion, organization and affect. Nevertheless, inten-
sity and familiarity, although not elevated to significance in this study, are at the second level of support 
to the main concepts because they ubiquitously occur under different processes of narrative activity.
193  Velleman does not specify which emotion is involved in the cadence and by this; his theory is ques-
tionable. Livingston (2009) cites “fearful expectation and eventual relief occasioned by a cliff-hanger” 
(p. 31). In my study, expectancy is central in sustaining narrative engagements as a primal emotion 
preceded by acceptance. My point here is, like Currie (p. 315), emotion is pivotal in narrative engage-
ments although Nanay dismisses this fact. On the other hand, Nanay’s (2009) dismissal of constructiv-
ism suggested by Gotthold Lessing is questionable because it fails to consider the mechanism by which 
we are to divorce action from process in holistic or snapshot engagements.
implying that each story contained a goal. Idioms, proverbs, and tales all engender 
and perform functions of essence formulation and continuity of cultural systems. 
Being accessible and specific at one level, intense and consistent at another, facilitate 
the coordination inherent in Ganda narrative. This makes narrative organized, 
persuasive, and affective thereby rendering familiarity, intensity, and continuity, 
as key to comprehension and retention of the timeless elements embedded in 
oral-visual phenomena. 194 Perhaps one way in which the Ganda propagated their 
narratives was by quotation or citation, through leveling. The Ganda, as they narrate 
their stories, personify them by quoting or citing excerpts of the protagonists–
actors or participants in the story to render it life like and believable. People are 
bound to imagine the text as told by the fictional character in first-person novels 
such as Charles Dickens’ David Copperfield. One expects readers to believe it is a 
memoir written by David rather than a novel written by Dickens (Diehl, 2009). 
This allows the listener to accept and take it as true in the mind. The quotation 
harmonizes the levels of the listener and protagonist so that they begin to realize 
a wider familiarization process that introduces and enables us to recognize and 
accept the story as being true and thus believable. The ideas expressed in this short 
paragraph will receive more attention later on in the present discussion. Berg, 
Downs, and Linkugel (1977) conceptualize persuasion as a strategy that thrives 
on voluntary compliance and in so doing, avoids confrontation and resentment. 
On his part, Bettinghaus (1980) provides a minimal condition for persuasive 
communication that should involve “a conscious attempt by one individual 
to change the attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of another individual or group of 
individuals through the transmission of some message” (p. 4).
Role of characters and personification
The story of Kintu and Nambi rotates around actors and their symbolism as 
essence formation units, and indeed its intensity flourishes within the actors, 
action, and scene. The duality encrypted in the choice of characters in the story 
achieves intensity through re-emphasis. Gulu is a character also echoed in his 
place of residence; Gulu’s name means his place of residence. This duality is 
an act of re-emphasis. When we refer to Gulu the person and ‘ggulu’ the sky or 
heaven, character and scene synchronously emphasize each other such that when 
one talks about `King Gulu’ he also reminds us of his Kingdom in heaven. This re-
emphasis facilitates retention and hermeneutic acts: we begin to interpret ‘Gulu’ 
194  When the Baganda constructed their narratives as mediums of communication and pedagogy, they 
chose to take alarmist routes to create maximum impact possible. This is not to say that all tales among 
the Ganda are pessimistic; many of them are optimistic, and packed with more entertainment than 
teaching purposes. This is apparent in their capitalization on pessimism as an impactive strategy that 
engenders biases in the end. Notably, they employed internally familiarity and specificity as tools for 
essence formation, with locality an external factor for the application of idioms, proverbs, and other pic-
turesque norms as substitutions for plain language. The human, I believe, is averse to negativity (pes-
simism) but at the same time very keen on it. Hence, many positive things will go unnoticed where as a 
few negatives will attract a lot of attention. The Baganda achieved familiarity through the processes of 
animation, consistency, and intensity. Within these processes, subordinate functions such as repetition, 
anaphora, proximity, and exemplification assisted in realizing the set goals.
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and ‘ggulu’ simultaneously in order to separate the two. It also, due to repetition, 
aids mnemonic abilities. The oscillation between heaven and earth creates scenes, 
milestones, and anchors in the story. Nambi, in a far-fetched situation, implies 
badness: `mbi’ means bad. Nambi is the cause of malady that Walumbe inflicts 
upon Kintu’s children. There is reemphasis of a bad condition that befalls earth 
due to her return to heaven that builds consistency of role and character. Her role 
re-emphasizes the condition she instigates in the narrative thereby intensifying 
ability to internalize. Nambi’s character in the narrative thus, describes the gloom 
that comes after her action. `Kintu’, on the other hand, is also re-emphasizing 
Kintu’s failure to reign over his wife and Walumbe in the events that pertain to 
their roles in the narrative.195  
In one version of the myth, Musoke is the means by which Gulu’s children ac-
cessed earth. The character of Musoke on this occasion emphasizes his inherent 
nature and the role of connecting earth and heaven or land and sky. Musoke in 
the Ganda dialect is the `rainbow’; it seems to touch the sky as well as the earth. 
Hence, Musoke was the actor linking heaven and earth, and, therefore, the means 
by which both scenes connected.196 The choice of the characters and the link to 
what they represented was not accidental when formulating the Kintu myth; its 
intention is to perpetuate consistency and intensity and precipitate retention 
within the Ganda people’s deity and customs. This is also uniform with the ob-
servation and strategy of consistency in the Ganda narrative: the nomenclature is 
seen-through-to the action in a single file. Kayiikuzi posits, of course, as a savior 
by scriptural standards. However, in his role as the arbiter who tries to save the 
world, his intensive act of up-rooting Walumbe from the underworld describes the 
character category `Kayiikuzi’–excavation or digging into the earth using some-
how crude methods with vigor and intensity. The character re-emphasizes the 
roles and builds intensity and consistency in the narrative. Walumbe is literally 
described as `illness’ but in other situations it is ‘death’ itself.197 Hence, Walumbe 
the character reemphasizes the condition of death, which is external to the char-
acter in the narrative.198 
195  `Kintu’ in an instance of the Ganda dialect, implies an improper human or thing. `Ntu’ in another 
meaning is thinghood that reemphasizes the possibility that Kintu in the capacity of a thing could not 
reason or act humanly. Therefore, in thinghood, Kintu appears docile and inert for failure to control 
Nambi’s action. Kintu could also mean a `thing’ that is either corporeal or ethereal; it can refer to any-
thing and hence not concrete in any sense. This directly links with Kintu’s failure to contain Walumbe 
and the handling of Nambi’s return to heaven. It re-emphasizes fragility in Kintu’s character and 
consolidates the general sense of lack of belongingness associated with the name Kintu in the Ganda 
nomenclature. It is a farfetched point for this text, but perhaps it could enhance our understanding of 
the Ganda narrative systems: that they are impactive and instruction driven in nature.
196  Ssekamwa (1995) re-emphasizes Musoke’s role by depicting him as transient and considers him in 
his actual sense of being a rainbow, whose presence depends on weather conditions.
197  There is an aphorism in Buganda that “Walumbe zzaaya” that means ‘illness is a taker’. ‘Zzaaya’ 
comes from ‘kuzaawa’, which means out of sight for a long time. Here, to ‘take away’ is an interpretation 
of being out sight, translated into the whims of death.
198  The claim that Ganda narrative constitutes intensities and consistencies as a pedagogic strategy 
bestows itself esoterically in the aforementioned situations. Intensity attracts and captures people’s 
attention so that they concentrate and attend to it. Furthermore, intensity contrives consistency in that 
This technically is an animation that enables understandability manifested is 
Ganda narrative as ‘personified’. The tendency to portray animate or inanimate be-
ings as humans with the power to perform human activity is an animation ploy. It 
builds up rigorous tensions and breaks down barriers to imagination.199 The Bagan-
da have also engaged in personification of characters by means of leveling: they 
address animal characters with `wa’ as in `Wakikere, Wakayima, Wanjovu’ in order 
to personify them. Without the `wa’ it remains at the level of animalism. With the 
introduction of `wa’ it attains abilities of humans and hence elevated to the level 
of humans. What this strategy exploits is the build-up of imaginative power that 
the mind undergoes in transfiguring non-humans to humans. The transfiguration 
process in personification is persuasive in that the mind transfigures the inani-
mate object into an understandable human presence in order to achieve leveling 
in the narrative. Thus, persuasion becomes pivotal in the Ganda pedagogical strat-
egy. In general, idiomatic language that is highly animated is persuasive in nature 
and we should know what it stipulates. In order to realize the sense in the trans-
figuration, the mind has to transform all the features of the non-human beings 
and align them with those of humans.  After the transfiguration, then we are able 
to accept and consider as real the role of the non-human. This means that once 
the mind accepts that the non-human is a human, then the roles become sensible 
and worthwhile. “The goal of credibility, to persuade, leads to intended behavior 
such as voting, loving, giving, and so forth. A message that is not believed cannot 
persuade,” writes Doblin (1980, p. 104).
The transfiguration is an animation as well as an intensive process given the 
time between its initiation and transformation. This may re-emphasize charac-
ter or it may intensify meaning making since it dwells on familiarity as its main 
source of energy. Familiar with humans, the mind ably transfigures the personi-
fied character to suit its role in the story. Personification may also be, and usu-
ally is, entertaining and pleasant to engage in as a reader or narrator, because it 
is normally emotional and mainly accepted through wonder, awe or joy. The re-
emphasis and thus intensity experienced in such transfiguration is vital for es-
sence formation and retention.200 The transfiguration process in personification 
what we encounter is consistent with what we already know. This is a case of reemphasis in the process 
of building consistencies. Likewise, intensity forms a virtual gestalt by making a meaningful whole that 
becomes a significant attraction; it also concentrates action and instigates interpretation by proximal 
repetitiveness. The repetitions, although disparate in composition, create psychological or even physi-
ological impact in their use, which enhances retention: it is tantamount to rehearsal in cognitive terms. 
Not only are they instructional, they are also performative and hermeneutic and thus persuasive.
199  Ganda rhetoric is significantly animated both in the sense of the word and in its affiliate con-
notations. To define animation in simple terms would refer to personification on the one hand, and 
demonstration on the other. The former would apply to intensity when the Ganda wanted to create 
impact or what can be regarded as a `big-bang’; when they wanted to breathe life into inanimate ob-
jects; and when they wanted to achieve anthropomorphic forms through animals or plants. They would 
prompt mental images of animated forms through picturesque tendencies. In ‘Njabala’, for example, we 
encounter a digging ghost portrayed together with a spy dog that informs its master.
200  For example, there is personification of Musoke in ‘Kintu’ by portraying him as a character that is 
facilitated access to earth from heaven and vice versa; but we also see Musoke in his firstness as a rain-
bow that is transient in nature. It is more evident in Ssekamwa’s disposition than Masembe. Whenever 
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is persuasive in that the mind transfigures the inanimate object into an under-
standable human presence in order to achieve leveling in the narrative. Persuasion 
thus became pivotal in the Ganda pedagogical strategy. Indeed, many stories in 
the Ganda culture entail many personified situations whereby intensity in reten-
tion and comprehension are the major goal. 
Amongst the numerous situations, which I have also worked with in the prac-
tical visualizations, is Kaleeba.201 Much as Kintu gains its meaning mainly through 
the intensity of duality in characters, Kaleeba is more inclined towards personified 
intensity that anchors meaning. Briefly, Kaleeba is a fairy tale chronicling birds 
that sang so well to the awe of by-passers. These birds lived by the village well and 
whoever attempted to fetch water from there, failed because each time the birds 
saw someone carrying water they sang:
Ssemusajja agenda, Kaleeba, Ngambira abali eka’eyo, Kaleeba, Ebinnyonyi bili kuluzzi, 
Kaleeba, Byambadde ensimbi, Kaleeba, Ensimbi n’obutiiti, Kaleeba, Cooo Cooki, Ka-
leeba, Kyuuka n’ondeeba, Kaleeba.202
Every time a person turned to view the birds, the container (gourd, pot, or calabash) 
one was carrying fell off the head and broke into pieces.  One day a leper claimed he 
would carry the water from the well and he was promptly availed with a container, 
amid contempt. Once the birds saw him carrying the water on his head, they 
started singing but to their surprise, the leper moved on steadily until he reached 
home. This earned him respect from his village mates. Although we know birds 
for singing, we do not know them for speaking like humans. The words uttered in 
the song by the birds personify them and thus elevate them to the level of humans. 
This choice of action against the characters is meant to create intensity by raising 
questions of ` why birds of all creatures’. In other words, personification is a form of 
leveling found in Ganda narrative. It is also comparable to visual citation in visual 
art practice. It also instills wonder and reemphasizes the message relayed in the 
text. As one wonders `why birds talking like humans’, one engages in a process of 
interpretation and this also tends to focus the mind more, than in situations where 
everything is familiar. 
‘Kaleeba’ as the chorus, is quite intense in its repetitive format such that it be-
comes a point of affective catchment. Kaleeba crops from `Ndeeba’ which means 
`see me’ or `look at me’ in the Nkore/Kiga dialect. This implies that the Ganda 
Musoke appeared in the sky, Gulu’s children boarded him and descended on earth to play in the trees 
but since Musoke disappears fast, they never stayed for long, lest he leaves them behind (Ssekamwa, 
1995). Masembe (2002) echoes the same feeling although in a more disguised manner, that Musoke did 
not stay for long in the sky and therefore Gulu’s children could not stay for long on earth.
201  Practical visualization in this case refers to artwork and the process of their making. Kaleeba is a 
story discussed later in chapter 5.
202  A literal translation: dear wo/man going away (in this case it was a man) inform those at home on 
my behalf, that there are birds at the well, adorned with cowry shells, cowry shells and bead girdles, do 
not give a damn, turn and see me.
might have borrowed some words from her neighbors. What is more interesting 
though is the stressing of `Kaleeba’ that in this case implies–in my own interpreta-
tion–`the seer’ and its primary action embedded in seeing. This insinuates that es-
sence piles around the act of seeing or expressed conversely; the seeing becomes a 
function of essence formation based on the singing of the birds. Two actions come 
into play to constitute the essence of the narrative; the overall meaning flares up 
by considering the falling of objects, which is a result of seeing the singing birds 
and the impact created by their personified state.203 On a technical point of view, in 
the narrative, it is evident that repetition creates consistency, intensity, and famil-
iarity with the texts and, thus, is impactive. On the other hand, intensity of action 
invigorates the life of the narrative. This reveals that familiarity is impactive when 
used in unfamiliar and unexpected situations. Importantly, it is also evidence that 
narratives intrinsically work like a tradition.
Idioms and imagery
Like in metaphoric situations, there is an equal or similar transformation for 
things to supplement and maintain their essence. Feagin (cited in, Korsmeyer, 1998) 
considers a `real metaphor’ as a substitute for a real thing for which resemblance is 
the key to its pictorial content: “Substitutes, or real metaphors, create `subjective 
spaces’, in which desires are fulfilled, created and sustained through their capacity 
to serve as substitutes”204 (p. 218). In figurative terms, idioms operate like metaphors 
and their integration thus enables hermeneutic procedures.205 In addition, “[m]
etaphors allow people to view the object in a new way. In compound statements, 
it not only creates a new understanding of the product and its categories but also 
reveals a different view point about the concept to which it is linked” (Athavankar, 
1990, p. 25). Different viewpoints also reveal themselves through idioms in 
supporting picturesque formations by drifting the mind into constructing a picture 
of the action that the idiom refers to in context of what its former counterpart–that 
which it displaced–would have specifically meant. The idiom though, takes a longer 
route that allows and engages the mind into interpretative play, due to renewed 
energy. The revitalized energy comes into play with existing energies supplied by 
203  According to Kaswa (1964), restraint is the overall meaning of the narrative. When the leper is con-
sidered, then it would also imply that we should never under-estimate others because of their apparent 
deficiencies.
204  For instance, `plough’ used for `sail’ in figurative situations highlights two different operations that 
are, indeed, far apart in normal terms.  However, in figurative terms, they share similar operations that 
equate and thus used to transform each other’s functions. Like a plough tilling the earth, a ship wedges 
its way through the waters. The wedge functionality becomes a transformative constant in metaphoric 
situations; in ‘Kintu’, penetration becomes a constant.
205  The Ganda narrators conditioned the mind to engage in image construction by the choice of diction 
or language they used in their narrations, which was highly demonstrative and hence picturesque: it 
required mental imagery. The most popular norm was through idioms categorized as snapshots; the 
other was through maxims, axioms, and proverbs. Idioms, however, integrate well into normal speech 
and thus form the focus of our present discussion. Idiomatic speech practices displacement. Taking a 
hasty insight, substitution takes place when an element replaces a similar or equal thing. Hence, there 
is constancy and consistency in substitution, however, the substitute specifically represents its former 
correspondence.
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surrounding texts. These form play of buoyancy supporting and upholding the 
original essence of the displaced text. This process achieves status quo through a 
rigorous transformation that rejuvenates essence formation by making it exciting 
to learn about, and increases interest in readership. 
The intensity of such a process is due to tension build-up between the existing 
texts and the replacements that require hasty tenacity. The tensions accrue from 
the likelihood that there might be a disparity in essence or context between the 
original and later texts. The force that relieves the tensions is the buoyancy that 
ensures constancy and specificity regarding continuity of essence. The continued 
essence derives its attributes from the animated thing or action within the mind 
that upholds and enhances the former intention or quality. The questioning and 
the urge to re-contextualize and reconstruct the attributes of the displacement is 
a revelation that tensions exist between the former and later texts. The displace-
ment thus transforms the surrounding texts into a renewed energy of forces. This 
is an effective tool in consolidating essence formation in narrative texts as demon-
strated by various narrators. Ssekamwa (1995), Masembe (2002), Kaswa (1964), and 
others have capitalized on idioms and proverbs to emphasize action and intensify 
meaning in their narrations. Idioms, in many cases, act as metaphors because of 
the function of displacement.206 In effect, signification doubles through metaphor 
“since the word’s projective image catapults reference to an idea beyond itself by 
means of feelings too complex to be exactly defined” (Jayne, 1970, p. 19).
When Kintu received advice to go and inform Ggulu about the malady that 
had befallen his children on earth, he immediately embarked Musoke and went 
to heaven. To animate this action, Ssekamwa (1995) writes that “[…] yasitukiramu 
nga eyatega ogw’ekyaayi […]” (p. 54). Literally, Kintu stood up immediately as one 
who used a banana plantain fiber for a snare. This is a metaphoric transposition. 
It also implies that we must first visualize the scenario of a fiber snare and the in-
formation that it has snared up a catch, and the speed or urgency that one engages 
to reach the scene, or capture the animal in order for us to contextualize and un-
derstand that Kintu left immediately. This commitment takes the mind through 
a series of internal picture formations and an interpretative maneuver in order to 
contextualize the idiom. The flatness of `immediately’ is therefore superseded by 
an idiom that dramatizes and accelerates intensity and essence formation. This 
imagery formation in turn aids retention; although it is specific and requires prior 
knowledge, we must also be familiar with the referenced articles. This doubles as 
206  The implication here is that a fiber is a weak material for use as a snare especially that it is vulner-
able to weather changes: when it is hot, it becomes brittle and therefore easy to snap, meaning that 
the struggling animal can easily break loose. Thus, if one has used a fiber snare, one should keep on 
ones toes ready to pounce at any opportunity instantly. Saying that a ship ploughed through the waves, 
one is using a metaphor. One uses the action of a ploughshare to stand for that of a ship’s bow thereby 
expressing the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar since the metaphor assumes that the ploughshare’s 
action is familiar to that of the ship’s bow is not (Fiske, 1990). Notably, a metaphor exploits simultane-
ous similarity and difference by working paradigmatically: “vehicle and tenor must have enough similar-
ity to place them in the same paradigm, but enough difference for the comparison to have this necessary 
element of contrast”.
intensity fosterage and as a familiarization procedure, whereby exemplification is 
the means by which we achieve it.207 It is also an interpretative activity, whereby we 
realize its essence and contextual balance through interpretation of an imaginary 
picturesque scenario. Compellingly, it refers to the magnitude of specific knowl-
edge we must arm ourselves with in order to grasp the meaning. Black (1957) artic-
ulates this phenomenon and, too, highlights our worth of engaging metaphors:
The shock of surprise caused by an unhackneyed metaphor, due to the presence of a 
familiar word in strange company, focuses attention on the characteristics that under-
lie the implicit comparison. A metaphor is a particularly effective way of securing a 
desired emphasis: ‘A man of courage’ would be a very flat substitute for ‘a lion of a man’ 
(p. 197).
The use of imagery and figuration also surfaces in the study of assorted Ganda story 
narrators who employ idioms as essence formation and intensity gimmicks to 
increase dependency. Masembe (2002) embroiders her narration of `Kintu’ with an 
idiom such as, “…twasanzeeyo omusajja ‘n’annyingira mu busomyo’…” literally to 
mean that they met a man who `entered her bone marrow’ (p. 235). In contemporary 
usage, this idiom is analogous to a man who `swept Nambi off her feet’. This idiom 
reemphasizes how deeply in love she was with Kintu.208 This is an intensive animation 
for someone to imagine how one person could enter or penetrate another person’s 
bones to the marrow: it intensifies action and fosters familiarity at the same time. In 
other words, the reader will imagine the whole spectacle of penetrating someone’s 
bones to the marrow through reconstructing images of bones and bone marrow; or 
perhaps images of instances when one has been in touch with such a thing.209 Bone 
marrow normally lies deep in the bone hollow that one requires hard labor to access it. 
The process by which we get to the bone marrow as we consume beef in a traditional 
207  In instructional strategies, exemplification plays a significant role in retention and comprehension; it comes 
in form of visual or audio aids such as demonstrations, or experiences of actual situations. While the Ganda were 
intent on continuing their knowledge through oral and bodily means, they were also careful about ways of trans-
mitting such knowledge and hence, they adopted strategies that would help them achieve their goals. An idiom, 
as a strategy is a form of example or demonstration of the situation referenced. Furthermore, exemplification 
is an animation of the actual situation, which I may as well call a simulation, whereby one simulates the actual 
situation by offering a similar or equal condition that helps explain the actual. This sort of gesture rekindles 
Kuhn’s (1996, p. 189) meticulous work ‘The structure of Scientific Revolutions’ in which expresses the kind of 
paradigm as a shared example: “Scientists solve puzzles by modeling them on previous puzzle-solutions, often 
with only minimal recourse to symbolic generalizations.” Newman (2009) too acknowledges Kuhn’s paradigms 
in which scientists often solve “important puzzles by modeling their studies on patterns of puzzle solving that 
have proven successful previously in illuminating other particular cases” (p.79). In this, we meet a better under-
standing of the actual situation that is not present at the time because the mind traverses a virtual but equal 
or similar condition. After this process, one is then familiar, in greater terms, with the preferred situation under 
reference.
208  Reemphasis in particular is a persuasive tool and thus accelerates essence formation. By reempha-
sizing essence, it persuades the viewer into comprehension of a visual reading.
209  An image is an abstraction of what we deem ‘real’ near to an actualization of substance. Sub-
stance may be material or ethereal as long as it is capable of transforming the mind. A mental image for 
example is substantive because it has the capacity to transform internal structures of the mind. Images 
can also a representation on inner thought in the world of tactile forces; we can experience it by the 
senses.
108 109
way is so intensive that we need maximum patience and consistence. Getting to one’s 
marrow then, is an intensive and vigorous exercise that when realized in picturesque 
form, demonstrates how far Kintu was into Nambi’s life.210 
The intensive process of imagination crammed with pictures of mental activ-
ity puts up with interpreting the former expression in relation to the later context 
of use. Since `entering of the bone marrow’ is far apart from `being deeply in love’ 
and thus their relations should be realized through interpretation. Ssekamwa and 
Nsimbi have referred to figurative speech specifically, idioms and proverbs respec-
tively as near to demonstrations with real-time pictures of the scene or action. 
Nishimura (2004) cites metaphor as an indispensible format in compensating for 
the economy of language and commonplace linguistic behavior. With intensity 
achieved through idioms, thus, the likelihood of hermeneutic practices is inevi-
table. The quality of intensity engendered by Ganda narrations is vital in essence 
formation and continuing indigenous knowledge.  Most importantly, other than 
being realistic, a metaphor is essentially imaginative and not bound by the princi-
ple of contiguity on the same plane of meaning; “instead, it demands, by the prin-
ciple of association, that we seek similarities between manifestly different planes. 
It requires imagination to associate a ploughshare with a ship’s bow,” concludes 
Fiske (1990, p. 97).
Equally important to note is that whenever displacement occurs, transforma-
tion is inevitable. Transformation implies that fundamental changes take place, 
but maintains rapport across the transformation for consistency. Transformation 
on the other hand derives its attributes from adhering to a goal orientation. With-
in these transformations, effects of vitality and persuasion occur at a high level as 
inducements. In other words, the meaning of `immediate’ in the Kintu and Nambi 
myth is fundamentally transformed by Ssekamwa into an animation; however, the 
essence is maintained as a matter of consistency as the overall goal.211 In relation 
with the factor of displacement, buoyancy in idiomatic forms suffices through the 
intensities that follow the functions of displacement. The meaning of `deeply in 
210  The process also that one grows animates the feeling Nambi had for Kintu: how deep it was. Alter-
natively, sweeping one off his/her feet intensifies the action as it demonstrates getting off-balance in a 
vigorous manner – due to intensive feeling. The process of realizing how one could penetrate another 
person’s marrow through mental visualization attempts to perpetuate maximum impact through inten-
sity and provide a meaning-making platform. From this chronicle, it becomes very clear that Nambi was 
deeply in love with Kintu nonetheless, in a manner visualized internally. It would be self-denial if one 
claimed that the imagination one goes through is independent of interpretation in the case of idiomatic 
forms. Intensity and interpretation drive towards a goal precipitated by inherent persuasiveness.
211  Metaphors create a similar displacement process, or in actuality, they are substitutive, whereby 
their meaning transfigures through subjective animation, exemplification or simulation of actual situ-
ations. Barry (1997) citing Gardener’s research suggest, “[t]he creative mind works according to meta-
phors because they help us to understand one idea through another” (p. 73). This is important to note 
because from seeing one event through another, we create new scenarios that improve our understand-
ability of the old ones. These simulations and other processes undergo intensive input to grasp them 
concurrently in order to keep up with the rest of the text. It is therefore a bumper-to-bumper situation 
of interpretative processes characterizing Ganda narrative readings. Referring to Bruner’s (1986) virtual 
texts, the processes described above are cases of text re-reading, which lead to understandability of 
texts. The process regarded as training the mind to develop instinctive interpretations and re-interpre-
tations due to intensity generated.
love’ is adequately reformulated and represented in similar or equal terms with 
penetration, as a constant, to the bone marrow. Thus, in contextual terms, the 
displacement gains momentum, and thus essence, from the texts around it with 
which it coheres. 212 
In conclusion, the intensive penetration then forms the balance that keeps the 
narrative afloat, and the result is maximum impact reflected in the Ganda concept 
of vital force. The process of internal demonstrations forms the structure of the 
animation in this case. The words that described the events of love or immediacy 
are inert; once we displace them and taken through a process of image formula-
tion that goes on internally, we breathe a new life into them by gaining new revi-
talized figurine and motor forms. Buoyancy is an animated force gained from its 
surroundings, and in this case texts that coordinate with the displacement; they 
come into play with the displaced energies to create an animation. Additionally, 
transformation is not static either; it is a dynamic process indicating vitality and 
renewal. The picturesque formations and internal motor activity that character-
izes transformational forces, is an ultimate animation process driven by a persua-
sive force pointing at an overall goal. Hence, there is an instance of telling and 
showing which is vital for retention and comprehension. This is the ultimate goal 
(telos) under Drout’s (2006a) Unconscious Imperative. Daugman (2001), however, 
warns against over reliance on metaphors: “We should remember that the enthu-
siastically embraced metaphors of each ‘new era’ can become, like their predeces-
sors, as much the prison house of thought as they at first appeared to represent 
liberation” (p. 33).
AFFECT AND ORGANIZATION
 
The animation and personification of the Ganda narratives through familiar and 
non-familiar things was to make them more appealing by super-humanizing them 
so that we may begin to wonder or get emotionally involved. They also chose their 
characters well and drawing from daily things that made their readers excited and 
knowledgeable.213 Although we–because I participated in the ‘Biduula’–developed 
biases positive or negative, we were able to remember such stories because of the 
psychological impact the characters inflicted on us: Forests and trees were said 
to swallow humans and hence discouraged the young to go there, by instilling 
fear. Such inanimate things were extremely memorable due to emotional impact 
212  After all, the two entities possess penetrative powers that displace each other: a buoyant penetra-
tion to the bone marrow displaces the deep love and thereby the essence of penetration maintained in 
both instances is persuasive.
213  For example, the hare–wakayima–always depicted cunningness, because of its physical morpholo-
gies and mannerisms; the hyena was always at the losing end and depicted as greedy and lazy. The lion 
was the king of the jungle and the leopard as an arbiter link between the overtly wild and the mild. All 
these characters had psychological dimensions that they imparted to the listeners, for example the hare 
was most admired and its trickery much coveted by the young lads. The ‘zzike’ was hideous and feared 
such that its antics did not solicit liking by the readers especially the young.
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they had on us. It is awesome for other beings to take on qualities of human 
beings–a strategy the Baganda narrators earmarked for retention and anchoring 
by attracting attention, raising questions, and attempting to answer them at the 
same time. Maximum impact swings into play by the reflection upon the singing 
birds in ‘Kaleeba’ that transfer their energy to the resultant act of turning-people 
and falling-objects. The singing of the birds and falling objects, for example, 
hinge on the emotional input they impart on the perceiving mind. Such emotions 
as anxiety, expectancy, and acceptance are very typical of narrative and indeed 
such emotions drive narrative and constitute it (Yiend & Mackintosh, 2005). 
We construct dependencies or compulsions in narrative upon expectancy and 
acceptance, and as such, because people are willing to accept narrative, be it true 
or false, it continues to reign in the human condition. In this way too, emotion 
becomes persuasive in message processing. Doblin (1980, p. 105) attests, “Emotion 
is important to information and persuasion as well: a boring lecture will lose its 
audience. Sex, violence, and humor are typical ways to arouse emotion through 
context.” 
The people who initiated Ganda stories camouflaged the ways of the people 
through flora and fauna in order to dramatize their tales, so that they became eas-
ily understandable and memorable (Ssekamwa, 1995). Memorability or retention, 
is one of the key strategies in the Ganda folklore, which is also echoed in Kasirye’s 
preface that the shorter the stories, the more likely they will remain adorable and 
memorable. This is because the mind tends to switch off at intervals in long and 
unending tales so that bits and pieces of the story are lost along the way. In such 
an event, the story could breed boredom and consequently people could lose in-
terest in it; however, when kept short, we consume it wholesomely and become 
admirable. Owing to the fact that Ganda Oral Culture was to continue indigenous 
knowledge, all ways of making it memorable came into place and this is an exhibi-
tion of the intelligence the Ganda used in sustaining their traditions. In fact, most 
folktales in Buganda remain short, precise, and seldom adorned with an idiom or 
a short song. These ingredients constitute a design meant to sustain dependency 
and court the listeners so that they can be able to adopt the stories. By reciting the 
idioms, proverbs and songs built within the tales, we easily achieve memorization 
and fitting without hustle into daily speech. They also become the talking points 
and hence the key informants or anchors in the tale. Crucially, apart from being 
dramatic and entertaining, the songs facilitate memory.
Musicality as interlude
Songs aided the involvement of listeners while at the same time breaking down 
the monotony of flat speech. Songs normally capture the attention of the mind 
because they are inherently attractive and pleasant to the senses. Our interaction 
with the narrator during narration through musical experience increased the 
chances that the tale would be remembered especially when the song is interesting 
in terms of lyrics, rhythms, and meaning. The construction of the Ganda songs 
embedded within narratives were short, had a chorus in between, and rhymes such 
that they were easy to grasp and memorize. In most cases, the extent of the story 
bore within the song such that once extracted from its original text, the meaning 
would be traceable. The authors of the folklore packed the interludes–musical 
sections–with maximum meaning such that at the second level of signification, 
the original meaning embedded in the stories is not lost. In addition to breaking 
monotony and bearing essences, the songs were points of reminiscence. Because 
normally, the children or even adults would remain with attributes of the song at 
their immediate memory levels, they were the conduits to discussing the narrative 
itself. Reminiscence is an independent space for performing meaning and 
strengthening memory specs.214 Further, songs were dramatic in these stories and 
points of absorption as mnemonic devices by becoming extensions of the story in 
both time and space. Together with my contemporaries, Ganda folklore had direct 
bearing on our lives and behavior. Independently though, the songs constituted 
summaries of the story and thus became the face of the narrative. Easy to learn and 
memorize, songs within stories became the mainstay of narrative dependency and 
propagation of oral cultures within the communities.215
Interludes are invigorating but also a way of releasing tension between readers 
and texts and internalization by the readers. Many Ganda tales subsume interludes 
in form of songs. One of the main aim of the Ganda narrative strategy was to `keep 
the fire burning’ until the end. Among other ways of retaining readership and au-
diences, was to package them with musical interludes deemed as interactive ses-
sions. Most of the anchors in the narratives were compacted within the musical 
interludes because they involved, or in other words, interacted with the listeners, 
in ‘Kaleeba,’ ‘Njabala’, ‘Nkoliimbo,’ and ‘Matyansi Butyampa’ (a musical narrative). 
Such an activity of a narrative in a narrative coincides with Obiechina’s (1992, p. 
200) ‘Narrative Proverbs’ that appear as autonomous stories of different genres 
embedded within larger story constellations functioning as images, metaphors, 
and symbols. The embedded narratives advance the meanings and formal qualities 
of the parent narrative. The narrators were careful in encrypting the Ganda tales 
with re-organizing, re-invigorating, and refreshing elements to create and main-
tain dependency. Here the order of succession begins to shape up. Consequently, 
as much as the narratives were instructional, they had an entertaining ingredient 
in them that rendered them likeable and attractive. 
214  In their free time, the children would revisit the songs they learnt from the story telling sessions 
and tried to assess which ones were more pleasant to listen to basing on their emotional involvement. 
We could hum, sing, whistle and even play musical instruments for the tunes that were interesting and 
touching. I remembered the songs of the stories that I loved most. I still remember ‘Njabala’ because 
it was easy to play with a fiddle; yet, ‘Kiyiri’ appealed to my affective faculty the most. In ‘Kaleeba,’ the 
singing birds touched me as a child because of their personified role and their emotional appeal. Conse-
quently, where the details of the story are lost, the song still bears the essence of the entire narrative.
215  ‘Njabala’ and ‘Kiyiri’ were my favorites as I played the fiddle. Many of the stories that did not have 
commonplace songs jumped out of my memory. The stories I can remember that did not have songs 
signaled important milestones in my life as a child. For example, I still remembered the story of ‘Kintu 
and Nambi’ because it spelt out how death came to be; ‘Matyansi Butyampa’ was frightening and the 
places it mentioned were accessible to me.
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Intensity and consistency accrued in the musical interludes too by the order 
of succession, which reemphasized meaning in many tales of the Buganda. ‘Ka-
leeba’ is one of them. We experience repetition in the word ‘Kaleeba’, which creates 
intensity but, too, dictates the ordering of events in the overall story. In ‘Kiyiri’, 
there is repeated pronouncement of the phrase “Kiyiri Omulangira” at the end of 
each line and the meaning in this story mainly embedded in the character ‘Kiyiri’. 
‘Nsangi’ bears an order of succession classified as reiteration, hierarchical in nature 
forming in the following pattern:
Nsangi Nsangi Nsangi, Nsangi mwana wange, Tonnamera bbeere, Lw’olimera ebbeere, 
Lwendigenda naawe, Nsangi ggulawo.
The song primarily means that Nsangi has not yet developed breasts and hence she 
cannot leave the cave in which she is hidden. A constricted recount of the ‘Nsangi’ 
story tells of a woman who lived in a village with many chimpanzees that were 
fond of eating unattended children who had not yet developed breasts. When the 
woman got a baby girl, she decided to hide her in cave, which the chimpanzees 
eventually discovered. The above song was the means by which she accessed her 
daughter’s hide out.  When she was away one day, a chimpanzee tricked the child 
into opening and it consequently ate the child. The woman consulted a witch who 
told her to ask every chimpanzee: 
Gwe olidde Nsangi? Ahaa baaba, sinalya Nsangi, Nannyini buto emabega, y’alidde 
Nsangi. 216 (Did you eat Nsangi? No, the one behind with a big belly ate her.)
She repeatedly asked the chimpanzees and they repeatedly sang back in the same 
way until she discovered the culprit. In repeating ‘Nsangi,’ there is re-emphasis 
of the character Nsangi; on the other hand, by repeating the short song response, 
there is re-emphasis of the character and the action of singing.  There is anchoring 
in the successive ordering of character and action, which is progressive at the 
general level.217 Note that in the second part of the song, the order of succession 
changes to recurrence. Both patterns are hierarchical characterized by emotional 
build up during reception. In the first part of the song, ‘Nsangi’ builds the ordering 
at two knots at level one followed by ‘bbeere’ with knots at level two. At level three, 
‘naawe’ ties a knot and so far, the levels are incremental. At the last level of the 
extra narrative, the level drops back to Nsangi but succeeded by ‘ggulawo’ (AA-
BB-C-A).218 The follow-up extension of the song posits three levels in recurrence 
216  Are you the one who ate Nsangi? (Nsangi is local name among the Baganda) Then the reply: Ahh 
baaba, I have not eaten Nsangi, the one beyond with a big tummy is the one who ate her.
217  This is a function of consistency achieved through anaphora especially when Nsangi’s name recurs 
by pick-ups at several intervals in the song. The exhibition of consistency and emphasis provides room 
for retention and comprehension.
218  See, Bier’s (2006) discussion of the ‘extra-narrative,’ which she refers to as the interpretation stage 
of the story.
but hierarchical in nature too (A-B-C-B). We begin to extract organizational 
and affective qualities as the story and song ensue. The organization develops a 
trajectory characterized by anchors, feedback, expectancy, and dependency.
The order of succession inevitably organizes the mind. Likewise, as we work 
visually, the inherent order of events takes over as an organizing tool: We con-
sciously or unconsciously succumb to the unwavering organizational qualities in 
stories that determine our scheme of work. The visual mind is as vulnerable to the 
order of succession as oral mind is to the harmonious and soothing intersections, 
successions or subtle gradations of the sweet melody in the melodic line.219 Tikka 
(2008) recounts Einstein as having conceived human expressiveness as a psycho-
physiological interplay, involving the unconscious and conscious mind-body 
system, that today’s neuro-science interprets as favoring coherence, networking, 
organization, similarity categorization, and filling in the gaps, inventing or infer-
ring the lacking information, over a coherent explanation of understanding world 
events. An important issue to note lies in the event that not only causal relations 
contribute to narrativity; non-causal relations exhibited in the orders of succes-
sion may significantly influence denomination of narrative. From this standpoint, 
I posit that since narrative penetrates the psyche, it suits comprehension and de-
pendency in visual images.
Prolepsis and primes
Grain, in this case millet from several narrators, is a turning point in the entire 
Kintu/Nambi myth. Also remotely is a chicken that was supposed to be the direct 
beneficiary of the millet.  Fowls, in this case chicken, are common in the Ganda 
domestic set-up and their main meal from long ago is grain.220 Here, the myth 
capitalizes on familiar things to form essence. We tend to notice and grasp familiar 
things in everyday life faster, easier, and further retain them in memory especially 
when they are locally accessible. When sending her off, Gulu advised Nambi not to 
return to heaven even if they forgot anything lest Walumbe follows them. Among 
the few things that Nambi packed were her chicken. These two scenes introduce us 
to future events and when we deeply analyze them, they are primes of such events 
or things. We are not always aware of our knowledge of the basis for our behavior 
as indicated by priming demonstrations, and as such, our moods could affect other 
people’s behavior without them ever realizing it (Andrade, 2005). When we think 
of Kintu, we also think of Nambi in which case Kintu becomes a prime for Nambi. 
Similarly, when we think about chicken in the story, we subsequently trigger 
thoughts about the millet. As a result, when one talks about chicken and millet, 
a synergy that aids comprehension arises. Priming as a functionality of prolepsis 
219  See, Meyer’s (1961) discussion of the vocal, instrumental, and vocal line in music.
220  This is a significant instance of priming evidenced in Ganda narration. The millet is a prime for do-
mestic fowls, which are vital to the understanding of specific units within the story. Priming is a remote 
form of reemphasis because it introduces us to its prime, which we are destined to know. When we know 
about it, it is a confirmation of our preconceived meaning.
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is another way of building familiarity, which is vital in essence formation because 
we are able to read ahead of the story. Profoundly, it becomes a relationship of 
collocations, which is inherently organizational.221
Logical linkages that eventually lead to essence formation precipitate consis-
tency. Synergies and interdependence of elements and articles form coordinated 
entities in the form of gestalts (Arnheim, 1994). Consistencies as well as intensity 
trickle into the ‘Kintu’ story through re-emphasis and priming norms typical of 
Ganda mentality. When things are consistent, they are also comprehensible. With 
the order of succession, we breed vital intensities and consistencies for com-
prehension and retention. Persistent coordinates build up intensive wholes that 
characterize continuity. Familiarity, therefore, through category building is one 
way of achieving consistence in visual representations; the narrative builds cat-
egory clusters within its laws that form coordinative patterns, based on familiar 
things.222 Familiar things tend to synchronize with our perceptual and cognitive 
systems that are a part of a wider coordinative process. Along the gradation, as vi-
sual clues slide away from the core, they appear less semantically effective in com-
municating category membership, yet, understandability of category and defini-
tion of human response to it, in general, depends, on the central member (Atha-
vankar, 1990).The more coordinated phenomena are, the more comprehensible 
they become. When a particular word in a sentence refers to a word or phrase that 
occurred earlier in that sentence or in a previous one, we achieve an anaphoric re-
lationship (Best, 1986). Therefore, organization of phenomena into logical units or 
categories normally lends itself to familiarity facilitated by anaphoric mechanisms 
through consistent characters, actions, and scenes. These doubly institute persua-
sion and mental organization within narrative texts as well as initiating ‘economy 
of effort’ cited by Warren (2005) because we naturally memorize what we repeat.
Filmic dependencies as a case scenario
During a conversation (May 8, 2007, at Makerere) with Rosa, one of the participants 
I co-opted for TV viewership, she intimates that when a story is not complete, she 
can still predict the end sometimes. She further informs me she is kept watching a 
movie because she wants to know the meaning of the story. She misses something 
221  When Walumbe kills Nambi’s children, we already anticipated danger due to the warning and 
death because of the fact that his name is a prime for illness. Intuitively and strategically, the mind is 
not only prepared and anticipating such action, prolepsis organizes it (the mind) in such a manner that 
it will receive this information at some point within the story. Genette (1980) refers to this phenomenon 
as Prolepsis: it designates any narrative maneuver that consists of narrating or evoking in advance an 
event that will take place later. We are thus familiar with the situation that follows due to the priming 
effects enabled by prolepsis and nomenclature in this case. There is consistency built up between spa-
tial and temporal constructs that is characteristic of coordinated pattern in the structure of Ganda oral 
literature.
222  I define anaphora in this text as a repetitive process that refers to familiar things or things that be-
long together recaptured and regrouped at intervals. The regrouping of familiar objects with each other 
creates cohesion in any narrative text and thus comprehension becomes inevitable. When parts keep 
picking up their bits, they begin to form a hierarchy that enables gestalt formations and consequently 
unitary wholes. 
if she does not get to know the meaning. The prediction here is that story telling is 
dynamic and hence the story itself is dynamic. It can lead us into making predictions 
based on what we know or expect. In addition, if we do not get to know or prove 
our predictions, it becomes unsatisfactory at the end of the exercise. “The meaning 
is cut off if you do not complete the movie. You predict the end and it does not 
end like that,” observes Rosa.223 There is profound similarity in Rosa’s testimony 
and Jose’s with that of Ted. Because the story is unpredictable, Jose remains on 
the edge and this makes him want to see more.224 He indicates to me that, a movie, 
for example, that has “a balance between the high and the low”; it has parts that 
heighten anxiety and those that keep him cooled down. Furthermore, a good story 
to Jose is one which has a “clear beginning and a clear end”. He rejects stories right 
away that begin in an unclear way and end in an unclear way: “Sometimes you 
don’t know that the movie has ended”, says Jose. “If a story is so good, you just 
find yourself inside the story. Some movies you struggle to get into the story”, he 
further contends. Jose makes a round-off remark: “If you want to make meaning 
out of communication you need to know what the person is saying”. We, in other 
words, immediately access some meaning in a story that we are yet to confirm due 
to narratives metonymic nature.
Ted, a TV soap fanatic in a face to face conversation (May 09, 2007, at Maker-
ere) claims that she does not want to get involved in any other story apart from 
one that she is yet to complete. When asked to explain why she had no interest in 
picking up another story from the up-coming ones, she replies, “Bweweteeka ku 
story tomalaako”, meaning that when one accepts to get involved in a story, s/he 
exposes oneself to a lot of pressure to keep track of its proceedings. She informs 
me that she has no time to keep track of another story because she is busy with 
her studies. Apparently, Ted did not want to miss any action or dialogue in the 
TV soap, which would plunge her into unwarranted pressure to watch every bit of 
the episodes and she was not ready for such pressure and commitment. In other 
words, she is running away from the addiction that comes with story involvement 
afforded to its followers. Stories are addictive because they probably appeal to our 
remote senses and we have no way of getting rid of such conditions until the end–
an instance of closure.
When asked why she enjoys watching films, Patio (July 26, 2008, at Makerere) 
replies that “nze simanyi, ndaba bulabi” (I do not know, I simply watch). There 
is a suggestion here that she is not consciously aware why she enjoys watching 
223  Additionally, Rosa finds stories “entertaining of course” and many of them quite applicable to “day-
to-day life; you learn how to go about issues.” Some are educative like Louie’s stories about ‘Balamory’ 
and ‘Little cook, Big cook’ (two children programs showing on BBC Prime television, based in England). 
These and many are some of the benefits of storytelling. Rosa, on the other hand, says that stories are 
interesting and she just finds herself involved even when she does not have to think about it. She real-
izes it is time for work way after having slipped into the narrative and finds it hard, at times, to let go of 
it.
224  Face to face conversation, June 05, 2007 at Makerere. These are fictitious names of participants due 
to the need for confidentiality.
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movies.225 Nevertheless, the movie derives its energy from tensions it creates and 
these tensions in turn build-up its dependency. However, the overall meaning lies 
in the affective dimension of excitement and joy of relief as exhibited by Patio. 
After the movie ends, she jumps off her raised chair and goes for lunch while ex-
hibiting profound satisfaction and excitement from the fact that she reciprocated 
her emotional input with the schematic mapping of her own prediction. It is clear 
from this communication to the New Vision editor that Ogoro is addicted to sto-
ries when he writes to the editor of the New Vision likewise:
I am an ardent fan of the Korean TV series ‘Jewel in the parlance’, which shows on ITV 
Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays. I know that many other Ugandans are in love with 
this program. I was therefore devastated when a satellite problem prevented us from 
watching the January 11 episode. I appeal to ITV to rescreen that episode so that we can 
keep up to date with our favorite TV characters.226 
Well, internal structures have dominated. Are there any external factors? External 
consistency maintains overall meaning of stories across narrators and generations, 
and thus vital for facilitating continuity, although it is beyond the scope of 
discussion in the present text. The internal consistency exhibited in stories creates 
interconnected webs across each appearance or pop-up of the same narrative. 
The web thus created allows continuity of vital qualities for the parent narrative 
to persist. Similarly, in digressional consistency such as that in the Wakikere 
tale (not discussed here) lays the need to explain and understand details of our 
surroundings. Furthermore, negativity such as a frog not having a tail lingers on in 
the mind seeking explanations. The result is that as the mind seeks explanations, 
it is also likely that it will digress but reach to a conclusion at one point driven 
by a particular goal. Thus, the consistency within digression appears through the 
intention of the originator. This virtual consistency helps in explaining the drive 
of Ganda mentality. It also means that their explanatory drive is a case to address 
even when we engage in visual expression. Ideally, narratives especially etiological, 
or in other terms fables, base on pure imagination or fiction, however the drive is 
important to note as it embeds the intention as a genuine concern.
Stories are for the other and that is why we tell them.  Otherness is a vital qual-
ity to continuity. Nevertheless, whether or not Ganda oral literature continues to 
suffice, one fact remains; firstly, stories are coordinated consistent entities that 
225  “Tremors” is a movie founded on the premise that there is a dangerous creature that operates 
underground, and the communities who are terrorized by the creature must fight and kill it. When the 
movie ends Patio makes a remark: “Film ebadde enyuma eyo”: that it was an entertaining movie. During 
the action, she is non-committal to the reason she watches the film and stays on until the end. Patio’s 
claim that “Eno film ebadde enyuma” is not because she was pleased with the action solely, but also 
that her schematic appraisal had mapped-up with the movie’s scheme. Probably she had expected the 
killing of the creature, which indeed, died at the end. She declares it entertaining as a result. Probably 
she wanted to discover the nature of the creature that caused ‘tremors’ so casually, and she sees it at 
the end.
226  See, The New Vision, Wednesday, January 16, 2008, p.15.
could engender continuity of indigenous knowledge and foster artistic develop-
ment. Secondly, narrative is a goal oriented tool or structure. Lastly and impor-
tantly, it contains qualities that aid essence formation and this explains why it was 
widely used by the Ganda as a pedagogical tool. This qualifies the argument that 
since narrative endows such qualities then we should adopt it for visual represen-
tation. Not quite so with Livingston (2009) who cites several problems associated 
with claims of epistemic value in narrative texts because narrativity does not de-
termine narrative’s truth-value in the determining of content and the contents’ 
influence on uptake and perlocutionary effects.227 
Second is the realization by Velleman (2009) that rather than Aristotle’s Muthos 
of organizing events into an intelligible whole, neither causality nor temporality 
is an essential narrative connective, but it is instead, emotive. With emotional 
cadence, the audience mistakenly feels that it has sorted out the events, having 
sorted its feelings about the events. “Emotional closure, which narratives provide 
by nature, is not the same as intellectual closure, which many narratives do not 
offer,” concludes Livingston (2009, p. 31). We still have hope though. Narratives 
represent paradigm scenarios usually comprising of notable actions and events 
with the role of explanandum–giving rise to interpretive generalizations that ex-
plain scenarios–and helping in tuning patterns of salience on which explanations 
depend (Dohrn, 2009). Sensorially, emotionally, and conceptually, readers develop 
representations of paradigm scenarios by appreciating relevant general structures 
as comprised in a way very similar to the means of appreciating general structures 
seen in the real world of experience. We thus dispense of the truism phobia by this 
assurance while strategically reinforcing the role of emotion in narrative interpre-
tation. I argue that we do not necessarily find the epistemic value in the truism of 
narrative content, but rather the possibility that such content applies to everyday 
experience.228
Scenario3
Jessica, a teacher at Springdale’s Nursery School confirms (personal communication, 
November 11, 2008) the feeling that stories aid essence formation when she tells me 
that while teaching infants, she engages in storytelling to make them understand. “You 
cannot teach a kid without telling him a story,” says Jessica. She further notes that kids 
pick up interest when examples are used.  She tells me about the story of Dippy Duck. She 
employs reemphasis as a persuasive and retention tool.  When teaching the alphabet, 
for example letter ‘C’, she uses actions or articles that reemphasize letter ‘C’ for Clever 
Cat, and followed by a story about clever cat. By the time it is over, the child would have 
227  This truism-based narrativity under-determination thesis does not conform to all strong theses 
about narrativity’s logical link to some epistemic valence, including weaker probabilistic theses. At-
tempting to measure a correlation between good and bad epistemic effects and a single variable (‘nar-
rativity’) mostly in a context where the very identification of that variable remains problematic. 
228  The reader should allow him or herself guidance by the narrative, yet, bring personal knowledge 
and view of the real world owing to the extent of salience patterns and the developed theoretical gener-
alities relevant to the actual world (Dohrn, 2009). 
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picked up, retained, and conceptualized the letter C. A case of reemphasis to familiarize 
the kid becomes apparent achieved by intensity, exemplification, and consistency. The 
acts of Clever Cat or Dippy Duck develop into points of internalization and interpretation 
by the child through the described process, which enhances learning abilities of the child. 
Jessica further informs me that she employs stories to solicit for the children’s views. “If 
you [want] a kid to know more, you keep telling them stories. They can listen and be 
attentive, if you want them to learn,” she maintains. 
This is an important revelation for the current research because all along my 
argument hinges on the notion that stories constitute essence formation qualities. 
Not only do they tailor towards comprehension, they are also interactive and 
therefore assist in contemplation and interaction. That is why the kids become 
attentive and able to learn through stories. The Ganda in their narrative strategy 
worked with a philosophy of maximum impact geared towards realizing their 
cardinal philosophy of vitality and extension of life. Propagation drives the concept 
of maximum impact, in other words. The use of idioms and other figurative norms 
persuaded the individual into understanding and realizing the intended meaning. 
Stories possess great power because of they are ability to tap people’s imaginations, 
creating openings and enlarging their circles (Lauck, 2004). Freddy has testified in 
an interview (November 3, 2008) that if a child learnt about the danger of playing 
with delicate materials without placing it in context, the child would gain minimal 
meaning. This is an act of engaging our imagination, a larger scheme facilitated by 
persuasive mechanisms. Thus, once placed into context by narrating the outcome, 
the child relates the consequences to real life situations through imagining. In 
so doing, the narrator is persuading the child to understand the extent of his 
engagements. This I believe is the overall goal of the Ganda narrators.229
229  Personal interview, November 03, 2008, at Wakaliga, Kampala.
5 /  Post-Independence Art  
  in Buganda
 
Preamble
In the phenomenon of administering 64 questionnaires to gain information on 
general views about art in Uganda today, to my surprise–instead of receiving 
responses, for example, citing interests in genre or affiliations to particular themes, 
or understandability of the exhibits–students referred to abstract and realism as 
their measures for quality, meaning, and success of an artwork.230 In effect, this 
implied that they were satisfied if they entered a gallery and found abstracted 
artworks instead of finding their popular comic, a village event, or a local social 
comment. Similarly, in a course assessment distributed with the questionnaire, 
sentiments of abstract and realism permeated as measures of the success of the 
course even though the main aim was to assess whether the course had created an 
impact on their creative, inspirational, and technical abilities. This issue became a 
point of discussion because I observed disconnectedness of art from its communities 
and suspected it could be a major player in the art versus society relations. Secondly, 
that the art itself was hard to discern because it is highly personal. In view of these 
phenomena, I decided to uncover underlying factors, the mechanisms of such a 
dichotomy, and its effects on art practice generally in Uganda today. Lehtovuori 
(2000), in his article ‘Abstractions and urban complexity’, finds abstraction as a way 
of escaping from the determinations of the local, conventional, or historically 
determined abstraction operates with material practice as a vehicle of constructing 
ideas engendered by textual support, metaphors, types, and meaning. 
FOUNDATIONS OF ART IN BUGANDA
 
A living legacy
Margaret Trowell School of Industrial and Fine Arts’ inception coincides with the 
time when modernism was mutating into a contemporaneous movement of Post-
modernism, in the Western cultures. However, at this time, people had not decided 
230  Art in Buganda translates into Ugandan art in a sense that the most concentrated area of artistic 
practice today are in Buganda. The Makerere art school being located in Buganda makes it a defining 
region in the dynamics of art production and practice in general.
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on which way to go because modernism was still stuck in all systems: politics, 
economics, society, and religion (Njami, 2004). When Margaret Trowell incepted 
the current Margaret Trowell School of Industrial and Fine Arts in 1937, she had an 
idea of the mixture of traditionalism based on indigenous genres of art production 
and subject matter colored by the context of difference and otherness (Sanyal, 
2006). While Trowell held the belief in art as bearing a moral message rendered 
through efficient design and dispelled the hierarchy between art and craft, she 
never allowed her students to appropriate any of the indigenous art forms in fear 
of propagating ‘soulless’ modernist experiments. In line with this complaint, 
Stankiewicz (2001) recounts Dow Wesley’s criticism of the academic approach 
that provided facts to students but deprived them of the power to make and 
appreciate art. Consequently, art instruction was separated from textile, basketry, 
and weaving classes. Littlefield (2000) commends Trowell’s instincts of reliance on 
existent artisanal structures to “introduce new technical knowledge as a pragmatic 
way to ‘develop’ the visual arts in a region of Africa where representational art was 
rare” (p. 141). Trowell in other words, represented a didactic form of pedagogy, and, 
consequently, art production.
“If Trowell represented a traditionalizing approach common to projects of the 
1950’s, her successor Sweeny Cecil Todd was fully committed to an African modern-
ism based on knowledge of twentieth-century developments in Europe as well as 
colonial African art,” notes Littlefield (2000, p. 143). Todd, himself being trained in 
the British system and working in South Africa, represented a pure modernist who 
uncompromisingly relented to the demands of British pedagogy. This reflected in 
the University of London’s degrees that Makerere offered at the time. He insisted 
on high skill levels, a Western concept of art history, and a wide range of world art. 
Caught up in the euphoria of nationalism and anti-colonialism, changes that took 
place in the West in the 1960s, by-passed Makerere, as it got deeper into generic 
art forms devoid of content applicable to its environment. Although we cannot 
exempt Trowell from a colonial mentality and the feeling of an African ‘naivety’, 
she nevertheless respected the condition of the native and expressed willingness to 
build along what she found in place.
Whereas Trowell went for a specific and didactic model of art production, her 
successors went for a more encompassing and inductive model evident in the 
writings of the time. Kingdon’s (1961) editorial remarks in ROHO suggest excite-
ment about the magazine that belonged to a ‘time and place’ of the 60’s and to East 
Africa and thus for East Africans respectively. Kingdon remarks, “Art is bread, not 
buns, and in this belief alone will artists find unity” (p. 2). The bread and buns 
analogy not only signifies universalism, but also a domineering approach towards 
art production that would see artists give up their own methods of work and take 
on new forms that reflect the spirit of togetherness. After all, most African of-
ficials opined and were hardly interested in the perpetuation of indigenous crafts 
believing that “one could skip over centuries of human development,” (Gardi, 
1969, p. 12). In attempting to give worth to East Africa’s diversity, Kingdon and his 
contemporaries diverted, the arts of specifics to the arts of universals that were 
eventually absorbed unquestioningly, the fruits of unity in the arts. Thus, mate-
rials, techniques, and methods that would help to achieve this goal found their 
way into the scheme of work at the time, while traditional art fell off the radar of 
the colonial notion of ‘progression’. About artists, Kingdon (1962) remarks, “When 
they are a part of society, when they are asked to work for society, for what they say 
in images rather than where their art goes, or what it does, then our culture will be 
maturing” (p. 3).
Scenario4
When a year II student, walked into my office/studio (March 29, 2008) as I worked on 
Kato Kimera II, and asked me to advise him on the way to go: whether he would paint in 
abstract or realism, I envisaged a situation of interest to my study. In addition, Maria 
and Jack had earlier expressed similar sentiments in their artistic sensibility.231 He went 
on to confess that his interest mainly lies in realism but Samson232 had advised him to 
paint with abstract technique because that was the selling style. In response, I asked him 
what his major goals in producing artwork were. He replied that he is, mainly, interested 
in ‘something beautiful and which carries meaning’. He was confident that abstract work 
makes someone think hence keeping one busy trying to negotiate the meaning unlike 
realistic art that portrays the meaning immediately thereby less interesting. 
Rita,233 whom I discussed the issue with on the same day, believes that the real 
issue is not abstract or realism because even realistic works have failed to sell on 
many occasions and abstract has sold in her own experience with her artwork and 
others. So, what is the problem with the classification according to style rather 
than content? Moreover, why will art fail to sell in the midst of many other popular 
art forms? Rita says that money is one of the factors; the other, sensitization of 
children right from the start of their academic careers. 
 
THE PLIGHT OF ART IN UGANDA TODAY
 
Creativity and originality
During an interview of two young artists (Muziri and Enoch)234 on a UTV program 
entitled ‘Art and Culture’ (April 16, 2008) hosted by Kiwere Nathan, Enoch considers 
abstract art as something refreshing: “Cameras are around. Why should we continue 
producing portraits?” he asks. “God made man. Man should be creative,” responds 
231  Maria is an art student in her third year and Jack is a lecturer at MTISFA.
232  Samson is a former student at the Margaret Trowel School of Industrial and Fine Arts who was 
under my tutorship between 1996 and 1999.
233  Rita is a lecturer and former student at the Margaret Trowel School of Industrial and Fine Arts.
234  Muziri and Enoch are former students of the Makerere Art School who underwent my tutelage at their 
undergraduate level. Muziri has exhibited his prints and paintings widely–internationally and locally.
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Enoch to a query of his woodcut prints being mainly ‘abstract’. In his opinion, being 
creative is doing something further away from what a camera does because of its 
tendency to reproduce lifelike images.235 More so, being ‘abstract’ in organizing 
pictorial elements does not necessarily indicate creativity. Creativity, I believe, 
depends so much on how humans can use available material to create alternative 
forms and new meaning. Shklovsy (1923) though, takes a poet as one who instigates 
a semantic dislocation by snatching a concept from “the sequence in which it is 
usually found and transfers it with the aid of the word (the trope) to another 
meaning-sequence. And now we have a sense of novelty at finding the object in a 
fresh sequence” (para. 38). Enoch is not worried whether his abstract prints were 
meaningful to the public; his main aim is to find new ways of representation, 
away from portraiture. “One must see nature as no one has seen it before. It is with 
the common language that one must express new ideas. Perhaps this is the only 
means to make them valid and to make them acceptable,” writes Cezanne (cited 
in, Chipp, p. 12). The belief that abstract art is refreshing is typically modernist. 
Perhaps autobiographical concerns could have driven the notion of the modernist 
to be inward looking manifested in a form of art only relevant to the artist and his 
group (Taylor, 1987).
Muziri (2008) refers to printmaking as an art of ‘Multiples’ because it can be repro-
duced so many times as the artist may wish. The only undoing comes when “people 
tend to shy away from them because they are not original” (TV interview, April 16). 
Muziri further defends the originality of woodcuts by reminding the viewers, “It is 
quite original because most of the techniques are improvised here, and all the mate-
rials are from here.” Muziri rotates his argument on modernist pillars of originality 
and novelty although he differs from his counterpart’s sense of originality. It is rather 
interesting to note in Muziri’s submission that in the first instance of originality, he 
refers to creativity and novelty, and in the second instance (art production), he refers 
to situatedness (its location). Artists want to be original in thought and action, as well 
as have an identity of their grassroots. Unfortunately, sentiments of originality and 
identity, that dominated postcolonial Africa, disappear in the frenzy of non-meaning 
within local communities, which dominates Ugandan art (Nicodemus, cited in, Deliss 
& Havell, 1995; Njau, in Kingdon, 1962). Going by Kant’s (cited in, Gibbons, 2008) idea 
of genius one finds that art can be novel and original without necessarily undergoing 
significant camouflage. In his argument, Kant posits that an artist (as genius) does not 
produce works of art like shoes in factory that have a pre-conceived idea and as such 
is reproducible. A work of art cannot be reproduced nor determinately predict its out-
come. Thus, in any case, a work of art, according to Kant, contains characteristics of 
novelty.236
 
235  Photography too, is a creative art that requires sophisticated input in order to produce photographs 
that can capture the human mind.
236  This implies that we cannot make it any novel or original because according to Kant, it is already 
novel or original by virtue of being a work of art. See, Gibbons (op cit, p. 30) for a detailed discussion.
In similar fashion, having produced something he had never seen, Marcel Duch-
amp was a great admirer of Albert Roussel in his early days (Duchamp, cited in, 
Chipp, 1968). Our cries for originality and novelty create distance from the com-
munity rather than bring us closer. We can be creative without necessarily being 
novel yet retain our identity. Indeed, in the multiple arts, originality and novelty do 
not apply anymore because we encounter reproduction as a way of life. By borrow-
ing, plagiarizing or stealing, appropriation, a key postmodernist strategy, dispels 
the reverence for originality by modernism. This indicates that art in the West and 
throughout the world no longer subscribes to the notion of originality (Barrett, 
cited in, Hutchens & Suggs 1997; Keep, Mclaughlin, & Parmar, 1993-2000; Lynton, 
2001). Highbrow culture detached art from life by concentrating it in galleries so 
that it may appear exclusive and elitist. Shusterman (1999) is envisions popular art 
as an alternative aesthetic form “which is free from modernism’s traditional com-
partmentalizing ideology and elitist institutions, and it is anyway more in touch 
with our ordinary life-experience and problems, with ‘the spare parts and broken 
hearts’ that keep our world turning around” (p. 43). Nevertheless, Kant’s (cited in 
Gibbons, 2008) aesthetic idea serves a great deal to distinguish between art and 
non-art as do other aesthetic theories on the nature of art.237
Modernism shunned popular culture; postmodern theory incorporates the hu-
man mind with body and therefore discredits ‘art for art’s sake’ (Tansey & Kleiner, 
1996). Gordon (cited in, Keifer-Boyd, Emme, & Jagodzinski, 2008) finds no fault with 
‘art for art’s sake’ or the ‘I-did-it-first’ syndrome as art made for a small group of 
people based on innovations bearing aesthetic response (p. 60). However, also valu-
able is, folk art, which marks a difference in art functionality and thus recognizes 
its varied aesthetic needs, and a pluralistic society. Kasule (personal conversation, 
June 19, 2008) refers to postmodernism as a “philosophy of life which challenged 
the achievements of modernism” and does not subscribe to movements like cub-
ism, abstract and so on and thus is best suited to the notion of inclusion. Motto 
editions, for example, are so popular within rural areas where one or more editions 
hang in almost each household. Mottos thrive on life experiences from within the 
communities, and, hence, people embrace them, yet they are art of multiples. In 
addition, they are cheap and affordable to the communities. ‘Not being popular’ 
in Muziri’s view is evident in not many people embracing woodcuts because they 
are not meaningful to them–on top of affordability. 238 Essentially, art is selection, 
though such a selection strives for being typical and inclusive (James, 1884).
In most galleries, the cost of woodprints varies from 300,000UGX to 
500,000UGX. In Muziri’s view, they are cheap. I completely understand that art is a 
multidimensional discipline, which is also a career in itself. However, contempo-
237  See, chapter 2, Keifer-Boyd and Maitland-Gholson (2007). 
238  Similarly, popular culture is for grassroots communities and thus more involving. Highbrow art is 
exclusive and thus less involving. Art is detached from its communities because of pricing and intention 
of production. Popular culture is meaningful to those who embrace it because it is accessible to them, 
consequently, we cannot popularize a culture that is not accessible to the community
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rary Ugandan art has not served the communities because it is concentrated in gal-
leries. This is evident from the TV show as both artists (Enoch and Muziri) directed 
one of the viewers who called in to seek access to their works to galleries such as 
Afri Art, Nommo, Tulifanya Art, and others; they did not mention an alternative 
space where such art is located. Shusterman (1998) detests the ideology of ‘quaran-
tining’ art to museum, gallery, concert hall, theatre and classroom, which detach-
es art from everyday life and demeans aesthetic quality. This sufferance extends 
to artist too: “Professionally isolated from the mainstream of community life, cut 
off from the ordinary people who could constitute their audience, artists are more 
narrowly constrained in the experiential materials and sources which can serve 
them in artistic creation” (Shusterman, p. 39). Consequently, art becomes concen-
trated in galleries where expatriates normally go looking for ‘Ugandan Art’, a situ-
ation Muziri finds unfortunate due to the small size of the expatriate community 
that normally buys Ugandan art.239 Gardi (1969) complained about the destruction 
of old ideas demoralizing many artisans that produced ancestor figures, only re-
placed by art produced for sale to a few foreign residents and tourist always with 
distinguished good taste.
Kasule (personal communication, 2008) raises the issue of producing art for 
sale as the main driving force in Ugandan art today.240 He thinks that such a trend 
is modernistic and only deals with art of permanence. He further indicates that 
one of his aims of producing an installation of garbage was to “provoke the artists 
particularly the young generation to start questioning how they are taught art i.e. 
methods and materials in terms of applying the principles and elements of art in 
terms of realizing the purpose of art produced for them and to the society.” Kasule 
argues that art is not just for selling because it is a language of communication.241 
In the more traditional communities like Bbaale, people still produce art for the 
community: mats, baskets, embroidery, pottery or carvings. Although many of 
these articles find their way in the markets, they remain within the communities 
as well and the messages they carry are those embraced by the community.242 It is 
therefore crucial to rethink art’s relation to community and its demands in order 
to redirect the course of art practice. Carson (1998) observes that life ways devel-
oped due to networking and community.
Empiricism
An open-ended questionnaire administered (see appendix A) to sixty-four (64) 
second year students at Makerere Art School reveals such flaws in the use and 
239  It is not clear whether it is also unfortunate that the size of the expatriate community does not 
provide a sizeable market for bigger returns.
240  Kasule is a lecturer at the Margaret Trowel School of Industrial and Fine Arts. He specializes in 
painting, sculpture and research methods.
241  This is an extract of an interview conducted by Maria, year III student.
242  Bark cloth, for example is still widely used as burial material and it not sold, but a way of ‘sending-
off’ the deceased, and a consolation to the bereaved family. Mats, pots, utensils, and others are still 
produced and remain within these communities although time changes, and is changing drastically.
classification of the terms abstract and realism that are principal determinants in 
the production of art and its appreciation, and hence the value attached to it. When 
I asked for the kind of art that students preferred to see in galleries that they found 
meaningful, 81.2% said abstract, 48.4% realism and 14%–semi-abstract. 20.3% of 
students that mentioned the abstract/realism phenomenon had both styles as 
pivotal to their artistic activity. 43.8% students had responses ranging from artistic 
disciplines such as painting, graphic design, decorative textiles, ceramic, fashion, 
jewelry; 3.84% on Regional classification as African art; 2.56% for communicative 
engagements; 3.2% for emotional input; 1.92% noted personal belief like religion; 
1.28% favored cultural art; 1.92% mentioned environment, narrative, society, 
landscape (classification within a discipline), mural, portraits and material. 0.64% 
did not have a response to the question of the kind of art they would aspire to 
encounter during a gallery visit. 
The second question that drew abstract/realism responses was whether the 
students ‘normally encountered the art that they identified with (or preferred). 
Forty-one (41) students responded in the affirmative, fifteen (15) in negative, while 
three (3) did not respond, and only one (1) rarely did. Amongst the 41 students who 
acknowledged the presence of art that, they identified with during their visits to 
galleries, twenty-nine (29) mentioned abstract, (15) fifteen mentioned realism, and 
eight (8) students mentioned both abstract and realism. Interestingly though, 1 
student says ‘no’ in the first instance, but goes ahead to mention realism as the art 
s/he identifies with. In terms of percentage, 64% said yes, 23.4% said No, 4.7% did 
not respond and 1.6% rarely encountered such art. Of the 64% who said yes, 70.7% 
mentioned abstract, 36.6% noted realism, and 19.5% mentioned both. 
In their responses, the second year students I interviewed seem to be more 
concerned with the forms they will eventually depict. That is, stylistic approach 
rather than the process through which they undertake art production. Eventually, 
the main concern of the student centers on the perfection of form rather than the 
theme, context, history or genre of the work produced. Comparably, 48% of stu-
dents mentioned aspects of culture, history, genre, affect, belief and discipline as 
driving forces in the art for which they crave. This, compared to 81.2% who see art 
through the dimension of style is not sufficient to exempt contemporary art in 
Uganda today from dwelling too much on formalism. The implication is that pro-
duction of art at Makerere Art School and its interpretation is predominantly de-
pendent upon stylistic rather than ideological input. What are the implications? 
What this means is that, teaching and learning are not conceptually driven, but 
rather ‘form’ matters more than the ‘meaning’ behind. 
Effects of the dichotomy 
As we began the tour of ‘Hello! This Is Bark Cloth’ art exhibition (July 11, 2008) Aggie 
declared, “I swear this creativity is too good. Come and see maize.” She refers 
to an artwork executed with the combination of recycled paper and maize cobs. 
“This looks good; these bu things,” She marvels as she appreciates the stitch-work 
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in ‘Adoration’. She notes, “These things take time.” Aggie considers ‘Belief ’ her 
favorite artwork of the exhibition. “It looks too good, too nice. When you look 
at the title, it’s already a cross”, she emphasizes.243 ‘Adoration’ is her best because 
she “could make out something from it.” Aggie further admires ‘Hope’ because “it 
gives you that feeling of hope,” she says. “It can make you keep on thinking.” She 
qualifies her admiration by noting the artist’s use of the sun to symbolize hope: 
“The atmosphere was dull, but when he put the sun there, people started hoping.”244 
Aggie further justifies her position by insisting that: “It is good because you can 
make meaning out of it. It makes you want more. It makes you feel like you want to 
look at it, because it is not easy to analyze.”245 Interestingly, Aggie’s adoration of the 
art works mentioned above revealingly dwells on meaning rather than form.
Aggie cannot compare ‘Hope’ to ‘Gourds’ in which “you can see gourds.” This 
is because, according to her, “when it is difficult to make out the meaning, it keeps 
you interested; it makes you thoughtful, unlike that one where you just see kids 
and parents (referring to ‘Adoration’ this time). She intimates that “the more you 
look at it, the more you discover new things.” In other words, she prefers to ‘dis-
cover’ than just seeing. When asked what a nonprofessional (outsider) would be 
looking at, she pointed at the colors, the materials, and the `simplistic things.’ 
She claims that her grandparents, for example, would enjoy the exhibits through 
discovering. “Aha, this is a person; and, by the way they would like to interpret 
it themselves.” Aggie thinks that because of the color, people who do not know 
art would enjoy the exhibition as well. This response comes after I had cited the 
low readability of exhibits in this exhibition due to extreme idealization. Both the 
figures and composition are highly idealized such that the art works are less figu-
rative; there is low recognition of images that would assist in making meaning 
whatsoever. However, Aggie serendipitously introduces an ideal of competence, 
as well as, notes that some art lovers prefer discovering meaning, to participate 
in the interpretation. This does not work for all, at least, with those with no basic 
level of competence or attunement towards interpreting visuals.
What Aggie finds most interesting about this exhibition are the compositions, 
the colors, and the time the artist invests into the production process: “[…] every-
thing was done bit by bit”. She finds the bark cloth and the materials the artist uses 
as the unique element about the exhibition. In her opinion, it is challenging. Aggie 
explains to me her preference of `abstract art’ to other forms as stemming from 
university training: “Before [we joined university] we did art and everything seemed 
interesting. Now I see things differently. You have changed my perception. Before 
everything was `simple’, but you made it hard.”  Aggie aims a jab at me: “I like those 
things that keep me thinking. I do not like things that you see and move on. And, 
243  Note that Aggie bases her judgment of essence on the recognizable element–the cross, which leads 
her to believe that the artwork is about [religious] belief.
244  She insinuates symbolism by considering the sun as a signal for hope.
245  The meaning Aggie gains is not that of linkages and decoding messages; it is an emotional yearning 
for unfulfilled desires that keep her wanting more.
that is the way you people trained us.” She further explains, “When you look at a 
painting and the things are easy to you, you tend to ignore other things because 
you already know.” The mix of the abstract/realism phenomenon sneaks in here. “A 
painting like this one which is abstracted keeps you looking up meaning. For ex-
ample, in `Adoration’ we missed out on the details because we got the meaning im-
mediately. It does not keep you so long.” She further insists that: “If I see something 
and I feel I have understood it, I move on because now I know what the artist wanted 
to show.” Erma (personal interview, May 01, 2008) shares her sentiments: 
There is a disadvantage if we have art that reveals it all. Art has to be a bit reserved; it 
should not be obvious that this is a boy carrying a bag. It should bother my mind and 
take more time for me to interpret the artwork. Then the artwork will have achieved 
its intention as an artwork since it is supposed to be appreciated and at the same time 
communicate. When I take a lot of time looking at the artwork, the artwork will have 
achieved its essence as an artwork by reserving some communication and by not giving 
me fast appreciation.
 
Aggies’s sentiments of course come with serious repercussions. Firstly, she is 
adamant such a thing benefits her art because she has to think about it in order 
to discover the hidden meaning; she thinks this is an advantage. Adversely, this 
could lead to less appreciation of other people’s “creativity because it is simplistic”, 
and “you think that now you cannot appreciate simple paintings”. This is because 
Veronica, in her submission, confesses that she cannot be satisfied, contented, or 
even feel good if she made a simple painting, thus, she painted over her ‘simplistic 
paintings’ with abstract since she felt “they were not good anymore”. In her class, 
whoever abstracted well was a good painter. Her discernment that “if you abstract 
the content and figures are realistic, someone is like aha ‘now I see a kid going to 
school’” and thus no depth in it, in my view is bothering and ‘unfortunate’.  Her 
‘advantage’ calamitously ebbs from the basics of what art should be–clear and thus 
easy to decipher. Erma expresses a similar view: 
Me as the appreciator I will have achieved, after looking at some artwork after a long 
time and then in the end I interpret it. Because, when it is obvious, then I think people 
would not be appreciating artwork without being given some kind of burden of inter-
preting them. 
The most disturbing though, is her claim and acknowledgement that “however 
unique a painting may be if it is not abstracted, no one will consider it.”  She 
prefers abstract art (presumably where both content and form are abstracted) 
because “abstract art is what sells nowadays, and it is what people consider [real] 
art.” She concludes by asserting that, “Abstract art drives my production of art 
because that is what my lecturers want to see, my fellow students, and the public.” 
She however relents when she finally accepts that “it is not what drives me, but it 
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is what I was taught to be.” Aggie raises several issues that affect our art today in 
Uganda and at Makerere in particular.  She raises, at first glance, the question on 
the nature of meaning and the issue of abstract/realism classification once again. 
She further raises the issue of simplicity lost, and the nature of instruction of art in 
higher institutions of learning. The issues highlighted pose adverse consequences 
to the development of art and the artist in relation to contemporary practice. I will 
consider the case of simplicity at length in light of the other issues raised in Aggie’s 
tour of the exhibition.
Simple, complex, and complicated 
As we grow up, our perceptual processes become more complex, and as we learn new 
things, our perspectives widen. This is because the mind broadens to accommodate 
new phenomena along the way. During these transitions, we continue learning and 
communicating, although at different levels of complexity. When a child undergoes 
training in various fields and skills, the mind grows broader and hence attuned to 
deal with complexities and new things. In so doing, the simplicity with which this 
child–now an adult–used to do and view things is gradually forfeited for complex 
systems. Once such attunement luxuriates, in most cases, it is irreversible because the 
mind cannot function in that way anymore.246 Outside the fields of excellence through 
training or specialization, things remain at a very simplistic and basic level such that 
any complexity just does not make meaning at all. More so, there are only a few complex 
things in people’s view of the world, and, the bigger part of our lives comprises of 
simple things. This is a huge generalization about a worldview assumed that we all 
share. One could argue that the most mundane repetitive everyday practices emerge 
from complex entangled social, political, historical, environmental, psychological 
processes. Young children guess and see complexity. If this stops, it is an educational 
process of indoctrination to not question, or see with curiosity. Whereas this is true, 
complexity at the extreme is inhibitive. The complexity we see in today’s art in Uganda 
is prohibitive, rather than raising curiosity. This is because, one needs to know where to 
start from, and this is very reason tradition works. In addition to this argument, apart 
from complexities we acquire through acculturation and environmental demands, life 
remains, in its greater part, at the simple level from where we start it. The simplicity 
that we start life with, therefore, remains with us and follows us through, at the least, 
sometimes recuperating conspicuously in old age. On the surface, it does not avail 
itself, but in almost everything we do, simplicity is part of it.247  
246  When one learns to ride a bicycle, one cannot choose to fall because the mind can no longer handle 
the consequences. It is true that young and old learn to fall without painful consequences. The fact 
in this is that, the learning process mentioned here does not take place in some of the visual cultures 
we have today in Uganda. That is why we need to re-strategize the making of art and appreciating 
it. Secondly, when we learn to ride a bicycle, we cannot un-learn the process, unless a deficiency in 
functionality of our systems develops like impairment. However, learning to ride means that we lose 
our disability to ride and as such, we can longer revert to our old selves. Nevertheless, our new learned 
systems become too simple to us that we can no longer recognize our engagement with them especially 
embodied practices.
247  Consider the ease with which we talk or perform acquired skills, that is not on the surface until we 
The point I am advancing is that we cannot afford to become that complex–
if complex means complicated in Aggies’s view–at the expense of simplicity be-
cause we only get out of touch with reality.  If I have trained myself to view things 
through a web of complexities, it does not mean that there is nothing simple about 
me. Notwithstanding, this does not mean that everybody else would become part 
of my learnt complexity because in that person’s view, my complexity should be 
simple to him/her. Whereas I do not see others as simple, in addition to the fact 
that humans are complex and complicated, in instances where we need to commu-
nicate, simplicity is the most proactive choice. Aggie singles out discovery as that 
which would pin an art viewer down to an artwork thereby creating a dependency. 
I argue that we do not only discover through complexities; we can, and so many 
times do, discover through simplicity (taken for granted assumptions, biases, 
stereotypes, prejudices) because it is the greater part of us. Even when we learn 
these complexities, the ease with which we perform them makes them simple to 
us. Perhaps the fallacy or shortfall in constructing complexities is the tendency 
to replicate it as being complicated. Although complicatedness and complexity 
may intersect at one point, they differ significantly, as they take on new forms.248 
Something complex is not necessarily complicated although it may appear so on 
the surface. Something complicated is difficult to decipher and therefore requires 
an extra effort, which, in case of absence, might lead to total failure of meaning-
making for example in visual culture. However, when complexity crosses the bar-
rier of complicatedness, it becomes pleasant and enjoyable to experience. This 
means that complexity is not commensurate to being complicated and hence in-
terchangeably, the two forms do not yield the same results.  
The implications are in Aggies’s point of view, one might never come to any 
discovery at all and hence building any dependency around a picture that is overt-
ly complex or difficult to understand by a simple mind, because however much one 
entangles with complexities, one always tries to find a simple way. It may appear 
that art is meant for only labyrinthine minds which can, and are capable of, reduc-
ing such labyrinths to mere basics. It is also evident, from Aggies’s submission 
that abstract art (as many scholars call it) aims at complicatedness and not simplic-
ity, in terms of form, i.e., composition, figures, color, and surface quality. Similar-
ly, subject matter might also become complicated and hence abstract–only known 
by the artist because s/he wants to remain discrete. Nonetheless, the argument 
and process of abstraction can be the opposite–to remove details, find essence–the 
‘simple’ core or essence of idea, feeling, and observed world is abstraction. Con-
sidering international signs–designers abstract to symbol, simple read, interpret 
at a glance because what it is referencing is familiar to most people throughout 
get to such a point that we can no longer do it in a simple way or with ease.
248  “Something complex may be well-organized and logically constructed as well as subtle and intri-
cate, while a thing that is complicated will have something irregular, perverse, asymmetrical in addition 
to fundamental intricacy; complex is more formal and technical (a problem in mathematics is complex) 
while something like personal life can be complicated.” See, thesaurus.com available online at, http://
thesaurus.reference.com/browse/complex
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the world such as crossing out of something signs to mean ‘no’. Moreover, this 
is exactly for what I argue. When we learn to do things, we are at ease with them. 
We become simple minded about them. When things are alien to us, we require 
complex body and mind systems to deal with them. However, this does not mean 
that we are simple-minded all through. In fact, we develop a very complex system 
of thought and bodily processes when undertaking what seems simple to us. That 
is our main goal.
Complexity may prevail without particularly adding meaning to an artwork, 
but only serving as a beautification strategy capable of building dependency of 
corporeal meaning. Conversely, complexity, outside the maze, determines the fate 
of readability of an artwork and may go beyond actual beauty or visual enjoyment 
to include abstract concepts that form the core essences embedded in the artwork. 
Interestingly too, one can be simple but complex at the same time. Namely, one 
may choose, as the artist did in the exhibits under question, to be simple in sub-
ject matter but complex in application. Complexity in its mild form has order, 
implying that one may gain accessibility to its internal mechanisms; complicated-
ness has no entry point due to its irregularity. Hence, the more complicated a work 
of art is, the less receptive it might become to a simple mind. I do not belittle the 
simple mind; instead, I describe a mind that deals with preset conceptions about 
the world on a daily basis in that it develops a complexity of prejudices, biases, 
and taken-for-granted assumptions that eventually become so simple to the mind 
in relation to particular tasks.249 To get out of this quagmire of dealing with our 
simple minds, remix, as suggested in this study, would form a critique of our sim-
plicity to view the world anew; in a new and fresh perspective, not to inhibit our 
ways of understanding the world by providing basics from which we can reinter-
pret the world. The simplicity we develop over time is after all, not devoid of ques-
tioning, but full of answers.
In its simplicity, art is one of the basic things in which humankind has engaged 
from time to time and its dispensation therefore, should remain at its simple lev-
el. Arnheim (1994) looks at simple figures as the closest identifiers of structural 
equivalents of perceptual qualities because of their immediacy as entitled compre-
hensive stimulus configurations, and not the abstract derivatives from concrete 
objects of the environment. However, following this view reverts one to the arts 
of the universals where one finds ready-mades in the environment and does not 
provide room for learned experiences. If we produce art out of intuition or need, 
249  Simple-mindedness, however, could still mean our inability to confront complexities, or even 
question them. This also implies, in turn, that, to have a simple mind is to look at things the way they 
are, the way we see them, which indeed is not an easy task especially so if we do not have the ability to 
do so. This, too, means that we always have a simple and complex mind whatever our level of human 
development is. For the indigene, or a child, the simple things that they see, are not the complex gallery 
artworks, but the implements, cultures, and beliefs, they are used to seeing. Being able to see what we 
see, means that we can ably see through what we see and getting beyond the surface of that which is 
before us.  Nonetheless, our engagement with what we see remains primarily grounded in the very thing 
that enables that visualization. Making meaning requires that we can see through what we see. Seeing 
the simple things, as such, is a way of seeing and contemplating the world.
then it must be able to fulfill our 
aspirations like any other form or 
order in human activity.  Although 
I have no definite tool I could use to 
decode the artworks in this show, 
it nevertheless captivates me with 
the amazing detail, care, time, and 
skill. Arriving at such complexity, 
the artist employs simple things 
such as stitching but with utmost 
care, patience, and involvement to 
build complex networks of stitches 
that keep me wondering how he re-
ally did that. On this note, his work 
is extremely complex but pleasur-
able. His treatment of the material 
also defines wonder as empathetic 
in that it makes the viewer feel like 
the artist him/herself during the production process. More so, these empathies 
help us achieve our own desires of being able to attain what we could not afford 
by ourselves. Even though the subject matter is complicated, the handling of the 
medium is simple but complex. Coupled with familiar materials and simplicity, 
this artist manages to bridge the gap between complexity and complicatedness in 
visual art experience. 
Title against content
Mano Hands Art Exhibition (Mano Hands) at Makerere Art Gallery features a 
renowned Ugandan artist who has explored bark cloth extensively both as material 
and medium of expression in art production. During the opening ceremony (June 
29, 2007) of his most recent art show at the same venue dubbed ‘Bark Cloth’, Gregory 
spoke of him as having “demonstrated that he knows bark cloth very well and has 
interrogated it and extended it to new heights.” In his scheme of work, the author 
of the exhibition is very indirect in that the meaning in most of his artwork is barely 
accessible to many, including trained artists; however, he has won international 
acclaim through his impassioned handling of bark cloth and recycled material.250 
During this exhibition, I interacted with two up-coming young artists namely Billy 
and Agnes who are both art students at mtsifa. 
Billy (personal communication, June 29, 2007) thinks that the artist (herein the 
author of the exhibition in question) succeeded in portraying the messages in his 
artwork of Inzikuru (see figure 8 above) although his view raises issues of informa-
250  See, news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/03/africa_africas_city_kampala/htmal/5.stm; www.
artofafricaonline.com/kwetu.html; www.artofafricaonline.com/aboutsanaa; www.voanews.com/
english/archive/2006-10/2006-10-26-voa61.cfm; www.africanloxo.com/repert-artistes/ouganda/01.htm
Figure 8. Sanaa Gateja, Inzikuru. 2007. Oil on bark 
cloth. (Photograph by Kabiito Richard).
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tion loss already discussed in this study by Pietarinen (2005) in reference to Rel-
evance Theory. Billy has thus to say “[…] the work of the Elders, when you look at 
it, it really depicts what the information is about. You really look at the thing and 
see that the elders are there. When you look at ‘Inzikuru’s crown’, when you look at 
her, you really see that Inzikuru was really crowned: the materials, the colors really 
show that Inzikuru was crowned.”251 The observation raises two critical issues: 
(a) Billy depends on a superficial familiarity instigated by the title of the artwork 
and not his own acumen of artistic sensibility; (b) Weak signals can become strong 
enough to be recognized if regularized,252 but quite seldom are they, because the 
weaker the signal, the slimmer the likelihood of being received. Cognitive mean-
ings, moral expectations, subjective expressions and evaluations must relate to 
one another in everyday communication, a process requiring a cultural tradition 
covering all spheres of cognition, moral-practical, and expression (Taylor, 1987). 
Similarly, in visual rhetoric, “elements are arranged and modified by a rhetor not 
simply for self-expression–although that may constitute a major motive for the 
creator of an image–but also for communication with an audience” (Foss, 2005, 
p. 144). 
The evidence of superficiality and weakness of signal stems from Billy’s conces-
sion that because he is an artist and he knows about Inzikuru, he is able to read the 
artwork and decode the message of crowning. It is also evident that a nonprofes-
sional with no training at all or anyone not familiar with cultural narrative of Inzi-
kuru would find it impossible to make any sense of such a text. In fact, Mondrian 
(cited in, Chipp, 1968) predicted that art would turn into a product of deepened 
inwardness and a more conscious pure representation of the human mind, ex-
pressing art in an aesthetically purified, abstract form.253 Purity of art in an inward 
sense, however, does not only enslave art to the artist, but also locks out many. 
This is a purely modernist sense of abstraction that reflects well in Billy’s idea of 
what should be. Billy argues that the exhibits would be understandable in terms of 
theme or expression like Leaner and Elders (not shown in this text), which are typi-
cally African norms. However, the question that lingers on is whether the content 
itself is legible. It is true thus far, that any communication system has legibility as 
its starting point, without which, the meaning of a product and hence its mem-
ory become irrelevant (Dorsa, Malven, & Mickelson, 1990). I am also agreement 
with Gardi (1969) that the clearer the signal at its source the greater are chances 
of understanding it clearly once we receive it. He warns though that at times we 
may receive the signal but fail to grasp the embedded meaning. For example, can 
the reader sense the leaning in the work within the context of its cultural back-
ground? Visual phenomena like sound phenomena, must present particular prop-
251  Perhaps I would have asked him to stop blushing because ‘her’ was a reference to a superficial im-
age of Inzikuru buried within his own conscience and less in the literal face of the artwork. 
252  Regularizing the signal involves receiving it and then transforming it into a recognizable entity. 
Thus, it involves active participation of the receiving party.
253  See article ‘Natural Reality and Abstract Reality, in Herschel B. Chipp, p. 270. (first published, 1919)
erties if they are to become flexible functions in a coherent syntactic structure, 
aiming at representation and communication, cautions Saint-Martin (1987). We 
have, for example, to depend on the title entirely for the slightest recognition of 
anything meaningful signaling a cancer of falsified abilities affecting Ugandan art 
today and artists through systems of education that do not consider community 
as integral in holistic learning. 
On her part, Agnes reported that some viewers liked the artwork, others did 
not understand it and yet some wanted to make bookings (to buy after Mano Hands 
closes). She adds hastily that some people ask the gallery attendants about the 
work, but normally the attendants too are not able to explain to the people what 
the art implies. “The only solution is to get the artist himself to try and explain the 
work”, laments Agnes (personal communication, July 11, 2007). It is a “turn-off ” 
she thinks, for would-be lovers of art, and to make matters worse, she claims that 
some of the titles do not correspond with the content and this normally requires 
the presence and guidance of the artist. Quipping into Billy’s falsified ability, this 
is concrete evidence that the titles offer the viewer a superficial familiarity and 
thus cannot be entirely dependable.254 Agnes is more impressed though with the 
artist’s unique approach to material and form: “He uses patch-work, he uses acryl-
ic, he uses paper beads in a rare way and he creates different tones of art works”.255 
She suggests a creative approach to handling form and material, which on its own 
affords pleasure to the viewer; the creativity thus becomes central to the artist’s 
construction of dependency in his work. Furthermore, it is through the material 
that he emphasizes culture and since the exhibition takes place in Buganda, she 
imagines that Baganda have something to smile about because bark cloth is part of 
their culture.256 Association, as Agnes insinuates, is a major player in appreciating 
visual arts. The suggested associative property is that attained through familiarity 
with and locality of the objects used other than the content. 
One of the  problems the gallery faces is that of marketing art that is produced 
in Uganda today because it bears no meaning to the local people: “It becomes hard 
to market the art work because there is no way one can explain the meaning of 
the artwork without the artist.” Secondly, the artists’ intentions elude the viewers 
especially when the meaning is not clear and thus “artists need friends to sell their 
works”, she laments. Parker and Pollock (1998) echoed this view when they dis-
cuss the status of an artwork in art history as inextricably tied to the status of the 
maker, meaning that the way a work of art is viewed depends on who made it. Ag-
nes’ account is multidimensional: it means that art is not part of the communities 
from which it comes. Indeed, she mentions “gallery art is exclusive and thus omits 
254  This mirrors Ismael’s (I will introduce the participant shortly in this chapter) experience when he 
sets out with one topic in mind and ends up with another picture. 
255  The materials used in this case become the catchment point and the source of essence rather than 
the inferential meanings achieved through linkages of the texts themselves.
256  Agnes herself is not a Muganda; she hails from Ankole in Western Uganda. She was conducting her 
Industrial Training at the Makerere Art Gallery by the time of this exhibition. 
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people of certain calibers and levels of understanding”.257 Artists should extend 
their art, in her opinion, to the communities thereby involving people and con-
tributing to their earnings; additionally, it means that we do not produce art for 
the community per se and thus “some artists do the work to please their custom-
ers” and this has led to a gap between the local cultures and the art produced. More 
significantly, the artwork in Mano Hands does not flourish on inferential meaning 
but tradition, socially interwoven into our daily practice. Thus, the cultural as-
sociation with which bark cloth takes over the referential intentionality, which is 
also a legitimate and traditional form of meaningful enjoyment within the Ganda 
communities; a kind of belongingness that is given a priori and could be enhanced 
rather than diminish.
Sharing ideas 
Ismael258 is a direct painter who capitalizes on locality as an inspiration for 
conceptual build up. My first contact with Ismael’s painting as a practicing artist 
drew me to his work because it had much in common with regard to my idea of what 
art production should be because he had exhibited traits of similarity in approach. 
Firstly, Ismael works with themes drawn from his immediate environment, meaning 
that he deals with scenes of everyday experience. Secondly, he maintains status-quo: 
his works are traceable, in both time and space and thus accessible in both form and 
sense. Lastly, he employs signs or objects drawn from his own environment that are 
readily identifiable and thus familiar to his community. Prior to our interaction, 
I attempted to understand the works from my own perspective, and largely, I was 
able to develop a story for each one of them. Emmanuel (personal communication, 
June 7, 2007) admired Ismael’s work because “he has been direct to the point. And 
even that writing ‘Ddobi’ is characteristic of Uganda; even that kiosk; Celtel can be 
anywhere but that combination of Boda boda makes it Ugandan because it is not in 
Kenya or Tanzania” (see figure 9).259 
According to him, painting should be a secret although nagged by the tenden-
cy that “there are so many works that you spend much time on without gaining 
anything.” He reckons that painting should communicate and short of that, he has 
a problem (this is a contradiction though because a secret should be confidential). 
Nonetheless, Emmanuel further stresses the point of origin and identity–which are 
functions of locality–when he identifies the combination of a spear, kanzu, and 
crown in Kato Kimera I (see figure 28) as factors responsible for its easy locatabil-
ity: “it cannot be somewhere else apart from Buganda”, he concludes. Throughout 
the gallery, Emmanuel finds very little content in the artwork, and he cautions: 
257  Eighty percent (80%) of the Ugandan population lives in rural areas with low levels of education, 
confidence, and economic ability. Even in the urban areas, people are still impoverished and barely 
educated.
258  Ismael represents artists of the younger generation having graduated from Makerere University in 
2005 with a Bachelor’s degree in Industrial and Fine Art.
259  The organization of the elements in the display enabled actualization of familiarity and locality in 
this work. Celtel, Kiosks, and Boda boda create a specific code of a Ugandan environment. 
“People think art is bringing nature onto something they can see permanently; in 
art you capture a certain emotion and you let it live forever. When someone comes 
to look at it and starts moving again. When that movement is not captured again 
then it is a problem”. First, there is a linkage between art and emotion, which re-
ignited every time you interact with the artwork: then, art must communicate. It 
also implies that a reciprocal situation during the interaction is inevitable and in 
any case, for art to communicate, that integration must avail itself at every en-
counter. The interaction constitutes the ‘emotion’ that the artwork engenders. 
In his own account, Ismael’s intention in producing community-based art is 
the desire to record daily experiences and the struggles people go through to sur-
vive (personal communication, June 18, 2007). He notes that Classic Ddobi (see fig-
ure 19) is emotional: “The gentleman in this picture has played a part in my live; he 
is the one who takes care of my jeans”. What drives him in his artwork is to address 
issues affecting society in an attempt to emulate performing artists. “The reason 
Figure 9. Kateregga Ismael, Market place. 2007. Oil on canvass. 
(Photo by Kabiito Richard)
Figure 10. Kateregga Ismael, Classic Ddobi. 2007. Oil on canvass. 
(Photo by Kabiito Richard).
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why performing artists are better than us is because they address issues of day to 
day life. So if someone does a song about them, everyone is aware of them and so 
it touches them”.260 Ismael is also cognizant of the fact that, to relate with local 
people there must be sharing of ideas. “So if I made a painting for myself, it would 
still be important to let some other people know what I feel”. In order to realize 
his goal, he has to use a language that anyone can understand: “If you are going to 
address a problem, you must use a language that everyone will understand”, he 
advises. He is silently intimating that meaning is a negotiated process and sharing 
is a mode of interaction, which is vital in communication. Negotiation and shar-
ing further reflect Ismael’s philosophy of art production by warning that it is not 
acceptable practice to impose personal feelings onto others; rather, “we have to 
come to a consensus”. He further posits that language is a social process and not an 
individual engagement: 
Comprehension of an image requires a commonality of experience; an interaction has 
to develop because the artist is evoking images stored in the minds of both parties. 
Meaning is thus derived from experiential sequence, as a thundercloud means rain or 
beafbuds mean spring (Barry, 1997, p. 113). 
The lack of meaning and the effects of ‘imposed art’ on others have resulted into 
communities seeking equivalent forms of expression, but which are meaningful 
to them. “Many Ugandans today”, remarks Ismael, “prefer to have a photograph 
because photographs speak directly in a language they understand”.261 Accordingly, 
Ismael wants to be more prudent and borrow ideas from motto productions that 
he thinks are stipulated guidelines to everyday life. “If we transform art and it goes 
to that level whereby it has a message to deliver to somebody whenever they see it, 
I think we will achieve our goals”, he concludes. His comments echo Emmanuel’s 
‘enduring emotion’ and direct communication as essential in an art form that survives 
within a community.262 His thoughts relate to postmodern concepts of otherness, 
community, and concern for the human plight. Unfortunately, as Spadling 
(2003, p. 81) noticed too, “The ascendancy of the artist over art has led directly to 
the disenfranchisement of the viewer.” Along the lines of disenfranchisement, 
Wang, Regina, Hsu, and Cheng (2007) advised designers, particularly, to pay more 
attention to recognizability of their designs by the observers. Hence, the apogee 
of Ismael’s insights is that art must be purposeful and the intention of it must be 
clear from the start and thence, must add value to people’s lives. Important to note 
260  Ismael in this observation refers to a song done by one Uganda’s most celebrated singers–Bobie 
Wine. In this song–Kiwaani– he sings about life in the ghettos and people’s deceitfulness in contempo-
rary Uganda.
261  Ismael references his observation towards the de-linking of art from community of contemporary 
Ugandan. The art produced today in Uganda lacks the ‘enduring emotion’ and the direct contact with its 
people.
262  Moreover, even when it is indirect, if it bears scenes, events, and objects of common knowledge, it 
still becomes a direct communication within that particular community.
though, is the fact that Ismael’s artwork appear of an impressionistic style, which 
is an abstraction of the impressions of the world. The labeling of either abstract of 
realistic is a simplified dualistic perspective of art.
Relevance and interpretation 
A questionnaire administered to gallery goers during the ‘Women’s Day Art 
Exhibition 2007’ was part of the Makerere Art Gallery’s programs of ensuring better 
services to both artists and viewers of its exhibition. According to the information 
contained in 36 questionnaires conducted by the gallery administration, a general 
remark made by one of the participants commended the show and acknowledged 
“all the artworks collected” had meaningful messages. Not all viewers felt the 
same way: “some pieces are abstract art and difficult to understand, but others are 
clear and send out great messages of women’s roles in society and development,” 
commented a viewer. The debate of abstract versus realism once again rages on as 
the same viewer posits, “abstract pieces of art need to have explanations for the 
lay person so their messages are understood.” However, the same viewer hails the 
organizers and wishes that it would be useful to exhibit or advertise some of the 
works “in various offices on campus for further sensitization and marketing.” 
This viewer is concerned that Ugandan art should be spread to the public and less 
confined in gallery spaces a view also expressed by Agnes in an earlier interview. 
Implicitly, the concern here refers to Pietarinen’s (2005) idea of relevance. That, 
which should be relevant for a certain context, and what should remain subtle to 
minimize information loss should become a matter of priority.
In a related reaction, another viewer acknowledges the relevance of many 
pieces, but decries the difficulty some raise when it comes to interpretation. This 
raises a second issue of relevance: the context is relevant because the artwork says 
something about ‘Women’s Day,’ but the detail of the content is not relevant to 
constitute its own meaning-making independence away from its environment. 
The viewer may know that one is talking about feminine issues, but might not 
exactly tell what the actual message is although the context is right. Dale (1996) 
adequately addresses this dilemma considering his proposal of expressions that 
mean. The same viewer offers advice, “All of the pieces should have a title that 
can enable the viewer to interpret better.” Contrarily, a viewer identified as an art 
student advised the gallery to show “more abstract pieces to overcome the plen-
ty of obvious pieces.” It is not clear though that all ‘abstract pieces’ are discrete; 
some may be even more obvious than non-abstract pieces. This is the mentality of 
the contemporary Ugandan artist especially the one trained at Makerere Univer-
sity and many other higher institutions of learning. Consequently, it disconnect-
ed the artist from his community, a matter too, that concerns Halkinhal (1999): 
If we hear that 300,000 people went to the Jackson Pollock show, then it is just because 
they were convinced they should go to the Jackson Pollock show.  They pay money 
and they look around to see a show that they have no interest in; they go just because 
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somebody else told them to take an interest in this. My audience ought to be anyone on 
the street who is smart enough to look at my work. We do works for ourselves, for each 
other; we do work for this little art Mafia (p. 31).263
A question of relevance versus interpretation arises as the dialogue ensued: that 
some artworks are relevant to the theme but difficult to interpret. Ideally, the 
viewer can identify some elements in the artwork as directed towards feminine 
representations, but the connections between these parts cannot logically form a 
legible whole. This anomaly occurs in summaries most of artworks, whereby layers 
of text do not coordinate with the visual elements although wrapped in one package. 
In such configurations, it is highly likely that the pileup of layered texts will not 
be logical during read back. The consequence is, in most cases, failure to deliver 
the required communication, even though the elements used as signifiers carry 
attributes of the said theme. This is because such configurations require parallel 
read-back processes, which in most cases, require expertise or high sensibility of 
artistic exposure. Relevance therefore, avoids the mix up with ability to interpret 
or decode the message because relevance in itself is a contextual phenomenon, 
which does not determine the choice of combinations in visual formulations. In 
conclusion, Pearse (cited in, Hutchens & Suggs, 1997) tackles this dilemma with 
warranted advice: 
We should examine cultural practices, as well as the artifacts of culture, as signifying 
systems, as practices of representation, not as the production of beautiful things evok-
ing beautiful feelings. Art educators should begin to understand the rhetoric of the 
image and how it persuades and positions the viewer/reader (p. 36).
263  Pollock–an issue of economically staged fame that works in a capitalistic society in which there are 
winners and losers, and top winners are designated superstars.
6 / Remix Aesthetics 
 
Preamble 
In dealing with the idea of remix, I draw inspiration from the current wave of 
reinvention dominating contemporary culture in Buganda. Following the abolition 
of Monarchs in 1966 by the then president Apollo Milton Obote, Buganda and all 
its institutions collapsed as the hierarchy that bound it together had disintegrated. 
Nevertheless, during the close period of the 1980s to the mid 1990s, a wave of 
youthful energized Baganda activists, following the reinstatement of Monarchs 
in Uganda by the nrm (National Resistance Movement) government, set out to 
reinstate the Kingdom’s past glory.264 The idea of revisiting their roots dominated 
agendas of various social groups in Buganda, some of which included Buganda 
Kingdom, Nkoba za Mbogo, theatre, music, cultural villages, and visual artists. 265 
The phenomenon of remix became a prominent entity in music, dance, and drama 
to represent strategically the concept of specific locale as a way of bridging the 
past with the present. Navas (2007) prefers to define remix in terms of music: “A 
remix in general, is a reinterpretation of a pre-existing song, meaning that the 
aura of the original will be dominant in the remixed version.” I thus discuss works 
of art produced with the concept of remix by appropriating cultural implements 
to strengthen my argument that familiar and specific things are instrumental in 
instituting meaning making and at the same time, we continue–as question and 
critique what is appropriated–the knowledge that comes with the appropriated 
implement is space and time. Typically, the goal of appropriation is to critique 
taken for granted assumptions but also maintains status quo in desired situations–
this is a goal of Remix aesthetics. Further, I analyze the significance of remix in 
constituting various levels of signification in visual narrative that appear through 
tropes and signs as linguistic entities and the role this plays in influencing art 
productions. I also interact with various artists of different age groups to gain an 
264  Nkoba za Mbogo is a youth wing of the Buganda cultural institution operating mainly in higher 
institutions of learning founded at Makerere University in 1989 to support and popularize the project of 
revisiting the past glory of the Buganda Kingdom.
265  See Sanyal’s article on “Kabiito Richard’s paintings: A local reinvention in a global perspective”, 
June 2004. Available online at, http://www.articlearchives.com/humanities-social-science/visual-per-
forming-arts/795065-1.html
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insight into their reactions to remix in particular and their general views about 
meaning in art in the context of Buganda and Uganda generally. 
ART AND THE ARTIST
 
Practising remix
In this study, I work with the concept of the Reflexive Remix concept of critiquing 
but maintaining traces of original essences even when I use pieces of material 
culture and narrative in new situations to mean differently. The practice of remix 
that emanated from music and today known as turntablism stems from the tradition 
of sampling; “sampling is the basis for the popular practice of cut/copy and paste” 
(Navas, 2007, para. 2). Navas outlines three types of remix; extended, selective, and 
reflexive. The extended remix is a “longer version of the original song containing 
long instrumental sections making it more mixable for the club DJ” (para. 6). The 
selective remix consists of subtracting material from the original song. This may 
contain new sections as well as new sounds, while subtracting others “always 
keeping the essence of the song” (para. 7). The reflexive remix allegorizes and 
extends the sampling aesthetic, “where the remixed version challenges the aura 
of the original and claims autonomy even when it carries the name of the original” 
(para. 8).266 The DJ may add or delete material but original tracks remain largely 
intact to be recognizable. Raymond (as I will shortly present) also believes that the 
clubs are not detached from their origin, although they now have a new meaning–
they are no longer enkoni, but Balaalo because they now pose as the ‘Balaalo’ with 
deep roots in the past. Rather than merely critique tradition, remix highlights 
the fact that tradition remains part of the difference that we make. Navas makes 
elaborates on the reflexive remix:
In culture at large, the Reflexive Remix takes parts from different sources and mixes 
them aiming for autonomy. The spectacular aura of the original(s), whether fully rec-
ognizable or not must remain a vital part if the remix is to find cultural acceptance. 
This strategy demands that the viewer reflects on the meaning of the work and its 
sources even when knowing the origin may not be possible (para. 16).
266  ”Allegory”,  Navas (2007) asserts, ”is often deconstructed in more advanced remixes ... and quickly 
moves to be a reflexive exercise that at times leads to a remix in which the only thing that is recogniz-
able from the original is the title. However, to be clear no matter what, the remix will always rely on the 
authority of the original song. When this activity extends to culture at large, the remix is in the end a 
re-mix that is a rearrangement of something already recognizable; it functions at a second level: a meta-
level. This implies that the originality of the remix is non-existent, therefore it must acknowledge its 
source of validation self-reflexively. In brief, the remix when extended as a cultural practice is a second 
mix of something pre-existent; the material that is mixed at least for a second time must be recognized 
otherwise it could be misunderstood as something new, and it would become plagiarism. Without a his-
tory, the remix cannot be Remix” (para. 9).
Embuukuuli  
Responding to Raymond’s artwork he created with two clubs mounted on a black 
background (see figure 11), Gregory asks at the opening of the ‘Different but One 
Art Exhibition’ (February 15, 2008), “Ate ezo embuukuuli zaani?” (Whose clubs are 
those?) Gregory further asks whether they are from Bwindi after Raymond claims 
authorship, “Z’eBwindi zino?” (Are these from Bwindi?)267 Gregory immediately 
remembers his trip to Bwindi through the clubs; he conceives the clubs as 
representations of Bwindi and therefore the meaning they invoke is the gorilla 
tracking in Bwindi. He does not consider the work as a complete entity in itself, 
but holistically as a memory of Bwindi. His mind goes beyond the clubs and settles 
on their meaning–Bwindi. Not only Bwindi, it also invokes tourism, the tracking of 
gorillas, and even the gorillas themselves. What does Gregory’s reaction contribute 
to this debate? It invokes the mechanisms of tradition’s influence on meaning. It 
further confirms metonymy’s specialty of invoking a string of other relations that 
aid meaning formation. Hence, the clubs, to Gregory, mean Bwindi because they 
carry attributes of Bwindi and therefore invoke memories of Bwindi. Gregory, in 
turn, adores the artwork more than many other viewers. This is because Gregory 
has access to knowledge about the ‘Embuukuuli’ and has an experience of them, he 
ably finds meaning in the artwork, and one who has no experience of it, struggles 
to make meaning.268 However, after Gregory chips in with his comment, I begin to 
look at the artwork differently. 
In his interpretation of Raymond’s work, Gregory refers to it as ‘embuukuuli’ 
and not whose art work it was; rather, he does not refer to the artwork itself but its 
means of expression–the clubs. In so doing, he links the subject with the object. 269 
Revisiting Dale’s (1996) idea of meaning, he proposes a system of meaning whereby 
the conditions under which one person can say something to another with a par-
ticular utterance become explicit. The question to ask is what is it about the clubs 
that makes them mean what they mean, for example, to Gregory? Alternatively, in 
267  Bwindi is a tourist resort in the Bwindi Forest Reserve where people go to track Mountain Gorillas. 
It is located in Western Uganda.  Academic staff of Margaret Trowell School of Industrial and Fine Arts, 
Makerere University organizes annually the ‘Different but One Art Exhibition.’ Its inception was back in 
the year 2002 curated and cofounded by Rebecca Uziel and artist from Israel and now Associate Profes-
sor Philip Kwesiga, then dean of MTSIFA.
268  I personally attributed it to a walking stick, which is normally an article for the elderly, so I was at-
tributing old age to his construction.
269  Embuukuuli is a stick mainly used by cattle herders in the central, southern, and western regions 
of Uganda. In Buganda, it refers to a huge stick with a round head used for protection against possible 
danger. “Ezo embuukuli z’ani?” implies that the clubs have communicated directly with Gregory in con-
formity with what Gregory believes Raymond wanted him to believe that what Raymond meant to say 
was that the clubs are from Bwindi. Furthermore, that the “embuukuuli” means much more to Gregory 
than the conceptual appraisal as construed by the artist. The artist only presents the clubs for viewing 
in a new context and not the old one. However, the clubs retain their original meaning even in the new 
dimension the artist places them simply because the intention of the utterer builds upon belief of the 
viewer that what he intends is to make his audience believe that he actually means that the clubs are 
from Bwindi his audience gets to believe it. Significantly, because the artist apparently chooses relevant 
content for the occasion, Gregory grasps the meaning of the artwork communicate directly with minimal 
loss of information. Secondly, Gregory and Raymond exhibit specificity and commonality because of 
their common belief and association with the clubs.
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respect to their meaning, what is it about the clubs that is so important for their 
use to say something about the land bill? Drout (2006) provides an inference, “if 
someone uttered ‘Sinatra wants to tour next year with Metallica,’ I would come to 
believe that the person said that Sinatra wants to tour next year with Metallica, 
even if, I never heard that sentence before.”270 Placed in the context of Raymond’s 
exhibit, Gregory interprets upon contextual information that Raymond’s interest 
in getting him to recognize his (Raymond’s) intention, to get Gregory to consider 
a proposition is, in fact, to have Gregory recognize Raymond’s intention and to 
have Gregory believe that proposition and thereby get to believe it.271 
Having placed Dale’s (1996) general concept of meaning in context, we now 
consider the implications of situations of communication under Raymond’s idea 
of using clubs in his artwork. The L-Sentence Dale cites in his theory is a composi-
tion of language and how an audience may participate in the use of such language. 
Not even in general terms as Dale’s proposal of a theory of meaning, will mean-
ing fall short of cognition. More so, Dale emphasizes the quality of the expres-
sion, which is the enabling condition for the resultant behavior. Thus, visually the 
content and indeed the quality of the expression that enables cognitive behavior 
must be of high repute. The meaning is that we must build up favorable anteced-
ent conditions for us to form qualitative expressions upon which we may build 
our belief systems. This is why I propose that Pietarinen (2005) provides an idea of 
the quality of Dale’s L-Sentence within which one translates ones understanding 
of a proposition into a common experience between two communicating parties 
in relation to condition C*. Pietarinen proposes purpose and full account of mean-
ingful intention whereby the expression bears an intended goal that the participant 
tries to grasp. This calls for accountability for the relevant factors considering the 
expression in light of its context of reference. Dale’s theory becomes important 
and useful if we can ably cognize the L-Sentence implied in an extract of his argu-
ments leading to his explicit theory: 
So I utter ‘Grrr’ intending to get you to consider whether to believe that I am angry, 
knowing that you know that I not, and intending you to reason from your recognition 
that I intended you to consider whether to believe that I am angry with certain facts I 
know to be known to you about our friend, that I am actually trying to get you to believe 
that our friend is angry272 (section 7.2, para. 9).
Dale’s (1996) theory is quite important because of its linkage with the idea of 
narrative that would work for this study especially so that it recognizes the intention 
270  Dale (1996) thinks that “this is more important a fact for understanding the nature of meaning 
than the fact that the nicest syntactic theories that people have come up with for describing natural 
languages have allowed for infinitudes of sentences” (section 7.3, para. 22).
271  Dale believes that inevitably that is what happens even in the simplest cases of saying.
272  The italicized words are my own emphasis on the idea of the L-Sentence in which we find cognition 
and historical background to the proposition even if there is no prior history of the utterance itself.
of the artist as the initiator of communication in a visual language. My study, in 
addition to Dale’s provision, proposes conditions under which an audience may 
recognize the L-Sentence in his proposition as a believable expression and as such 
meaningful in that recurrent condition. To create conditions for expressions to 
become recognizably meaningful, we work by invoking traditions that help us 
interpret the situation as demanding our attention. In this way, meaning connects 
with tradition. I have earlier linked Dale’s condition C* to the traditional referent in 
Drout’s account of tradition as it also seems to be recurrent. Turning to Raymond’s 
exhibits, the articles used in their capacity as original entities, with minimal or no 
modification may still mean the same things in new contexts and even evoke the 
same emotions as when deployed in their original settings.273 
The revelation here is twofold: it suggests that remix aesthetics is still, and will 
be crucial to visual readings in any context: and that, narrative text can borrow 
from the remix concept for its explicit, introspective and affective abilities for 
those who hold such experiences. Perhaps, it is vital to note that both concepts 
narrative and remix can depend on each other to enhance comprehension in vi-
sual readings.274 Whether Raymond was expressing an idea far from what Gregory 
expected and perceived in his reading, the expression and communication that 
transpired between the two entities suggests that the articles in the artwork, in 
some way, deliver a message to Gregory; Gregory in turn, is in complete interaction 
with the embuukuuli. Realizing that condition C* relies on context and tradition, 
one could also recall Pietarinen’s (2005) suggestion that under situations of com-
munication, the interpreter infers context-dependence in reliance to the intended 
meaning of the communicator. Duly, Gregory is in direct dialogue with his own 
socio-cultural experiences, thereby, relegating the artist to a status of initiator: he 
starts the dialogue and withdraws into oblivion while the enabling condition gets 
into direct contact with the viewer for a more comprehensive interaction.275 With 
economic and pragmatic concerns, the artist and audience build up rapport that 
enables Dale’s (1996) condition C* to luxuriate and bolster meaning making during 
communication.
It is important to note at this stage that Dale (1996) emphasizes in his argu-
ment that the idea he advances was not to provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for things to mean what they do. He instead provides a general outline of 
why things mean what they do. The study conforms to this postulate in its explo-
ration of condition C* because it is only an aspect of his theory on which I focus. In 
273  This is not to say that all articles maintain their original meanings. Some symbolic articles, for 
example sacred objects, once separated from their environment lose some of the symbolic content, as I 
will testify.
274  They do so by the process of reemphasis. By attending to a particular thing, we emphasize its 
presence. Reoccurrence of the same thing within the same context reemphasizes its presence and thus 
asserts its position onto the perceiver.
275  Here is where conceptual accounts of meaning may serve to constitute a holistic experience of an 
artwork, rather than dwelling entirely on the artist’s own experiences or intentions. See, Gabarini & 
Adenzato (2004) and Feldman & Narayanan (2004) in my earlier discussions.
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other words, it is a pigeonhole for exploring the world beyond. Secondly, I retain 
all qualities of Dale’s theory, including condition C* as terminology for what I set 
out to explore, with the aim of avoiding a scenario of misrepresentation. Addi-
tionally, since Dale bases his implicature theory of the ‘expression’, as a core con-
cept, we need to define the qualities of that experience. Ideally, we could define it 
in different ways, nevertheless, with the present text, remix and 
narrative will, as working concepts, act to advance the notions in 
condition C*. Importantly, after naming condition C* as constitu-
tive of an expression that means, the study will, in the following 
chapters, explore the recurrence of this condition with narrative 
and remix aesthetics as explorative tools. This is because condi-
tion C* seems as though it is recurrent and every time it occurs, 
an audience recognizes it as meaningful.
Balaalo 
Upon interaction with Raymond on his clubs, the title of the 
artwork turns out as Balaalo (see figure 11 above) not Embukuuli as 
envisaged by Gregory. Here, the artist directly mediates meaning. 
Contrary to my earlier interpretation of the artwork, based on 
Gregory’s comments, Raymond was making a political and 
historical statement at the same time. He has always been very 
curious about the ‘Balaalo’276 (cattle keepers) who he wonders from 
where they hail. On the other hand, the issues that dominated 
contemporaneous Ugandan politics at the time constituted a 
controversial Land Amendment Bill proposed by government.277 Two clubs (enkoni) 
fixed on a black background face the opposite direction: one faces up, and another 
down. Apart from copper wires that the artist wound around them in small doses, 
the clubs bear no additional manipulation. “These”, Raymond says, “were basically 
complementing the clubs.” They have no basic function; it, was kind of upgrading 
the clubs to ordinary artworks.” Raymond does not seem to believe that a work of 
art can come into being without formal mediation by the artist. That is to say, the 
artist must modify the form of his material before he can achieve forms that would 
eventually become art.
In their new context, the clubs become communicative, and to Raymond, they 
are not art for art’s sake.278 Even to the Balaalo themselves, there is a deep story 
276  A long time ago in Buganda, there were no cattle keepers. What happened is that people from the 
Southern and Western cattle keeping tribes, disadvantaged at the time, and came to Buganda as cattle 
keepers. These people were mainly Nyarwanda and Kiga from Southwestern Uganda. They later settled 
and became part of the later generations of Buganda.
277  Rumor holds, that some of the current leaders are mainly people of the cattle-keeping races; hence, 
Raymond wants to know what their identity is because it looks like they want to grab land from its right-
ful owners yet traditionally, they did not possess land in Buganda. So, who are they? “Abalaalo baava 
wa?” he asks wonderingly where the Balaalo came from because it is not also clear to him whether 
everyone who holds a ‘Nkoni’ is a Mulaalo. Mulaalo is the individual separated from the group.
278  The clubs are more similar to Duchamp’s readymade Fountain (1917) as aesthetic–as a theory of the 
about their relationships with their cows. Raymond thought about the artwork for 
a while and it was not accidental. Raymond chooses not to manipulate the clubs 
because he the message of the clubs to take a bigger percentage of the artwork and 
any manipulation would distort its meaning and reduce its intensity.279 More so, 
manipulation of the clubs would interfere with, and reduce emphasis on the over-
all meaning. Raymond, in other words, knows that readers of his text would derive 
intense and invigorated meaning from the artwork if they encounter what they al-
ready know. My interest in Raymond’s work was never its meaning, but its presen-
tation and conceptual elegance. The essence of Remix aesthetics is to re-emphasize 
meaning and increase its intensity in the context of this study. In a flashback, the 
enabling condition in Dale’s (1996) theory is the condition C*, which I may confi-
dently now identify as the ‘expression’ that causes behavioral changes in an active 
party. Ideally, in order to recognize my intention to have an audience believe my 
proposition and thereby come to believe it, I must make an emphatic statement 
in the proposition for them to recognize my intention to have them consider my 
proposition.280
Noticing the above statement, Raymond’s artwork is elegant in its proposition 
that it elicits contrasting, but amicable reaction from its readers. That aside, ‘Em-
buukuli’ in contrast with ‘Balaalo’281 gave Raymond another angle because he want-
ed to know how people reacted regionally.282 Although Raymond commented on 
land wrangles in his work, no one actually ever comes up with such an interpreta-
tion. Indeed, he confesses that he dangled between the rich history of the ‘Balaalo’ 
and the political statement on land issues as taking dominance in his intended 
meaning. However, his artwork can take on any meaning or carry any message in 
the context one chooses to read it. Tomah told me that if he had money, he would 
have paid for the clubs because they affected him so much. “Gino emigo, nawu-
nature of art or intentionality of the artist (selective remix)–more so than a remix aesthetic in question-
ing and critiquing appropriation mixed with or juxtaposed with imagery to question the appropriated 
(reflexive remix).
279  The ‘dominant attraction’ in play: Raymond’s suggestion in this is narratorial in nature; he wants 
a domination of significance that would raise questions. Furthermore, he reiterates the figure of the 
‘mbuukuuli’ to reemphasize his intention of maximum impact by suggesting a ‘bigger percentage’ or 
saliency in narrative terminology.
280  It important to propose at this stage that, Dale’s (1996) proposition is not devoid of antecedent 
conditions although it says so prima facie. For that reason, it requires strong propositional statements 
to attract attention.
281  ‘Enkoni’ is a Nyankore word for the clubs. Banyankore hail from the Tuusi Races believed to have 
links with the races of Ethiopia and a cattle-keeping race.
282  He discovered that people from the Western region reacted more to the artwork than any other 
region to the extent that Tomah wanted to buy the clubs themselves not in their capacity as artworks 
in a gallery. Gregory looked at the artwork as embuukuli in its context of being  ‘embuukuuli’–clubs. Ted 
makes a similar observation. People from the Central region - Buganda see it as ‘embuukuli’ whereas 
those from the West look at it as ‘enkoni’, a perspective of herding cattle, security, arbiter and discipline. 
In Buganda, for example, it is mainly for security purposes and that is why its name is Embuukuuli 
because it has capacity to destroy enemies with its huge protuberance. From Gregory’s point of view, 
therefore, he is right and on the point. Indeed, when in Bwindi, they used sticks to climb hills in Bwindi 
forest. Raymond’s idea of embuukuuli, though, differs from Gregory’s line of usage of the word, but he 
was not wide off the mark in terms of what Raymond wanted to mean.
Figure 11. Nsereko 
Raymond, Balaalo. 
2007. Clubs and 
copper wire on 
plywood. Photo: 
Kabiito Richard
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lidde nga kinkuteko nnyo kubanga Raymond yankutte kumutima” (I felt so much 
concerned with these sticks because Raymond touched my heart), he explains. 
Analytically, it does not matter whether Raymond was making a political state-
ment. His concern is what the clubs mean to him in his context of meaning. “In 
our place, this stick performs several duties: herding, security, when you are angry 
you settle matters there and then; when you annoy me, I hit you, you hit me and 
at the end irrespective of whoever overpowers the other, the quarrel is settled; the 
stick is used for ceremonial marriages,” he narrates. 
Furthermore, it is taboo to place the ‘nkoni’ upside down or laying it flat on the 
ground; if a woman jumps over it, it is disrespectful; the children and women are 
disciplined by this stick and they consider it as their ‘ears’283; marital differences 
are settled by this stick. Additionally, when Tomah first saw Raymond’s work, 
what he liked first were the clubs.284 Tom is attached to the art work because it has 
direct bearing to his cultural and historical setup; more so, it brings back memo-
ries of his own within alien localities; hence, Raymond touches his heart when he 
does not manipulate the nkoni to retain and maintain its attributes. The originality 
Tomah mentions is not about novelty, but it concerns attachment. Moreover, the 
reason why Balaalo is neither painterly nor sculptural is the intensity of affect it 
imposes on the reader. Tomah proposes to buy the clubs because of his attach-
ment to them; without them, a lot cannot go on in his own cultural and social 
context. Such attachment related to the presence of the ‘nkoni’ remains the same 
even when we encounter it in new contexts and indeed used in different ways. The 
meaning derived from such a representation is far greater and more embracing 
than meaning derived from nowhere. Indeed, meaning from nowhere is not mean-
ingful because we have no dimension to get into it. 
What remix affords the reader is the actual experience being re-experienced 
afresh in another form. Metaphors capably maintain meaning; on top of ushering 
in new meaning, in case we already dealt with the artist’s expression. Metaphori-
cality in Raymond’s work mainly accrues between context and expression in the 
idea presented of Balaalo and the Land Bill. The clubs present an aesthetic idea: the 
presumption that ‘Balaalo are clubs’ to mean ‘the mighty power of politicians will’. 
That is, to see the clubs as political might one cannot determinately subsume it. 
Raymond, also, introduces the historical relations of the Balaalo with the nkoni, 
which make the metaphoric representation quite compelling. In addition, the nko-
283  Metaphorically used in this sense. Warner, (2002) thinks that metaphors of answering, conversa-
tion or talking back, form the normal way of imagining the interactive character of public discourse.
284  Raymond’s work is the only one that touches Tomah in the entire exhibition: “The clubs have 
something they remind me of. When in Kampala you forget about particular things, but when you come 
across it, it is so touching and eventful”. Tomah, a self-taught artist, is of the view that the work is origi-
nal because even if you got a man from the remotest part of Ankole, he would say, “this is what I know 
out of the entire exhibition.” Original in this sense used by Tomah designates identity: roots of the works 
rather than being novel. Gadamer (cited in, Korsmeyer, 1998) clarifies Tomah’s experience: “The joy of 
recognition is rather the joy of knowing more than is already familiar. In recognition, what we know 
emerges, as if illuminated, from the entire contingent and variable circumstances that condition it; it is 
grasped in its essence. It is known as something” (p. 97).
ni enact a host of relations in a metonymic sense: Gregory re-experiences climbing 
the hills of Bwindi in pursuit of gorilla viewing; Tomah re-experiences cattle herd-
ing, authority, natural law, discipline and arbitration in its original context. The 
re-experience forms the core of meaningfulness afforded by the artwork. The rest 
of the works in the exhibition are not conceptually accessible to many except the 
authors, according to Tomah the nkoni is readily understandable to many: at least 
some meaning is accessible although not in the artist’s sense.285 Apart from the 
potential to exhibit other linguistic forms later on hung in a gallery as art, Balaalo, 
designating a political might, is deeply metaphoric if we already know that it is a 
metaphor.
The dilemma facing art today lies in Raymond’s strategy of upgrading the clubs 
to ‘ordinary artwork’. Although he claims that he does not manipulate the clubs, 
I think he does. The spiral copper wires are an attempt to enhance or upgrade the 
clubs to art, believed to be a manipulation of visual texts by either reformulation 
or altering their appearance or by additions that enhance or detach them from 
their original contexts. These manipulations run by rules and procedures conven-
tionally agreed upon by parties who have assumed artificial authority to deliberate 
on what should and should not be as in tradition. “The essence of art is in the idea, 
(conceptual art) not in its implementations, which could be many and different, 
but all equally inconclusive and mortal,” declares Bauman (1998, p. 33). In Ray-
mond’s submission, he declares the clubs as being inherently communicative; but 
upgrading them to ordinary artworks’ contradicts that view. “Art can only exist if 
someone has made it. Art is always the product of a personal perspective, however 
subtle and ambiguous that might be. Art always expresses a point of view, even 
when at its most elusive. Art is a language of expression and it manifests itself 
through craft” Spadling (2003, p. 39). 
What art is and what it is not, remains a dilemma facing art today. Other than 
art being the actual construction of material elements, art in the post-modern era 
is the concept behind its origination, and construction. Appropriating the clubs 
or ‘enkoni’ from being utilitarian articles and considering them as communica-
tive in the gallery is an artistic act: it is creative and catering for the human soul. 
The audience should be the end recipient of visual texts though, because it feeds 
on concepts and ideas rather than material entities.286 Materiality of artifacts is a 
medium that, in its dispensation, mediates between the individuals and the world 
of images. Hence, whatever form or shape the material articles endow is immate-
rial if the soul is not the end recipient; that is to say, if we do not cater for the indi-
vidual and later on the group. Nevertheless, tradition sounds like meta-narratives, 
285  Tomah prefers that kind of execution to individualistic work and his final verdict was that he would 
like to see such a technique taught at the University. On the other hand, “I embrace that technique 
because I want art that people relate to”, concluded Raymond. Of course, “[t]he quality of a technique 
can only be judged in relationship to the artist’s purpose. If treated as an aim in itself, craft becomes a 
trap. That is why art is more than craft; it is a language,” insists Spadling (2003, p. 38).
286  Specifically, this distinction is affecting the Ugandan contemporary artist as s/he tries to search for 
‘appropriate’ art forms that suit that status.
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which do not meet the requirements of the individual, thus sometimes not all 
conventions fulfill our goals. When one, though, takes into account Drout’s (2006) 
‘elbow room’ where tradition gains room for interpretation, such fear falls apart.
If tradition is an agreement between concerned parties then it is as a tool for col-
lective meaning. So far, there is no binding agreement on what art is. Further still, 
are only guiding principles and not the bearers of essence (Spadling, 2003). Art in 
the middle ages up to now is dependent upon the individual as expressing his/her 
own feelings. What about art expressing the other’s feelings? Does such a trend, 
then, cater for the soul of the other? On an optimistic note, Balaalo highlights the 
potential of remix aesthetics in meaning making practices within the confines of 
tradition. It also highlights the presence of polysemy in visual texts and the mean-
ings they carry within cultural contexts and localized settings. Not only polysemy, 
it also highlights the fact that we can still interpret phenomena within the con-
fines of tradition such as Tom does. Secondly, tradition works within the confines 
of remix philosophy because of the ‘elbow room’ that allows self-critique and at 
the same time questioning its transcendent or imminent competing traditions.287 
Tomah insinuates that articles already known to one by either convention or ac-
culturation will be more understandable and hence more meaningful in any place 
or context to those particular individuals who have prior experience of them. 
Art in a traditional context–or with a touch of tradition–provides the reader 
with meaning and does not restrict one from having a personal viewpoint. Thus, 
articles continue to critique and reveal traces of former meanings within their lo-
calities even if we remove them from their natural environs and place them into 
new contexts. These traces act as starting points for our understanding of the new 
intended meanings. This works emphatically in communities where tradition 
thrives as a basic unit of understanding the other. Further, these articles may carry 
explicit meanings to those who subscribe to them or have an idea of what they 
are unless led to believe and think otherwise. For example, Raymond’s title Balaalo 
restricts the meaning to cattle herders and locks out Gregory’s gorilla tracking, 
Tomah’s notion of security and other norms, locks out my interpretation of the 
clubs as walking sticks. The most interesting bit though, is that each one of us has 
some meaning attached to Raymond’s Balaalo according to one’s own interpreta-
tion of the tradition. Moreover, this is the true purpose of art; to communicate 
with the viewers, whereby communication does not mean imposing meaning on 
the readers but allowing them to participate in the process of producing mean-
ing. As argued earlier, tradition entails interpretation in its application; before we 
can interpret a situation as a tradition, we must first understand it as a tradition 
in order to apply it to our present context. This observation is in agreement with 
Drout’s (2006a) submission of tradition as having an ‘elbow space’ for its interpre-
tation.
287  Tradition does not conflict with critiquing because tradition itself is a tool for critique–in regener-
ating, and thus, perpetuating itself, tradition critiques itself and its competing traditions. Thus, remix 
itself is a tradition that critiques other traditions.
Signification levels and intimacy
Meaning is more intimate at its basic levels of signification and becomes less 
intimate the more conventionalized it gets, at the extra-narrative level.288 A sign 
implies in principle, a differentiation between a representative element and a 
represented one (Santander & Aimone, 2002). They further claim that the index 
is more of archaic ontological production of sense-body-space-objects, and the 
contact order, which places the index at the first signifier level of corporeality. 
That is, the possibility of touching the index, seeing it, and scouring it (Veron, 
2002).289 Meaning continues to transform itself according to the orientation of its 
bearer implying that meaning is not static. The tone in which Gregory and Tomah 
refer to the ‘embuukuuli’ and ‘e’nkoni’ is quite intimate and very subjective at its 
iconic level: ‘ate zino e’mbuukuuli z’ani?’ is quite an intimate reference. Gregory is 
referring to the clubs as e’mbuukuuli not as art works but as their name suggests–a 
sign of intimacy: he detaches himself a bit from the intimate connotation when 
he adds “z’eBwindi”–the extra narrative. If Gregory had not discovered the author 
of the artwork from whom he gains the extra-narrative, he would have remained 
at that raw stage of intimacy and still he would have gained meaning. Similarly, 
Tomah says that “Gino emigo ginkutteko nnyo nnyo era singa mbadde ne sente 
nandigiguze”, meaning that the clubs touched him so much to the extent that if he 
had money he would have bought them. 
Two things to note: the statement itself is very intimate because Tomah views 
the clubs in their firstness. Secondly, the clubs certainly have other connotations 
as Tomah narrates to me later that they are protective, symbolic in cultural en-
gagements, and corrective. However, these connotations are in their first order 
of signification to Tomah because he knows them that way. Indeed, this creates 
the intimacy Tomah portrays with clubs; the other is that Tomah, in his conversa-
288  In their reading, symbols are very complicated to comprehend and therefore require exquisite 
knowledge to formulate their basic connotations because they are highly abstract and could imply 
anything. Icons on the other hand, are easier to read due to their subdued knowledge prerequisite. 
Indexes’ require that we are aware of the cause in order to read their correct connotations. Hence, 
in terms of readability, Fred’s technique is perhaps more user-friendly than Raymond’s because its 
knowledge pre-requisite is minimal. Symbolic dialect, visual or otherwise, may prove troublesome to 
low knowledgeable groups or individuals due to their inflated requirements. Furthermore, symbols may 
not be workable on an interpersonal basis because they require or exist in their ‘thirdness’ of significa-
tion whereby individual subjective input is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. Tomah’s claim that 
even a man from the remotest part of Ankole can create meaning out of ‘enkoni’ is because he bases 
his reading on iconic signification. Icons represent themselves on all fronts because their attributes are 
what they represent. Enkoni in Raymond’s Balaalo iconically does not represent Balaalo but e’nkoni. 
Tomah’s narrative about the utility and symbolic or ideological function bases on its physical attributes 
as an icon and not because Raymond uses it to represent Balaalo or land wrangles at the highest level. 
Indeed, if Tom knew the title of the work, it would exert negligible credence on his overall attitude about 
the meaning embedded in the work because Balaaloness to Tomah is second-order signification that 
would certainly carry no weight. Because of the presence of iconography in Raymond’s work, it is able to 
generate meaning to both Gregory and Tomah. Metaphor is a lower order of signification and it is at the 
first level because its attributes are interchangeable; it is in other words, a sample or cut and paste, in a 
sense, earlier mentioned in remix aesthetics.
289  Griffin (2002) thinks otherwise by basing signification on Pierce’s three semiotic triads of compari-
son performance, and thought, which he tallies with icons, indexes and symbols. See also Howell’s 
discussion of Iconology concerning levels of signification and meaning making.
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tion, does not seem to go beyond the iconic level in the context or orientation of 
the clubs. Even when he suggests buying them, it is not that they are artworks to 
him, he sees them in their raw form of signification and that is what they mean to 
him. He therefore does not go beyond the first level of signification to say that, the 
clubs are a piece of art. Why assume this as a higher level of signification? It would 
depend on one’s theory of art, and therefore, what and how something is valued as 
art. Tomah had a content-based critique rather than art for art’s sake critique.290 
All his narrations are centered on the initial importance and regard he bears upon 
the ‘clubs’ not the ‘art work’–the extra-narrative in this case. This suggests that 
meaning-making processes may not as well succeed each other in particular situa-
tions and that they may remain at a particular level, or that a certain level may take 
precedence over the other.291
Raymond is more detached from the entire process because he uses the clubs at 
a higher level of signification that requires his viewers to have knowledge of what 
he drives at in the sense of symbolic properties. He uses it at the extra-narrative 
suggested by the name he gives them of Balaalo. When I asked Raymond whether 
his viewers knew that he commented on the land bill or sought information about 
the identity of the ‘Balaalo’, he informed me that nobody in the entire exhibition 
commented on the issue of the land bill or the Balaalo. This implies that at higher 
levels of signification there must be general knowledge on the issues at hand, and 
that there will be consensus on how to represent such issues. Arbitrariness is the 
order of the day at this level because anything can represent anything (Enrique & 
Santander, 2006; Griffin, 2002). It is hard to imagine that clubs could represent 
a comment on the land bill without consensus of that kind of representation. 
Clubs and the land bill are very different elements with no inherent relationship. 
The knowledge base required to make meaning at this stage is wider than that of 
knowing the clubs as clubs and not the identity of Balaalo or the land bill. Interest 
in the stimulus also decreases as the intimacy decreases in the viewers. Raymond 
fails to realize his goal because the text he uses, or the level of signification he 
employs does not apply to his audience. In other words, this kind of representa-
290  The assumption of whether Tomah makes meaning at a higher or lower level of signification 
depends on the degree of simplicity or complexity discussed in chapter 5. Our approach to a work of 
art will depend on our ability to oscillate between a simple or complex phenomenon concerning a 
particular task. We may approach a work of art from either a content-based perspective or an art for 
art’s sake perspective, or even from a traditional perspective. Art for art’s sake of course normally carries 
a disinterested perspective–a modernist perspective, which is always distant from the individual. Such 
conceptual approach normally determines the level at which we interpret the artwork, coupled with its 
context of appearance. At the level where the artwork is extremely intimate, one finds the icon; the im-
age represents its own properties. At the next (indexical) level, the image adopts other images from its 
environment or subtracts some elements, which becomes part of its interpretation. Yet, at the last level, 
the image completely sheds off its inherent qualities to signify only other things with no trace of its 
internal qualities present (symbol). This forms a hierarchy of possible meanings that may or may not be 
interrelated. At times, one may as well remain at the first two levels without getting to the highest level 
and can still make meaning out of a given image. Yet, on other occasions, images bear only depictions at 
the third level, which may require extra knowledge input.
291  It is important to note this claim in that when one draws a picture for a particular audience, there 
must be an understanding of the level at which this drawing will be processed, and hence understood.
tion would be or would not be strenuous to particular groups reading his text. It is 
therefore important to read and understand the audience we produce for and ap-
ply the appropriate organizing, representative and orientative properties for such 
a community because meaning keeps on changing its face as it advances in levels 
of signification.
Scenario5 
A cultural paraphernalia vendor on the dusty streets of Kampala always addressed me 
as a culturalist as he sold me his merchandise. He talked to me in anticipation that I may 
buy his articles from the point of view that I was aware of the various nomenclatures in 
the context of practicing cultural healing and I conform to the metaphysical aspects they 
symbolize. Thus, he tells me, (personal communication, March 5, 2008) “Ono Mukasa, 
ono Ddungu, ono Kiwanuuka […].” As he points at a copper spear, a brass spear, and mild 
steel spear tending towards black. He also sells me a wrist strap embroidered with red, 
white, yellow and black colors and they all stand for a particular ‘Lubaale’–cultural god: 
Kiwanuuka, Ddungu, Musoke and Mukasa represented on the strap made of bark cloth 
and colored with beads. 
At first interaction, he sounds like he refers to the spear as the god himself; 
but at second thought, he refers to the spear as being representative of its god. 
On the third note, he refers to it as bearing in mind that I know all the different 
nomenclatures and what they symbolize and hence what they are used for. Actually, 
before he tells me about the nomenclatures, I see the spear as a small dummy spear 
and nothing beyond that. Indeed, I still regard it as an article that represents itself 
and my use of its elements in the subsequent work is because it offers variety of 
color and texture, and because my study requires that I use such articles in my 
work. In my scheme of work, the paraphernalia aid me in achieving a material end 
whereas to him, it deals with spiritual matters. The question whether they still 
mean the same thing at the different levels of signification is part of that which 
this research seeks to understand: whether, material things or objects can still bear 
qualities of their former meaning as they perform a critique of existing traditions 
within their specific communities. This is important because remix as a history 
needs to be recognizable. Hence, when the vendor tells me about the gods in his 
paraphernalia, do they mean the same thing to him at every encounter of the said 
stimuli? Maybe the vendor shapes the meaning to fit needs of the buyer to sell his 
items (called social motive in psychology or marketing goods).
Tomah has demonstrated that the nkoni still mean the same thing to him 
even when he finds them in a gallery.292 His suggestion to buy them was because 
he wanted to use them as e’nkoni and not to decorate his house with the clubs. 
However, we need more evidence to this claim to make it a solid point of revela-
tion especially since I am advocating for fondness and intimacy in meaning mak-
292  The vender of cultural paraphernalia says that the objects no longer mean the same if they are not 
put to the same uses.
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ing processes in the visual arts. All done 
and said, what do the various levels of 
signification have to do with narrative and 
comprehension of visual images? I believe 
narrative provides us with contexts of un-
derstanding phenomena. It also suggests 
the levels at which meaning should be per-
formed because it provides the organizing 
factors like tropes and presuppositions. 
Therefore, the orientation of the narrative 
is significant in determining the level of 
comprehension in a visual text. That is to 
say, the figuration process and the adoption level predetermine the meaning of 
a visual narrative. There is holistic meaning when one processes all levels but at 
least we have quality meaning when the levels of narrator and narrattee seamlessly 
interfaced.
Mulere 
Mulere (see figure 12) boasts of inspiration from rock gongs found on Lolwe/Lolue/
Dolwe293 Island in Lake Victoria. Rock gongs are stones that resonate or produce 
sound when struck.294 In the artwork, Mulere, Ronald (personal communication, 
May 13, 2008) worked with a flute player who got conduits from electric wires to 
make a flute. Although originally, as he started work on the Mulere, it had a mouth 
that he later cut off. His interest lay in this area “because that is where most activity 
is: blowing and coordinating with [the] fingers.” Ronald’s major concern was to 
“bring that naturalness and exposure of our own materials to the public–bark cloth 
and clay”.  More so, bark cloth and clay are symbolic in a sense that people use them 
in shrines for worship. Ronald used to think of the simplest way of representing 
something and in this work, the “bark cloth was basically symbolic–for worship 
and representing the stones.” The bark cloth is a symbol: “it represents religion–it 
is symbolic to our cultural worship. The clay is also symbolic in our kind of material 
culture,” adds Ronald. Ronald works out his presentation with the symbolism 
associated with the material he uses.
However, Ronald claims that the clay is merely a material: “Whenever you 
change the media, there is a reason. Using metal may bring in the resonation in 
the work because we used [it] to hit the rocks.” He attempts to trigger `the person’s 
mind’ with the action in the work which is represented in the title “Omulere.” Not-
withstanding though, his priority was about the symbolism and the flute. Spa-
293  The island of Lolwe has different names by different communities in the area.
294  Ronald traveled to these islands on a project known as “Rock Art Rock Music” organized by 
the Rwenzori Sculptural Foundation in collaboration with Pangolin Edition based in England, which 
included European musicians and Ugandan counterparts while the visual artists were tasked to carve 
images out of the rocks.
dling (2003) is also concerned with the likelihood of achieving communication in 
an artwork: “A language is only any good if you can use it to communicate” (pg. 
37). Hence, when bark cloth is used, it is “basically because it is used in shrines.” 
“The black background means doom, or something I do not believe in”, proclaims 
Ronald.  He does not think, though, “The bark cloth means the same thing outside 
the artwork.”295 He believes he achieved what he wanted; some people ‘got’ what he 
was trying to stress.  He is biased against “painting and painting” simply because 
he normally wants `to bridge a gap’, which “can be done gradually by dealing with 
what people already know.” What Ronald stresses, and what is important to this 
study is that “when you want to bring out something to the public, you normally 
look for something that will easily tell your story to the public.” Ronald’s major 
concern ideally is to portray the naturalness and exposure of his own cultural ma-
terials to the public. Secondly, he tries to show that materials can stand on their 
own without extra connotations, although in my view, he fails to do so, since he, 
qua his explanation, admits that clay and bark cloth are symbolic of the culture.
Scenario6 
“Oyo Macaw Uganda era office yang erring sabot,”296 narrates Marie to Segundo (April 
15, 2008) during a conversation, they had about art and the public. Although Marie 
knew that, I was indeed using witchery paraphernalia for artistic purposes he decides to 
call me a ‘Macaw Uganda’ (Cultural healer). This is of course false and Marie is making 
fun out of the materials I use for my research. However, it has some deeper connotations 
in that such a reference triggers another event that Marie promptly refers to: It is the 
meaning and functionality of such objects traditionally known; or, it is what this 
paraphernalia stands for in its ‘raw’ state.297 Micah, also made a similar remark and it 
too, on the surface, was a joke; but deeper it meant the he still viewed the articles as those 
of witchcraft and not art materials. Hence, what they actually mean to him usually is 
still in the articles although in their new context they mean different things according to 
the level of signification. 
What is the implication then? 
The implication is that by questioning old traditions, remix maintains quali-
ties of its historical renditions while creating new meanings. Such a view resonates 
with that I just discovered from Ronald stipulating that materials can stand by 
themselves, but can also mean more than they stand for. Ronald too, acknowledg-
es that it was a way of maintaining cultural identity. Remix thus, continues indig-
295  In my opinion though, in the sense of the traditional use of bark cloth, it means the same inside the 
artwork as it does outside according to the author. Ronald uses bark cloth in this sense as symbolic of 
cultural values of the Buganda, and as representing bark cloth qua bark cloth. This resonates with my 
assumption that appropriated objects can still carry meanings of acquired within their former contexts. 
Nevertheless, this is an emphatic point stressing the possibility of creating new meaning with old mean-
ings.
296  The statement literally means that, “That one is a witch-doctor and my office is now like a shrine”.
297  The state it is in before modification or elevation to another level of meaning.
Figure 12. Mpindi Ronald, Mulere. 2007.  
Clay and bark cloth on wood.  
Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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enous knowledge because of its preserving nature by appropriation (sampling, cut 
and paste) as the most significant tool of remix aesthetics. It means that objects, 
event, or words allow reuse in their natural states to create alternative meanings or 
‘generic connotations’ so to say. They can stand for themselves or for other things 
although applied in their own capacity as things. Similarly, when working on the 
stories of Kato Kimera II (see figures 49) and Matyansi Butyampa (see figure 42) with 
Emma, I realized we were referring to the materials by what we know them as and 
not their materiality. Hence, we referred to the skin of a ‘Kasimba’ not as leather, 
but by the animal’s name–akasimba.298 The Characters were, on the other hand, 
also called by the names of who they represented therefore extending the presence 
of the represented–Matyansi Butyampa, Golooba Bidandi and the Murderer–who 
was later, nicknamed ‘Omutujju’ (terrorist). It is important to note that such refer-
ences and naming propagate and retains the character and identity of things, but 
creates new characters and identities at the same time. By realizing that we cannot 
entirely detach meaning from its traditional states in the case of remix, but create 
continuity drawing on such states, we now need to see how far we can adapt remix 
to visual communication as a tool.299
 
Scenario7 
When Jose and Pat (May 8, 2008) visited our studio to view what we were doing, Jose 
asked Pat to observe the way in which we had combined various materials. Pat said, 
“Emisota gyaffe gyonna bagimazeeyo” meaning that we had depleted the entire snake 
family.300 This is certainly a gross over-statement but holds enough water for us to quench 
our thirst. Pat says this because he sees the alligator skin in Kato Kimera II.  
It is significant to realize that Pat does not consider the skin a statement or reaction to our 
ways of seeing things in a particular way, and, trying to create new perspectives out of 
the old ones.
Pat probably sees a depletion of wildlife or he sees a snake instead which, in my 
view, is that articles used in their actual state, in many cases, retain their original 
meaning, unless otherwise contexualized. One finds it, thus, quite laborious to 
create a distinction between tradition and meaning. Namely, unless we agree on 
the changes to that effect, meaning remains within the whims of tradition, the 
indigene will continue to interpret situations the way s/he knows them and the 
298  Akasimba is wild animal in the family of the Genets (Genetta) – Genetta tigrina stuhlmanni (pat-
tern) is a type particularly found in Buganda. Color variation is particularly conspicuous in the very 
large-blotched type which ranges across southern Uganda and Kenya to the moister areas of Northern 
Tanzania (Kingdon, 1988, p. 148)
299  That is, if the traditional state is the traditional (social) knowledge of a particular group. The 
discipline of cultural studies refers to such knowledge as cultural narratives, which came to be oppres-
sive to some people in society – creating justification for injustice because of the long-standing cultural 
narrative of the way things are or have been and supposed to be. Remix aesthetics critiques cultural nar-
ratives by using/changing these narratives. It changes contexts, juxtapositions, showing what is absent, 
metaphor and many other forms.
300  ‘Emisota’ in Ganda dialect is translated as ‘snakes’; ‘musota’ as ‘snake’, and ‘omusota’ as ‘a snake’.
modern will continue to separate a beer glass from a wine glass using the same 
formal art principles.301 
The implications are with remix, one is able to combine various elements and 
forms boldly without prejudice. This is another way of referencing/citation in 
visual text: transplant or reuse to suit new contexts. Postmodernism encourages 
citation in visual texts, a thing modernism rejects out-rightly. When I tried to ex-
plain to Emmanuel how I had used his ideas to produce art work, it occurred to 
me that I was engaged in citation of visual texts. My depiction of the ‘Matyansi 
Butyampa’ story and Kato Kimera depended on Ishengoma’s skeletal structure. 
This is possible because the postmodernist does not rue re-use. This makes the 
concept of remix pivotal in the reinvention of the self and the link with the ‘other’. 
It links Emmanuel’s (a Year iii student at mtsifa) idea with mine so that we both 
support each other’s idea. In so doing, the idea becomes common to us and it keeps 
growing and spreading out to ‘others’. Sega (personal communication, 2008) used 
stories in some of his works because he wanted to “work with something that was 
already known.” In other words, he is not inventing something out of this world; 
he is re-inventing himself and the other. The ‘other’ wants sometimes, to know 
about something he already knows so we can only understand ourselves better 
through re-invention of the selves. That is, if we already have an idea about some-
thing, it attracts attention more than what we are clearly ignorant about. In turn, 
it creates wonder rather than debate in the ways it comes to our awareness. We can 
reminisce about what we all already know and this extends phenomena both in 
time and space. This, however, does not mean to say that we should not deal with 
new things; although equally important, we should move along with the old that 
is vital to our well-being. Apollinaire bore the instinct of emphasizing continuity 
of new things with the past (Spadling, 2003).
Greetings from Uganda  
Unconscious Imperative
Our implicit processes, I suppose, predetermine the meaning of a story, which 
leads to its reading in a particular way. Metonymy as explained by Drout (2006) 
and the ‘Unconscious Imperative’ work to institute things that have worked 
for us before. In addition, narrative can operate subliminally and thus has the 
ability to impose its organizing attributes upon an individual, to aid one’s ability 
to understand phenomena. This is evident in Fred’s work produced in a typical 
traditional philosophy of narrative as a causal art form. Contrary to my initial 
analysis of Fred’s narrative, the title is Greetings from Uganda (see figure 13) made 
up of figures embracing, welcoming, and at the same time, depicting different 
messages.302 Fred deals with typical African dress like Kanzu and items like pots 
301  Even in highly abstract conditions, one will always try to look out for a traditional spec to kick-start 
the interpretive process. Thus, dismissing indigenous knowledge as traditional is like one cutting the 
tree branch on which s/he sits.
302  Visually, this artwork constitutes a powerful narrative. Conceptually though, on a closer look, it 
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and musical instruments, home implements and domestic animals that include 
cows and chicken. Fred’s concern is an attempt to depict Uganda through greeting 
and the hospitable environment Ugandans boast. The artwork comprises of 74 
scenes painted on different days, under different circumstances. Several viewers 
looked at the artwork in different ways but Fred concedes that “most of the images, 
although they were imagined, they have a background”.
Fred confesses that he had not experienced most of the scenes he depicts in real 
life and he only produced mere representations of what he has heard from other 
people. The artwork produced in four days, comprised of scenes parallel to each 
other, and he dealt with not more than four ideas in a day. One of Fred’s revelations 
indicates that he needed bigger formats when under duress because the smaller 
ones needed more concentration. He used bright colors to lighten up the dull bark 
cloth; hence, colors such as red, really minimized. “I realized that most of the peo-
ple wanted it not chopped, [because they] had recognized a unitary message or 
story, well as me, I was seeing it in a different way” Fred narrates. Although most 
people thought the artwork had a message, Fred needed “to survive” and of course, 
follow the market trends. Nevertheless, Fred also is aware that artists see things 
in a different way, which things “tend to go deep into our lives”. Manuel an artist 
and curator, together with Were (an art historian), found the work a good mural. 
However, Fred’s intentions of producing the work and hence his perceptions of it, 
“were beyond the good in it”; they were in monetary terms. 
Fred admits, “I saw the story of Kintu and Nambi after it was said. The chick-
en stuff had a big role in the Nambi story; I could see the cows, apart from the 
Bodaboda.”303 He further promises to deal with stories in his next version: “when 
you do it that way, it is pure Ugandan and it flows. It has given me a straight line, 
instead of dealing with many ideas at ago”. Furthermore, “when you work, you try 
to imagine some figures in a certain scenario, but since I have never seen them, 
it seems they connect to a story from a long time ago. For example, malwa drink-
ers have been narrated to me and how they consume it. So the imagination is a 
connection to some distant story dating from the past”. He views the process of 
lacks a defined plot although it forms a disguised sequence. It perceptually forms a story-structure be-
cause of its chronology of episodes that seem adjoined by a common concept. Scenes although not iden-
tical, seem to lead to the next by virtue of action or expression. The narrative depicts scenes of common-
ality, community, values, and recreation of designated Ugandan societies to form a national narrative 
about ways of life. My first impression was a story of Kintu and Nambi because of the chicken. However, 
it became problematic building a plot of such a story at a closer look. Fred recollects or connects scenes 
by action, yet in some, color. In itself, color is vital; the action actualizes the virtual plot and sequence 
in a logical way to access meaning. Color in itself is only a medium and not a signifier, since the artwork 
does not depend on medium; but rather intentionality of the human plight: the need to communicate a 
human condition, derived from human instincts of action, intention, and objects of desire. Although the 
story is not out rightly declared, it gives us glimpses and or revelations of a narrative text by virtue of its 
disposition as a unit. Jerome Bruner (1986) reacts as such towards texts: “Its central hypotheses (prag-
maticism) are as follows: A text means nothing in and of itself; it is the reader who gives it meaning” (p. 
156). Besides, since the text has no stable meaning of its own, it is the reader and the critic and, finally, 
an “interpretive community” that make stable meanings.
303  Boda boda is a local slang for motorcycle or bicycle taxi. The term came from Eastern Uganda in 
Jjinja where bicycles were widely, and still are, used for commercial transportation. The term boda boda 
further portrays traces as far as Tororo and Busia where bicycle transport is a major means.
the artwork creation as a scenario of interconnected episodes, only intercepted by 
cases where he wanted to create pairs of the same scene.  Some of the odd scenes 
like the boda boda cyclist– a more recent phenomenon–filter through because of 
prior exposure that linger on in his mind and it come out first. An important re-
mark from Fred before he concludes is that, “there are so many stories and unless 
you get color and start painting, these stories come up from P.4 (Primary four) and 
when you make one stroke, it leads to another. When you make a stroke of a knife 
and it shows dancers, stories of dancers begin to come out”. Tradition works on 
similar terms whereby small parts can awaken an entire history of a tradition. We 
may also come out of the subliminal mode in case we need active consciousness, 
just as one may refer to the ‘Universal Traditional Meme’. Narrative thus intrinsi-
cally works like a tradition.
A priori organization 
The different sets of scenes and ideas are a result of different mindsets one comes 
with every time s/he gets to work. It is evident enough from Fred’s confession that 
stories actually do operate at the back of our minds without us ever realizing their 
presence. Fred only admits later that the episodes were indeed “interconnected” 
although he clearly works on the narrative on different days, with a mindset not 
similar to the previous one. More so, the scenes depict independent scenarios 
but at the same time, they embody the same theme, greeting. It is amazing how 
different scenes create harmony and interconnectedness both in meaning and 
Figure 13. Kakinda Fred, Greetings from Uganda. 2008. Oil on bark cloth. Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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construction; it is as if they are predetermined to complement each other within 
their sense of ‘difference’ or ‘otherness’. As we discussed the conceptual build-up 
of the artwork, Fred realized that indeed, they were reflections on stories of the 
past that always operated on him unconsciously and hence he was able to organize 
his conceptual frame in a continuum of related episodes. It is also imperative to 
note that the concepts are not predetermined; one episode leads to the other, and 
so the narrative develops. Although he paints the scenes along one theme, no 
single episode of representation is identical to the other, but the rhythm seems 
determined a priori. Indeed, it takes the author time to realize that he was engaged 
in a narrative of surmountable sense until others, who are outside its locus, insist 
that there is something about the work. The ‘good’ seen in the work is below Fred’s 
threshold of consciousness because his prime target is survival, not the ‘good’ he 
develops unconsciously. Fred’s failure to recognize the ‘good’ others see, implies 
that he is not aware of it. All the same, once prompted, he indeed acknowledges the 
‘good’ that others see is present.
The stories that Fred deals with are from the distant past, invoked remotely 
to allow him to organize his mindset yet such stories lay always within our re-
mote senses. Every time we get to work in such situations, we remotely invoke 
stories to take control of our conscious engagement in artistic activity. On top of 
the conceptual dispensation in Fred’s narrative, the perceptual is equally telling 
in terms of narrative forms: We see the elements of language, narration, and sig-
nification combined to form a comprehensive story about Uganda. I believe that 
the first instance of narrative structure is its formation: organization of the over-
all unit. Before he could place any paint or image on the bark cloth, Fred demar-
cates his space in many small units that are different in shape and size. This is 
the first step towards narration because a narrative is made of various units that 
are logically interconnected.304 The chop-up of small units–which would give Fred 
a bigger return–not only organize space, but they provide room for episodic de-
velopment. While he works with the interconnected space that itself is in many 
arbitrary smaller formations, the law of gestaltian closure and similarity takes 
over even without noticing it because now the eyes are not looking at each scene 
independently, but in its wholeness.305 Continuation then requires linked parts to 
relate to each other in some way in order to make sense of balance although there 
is chopping of the small pieces into separate units later. Fred notes that he created 
related episodes in order to create sets of similar scenes. My observation in this is 
that there was implicit demand for similarity and continuity that was so vital to 
completion of the work. 
Disjointed scenes or episodes would cause discordance and would deter pro-
gression. Hence, in order for Fred to execute the work to the levels of his expecta-
tion, he begins with the idea of interconnectedness at the organizational level. Ob-
304  This may be causal or not, but at least there exists some kind of connection between episodes.
305  This rhymes with emotional cadence we saw in the discussion on narrative theory.
servers of Greetings from Uganda were very insistent on not chopping it up because 
the beauty and continuity it offers to the viewer–that one rarely sees–will become 
dead and mute. Chopping it up means immediately, losing the storyboard. We no 
longer have the good Gestalt that gave us the continuity that we so much desire to 
see. Rather than see each unit on its own, we had better view it as a whole made up 
of smaller units. However, Currie (2009) has indicated that perception works tem-
porally, in addition to mere momentariness. During the search for connections 
between different units, the mind builds up plot even without a guided sequence. 
The mind begins to create a string of events that will eventually lead us to a logical 
conclusion. That is the organizational power of stories. Causal theories face criti-
cism as observed earlier in the text, instead our experience with the narrative texts 
matters and becomes vital. Indeed, the audience of Greetings from Uganda testifies 
that our experience with narrative texts is quite important when we deal with 
narrative. Secondly, Barwell (2009) indicates that some relations do not necessar-
ily exhibit causality, but instead give us reasons for evaluative judgments. Thus, 
when we supply reasons for evaluative judgments, we perform a task as basic as 
explaining the occurrence. 
In conclusion, Fred’s artwork is such a hit when it comes to pictorial narrative 
and specificity. An important and interesting finding is how the human mind in-
fers meaning upon stimuli based on what it already has in store: Because my inter-
est is so biased and inclined towards story telling in pictorial structure, I straight 
away see a story of Nambi and Kintu in Fred’s work. This is in agreement with 
Nanay’s (2009) idea that we can only deal with a text as a story if we consider it 
one. This also connects with Dale’s (1996) condition C* that calls into place, a host 
of relations and mnemonic material. Further still, Drout’s idea of metonymy as a 
blanketing principal in the entire relationship receives attention. By virtue of the 
biased mind towards narrativity, the work evokes a narrative pattern within the 
perceiving mind immediately and begins to search for a befitting story to match 
its own. Enjoying it and comprehending it, the perceiver must generate a story to 
match that of the work and s/he is going to look out for elements that lead to some 
kind of synchrony with the artwork.306 Once again, we see image reconstruction at 
play. The mind searches for images and relationships that can match those pro-
vided and invoked by the work at hand. These images and relationships come into 
place parallel to the work: a string of mental images line up against those of the 
artwork concurrently in order to create a match. This implies that immediately, 
the perceiving mind sees the work a search for templates that match such pictures 
begins. This also means that one can access the meaning of the story immediately 
if one can ably locate pictures in the mind that match-up those at hand. The best 
match is what we begin to build the story on. The implication bears that the story 
requires specific story structures of features that fit its own parameters. It along, 
creates biases towards certain goals.
306  An alignment of the artwork’s mind with that of the reader is crucial in understanding and appreci-
ating it.
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Robét one of the observers obsessed by the narrative says, “Tosala work eyo”, 
he continues, “Erina uniqueness eyaayo. Bwonogisala ejja kufuuka buno bulejj-
alejja.” Literally, this statement implies that if Fred chopped up the narrative art-
work, it would lose its uniqueness and become a cliché – tourist art. Robét, the ob-
server, has two elements he introduces into the narrative dimension: uniqueness 
and fluidity. In uniqueness, I see the tradition or specificity that he does not want 
to see dead. The fluidity, he leads us to some sort of gossip that lacks concreteness 
although this concept lays minimal credence to this discussion. In other words, 
Robét sees tradition in Fred’s work, which in turn tells us that narrative as a tra-
dition is specific and concrete. When Robét mentions ‘uniqueness’, he does not 
mean that the work is unique in its own sense of not being a normal thing we see 
every day in the galleries and museums; he instead sees an idea that is so specific 
and therefore suited to its environment and community. In other words, it contin-
ues a tradition of both material and values of the tradition.
The uniqueness of difference is inevitable. However, as I earlier mentioned 
that I had not seen such a work for a while. Indeed many observers marveled at 
its uniqueness because it was specific to them and indeed, it made a difference. A 
difference because it seemed to affect their personalities in a way specific to them 
and that is why many viewers of the work could not figure out what it could look 
like once chopped up into pieces. Specificity, hence, is vital in narrative text be-
cause it makes a great deal of difference when people are constructing their own 
replicas of the stimuli.307 The perceiving mind takes centre stage in absorbing and 
comprehending narrative text. Thus, such narrative, for better comprehension, 
must be specific to the human mind and not the collective group. Nevertheless, 
small groups or communities, in reference to their particular setups, have par-
ticular constructs that are universal to that group, which is inevitably capable of 
allowing them to have the same perception of a particular element of their culture. 
Specificity then, like tradition, spreads out from the individual towards the group. 
As the community grows bigger and spreads out, specificity becomes fluid due to 
more interference from other cultural constructs.308 When Robét talks about lej-
jalejja, he drives at universality. “Lejjalejja” means a cliché, but one rated at the 
lower end of society’s scale; it is like gossip, abhorred in most societies because 
of its fluid character.309 The more a concept grows universally, the less concrete 
it becomes to particular communities or elements. Reducing the narrative paint-
ing to tourist art is already a universalizing process that denies it its concreteness 
and hence its traditional value within its specific environment.310 Narrative in its 
307  Narrative is present objectively; it is a subjective phenomenon such that even a met-narrative is not 
wholly absorbed in the same way.
308  Like tradition, narrative affects the individual first before it spreads out to the group, and thus 
intrinsically traditional.
309  Lejjalejja could also refer to lack of identity of belonging in exhibiting specific pattern of action or 
thought. In this sense, I see it as a lowly art form without identity of its own.
310  Ironically, this is what tourists hope to buy. 
traditional state therefore, must be concrete and specific in order to make mean-
ing and survive in its own society. In conclusion, Greetings from Uganda’s major 
contribution to this study is that narrative directs thought and as such organizes 
it intrinsically even when we are dealing with visual images.
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NAGGALABI  
Naggalabi is a series of copper, aluminum, and sisal artworks made of five 
different panels forming a narrative about coronation of the Kabaka of Buganda at 
Naggalabi (see figures 14). The texts interconnect by conceptual qualities inherent 
in signs and tropes, which represent aspects of the coronation rituals. The artwork 
is for viewing in succession, but with intervals in between, creating a synthetic 
coherence similar to what McCloud (cited in, Pratt, 2009) calls closure. Closure, he 
posits, is an everyday process of observing the parts but perceiving the whole. He 
further explains how it works: “In the limbo of the gutter, human imagination takes 
two separate images and transforms them into a single idea. Closure allows us to 
connect [otherwise unconnected] moments and mentally construct a continuous 
unified whole” (Pratt, p. 111). In other words, although we see nothing between the 
two panels, experience tells us something must be there.311 In this story, we begin 
at Naggalabi hill and end with a crowned king. It is imperative to note that this 
artwork is in the initial stages of my pursuit of organized form and search for 
meaning in the visual arts. 
In the first panel (see figure 14a), I depict the symbolic elements of Kabakaship 
in Buganda: the crown-king and some of his symbolic names such as Cuucu (a type 
of plant). The second panel (see figure 14b) shows Cuucu but now includes Naggal-
abi hill with the legendary tree where Kabaka Kato Kintu was crowned and one of 
the many names he symbolically inherits–Magulunyondo (the king has many legs 
in which to hummer). In the third panel (see figure 14c), I introduce the time fac-
tor involved in coronation rituals, which begin in the night and go on throughout 
the day. The fourth panel (see figures 14d) manifests the crowned king with the 
zigzag patterns that decorate the king’s rob (see figure 15). The last panel (see fig-
ure 14e) portrays the Kabaka’s subjects prostrating before the newly crowned king 
(also see figure 3). It is notable that the shape of the flower or plant is present in all 
311  Panels reference comics that McCloud (2009) reviewed in the cited text. This is akin to Nanay’s 
(2009) recount of total experience in narrative pictures. Pratt (2009) is quick to disassociate himself with 
closure normally referred to in the resolution of narrative tension. This is because, as discussed earlier, 
closure does not constitute, on its own, a narrative text per se, although from my findings, closure is a 
significant psychological phenomenon in creating dependency in narrative texts.
Figure 14. Kabiito Richard, Naggalabi. 
2004. Copper, aluminum, sisal, on 
board. Photos: Kabiito Richard.
Figure 14a: The crown king and his 
Symbolic name Cuucu.  
Figure 14b. The legendary coronation 
tree and the symbolism of  
Magulunyondo. 
                               
 Figure 14c: Night and day rituals at 
Naggalabi. 
Figure 14d: Royal regalia.
Figure 14e. Prostration before the 
crowned king 
Figure 15: Kabaka Muteesa II in his 
royal regalia.
Photo: Ssekabaka Muteesa I Founda-
tion archives
7 / Prologue
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panels, which emphasizes the presence of regal authority (Cuucu). In the last two 
panels the zigzag patterns are incorporated to indicate that the Kabaka is crowned 
and donning his official regalia. In the first two panels, emphasis is on the initial 
processes of the event, and the in third panel, I make an introduction of the crown 
king outlining his symbolism to his subjects. In Buganda, the use of Cuucu as the 
Kabaka’s personality is metaphorically significant. Cuucu is the king of plants (as 
presumed by the Baganda) because of its imposing odor over the other plants, and 
this kind of supremacy is comparable to that of the Kabaka. In order to compare 
smell and might of the king we have to institute a metaphoric situation, ODOR 
IS POWER. In other words, the Kabaka stinks of (regal) power. The imagining of 
the king, as an odorous plant cannot be determinately subsumed as majesty of the 
King and as such sets the mind into ‘free play’. ‘Okuwunya’ (stinking) idiomati-
cally refers to excess or abundance whereby one possesses too much that it begins 
to stink.  
Structurally, Naggalabi creates a pattern and portrays basic tenets of well-
formed narrative, with intensities, ordering, anaphora, prolepses, and more; how-
ever, the elements used are not ideally common codes directly understandable by 
everybody. Actually, Naggalabi loses its meaning in functionality. When construct-
ing these artworks, they were too, part of an interior decor and thus they were to 
serve a dual purpose: art works with a message and at the same time lamp hold-
ers. The viewers tend to look at it more as a functional artwork than an aesthetic 
representation. By default, cuucu becomes a uniting factor because it is a shape 
suitable for decoration due to its social affiliation; but it is ideal for an opening 
of a backlight. Thus, its functionality supersedes the connotation and for empiri-
cal purposes, to date, no one has asked about the meaning of the signs in, these 
copper artworks.312 The best explanation is functionality took center stage and the 
visual elements not traditional enough to stir interest.313 Crucially, the signals are 
too weak to be detectable by a wider section of the readers. In so doing, the art-
works are not able to draw public acclaim even though coronation is in its own 
cultural context.
In Naggalabi, the main idea was exploring the possibility of viewing a story in 
series. The individual pieces of work were placed either facing each other or at the 
back of the pillar so that an interval is created in between the viewing. My discov-
ery was that the mind kept the storyline and promptly reconnected it with the next 
episode after the interval. However, apart from the apparent consistency of cuucu, 
nothing else indicates any causality in the formation of the episodes, although we 
can inevitably recognize a correlation. This explains Nanay’s (2009) experience of 
narrative as vital in constituting narrative texts. My experience with the text in-
312  For purposes of accountability, only three artworks remain; the two removed and dismantled. 
Evidence is with the second panel that I reassembled for the purpose of this publication–photography.
313  In addition–context of display–in, a gallery people’s tradition in such context is to interpret or make 
meaning. When in an interior design context, most people do not have tradition in their education to 
interpret.
spires a feeling of mental reconnection with the texts and this prompts further in-
vestigation. It also gave me a clue and belief that stories contain internal organizing 
structures that kept the mind at bay and that before completion, there is a possibil-
ity and a tendency to perform a mental reconnection of a series of related pictorial 
forms. This observation further leads to the belief that indeed aspects of oral liter-
ature could transfer to visual literature and work well within the scheme of vision. 
AFRICAN HOUSE 
 
African House was a pilot project too, and in this, I prompted other people to work 
with stories as schemes of reference.314 I preferred to work with local episodes 
and telling them to work with local objects and material to assess their impact on 
readability. During the African House project, I was inclined to drawing stories from 
everyday life situations and thus, during this project, I asked participants to draw 
stories from their own life experiences. Although the project had a range of themes 
to work with, I chose stories as a medium. My insistence on working with stories 
as technical and conceptual tools was the urge to track the organizing element and 
mental reconnection earlier observed in the ‘Naggalabi’ story.315 Although many 
of the products in this workshop yielded exciting results, I particularly selected 
two artworks that were ostensibly revealing. I decided to study them to allay my 
fears and prove my discovery. Monica and Susan make profound revelations in 
their artworks based on childhood desires; Monica was obsessed with handicraft, 
(especially weaving), while Susan had an attraction to metaphysical practices 
(witch craft). 
Having been aware of their work in daily practice, this was rather strange and 
in that event, I decided to study what made them strange, but affective. In her 
story, Susan talks about mediation by the witchdoctor (Kabona) who represented 
the gods. She describes the scene briefly as comprising of small shrines (Ssabo) 
with many objects of worship that assist in the mediation process “between what 
is physical and that [which] is not physical” (Susan, February 19, 2007); ensiimbi, 
bark cloth, animal skins, feathers, coiled baskets (ebigali) for offertory and many 
sacred objects (see figure 16). She selects these objects to design a garment for a 
performative disposition in combination with the structure of a shrine and its at-
mosphere. In the guise of unease, performance comes into being, in the realm of 
a promise of something, yet there, articulated, and of agency not yet recognized, 
or named (Rogoff, 1998). Additionally, “[v]isual semiotics has to be related to an 
eminently performative language which is not only dynamic in its material con-
314  The African House project ran from February 2 to March 22, 2007 culminating into an exhibition of 
artwork in the Diversity Room at Penn State combining artwork from Makerere University, Pennsylvania 
State University and University of Art and Design students.
315  The mental reconnection referenced here dwells on the ability to retain the image of anteced-
ent phenomenon that eventually links up with its ascendant object. The link inherent in the transition 
becomes an organizing element in perceiving and understanding of both the antecedent and ascendant 
objects.
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stituents but which cannot be constituted as a text without constant changes in 
the internal experience of the observer” (Saint-Martin, 1987, p. 10). Susan, in her 
performative artwork, creates an actual experience of a shrine and the feeling of 
witchcraft is present. First, the performance is unique in itself as an independent 
art form in the local context. Second, the artwork culminates into an installation 
with the introduction of the shrine structure; she combines two concepts of art 
production that are inherent within the local communities, but not identified as 
aesthetic visual art forms. The apparent ‘action token’ in Susan’s performance in-
evitably leads to our experience of her artwork as a narrative text. This is, in part, 
because we are suitably informed and wherefore competent spectators.                                    
Finally and most importantly, Susan employs objects locally available and thus 
unique or specific to the local communities and combines them creatively to con-
stitute a narrative. Although the parts are fragmented, she links them with a com-
mon unifying factor of the bark cloth that holds together to form a logical pattern 
of forms. In prompting categorization and thus accessing meaning, visual clues 
are indispensable in developing links with stored experience to help in our ability 
to apprehend new input (Athavankar, 1990). The ‘shrine’ and the dry lawn integrate 
with the performance by virtue of belief and mental connections both physically 
and abstractly forming a consistency in pattern that revealed an advanced system 
of organization inherent in narrative texts. Not only does the narrative assist her to 
organize, but it also influences her choice of objects. The connectionism revealed 
in Susan’s work, both material and mental emerges in Monica’s installation. Con-
nectionism builds holistic experience that helps in organizing and choosing of ar-
ticles for specific meaning making purposes. While Susan activates two lines of 
narration, Monica maintains a single-file narration pattern as will be evidenced 
shortly. Here is an analysis of Susan’s exhibits:
Like traditional education, the art of tradition/indigenous societies is conservative, 
having a primary purpose of reinforcing and transmitting core cultural values and 
beliefs. In fact, traditional arts so deeply embed in the web of culture normally they are 
known and judged for their functions in society rather than as works of art, frequently 
not even defined as artworks in their own right. In fact, many languages do not even 
have a word for art, which corresponds with the western conception (Anderson, 1997, 
p. 66). 
In respect to the above view, Monica, on her part, recounts her obsession with 
weaving as a little child, in interplay of cultural artifacts organized in a hierarchical 
configuration (February 19, 2007). The hierarchy, rather than the connectionism is 
appealing in her visual recount. Nevertheless, our awareness of the ‘action token’ 
in the text allows experiencing it as a story. Choice of objects once again resurfaces: 
an obsession with weaving warranted a choice of woven objects, although Monica 
reveals to me that the objects have traditional functionalities. Monica manages 
to actualize her intention to narrate the story by forming a hierarchy of related 
objects to achieve a linkage between events (see figure 26). Withal, her intention 
to have the expression make the viewer believe that what she presents is her 
lifetime story, presents the viewer with the recognition that the expression is 
indeed a story, and as such, our experience of it makes her expression a narrative. 
Although there is chronological build up in Susan’s approach, it is evident only 
in individual planes–there is build up of form from the tail of the garment to the 
headgear, which is noticeable only after scrutiny. At the next plane of the shrine, 
there is no apparent sequence because it only forms two planes (see figure 17).316 
However, the overall formation culminates into a well-formed narrative through 
connections of the parts. There is apparent movement from one level to another 
that keeps on building momentum as the mind processes the stimulus. Because of 
these observations, I concluded that in my first attempt I was right to imagine that 
there is a mental connection of parts that belong together integratable in artistic 
production.317                                     
 
BUGOLOOBI PROJECT
 
As confidence and belief gathered momentum with my discoveries, I embarked on 
my first project of reusing existing local stories that people were familiar with and 
thus specific to their communities. My major interest lay in specified meaning that 
was applicable to local settings as already indicated. Consequently, furnished with 
concrete awareness that stories contain organizational abilities, I embarked on my 
316  A sequence requires a repetitive pattern of more than two objects or events.
317  This mental reconnection features in Barwell’s (2009) postulate that the mind functions temporally, 
but crucially, the mental experience need not be a chronology of events.
Figure 16. Nambalirwa Susan, Tra-
ditional deity. 2007. Performance. 
Photo: Kabiito Richard.
Figure 18: Kansiime Monica, Childhood. 
2007. Installation. Photo: Kabiito 
Richard.
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next project that based on the stories of ‘Enkoliimbo’ and ‘Kato Kimera’.318 The first 
story recounts a man who tried to dupe a bird into believing that he had no food to 
eat but the bird turned out smarter. In the second story, which is an account of Kato 
Kimera’s rise to kingship in Buganda, I also attempted to incorporate the story of 
‘Kibuuka Omumbaale’. In these two artworks, I set out to prove that familiar local 
objects within a particular community could effectively improve artistic expression 
within that locale because of its ability to produce specific communication easily 
accessed by members of such a community.319 This project kicked off with a series 
of drawings, including among others, the stories of Enkoliimbo and a dichotomous 
drawing combining the stories of Kato Kimera and Kibuuka Omumbaale; however, 
viewers discredited the dichotomy due to frailties in its representation.
Nkoliimbo (see figure 19 above) is a metallic depiction of two figures supposedly 
pounding groundnuts. In the story line it depicts scenes at the beginning and the 
318  The work commenced on May 16 to 29, 2007.
319  This part of evidence forms my choice of signs in the Nggalabi narrative, Monica’s choice of objects 
in her recount of child hood obsessions, and Susan’s preference of signifiers in her attractions to meta-
physical belief.
end; the episodes in between are omitted although they hold a significant contri-
bution to the plot and this depends largely to personal interpretation.320 A mortar 
placed centrally represents preparation of particular types of local meals in Bu-
ganda. Conspicuous spaces between the fingers of the two figures that at some 
point cut through bodies and objects are a metaphor for emptiness as indicated 
in the story that they all ended with ‘empty hands’. It also animates the idiom of 
‘empty handedness’ (falling through) in the English dialect; it also incorporates, 
in the same process, an idiom in Kiganda popularly known as ‘okuyita mungalo’, 
which literally means ‘passing through the fingers’ and thus animates ‘losses’. The 
‘passing through’ is facilitated by the intentionally overstated gaps, which we may 
conceptualize with a root metaphor of ‘perforation’. There is emphasis created 
by the exaggerated fingers and the hollow emptiness and repetitions that build 
intensity of action and meaning. The gaps further demonstrate consistency of in-
tention whereas the sad faces display consistency of mood. This generates both 
conceptual and perceptual consistencies built up in the artwork. Narrativity in 
Nanay terms emerges through the action token (bowing in submission) that cre-
ates a somber mood of the sad faces; objects such as the motor and pestles are cru-
cial in grasping the overall narrative and thus meaning. The act of pounding in the 
bottomless motor–emptiness–is paradoxical and not only does this dramatize the 
artistic disposition, but also reinvents time by building expectancies; in addition, 
the action builds presupposition or implicature that is necessary for meaning per-
formance.321 The texture of the pestle functions as intentional texture that creates 
contrast in the artwork to break monotony, as well as represent cereals; thus, it 
has a dual purpose. Locality and specificity come through the mortar, dress, and 
fashion; a touch of color makes it exciting.322
Kato Kimera I (see figure 20) on the other hand is a more straight representation 
of royalty with the crown as the main symbol. The shield and the spear are tradi-
tional symbols of power and authority endowed and entrusted with the Kabaka. The 
kanzu is present instead of the royal gown because it is the traditional dress of the 
Kabaka and thus specifies locality. The loose handling of the implements led to dis-
satisfaction among viewers by claiming that it could not be a warrior as initially 
suggested in the combination of two characters in one representation–the Kabaka 
and a warrior. Thus, the pose comes to be the significant determinant to meaning 
performance in this particular case; it also depicts royalty where the Kabaka is seen 
as an idol and there is a general feeling among his subjects that he has ‘got it all’ ex-
pressed idiomatically in Luganda as ‘okutuuka’, ‘okumalako’ and similar words that 
320  In the story, the element of enkoliimbo in particular strikes me most because since childhood I 
always asked myself how this plant looked. Up to now, I have never known what their true nature is. In 
this depiction, I am still asking myself a question: are they prepared like groundnuts?
321  In the artwork, the mortar is bottomless, although in a profile view it is not visible.
322  It is indexical in a sense that it does not particularly resemble any cereal, but rather an ambiguous 
shape that signifies a cereal structure. Thus, specificity eliminated from the general structure.
Figure 19. Kabiito Richard,  
Nkoliimbo (260 x 90 cm). 2008.         
(260 x 90 cm). 2008. Metal and 
oil color.        
Figure 20. Kabiito Richard, Kato 
Kimera I. Metal and oil color. 
Photos: Kabiito Richard. 
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express completion.323 To conceptualize his ‘arrival’ as success, we need to premise 
it upon the metaphor ‘life is a journey’. Arrival marks Success. There is nothing, 
absolutely, in the image that indicates life as a journey apart from the imagination 
brought to our attention by the image. That is, contemplation of a ‘weapon cuddle’ 
as success in life leads to rational ideas of ‘nobility’ or ‘tender care.’ Thus, the re-
laxed handling of the instrument of power and authority is a metaphoric expression 
of contentment and the aura of royalty. The spear reemphasizes by its background 
shape but also breeds familiarity and perpetuates the idea of reuse. Observably, re-
used objects create intensity in the artwork and heighten curiosity among viewers.
Search for meaning
As the work progressed, I asked Henrico, one of the most active members in the 
group, whether he could deduce anything from the artworks. He duly informed 
me that he did not understand what the images represented; however, he could 
recognize a woman holding a spear (referring to Kato Kimera I). One of them, Freddy, 
interjected and informed me that in Nkoliimbo a woman was with a kid and the 
other (Kato Kimera I) a man was holding a spear. This indicated to me that they were 
not very interested in what the meaning was, but actually in identifying what they 
could see and linking it with what they already knew. This is the first indication 
of collaborating common knowledge by this group of young men. Indeed Henry, 
after prompting, admits that he had all along mistaken the man for a woman.324 
Essentially though, these youths who are predominantly primary school dropouts, 
are looking for things they can easily identify and associate with to give them clues 
on what the picture means. Although they did not know what the artworks stood 
for at this stage, they instinctively could tell that they would be quite attractive 
when completed. 
They were particularly excited when I informed them that I would frame the im-
ages. Henrico applauded the idea, which they all accented to, and assured me that 
the artwork would even appear more attractive. Ideally, their sense of beauty is in the 
material form and functionality.325 Association of emotion with particular cognitive 
processes is not arbitrary, but a response to natural biological and social functions 
served by different emotions (Macleod & Mathews, 1997). The sense of closure that 
is apparently a generalization is sensitive to one of the traditional ways of sensing, 
expressing and appreciating beauty among the Baganda. Functional things, on the 
other hand, share common values and thus Baganda conceive them generally in the 
same way and stand for similar things, although particular use may differ from in-
dividual to individual. This concept of closure spreads out into visual analysis and 
323  Okutuuka (arrive, reach), okumalako (finish)
324  Culturally women wear long dresses and this could have led to miss reading the image. Feldman’s 
four stages of art viewers begin with basic descriptions. Those educated in analysis can move to analysis 
and interpret. If not educated, then they just describe to achieve uninformal judgment.
325  The frame functions as an enhancer of beauty. This is typical of the Ganda traditional sense of 
beauty mainly seen in functionality and form, not the essence because traditionally art forms denote 
some kind of function. 
sense of beauty–okuwumbawumba’.326 This implies that disinterested appreciation 
of beauty advocated by modernists would not abound in the Ganda cultural fabric 
because there is a cause/effect relationship.327 
Freddy is not satisfied though when he does not see what he expects to see in 
the artwork (personal communication, May 24, 2007). After telling him that the 
artwork is about e’nkoliimbo, a story well known to him, he quips: “Kyabuzeeko 
kambe”, literally meaning that ‘it is only missing a knife’ suggesting that a knife 
should have been included since it is essential in the process of preparing food. 
When I sought to know why, he made another comment: “Ak’omukazi kabeera 
nako”.328 Freddy’s dissatisfaction translates into a condition that is common to any 
human organism: the search for meaning. In this, he is trying to locate familiar 
things that could help him to think along the lines of preparing food; it is rather 
unthinkable to prepare food in the absence of a knife because traditionally, a mo-
tor is for pounding groundnuts used for sauce while staple foodstuffs in Buganda 
are prepared by pealing. This also signals the condition of the ‘traditional referent.’ 
Usually, we think less of how much materials that contain conscious and specific 
meaning have to do with determining forms of messages given that such materials 
provide meaning to things from which we make them (Zimmer & Zimmer, 1978). 
This means that in order to arrive at certain meanings there must be particular 
things in place that form linkages.329 Interest rather than disinterestedness always 
saturate us when we gaze at visual images–which we get to identify with–dictated 
by visual patterns that heavily rely on experience and expectations (Zeghlin, cited 
in, Korsmeyer, 1978). Sensitivity to representation becomes apparent in the search 
for linkages between individual parts, which is not a common practice in Ganda 
traditional art forms.330 Nevertheless, these linkages normally develop from the 
level of interest we have in the overall idea of engaging an artwork for viewing and 
our own expectations. In his attempt to create linkages, Fred looks for familiar 
things from his own experience in order to place the expression into context.
The tendency to search and discover familiar things in artistic forms for mean-
ing making purposes continues to unfold when three visitors come to check on 
their personal work (May 22, 2007). A woman is surprised to see the artworks in 
the workshop and she exclaims, “Eh, these are pictures.” One of the male visitors 
joins her, “Eh, I can see them: this is a man; the other a woman”, but the second 
male visitor disagrees, “Aah, I already noticed this one: this is a woman; the other a 
326  Okuwumbawumba is an aesthetically inspired concept of covering up, closing up, gathering to-
gether of some open or scattered objects. Thus, okujagalala or okusunsumala is an un-aesthetic way of 
referring to openness, wildness, scatteredness.
327  See, Peggy Zeghlin Brand’s article: Disinterestedness and Political Art, in Carolyn Korsmeyer (1998, 
p. 264). 
328  This is translated as ‘the one a woman always carries’. 
329  Collocations as traditions in this sense can also appear in both mental and visual form.
330  In Fred’s experience, food must follow a certain pattern of preparation and as such, some basics of 
preparing food must follow suit. 
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child.”331 It is crucial to note these people are searching for meaning using possible 
familiar objects or clues. Secondly, these people share certain common values with 
the workshop group and in their meaning making process they significantly de-
pend on collaboration. The search for meaning continues. Robbie seeks for knowl-
edge about the drapery on the taller figure in Nkoliimbo while in reference to the 
netlike design on the fabric; I replied, ‘cloth’ (May 24, 2007). He complimented the 
accomplishment by suggesting that I had succeeded in portraying it ‘as such’. He 
further asked about protuberances on the ‘club’ but I informed him that they were 
pestles.332 
Three days later (May 27, 2007), two men came to inspect their work. On seeing 
the two artworks, one of them exclaims in bemusement, “Eeh, kuno mutaddeko 
n’engabo!” He was surprised that we had included a shield in one of the artworks. 
Robbie replied sarcastically that “Olwo luggi lwa Kabaka; lugenda wa Muwenda 
Mutebi” (That is the king’s door; it is going to Muwenda Mutebi’s home). In so 
doing, Robbie begins to form an extra narrative by linking the shield to royalty. 
The man notably muses at seeing a shield used as an object of representation in an 
alien art form. Additionally, he refers to it as ‘engabo’ (shield) and not something 
outside that identity that looked like engabo. Do items lose their identity even 
when used in an order inferior or superior to their common order? No. They retain 
their identity and this is why Robbie refers to the fabric as ‘olugoye’, the figures 
identified as ‘musajja’, ‘mukazi’, and ‘mwana’. Therefore, objects used in artworks 
retain their identities and they still represent their material states and in this, their 
meaning only accessed through their iconic formations; from that point onwards, 
they develop into associations and contiguities that constitute external qualities 
related to the presence of the objects. The collaboration also means that since they 
share common knowledge, the individual members can depend on others to build 
up meaning, classified as specific to that group. More especially, they try to under-
stand the artwork in view of their attitude towards non-traditional art.
After completing the artwork and making unobtrusive studies of how this 
group of young men made sense of art, I decided to engage them directly by recit-
ing ‘Enkoliimbo’ to them and gathering views on whether it made more sense to 
them reading the picture with knowledge of the story behind the production. Rob-
bie began by describing the nature of the plant that bore ‘enkoliimbo’ (personal 
communication, May 28, 2007). To make his description known to the others; he 
informed them that the motor in the artwork was to pound the nut-like wild grain. 
By referring to a more familiar process of pounding groundnuts in the local com-
munities, he exemplifies the more unfamiliar grain he was trying to explain. He in 
other words, works with a metaphoric kind of explanation. This prompted me to 
ask them about what they would deduce from the artwork if they had no idea of 
the story. A member from the group replied that “Otunula butunuzi”, meaning 
331  The dialogue ensued in Luganda and therefore these are translated texts.
332  The structure of a club is comprised of a protuberance at one end of the rod in Ganda language 
called ‘enddoddo’.
that ‘you just look on’. After that flat response, I concluded as such: Familiarity is 
crucial to essence formation; secondly, ‘just looking on’ creates uncertainty and 
thus, no association formed; lastly, without any association, no meaning formed 
and therefore, no impact created artistically. The bright light at the end of the tun-
nel is that the story excites Robert and reminds him of the songs from these tales 
they used to sing in childhood and he reconstructs his own time; it also indicates 
the affect stories impose on the intellect. He forms ‘metonymic associations’ as 
Drout (2006a) described them of that expression in relation to why it means so. 
We can only gain genuine altruism in relation to the literary text, and never in life, 
that we can have a relation characterized by, and by genuine acknowledgement of 
the otherness of the other.333 “We need, then, texts we can read together and talk 
about as friends, texts that are available to all of us. […] A community is formed by 
author and readers,” writes Nussbaum (cited in, Korsmeyer, 1998, p. 207).
During the artistic process, I relied heavily on a phenomenological approach 
and kept on recording all acts or utterances by the group members or visitors to 
the workshop about the artworks that could lead to any useful discoveries. Some of 
the comments were profoundly revealing especially on aspects of attitude and as-
sociation. One of the statements made by Robbie (personal communication, May 16, 
2007), as I showed him the drawings of the artworks he and colleagues were about 
to fabricate, revealed much about the general attitude that the public holds about 
‘academic art’. 334 He disapprovingly told his colleagues that, “Abantu b’onoona sente 
ku buntu obwo”, literally meaning that people waste money on buying those things. 
This negative and disinterested attitude does not occur because of money per se but 
averseness to things that do not make sense. This results from the fact that intention 
and functionalities of most academic art are not accessible to the nonprofessional. 
‘Obwo obuntu’–those things–is a negative reference, which connotes either disin-
terestedness, loathe, despise, lack of adequate knowledge, or understanding.335
Scenario8
As we walked around the studio viewing exhibits during an end of year student’s art 
exhibition, Louie asks continuous questions as a curious young mind that is seeking 
to know more of the world to which it is exposed. Suddenly she saw a poster of Safari 
Tea, and she informs me of a “baby taking chai Kalu” (personal communication, July 
17, 2007).336 Adjacent to the tea advert, she yet recognizes a trumpet, in all its disguised 
form, as a silhouette of the trumpet shape.337 Next to this poster for ‘Jazz Night’ at Club 
333  The knowledge that Robert has about the facts in the story create a condition that would fit into 
our notion of meaning to become a meaningful event. In other words, it makes us believe that indeed it 
is the story of Nkoliimbo and thus believable.
334  By academic art I mean the type of art that has been greatly influenced by Western ideological 
concepts of art production such intentional distortions and combined scenes or imagery.
335  Normally we refer to objects by their names or identity, and it is out of abnormal situations that 
identifiable objects refer to a ‘thing’ in the context of Robbie’s remark.
336  ‘Chai Kalu’ means black tea in her own simple language.
337  I remembered that she had seen one in her reading books, although its rendering was entirely a 
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5, she sees yet another recognizable image in form of a painting: it is of a young child 
seated with legs stretched out, while the feet point at each other. She exclaims “Eh! Baby 
seated in water.”338 As I tried to get to terms with these discoveries, she further recognizes 
a woman painted with dark colors in a painting opposite the ‘Baby’ and she exclamations 
‘Eh! Woman is dirty’ although with this one I had helped to figure out the image of a 
woman. Notice how she ascribes color to sanitation and how she creates a context in the 
painting, which was never part of its construction. 
The child’s ability to transfer learned experiences to objects in contexts and 
constructs far apart requires scrutiny. The mechanisms a young child adopts in 
recognizing and assigning meaning to–which is not far from the primitive’s–or 
naming phenomena, are in the first place learned experiences. Further still, 
these learnt experiences are easily understandable through their representation: 
the variables that form gestalts that lead to some logical being are in their most 
recognizable state and existing within a context that brings such meaning every 
time a condition of that nature occurs. The processes of regrouping rely on the 
directional forces suggesting movement and tensions that represent action leading 
to a recognizable event or element. The rest of the exhibits do not mean much to 
Louie because she cannot easily recognize elements stored in her repertoire of 
experience although such elements are contained within. The actual meanings 
and communicative structures actualize connotations in a visual artwork with the 
stewardship of antecedent conditions. These we may as well perceive as recurrent 
or traditional expressions. 
On the other hand, systemities that are more general bind in different areas of 
connotations actualized and directed by context (Somov, 2006). As such, the poster 
of the Safari Tea contains a photograph as its connotative element; a trumpet as a 
symbol of music represents ‘Jazz Nite’; the painting contains the image of a child 
while the other painting recognized because of the colors. Hence, whereas one 
considers the Safari Tea more realistically–iconically–represented, together with 
the painted baby, the jazz poster appears to the viewer more symbolically. Indeed, 
the child reaffirms her percept by revisiting the jazz poster and asking: “What is 
that?” and answering, “Trumpet”. She also introduces abstract concepts when she 
refers to the dark colors of the fourth percept as dirty because they are dark. Ad-
ditionally, baby bathing was just prior in her thinking. So, clean and dirty is the 
story she created of the images. 
One recognizes, in these observations, iconography, symbolism and abstrac-
tion at play in the initiation of a meaningful expression to her world of reality on 
both the concrete and abstract notions. On the other hand, in this encounter with 
various forms of visual representations, the child prefers to interest itself with 
different format and representation; however, some traces of its shape and form still appeared.
338  She recognizes her own self while taking a bath, although to me the child in the painting did not 
look like she was taking a bath, but because Louise is in such a pose while bathing, she ascribes that act 
of meaning to bathing.
those exhibits that she has experienced. She looks at the small child and she likens 
her to when she sits in water. Probably she pictures the nakedness, the pose that 
simulates a basin shower; because she has learnt about tea drinking, she is able 
to identify such a performative act; because her reading book contains a trumpet 
somewhere between the pages, she readily recognizes it. This is not any different 
from an adult who is searching for what he knows or who encounters something 
he has seen before. She asks; what is that? She responds, “Blouse”. From all the 
exhibits, she was only able to recognize and ascribe meaning to those items she 
had experienced before. Most significantly, the child is able to realize the world 
through those simplest images that are the most meaningful to her.339 This affirms 
Berger’s (1974) argument that we see what we know.
Mood and emotion
When the artwork (Nkoliimbo and Kato Kimera I) arrived at Makerere Art Gallery, it 
immediately created an impression of utility. Paulo, a lecturer at MTSIFA, instantly 
envisaged utility due to the size, shape, and the use of metal, which are normally 
associated with gates.340 Paulo found beauty and exceptionality in the knowledge 
that they are utilitarian.341 Ramah, on her part, was more concerned with the reason 
why the tow figures in Nkoliimbo were sad. She is already engaged in interpreting 
the artwork. She asks, “Why are they sad?” as she approached the artwork (personal 
communication, May 30, 2007). Nevertheless, she does not react the same way 
towards Kato Kimera I; she thinks its understandability will arise from the artist 
having to explain his intentions. Nkoliimbo communicates directly with her: “…
you can see the dad is trying to comfort the kid”. Ramah, an art student at mtsifa, 
also notes that someone who likes the story would think more about the picture. 
The story in itself rather creates a dependency outside the physical properties of 
the artwork. She ties her interpretation on the actions as no one is pounding and 
the mortar being bottomless, thus she thinks it was a lie. “When you look at the 
mortar, and the when you look at the hole down, then you know that there were no 
nuts and it was a lie”, she maintains. She is nonetheless clueless when she turns to 
Kato Kimera I: “It is not giving clues, just making me stranded,” she complains with 
indifference. “Some stories lead you to another stage and others leave where you 
are; where you found it is where you leave it”. 
339  Those that do not seem to capture her attention do not seem to offer her any room of pleasurable 
experience. Thus, the essence of a thing gains shape from abstractions and amplification of the relevant 
mental imagery comparable to caricature or cave art, and thus, the ability to grasp the form of ideas. 
Notably, combining forms into associations of more complex gestalts, exemplifies the quality of abstract 
thought. Consequently, when the shape of a mental gestalt finally forms to make sense of it all, emo-
tional anxiety inherently generated by incompleteness that characterizes both mental states is relieved 
(Barry, 1997). This may form one of the ways by which we experience narrative texts, although it may not 
turn out as a sufficient denominator.
340  The artwork arrived at Makerere Art Gallery on May 29, 2007. Paulo first saw the work as we off-
loaded it from the truck.
341  Perhaps it could have afforded him more satisfaction if I had indicated to him that my intention was 
about utility and not only representation per se. After all, their inception was well intended to cover up 
niches in a newly constructed house that looked so empty.
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Ramah reveals that the ‘first impression’ you get when viewing an artwork is 
crucial to the overall understanding of it. She discloses that after reading the sto-
ry of Nkoliimbo it prompts her to get back to the artwork and tally the two texts: 
“When you look at it, you go back to what you thought immediately when you 
saw it. Because when I saw it, I knew they were sad”.342 She admittedly reckons that 
the expression worn by the two kids affected her mood. In comics, Pratt (2009) 
acknowledges, “a panel can inform the reader pictorially about the emotional and 
other mental states of the characters contained in it, without the use of words” (p. 
110). This kind or episode does not stop with comics; it spreads out to all expres-
sive pictorial structures. Indeed, Ramah’s testimony suggests that we access the 
possible meaning in the artwork immediately and in order to assess and prove that 
projection, there must be clues to that effect. Clues depend on what we already 
know or what we expect from previously similar conditions. Besides, she is aware 
that “stories always have something behind them” because her grandmother could 
not engage her with a story “out of the blue”: When she is sad, her grandmother 
tells a funny story that makes her laugh, and her reaction is normally determined 
by the tone in which she tells it.343 
Ramah narrates to me how she uses stories to change attitudes and behavior of 
her niece quite comfortably because the kids eventually get involved in the narra-
tion and evaluation of the story. This involvement facilitates a reciprocal process 
through negotiation. When she narrates the story of ‘Kiyiri’, her niece has personal 
input to make “Aah mummy tayagala ba mpisa mbi”, meaning that her mother dis-
likes bad behavior. Consensus outlines dialogue organization whereby participants 
practically align their linguistic representations at various levels thereby supporting 
mutual understanding since alignment links various levels with each other (Garrod 
& Sanford, 2005). The niece’s input completes the negotiation process by evaluat-
ing the behavior of the other child depicted in the story and pitting it against her 
own, which prompts her to stop crying for fear of being labeled a ‘bad girl’ as the 
one in the story.344 Comparably, the kind of evaluation implied in Ramah’s idea is in 
sync with that presented by Barwell (2009) in his evaluative judgments. The niece 
practically pits her own behavior with that of the child in the story to evaluate her 
behavior. In this way, Barwell thinks it is a constitutive relation, whereby, the child 
reflects on its own behavior, but crucially engaged with narrative. Ramah also notes 
that kids always memorize stories, and “the message is always got”, probably based 
342  Her first impression of the story comes in the most striking element later turning out to constitute 
her overall interpretation of the story referred to by Ramah as the dominant attraction.
343  Ramah highlights Nanay’s (2009) position that recognizing the ‘action token’ leads to treatment 
of such texts as narrative. Implicitly, this is what she implies in her observation, although it apparently 
refers to conditions under which, her grandmother applies them.
344  Humans are averse to negativity and thus are always attempting to reverse the course of negatives 
and directing them to positives. The Baganda thought that by building on positives, they would achieve 
little because positivity, being a generally preferred and dominant condition, eventually becomes a 
given, which does not require any kind of interruption. Thus, by being negative, they anticipated maxi-
mum impact because then people will attempt at all costs to avert the negativity. Negativity then in this 
sense is action oriented. 
on their capacity to instigate negotiation. Stories are thus destined to communi-
cate by default. Lastly, when we negotiate, we narrow down the scope of negation to a 
more unified whole so that we develop a singular line of thought and action. 
Sherry, an art student at mtsifa, has a different approach towards viewing 
Nkoliimbo and Kato Kimera I. On her first encounter with Nkoliimbo, she noticed the 
mortar and she immediately imagined pounding groundnuts but when she looked 
at the faces of the kids, they did not seem to be happy with what they were doing.345 
She also recognizes the textures and equates them to nuts: “The texture comes out 
like the nuts themselves; it is more than texture […] you look at the grains flowing; 
and even their faces, they are sad” (personal communication, May 30, 2007).346 I 
perhaps could interpret this situation closely with Spadling’s (2003) insight, “The 
meaning of a work of art can often hit you with immediate and surprising force, 
yet to appreciate all its subtlety and richness, you need to understand its grammar 
and vocabulary” (p. 41). She intimates that it expresses action, drama, and entails 
affect. “It is dramatic, there is mood,” she admits. Counterfactually, she does not 
think of any possible separation because if the kids were happy, the story would be 
about happiness; and the mortar removed, the essence would be lost and meaning 
altered. The textures place the artwork in context of pounding groundnuts and not 
cassava. “Actually, this mortar places the piece in context; it brings us the whole 
meaning itself ”, she confidently declares. When features of objective character 
codes predominate, it aids the interpretation of images as information about rep-
resented objects: “their motion, location, mutual distances, forces, and inclina-
tions, including the spectator’s movement among these objects,” writes Somov 
(2006, p. 150). Sherry subscribes to the notion that once we read the artwork to-
gether with the written text, it provides a better understanding of the visual image 
and thus the meaning than when we adopt it from other sources. Secondly, that 
“when you know about the story, then it gives you reason to stay around and try to 
[…] relate the story to the artwork”. Such a tendency builds dependency.347
Sherry is more submissive to Kato Kimera I than her counterpart is; she sees 
a man with a spear and a shield indicating that he is a warrior. Nevertheless, she 
doubts that anyone could fight while wearing robs. Coupled with the crown on the 
head, she is convinced it is a King, because “a crown gives him kingship; robs, the 
attire, the weapons, and even the way he holds them.”348 She too admits that the 
written story aids her understanding of the story; she is also sure, Nkoliimbo has 
345  In her assessment, Sherry chose to view the work from a more technical dimension.
346  Note that Sherry has a different entry point from Ramah’s: she enters through the motor whereas 
Ramah enters through the sad faces (facial expression). Art works have different entry points and nor-
mally we judge the essence of the artwork depending on our entry points.
347  Sherry introduces the idea of mood that characterizes Currie’s (2009) view of narrativity, which may 
form in turn part of Nanay’s (2009) experience since the mood created depends on our awareness of the 
action in the story.
348  Therefore, every time we see such articles, we may as well believe that the expression points at 
kingship, unless otherwise. What puzzles Sherry is my insistence that it had connotations of a warrior, 
something she could not ably understand.
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feelings, mood, and when “you look at it, you get involved”, she confesses. Adapt-
ing to a world of comics, a similar situation arises in this relationship: “The words 
within comics have an interesting relationship to the diegesis, the story world that 
is ‘real’ to and hence can be experienced by the characters that populate it,” writes 
Pratt (2009, p. 108). Sherry raises two issues yet again: “When you read the story, 
you identify with the two girls and even in the real picture, you do”. It means that 
images still can afford the same affect an oral text can bear upon its reader and that 
the written text besides the art work can instantaneously offer the viewer familiar-
ity necessary to decode the visual.349 Yet, the effect of having the same experience 
from both texts is testimony to the re-experience encountered in narrative texts. 
The other issue is, “they are pounding, you can tell they are going to eat food, but 
now they are unhappy, you ask yourself ”–it raises questions.
Familiarity and specificity
Zoe’s, an art student at mtsifa, analysis of Nkoliimbo kicks off with identifying 
familiar objects such as the mortar, the pestle, and the action of pounding 
groundnuts, the child and the elder. She agrees that the written texts were in 
complete agreement with the pictorial texts. She says, “When you show here 
that the bird went back and ate their food, it relates with the fact that they were 
going to prepare food” (personal communication, May 30, 2007).350 She continues 
to explain, “Because one sees these figures, one immediately realizes that this is a 
mortar and these guys were trying to prepare food”. Her revelation leads further 
to the suggestion that familiarity is helpful, and thus a necessary condition for 
conceptualization, identification, and evaluation of sense stimuli in visual images. 
“An image should contain some groups of characteristics corresponding to the 
codes participating in identifications,” (Pratt, op cit, p. 150). Zoe engages in a self-
evaluation: “When you look at this image, it shows these two figures are preparing 
food, the bird returned and ate their food. Now am trying to get the message,” as 
she tries to make sense out of the image. She bases her evaluation on recognizable 
elements to form a relationship that provides her with meaning: the mortar is a 
code for preparation the bird is a code for perpetrator, and the action is a code for 
intervention.351 
After the analysis, Zoe is content that she had captured the message; she is also 
convinced that it is the right message because in her confession, she could not 
tally the two texts–image and word–at the start of the viewing process. Zoe’s tes-
timony is further proof that when we are aware of something, it is easier to get 
the preferred message and thus the meaning of a particular text. She also makes 
349  My interpretation of the affective element of Nkoliimbo lays credence on the fact that Kato Kintu 
does not create the feeling of personhood because its subject does not belong to people: it is not in the 
domain of ordinary experience because very few people can experience kinghood. 
350  This is a translated text from Luganda.
351  Zoe, on her part, enters the narrative through the action of pounding, which ideally implies prepar-
ing food. She enters it on the angle of action than mood or form. However, this action prevails in the 
presence of the mortar and pestles.
an exciting comment: “When you have not read the story, you realize that there 
are two figures pounding groundnuts; when you read the story it becomes a rela-
tion….” As noticed, some vital elements to the story are not included such as the 
bird. Knowledge alone cannot guarantee specific readings of texts, which means 
that a higher order process is required to harmonize the texts and provide room 
for creating possibilities necessary for specific tasks. Thus, knowledge is more 
of a generality, whereas accessibility and thus familiarity introduce the quality of 
locally specified readings; knowledge alone cannot supply us with sophisticated 
systems of dealing with specified data. Such a concept is contained in Ramah’s 
own assessment: “When you look at them, their eyes are downcast, their heads are 
downcast, and you see those eyes explain the whole: the sorrow, the sadness; but 
the hunger bit of it you will understand when you read the story.” Zoe is adamant 
that the mortar anchors the message in Nkoliimbo, whereas in Kato Kimera I, the 
sword and the shield show the power of the king.
Expression and experience
Lille, an art student at mtsifa, finds Enkoliimbo very expressive and can feel the 
stillness in it: “As if they have been asked to stay still,” she elaborates (personal 
communication, May 31, 2007).352 She also thinks that Kato Kimera I is about 
inheritance, not so much about kingship because when she reads the story, it gives 
her an account of how Kimera came to rule Buganda and thus depicted as protective 
of his throne. She also cautions that people who are not artists by profession would 
find it very hard to understand Nkoliimbo. Kato Kimera I on the contrary is direct; 
“When you look at this one, you see kingship,” she confirms. She reckons that it 
would be very hard to think along the lines of Nkoliimbo without reading the story. 
She commends my idea of working with stories because she thinks, “this is good! 
It will interest any one […] who does not appreciate art such that there are people 
who look at it and when you read the story, and see the piece, you are like ‘at least 
there is something in there.”’ Her remark implies that meaning, in whatever form, 
is the preferred goal of any engagement in reading visual narrative texts. 
In addition, this goal receives a boost by what we already know and on that 
note familiar. She recommends ‘praxis’ of letter and picture to actualize lived ex-
periences of oral and written texts. Lille cites a story of ‘Kintu and Nambi’ that she 
still remembers because of its etiological dimension experienced in daily life. The 
story becomes part of her experience of an earthquake. Traditionally, earthquakes 
in Buganda result from underground movements of Kayiikuzi trying to capture 
Walumbe. There is another legend attributed to Musisi as the king of the under-
world. “That is why whenever there is an earthquake they related it to that story. 
When you translate it to real life and children get to know about it, whenever they 
come across it they are like, ‘we have heard of this story”’. In other words, embod-
ied experience of the story inadvertently creates memory traits and animates real 
352  These are translated texts from Luganda. Indeed, the conversations proceeded normally as in daily 
speech. 
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life experiences so that one can easily relate to it. Conclusively, people tend to re-
late to what they already know, which they could probably re-experience than some-
thing out of touch with human experience. Bruner (1990) claims, “While we have 
an “innate” and primitive predisposition to narrative organization that allows us 
quickly and easily to comprehend and use it, the culture soon equips us with new 
powers of narration through its tool kit and through the traditions of telling and 
interpreting in which we soon come to participate” (p. 80).
Reye’s, a lecturer at mtsifa, appraisal suggests that the artwork seemingly be-
longed to a certain group of people.353 The question this observation raises is ‘why 
does the artwork offer such an impression? Because “when you read the story, and 
look at the images, you get a clear understanding,” he remarks (personal commu-
nication, June 4, 2007). He presumes that on the first reading without the images, 
something is asunder, “but the images, they more of like visualize the story: they 
make more of understanding the entire story–more much clearer both visually 
and literary”. In comics, as hybrid art forms, words appear to make the reader’s 
primary focus of attention (Pratt, 2009). This incident seems to occur when I jux-
tapose literary stories with their visual counterparts. Consequently, a symbiosis 
in the understanding process developed whereby when he (Reye) read the story 
and looked at the work, he looked at the artwork then the story–“that kind of two 
ways”. Artistically, I envision an involving process that is by default destined to 
build a dependency; it also makes viewing the artwork an experiential process as 
it involves motor, kinesthetic, and mental processes to actualize it. Experience is 
a coherent unit that relates features in the complex interactions between a human 
organism and the chaotic flurry of things that act on him/her (Eaton, 1998). 
Words assist a more determinate knowledge of a character’s mental state acces-
sible through a single image because, without text, it is ambiguous: “while it could 
represent just one instant of a causal sequence, it could also depict an unmoving 
set of objects in any span of time up to eternity” (Pratt, 2009, p. 109). The presence 
of the story on the other hand, builds a dependable familiarity that could be useful 
in artistic experience within the existing condition.354 The presence of the familiar 
thing is a reemphasis of the activity of experiencing it in a new or alternative form. 
Reye castigates the tendency of artists to “express their personal feelings” because 
it leaves the community in suspense “in a kind of take-it-or-leave-it situation.” 
Such a view and others reappear in my arguments that artists in Uganda today 
have thrown the community away and instead sought inner redress thereby leav-
ing the artwork to artists alone. “But when you have a story and an artwork, you 
feel a certain belonging like a Muganda, and when you come across such a story 
being close to a visual then you feel attached to the artwork,” comments Reye in 
353  When Reye points at a certain group of people, he is referring to those maligned by self-referential 
tendencies of discreet art. He implies so: that the artist this time is not producing for himself and col-
leagues, he is also involving ‘others’.
354  My reliance on instantaneous familiarity unconditionally proves worthwhile based on this observa-
tion and earlier ones observed by Ramah, Sherry, Isma and Zoe.
reaction to inwardness expressed by many Ugandan artist today. In other words, 
Reye is suggesting a credible re-link between art and community. Secondly, that 
our engagement of narrative heavily relies on the conditions laid out by Nanay 
(2009) in his theory of goal-directed action experienced in the ‘seeing-in.’355
Isa, a former art student at mtsifa, sees more of a warrior than a King does in 
Kato Kimera I: “I can see a warrior with a shield and the story tells about the king 
going to that man and then the man telling him to go to the god of war. To me the 
way the man stands, you can see that he is a real warrior; you real feel a warrior 
with his shield and spear he feels a real king of war” (personal communication, 
June 4, 2007). ‘To him’ it is a network of relations rather than being merely a royal 
disposition: it links with might and valor instead of traditional kingship, but ad-
mits that he would not have thought so if he had not read the story. Implication-
ally, familiarity furnishes him with ample ammunition to confront the essence 
head-on; additionally, he would not have been that inquisitive either and would 
only look at it “just like any other work.”356 Conversely, Isa does not work with sto-
ries because “it limits: sometimes the artwork changes, yet the story I had I get to 
realize that it does not come out that way because sometimes you realize that the 
painting is leading to something else and the story you harbored just has to die”. It 
is compelling to realize how organizing stories are from this observation and how 
limited in scope they may turn out to be. Additionally, we encounter limitation of 
stories in literary works, which belong to genres, yet genre constrains and deter-
mines choice of events and the shape of individual characters. Thus, a tragic hero 
cannot be a coward, and it excludes cowardly deeds not merely from the recounted 
action, but also from the hero’s presumed past (Goldie, 2009). 
Myths and reality
A myth is a culture’s way of thinking about something, a way of conceptualizing 
or understanding it. Myths work metonymically in that one sign stimulates us to 
access the rest of the chain of concepts that constitute a myth, just as a metonym 
stimulates us to construct the whole of which it is a part. “Both are powerful 
modes of communication because they are unobtrusive or disguised indexes. 
They exploit the ‘truth factor’ of a natural index and build on it by disguising its 
indexical nature” Fiske (1990, pp. 88-96). Notably, Ellul (1976) describes that myth 
as something that “does not address itself to existing feelings, but must create an 
image to act as a motive force. This image must have an emotional character that 
leads to the allegiance of the entire being, without thought” (p. 273). However, these 
stories have no specific linguistic code thus; they could act in any form: Njabala 
describes laziness and thus it can be a metaphor in case one wanted to narrate it 
355  ’Seeing-in’ is operating at the level of the narrative, away from the normative one. This concept 
connects quite well with Drout’s (2006a) idea of “interpret me ’as if’,” whereby language becomes 
marked as proverbial.
356  Nanay’s (2009) idea seems to carry a lot of weight when it comes to constituting our narrative 
experiences, namely that we must be aware of the action token in order for us to experience a text as a 
narrative.
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in that way. ‘Baana ba Kintu’ for example is an idiom referencing Baganda: this 
idiom summarizes the entire story of ‘Kintu and Nambi’ to render it a metaphor 
in Buganda. “Metaphors and other rhetorical devices may serve the cognitive task 
of articulating facts,” notes Dohrn (2009, p. 43). I will discuss the above metaphor 
shortly. Members of a culture will always consider their own myths as factual and 
true whether scientific, historical, philosophical, or religious. “Each myth has its 
place in the mythology of its culture. Taken together, the myths unify the members 
of that culture by giving them a shared past; a meaningful, life-sustaining present; 
and a predictable future,” writes Rosenberg (1997, p. xxv).
In a fiction story, we experience an illusion of reality (Hoijer, 1998) expressed by 
Mona, an art student at MTSIFA, who begins her search for meaning by pointing 
at the objects employed in the artworks: mortar, crown, spear, which is all famil-
iar to her. She connects the “misery” of the kids to the loss of something and the 
downcast eyes portray this. She enters the artwork through the pose and the ac-
tion of downcast faces. She further believes that every artwork has a story behind–
but I would interject by claiming that the implementation of physical structures is 
not in line with story structure–and that people memorize stories because “maybe 
when part of the story that was told to you comes true” implying that stories are 
normally related to “reality”.357 “When you face the same situation you were told 
in a story back you get to understand that it was real and your mind immediately 
gives you a flash back” (personal communication, June 4, 2008). Mona highlights 
the fact that a work of art having a story does not necessarily mean its execution 
in a story like manner, and in this, there is separation of content from method.358 
Currie (2009) is convinced that “[…] contexts determine threshold levels of narra-
tivity” (p. 311). In other words, some texts carry a greater degree of narrativity than 
others do. These and other views built confidence and paved way for the research 
to institute further probes into the actual functionality of narrative texts and how 
these could be deployed in visual artistic expressions.
Auxiliary narrative
Our conversation with Freddie, a practicing artist and former student at MTSIFA, 
on May 29, 2007 yielded vital findings.359 Freddie, by looking at the metallic work of 
Kato Kimera I, saw another story of ‘Lukomera’ who, in his search of riches, received 
advice from a foreseer to go out in the wilderness with a spear and shield. The 
first house at which he stopped would be the one to find the wealth. Because the 
occupants practiced cannibalism and witchery, they gave Lukomera several things 
that he refused because of their reputation. Fearing that he would expose their 
habits, they gave him cows and other valuable things and as such, he became a 
wealthy man. The narrative that the artwork resurfaces, due to, in this study, I refer 
357  What Mona refers to as reality are the lived experiences from which stories suffice, closely related 
to Lille’s concept of actualization where we experience the physicality of scenes expressed in a story.
358  Refer to Genette’s (1980) distinctions of narrative and story.
359  Freddie is a practicing artist and a graduate of MTSIFA. 
to as an auxiliary narrative: that instance when the intended narrative culminates 
into another narrative that serves to replace the main narrative, as perceived by the 
reader. In other words, what Freddie sees in Kato Kimera I is not a king but Lukomera 
the fortune seeker. Freddie’s memory of ‘Lukomera’ sparks off by the same triggers 
that constitute the Kintu narrative.360 These are the elements that are consistent 
with both narratives; in my construction of Kintu, I lay emphasis on the shield, the 
spear and crown; the insignia, as lexical as well as semantic articles that constitute 
the fabula of the story. 
In Freddie’s story, the two articles serve as instances of protection; in Kato Ki-
mera I, they serve the purpose of power and regality. Nonetheless, in both cases 
they lead to some sort of meaning performance: they mean what they mean for 
the same reason, namely that they occur in guise of constituting an expression. 
By rekindling auxiliary stories, the artwork builds a dependency external to its 
own intentional dependency. This is a significant revelation in visual narrative 
that during oral narration, stories can rekindle other stories of the same genre us-
ing similar structures by function of metonymy. This also implies that, in visual 
culture, artworks can create their own dependencies from supporting stories or 
‘characters’ just as in a normative narrative episode. Such supportive roles are vital 
in understanding and sustaining readership in visual images. Not always do we 
gain the same information from the things we see, even though we may be look-
ing at the same things. The implication then is that the meaning of any language, 
visual or verbal, is in us and not in words, letters, lines, colors, or spaces because 
we learn to attach meaning to these symbols (Zimmer & Zimmer, 1978).
In so doing, the artwork takes on new meaning but still rides in the confines 
of its trigger of the actual narrative text transformed into a new narrative. The 
new narrative then becomes a product of the actual narrative, which is a virtual 
text in itself. As Freddie views the artwork and contemplates it while he learns 
about Kintu’s escapades, he constructs an auxiliary narrative that is a virtual text 
of the actual narrative. The auxiliary narrative is what Freddie makes of the ac-
tual text. It is consistent with the actual text because it carries the same triggering 
elements and the same structures. The syntactical and pragmatic structures are 
consistent, only the semantics differ in this case. Like any other virtual text based 
on the same story, the semantic structure differs greatly from individual to indi-
vidual or group. Bruner (1986) commends the virtual text that “becomes a story of 
its own, its very strangeness only a contrast with the reader’s sense of the ordinary. 
The fictional landscape, finally, must be given a ‘reality’ of its own–the ontological 
step”361 (p. 37).
360  The narrative runs along the same pillars of narration. There is no meaning lost because the reader 
is able to decipher essence from the story. Narrative activates various remote resources and once any of 
such resources is adaptable to the narrative, it takes over as the main essence. The auxiliary narrative 
thus assists the main narrative to maintain essence and decorum in the main story. This is a typical 
example of polysemy. 
361  According to a study I carried out on virtual texts administered to 76 art students, I discovered that 
the lexical and syntactical morphologies were quite similar, only the semantic structures differed: their 
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This does not imply on the other hand that the viewer misunderstood the work 
since his/her line of thought does not much differ from that of the author.362  Nar-
rativity offers room for multiple meaning of the same text. Vagueness diminishes 
the clarity of the text such that one cannot derive any meaning from a given text. 
What ambiguity provides the audience with is a multiplicity of choices, or pos-
sibilities of meaning embedded in one particular text. Therefore, one text can lead 
to the birth of another text with only the common features remaining constant 
and prominent across the two texts. When this happens, then an auxiliary narra-
tive is born.363 The text at the end, does not communicate what the author intend-
ed, but it does remain within his/her confines of thought and intention. By this, I 
mean interpretation of text is different across the spectrum. However, this line of 
thought does not counter the essence of auxiliary narrative.364
More so, auxiliary narrative is not a ‘counter narrative’. Counter narrative de-
velops to resist a dominant narrative such as a meta-narrative. It does not enhance 
the performance of a narrative structurally. It is a superficial deterrent to an ex-
isting narrative. In this case, an auxiliary narrative enhances the performance of 
a major narrative. In many ways, it helps the understanding of a given narrative 
because of its associative endowment. The manner, by which one story or text is 
interpreted and understood, will at all costs influence directly the construal of its 
associated text. My interpretation of the spear and the shield in Kato Kimera I will 
enhance my understanding of the story of ‘Lukomera’ because of the associative 
power I assign to the two articles. Prior to learning about the story of ‘Lukomera’, I 
already had various meanings embedded in a spear, shield, and a crown. Their ap-
pearance in another story of a different construct will enhance my understanding 
of that story: it will trigger imaginative play that enables one to construct his/her 
reality of given phenomena. The meaning I may assign to ‘Lukomera’ may not ex-
actly be the same as that of ‘Kato Kimera’; however, the source material of whatever 
meaning is assigned to which text is the same and therefore easier to reconstruct. 
Along this line of thought, auxiliarity is a vital element of narrative by endowing 
it with the character of polysemy and reemphasis. Polysemy on its side animates 
construal was far apart although they used similar words or sentence constructions. Therefore, auxiliary 
narrative is an independent virtual text based on a very different narrative of which certain elements 
intersect at the lexical and syntactical levels. The transformations that Freddie administers in his virtual 
text are a way of assimilating the story that he reconstructs from the Kato Kimera I text. This line of 
thought is by no means disputable especially so that, the actual text and virtual are different interpreta-
tions. It would take an entire publication to argue this case. However, the result of this interpretation is 
that subjunctive language is bound to impose a number of interpretations of the same text.
362  In so doing, the meaning in the original text certainly falls apart, howbeit, we may not mean what 
we say, but still mean in the context of Dale’s (2006a) account.
363  An auxiliary narrative is a narrative triggered by a story momentously narrated that obscures the 
main narrative. It takes away our attention from the narrative that we start with and takes centre stage 
at the expense of the ‘authentic’ narrative. This could happen to the author as well as a third party.
364  If I have various options of the similar profile of an entity, the onus lays on me to choose my 
preference. However, choice weakens if we have various options of different entities, that do not add 
up to constitute an intention. This features prominently within Dale’s (2006a) theory and he mentions 
it explicitly that even if he did not mean what he said, quality of the expression that means remains the 
same.
difference on which the narrative builds imaginative play. Noteworthy, polysemy 
and reemphasis cannot successfully apply to counternarratives because their ma-
jor function is to perpetuate the meaning of the story rather antagonize it.
Scenario 9 
On a relatively quiet Monday night, as I tried to negotiate my sleep, a neighbor below my 
flat embarked on a tireless stint by knocking the door so hard that the people inside the 
flat could have been dead asleep. Since I was already struggling with my sleep, I switched 
to the sub-conscious: Part of me was already asleep, but the other part was still awake 
trucking events. During this time, I dreamishly heard opening doors and low voices and 
figured out images of an obscure woman wearing very big earrings just about to devour 
the other she found in the house. Suddenly, within my sub-conscious mode, a door 
opened in the flat below, and it sent a thrill through my groin that suddenly woke me up. 
(October 10, 2007)
Before I gained my full conscience, I was at the stage of describing how this 
ruthless neighbor looked like because my mind was dangling between a hideous 
creature and a horrible personality. However, what I could only figure out about her 
possible description was a figure wearing very huge earrings curved up to her lower 
ear lobe. I could still clearly see a huge white shape of an earring dangling in the 
darkness, even after opening my eyes. Other than passing as an after image, it was 
a summary of the description of what that ‘horrendous’ neighbor who caught me 
between the struggle for consciousness and unconsciousness was; it is what I could 
refer to as a virtual text of the story. They are summaries of real time phenomena, 
which we transform into static, motionless pictorial representations. In relation 
to the above episode, reconstructions of visual texts are normally summaries of 
what we perceive over a long period. As a visual image, the huge earring became 
a summary of my description of a phenomenon spanning a considerable period. 
This transformed the spatial chronological events into timeless static objects of 
representation. We compromise the actual text: the virtual text takes over as the 
actual text and hence it gains its own ontological construct. It becomes our true 
text after transforming the original text.
 The process of transformation engages in, the greater part, deletion of un-
wanted details and leaves us with the main essence of the actual text. As the story 
is being narrated, we are consciously present and listening or watching the action. 
What Bruner (1986) calls a virtual text is an in sync re-run of the text, which I pre-
dict as largely controlled by non-conscious processes. What plunges one into fren-
zy is the automatic re-run of the text in a more summarized or constricted script365 
that requires our attention because it is from it that we grasp the essences of the 
365  See, Best (1986) when he notes: “a script is a general, content-free, mental framework that can be 
used to organize particular sequences of common and familiar actions.[…] Adults can call up a fairly 
large number of general scripts into which incoming story information is fed” (p. 67).
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original texts.366 Hence, as we read the text, the mind is preoccupied with the bid 
to understand and decipher essences from triggers or indicators, of such essenc-
es. That is why I suggest that re-reading operates in the opposite direction as we 
attempt to understand the texts. The intersection point of the actual and virtual 
texts is where the fabula lays–the timelessness of the story. This can occur at any 
point in the story depending on the speed at which the re-readings operate and the 
parameters employed in such an operation. In conclusion, such conditions may 
form a foundation for a basic understanding of our ability to interpret situations 
as presenting the recurrence of a meaningful expression.
366  Indeed, Bruner’s (1986) virtual text really is, implied because it is not locatable in time and space. 
We can only experience and re-experience it in our attempt to assimilate it.
OPEN-ENDED TEXTS
Karimojong 
These artworks (see figure 21a) developed in collaboration with two Year III students 
at mtsifa: Emmanuel and Nicholas. The aim was to achieve a dynamic interplay of 
line and color based on the structural formations of the Karimojong dance attire.367 
We intentionally idealized and itemized the artwork in order to study readability and 
vulnerability to manipulation of non-narrativized texts.368 The artistic proposition 
about the Karimojong is describing their dance attire, which does not have any 
particular sequence; it is manipulatable singly or collectively without losing 
the Karimojongness in it. Conversely, there is a possibility of losing track of the 
Kato Kimera’s story if one tampered with the elements that make it mean what 
it means. Hence, the reason why the attire is alterable is simply because it is not 
narratorially constructed and thus its overall structure reordered and manipulated 
without loss of essence. For example, Sherry has made it clear that Nkoliimbo is 
not manipulatable without loss of essence. This is ideally because all the parts are 
essential to the whole; it has developed a symbiotic structure that needs to hold 
together if what it expresses is to remain meaningful in that way. The protocol 
thus employed in Karimojong is open, whereas the Kintu’s and others is arbitrary 
because certain defining aspects are predicates and thus must be present. 
Karimojong thrives on informative tenets mainly tackling the theme of ‘dance 
attire’ without necessarily interlocking the events into a substantive goal-directed 
action that would mark our competence to engage the text narratively. The repeti-
tions, for example, are due to the limited scope the dance attire of the Karimo-
jong exhibits. Indeed the goal of the production of these drawings significantly 
depended on the need to produce various scenarios connected or depicting a par-
ticular theme designed as independent episodes that did not necessarily build up 
a hierarchy or an action token. It was thus not detrimental in any way for the dis-
367  We started working on this artwork on November 14, 2007 as a comparative study and a sketch for 
glass panels for an office interior in Kampala (see figure 21c). 
368  Readability is essential to our interpretation and recognition of the recurrence of an expression that 
means in order to consider it as worthy of belief and as such attending to it.
8 / Interlude
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mantling of these productions to conform to the formats of the glass panels as per 
the specifications of the architect (see figures 21b & 21c).
In addition, other than the physical qualities of the Karimojong attire that are 
mainly color and shape, the works do not have any other extraordinary connota-
tion of what I would refer to as abstract constructs beyond themselves. The highly 
idealized approach was to conform to the concept of design in line with planer fea-
tures of two-dimensionality found in graphic forms. In these artworks, color plays 
the major role of representing the Karimojong attire.369 The beadwork introduces 
an ovular shape in the displays, although the clothing is mainly checkered, or 
striped. Thus, the aspects of color and shape that predominate are the ones shared 
by all the artworks although are not sufficient, in this research’s view, as condi-
tions to constitute a concrete narrative. Because of the independence of the parts, 
they then become susceptible to manipulations that stretch as far as losing the 
original features. We can translate a theme in any way if its symbolic content is 
availed.
It is also evident that there is no immediate meaning attached to the works 
in their autonomous presence. For their reading, specialized ability is required to 
grasp the basic connotations of dress and jewelry. There is evidence of earrings 
and necklaces in several of the artworks but they are significantly transformed 
to the extent that the Karimojong themselves world not out rightly identify with 
them or even the artworks themselves. Perhaps the colors could give them a lead, 
but this option is also only a possibility. There are traces of the beadwork straps 
369  Their attire is very colorful and predominantly red, green, purple, and blue and mainly in their 
chromatic states.
Figure 21b. Unknown artist. 
2008. Colored pencil on paper. 
Original drawings manipulated 
to constitute new artworks. 
Stories do not offer this kind 
of flexibility without loss of 
meaning.
Figure 21a. Kabiito Richard, Ishengoma Emmanuel, & Tamale Nicholas. 2007. 
Computer print-outs. Original drawings designed for stained glass. The artwork 
does not constitute a specific story; it largely depends on a thematic notion of art 
production.
Figure 21c. Unknown artist. 2008. Fabricated stained glass in the interior of an 
office. Original texts almost lost. Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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however is only theoretical and not practically applicable in all instances of narra-
tive engagements. Perhaps the reason for this artwork for not having a particular 
storyline is that I have no ready-made schema onto which I can map it. If this is the 
case, then it is a revelation that narrative comprehension and construction heav-
ily depends on ready-mades that compose and direct our conscience and reaction 
to the busts both sensually and perceptually, but not narratorially. Therefore, the 
story lives within us, but the narrative comes when we tell it. Experience, events, 
and knowledge come together to form stories that we greatly revere. 
To wind up this discussion, in terms of typicality, Fred’s Greetings from Uganda 
is more typical of a story than Headgear because of the expression of action use-
ful sometimes to apparent in it a chronological build up of the story and I guess 
constitutes the reason why many viewers were against its chop up. Although the 
artwork provides a wider scope of events, it also supplies us with the urge to con-
sider it that way. Headgear does not; it only allows us to look at each piece inde-
pendently and not as a whole due to conceptual and perceptual fragmentation. The 
innate power of stories, on the other hand, is intriguing and thus the reason we 
should adopt them for artistic practice. Russo (1977) dramatically leads the way 
out of this eye-catching exploration: “The dull expressions seem difficult for one 
been correct to claim that “Narrative deals with the vicissitudes of human intentions; it has a “primitive-
ness” that is appealing (pp. 16-17).  By primitive, I mean that one can make a strong argument for the 
irreducible nature of the concept of intention. That is to say, intention is immediately and intuitively 
recognizable: “it seems to require for its recognition no complex or sophisticated interpretive act on the 
part of the beholder” (ibid). Perhaps it is a display of sarcasm, disconnectedness, and confrontation. 
Alternatively, it is a story about disconnectedness and intention. Intention becomes important in deter-
mining what an artwork constitutes. It could also be a sophisticated narrative dealing with fragments 
compiled into logical wholes. Contrastingly, it also describes relationships. There is always a tendency 
of figuring out the end-of-the-road. It is a typical summary. Each of the busts can tell a story of its own 
thereby introducing the idea of layering and fragmentation. I used Kitengi fabrics, jewelry and busuuti 
to perpetuate the concept of reuse thus introducing color and pattern. Headgear treads on the grounds 
of possibilities and human intention.
that form the frontal parts of the gear tied around the waist camouflaged by the 
network of stripes so that they may not easily become recognizable. The men sig-
nificantly, especially the elders, tie a knot that forms in a web-like structure out of 
these features that are not accessible perceptually to a ‘naked eye’. There is much 
interference engendered by overt idealization that blocks meaning performance 
and instead renders the artwork purely decorative other than representing any 
other thing beyond itself. The meaning here is physical because it serves the pur-
pose of embellishment. Indeed, there was no question regarding the glass panels 
and it was apparent that they were part of the architectural design rather than any 
artistic work that could possibly represent something else (see figure 21c). Never-
theless, in some there are still recognizable elements that could constitute one-
on-one inferences rather than a contiguous relationship. What Karimojong lacks 
is quality in an expression that helps us detect its ‘recurrence’ thus performing a 
meaningful interpretation of its context. Due to lack of easily recognizable ele-
ments, the representativeness in them is lost and thus the timelessness.
Headgear 
On the other hand, Headgear (see figure 22), also partially inspired by Karimojong 
headdress, provides an open-ended narrative text that could supply material 
for constructing our own story. What the gear connotes seems to be immaterial 
presently; denotation is paramount. An imaginary story about contemporary 
headgear but cannot be located in time and space. It gains narrative features 
through its consistencies, but it falls short on generating and building a compelling 
‘action token.’ The man looks like a typical polygamist, but the woman on the right 
is ready to confront him, yet, her co-wife seems resigned to tradition. I was trying 
to create a story out of ‘no where’ but mainly depending on a theme without any 
particular plot. There is an implied story but not exactly locatable at this point. I 
have no idea what a story constituting these three heads with elaborate headdresses 
leads to at the end of it all. Thus, it could work well as a description of a tradition 
rather than form a story of literary significance. Conversely, with a story in place, it 
would become logical and an action token would be discoverable and constitutive 
of an art production. Why it is open ended is because anyone can construct a story 
of his or her own since the headdress per se does not restrict our imagination.370 
In a well-constructed story, there are limited options to work with and thus the 
possibilities of ending up at the same point are numerous. 
Headgear is a test in this study, of how a well-formed narrative could withstand 
the whims of counterfeit texts carrying the face of a story by raising the question 
of whether any text can be a narrative, in other words. It is thus a litmus test for the 
authenticity and strength of character comprising narrative texts: the intention 
must be spot-on and thus the result must be specific and locatable.371 This claim 
370  See Pickstone’s (2001, p. 63) From riches to Rags article discussing Arte Povera
371  Intentionality becomes a key issue in narrative or story texts because it supplies us with goals. 
Headgear is ‘expressionless’ at first viewing: it is open and full of ‘intention’. Bruner (1986) could have 
Figure 22. Kabiito Richard, Headgear (170 x 90 cm). 2008. Bark cloth, fabric, fiberglass, and beads. 
Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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to experience and in turn envision mentally, whereas one can imagine actually do-
ing the vivid expressions and can picture doing them” (p. 5).
  
YEAR II PROJECT
 
With a rough picture of what goes on in the art world on the Ugandan scene, I 
focused on a project conducted with Year II students of the mtsifa, which ran 
from February to June 2007. A class of 80 students split into nine groups and each 
was to produce an artwork based on a story picked from any cultural group within 
Uganda. The major aim was to study the nature and significance of the virtual text 
during the transition of stories from oral to visual form. “The virtual text is not the 
actual text but the text that the reader has constructed under its sway,” says Bruner 
(1986, p. 37). That is the reason why the actual text needs the subjunctivity that 
makes it possible for a reader to create a world of his own. It was necessary to trace 
narrative properties within the transformed texts for a concrete understanding of 
its operational nature. I discovered for example, smaller excerpts of summaries 
of the regular texts extracted to tell the entire story. This meant that significant 
deletions, substitutions, or additions and reorganization took place. Signs and 
linguistic tropes take over as dominant elements that are to determine the meaning 
of the visual representation because of their representative and transformative 
nature. 
Secondly, it was imperative to know whether collective meaning is achievable in 
a culturally diverse group of locally situated individuals. The project commenced 
with all individuals dealing with the story of ‘Kintu and Nambi’ of which they were 
required to construct visual virtual texts. This was to assess the student’s abili-
ties to track and identify narrative traits in visual representations. I discovered 
that each of the students had the ability to adapt to working with narrative due 
to the preliminary drawings they produced although the degree of success varied. 
Secondly, that each of them had one’s own unique interpretation and thus visual 
representation of the story.372 The next exercise required to work in groups and for 
the group to choose one story to work with. Each one was required first to make 
a personal interpretation of the story and then merge their interpretations into a 
unitary artistic production. Although they had personal insights into the story re-
reading, the group drawing was a matter of consensus. Indeed, one of the groups 
adopted the drawing of the most active member without incorporating any other’s 
ideas. The virtual texts were mainly summaries of the actual texts with significant 
transformations of the oral texts; in visual texts, it is severe because with less at-
tention the plot and thus the essence could be lost.
The students embarked on their production phase that commenced after eight 
weeks of brainstorming and mock-ups. Our major aim in the final works was to 
examine how triggers could assist in producing artistic concepts of presupposi-
372  This finding confirms that the notion of rationalism in tradition lets the individual interpret a tradi-
tion individually without consensus of the group’s hierarchy.
Figure 23. Group work, Seven girls 
seven pots (200 x 100 cm). 2007. Oil 
on canvass. Photo: Kabiito Richard.
Figure 24. Kabiito Richard, Kato Kintu (220 x 100 cm). 2008. Spear, bark cloth, mats, fabrics, and beads on metal. 
Photo: Kabiito Richard.
Figure 25. Henry Lumu, Kamasiira. 1964. Illustration. 
Kamasiira only narratable in-that-way.
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tion to determine the enabling factors of meaning in narrative texts. At the end of 
the exercise, this took them another four weeks to complete. At the end, students 
exhibited the work for assessment to determine their strong and weak points.373 
For the interest of this research, I selected two artworks that displayed exemplary 
qualities in both execution and experience of the artists. I gathered the informa-
tion through oral interviews and observation. In addition to these, three more sto-
ries were examined for their abilities or undoing’s for comparison. 
Dominant attraction, autonomy, and decision-making
The study chose Seven girls, seven pots (see figure 23) because of its representational 
qualities and clarity of mind its authors exhibited. In their responses, they revealed 
a few aspects that were significantly independent of external influence. The group 
leader, Sherry, is proud of their achievement “because the picture tells the whole 
story; seven girls, seven pots, and that’s what interested us most. Why didn’t they 
say four girls, four posts”, she wonders. Indeed, their most conspicuous triggering 
object is the number of the girls and the pots.374 They use mainly the pots as their point 
of emphasis. Additionally, they use the pots and the girls concurrently to maintain 
the storyline and avoid misinterpretation. Accordingly, Sherry emphasizes the 
seven girls as a necessary and sufficient condition to tell the whole story of the 
‘Seven girls, seven pots’. This instance is a ‘kernel’ according to Chatman’s (cited in, 
Smuts, 2009, p. 9) terminology, which refers to major events that are necessary in 
maintaining a narrative’s essence. In this case, the representation is determined a 
priori and any divergence leads to misinterpretation. “There are numerous stories 
that are tied to a particular setting: a house, or even a room,” explains Smuts (p.  9).375 
Kato Kintu (see figure 24) further demonstrates that in the absence of Nambi, the 
story would lose its theme as that of Kato Kintu, the first king of Buganda.376 This 
373  I assessed the exhibits and conducted individual and group interviews on June 21 and 22, 2007. 
374  In figure 23, one confirms the idea of ’kernel’ as is evidence from a different point of view of a dif-
ferent artist who too, could not have depicted the story of ‘Six girls six pots’ (Kamasiira) any-other-way 
(see figure 25). Figure 33 illustrate the kernel differently: the same artist depicts the story slightly differ-
ently but also had to maintain the presence of the beasts, or else, the story loses its entry point into its 
meaning.
375  Smuts (2009) notes that one can plausibly retell the story behind Richard III in Nazi Germany, 
Othello in a high school, or Hamlet in a the present New York. However, retelling the film City of God 
outside Rio de Janeiro is practically impossible or Sex and the City outside of New York City.
376  In Kato Kintu, Nambi’s absence would significantly alter the meaning of the story and thus the mes-
sage would be quite different. This is significant of how kernel influences meaning. These two art works 
have no definitive emplotments: we can only see the spear, shield, Kintu, Nambi Nantuntululu at different 
levels of visualization that form a totalizing experience. The shield, spear, and crown work as icons at the 
first level and symbolically at the third level of signification especially in Kato Kimera where most viewers 
considered them as representing Kinghood or royalty. The Kanzu is a cultural dress that is specific of local-
ity and symbolically represents Buganda. The shield facilitates intensity, repetition, and thus reemphasis 
of form and objects. The mats in Kato Kintu are merely decorative and augmenting beauty. The crown on 
the vertical axis is at the level of the king because it is part of his personality while the spear and shield are 
just extensions. The plants in the interlude area create suspense and lead the viewer on to the last bit of 
completion. Interestingly, Kato Kintu does not portray a causal relation but rather a mental reconnection 
requiring experiential and explanatory credence; we have to conceive of rejoining the parts rather than 
capturing causality. It requires embodied experience to reconnect the parts, and as such, one could set the 
conceptual metaphor, as suggested by Lakoff, ablaze. Even then, our experience depends on the fact that 
is a very important point to note that we cannot compromise some stories because 
of their compelling nature to represent it in a particular way. This claim gains 
credence when one considers Lumu’s (in Kaswa, 1964) representation of Kamasiira 
a story closely related to Seven girls seven pots (see figure 25). Thus, Sherry and her 
group members had no other logical way other than that or something similar 
but the bottom line: ‘Seven girls, seven pot. It behaves like a maxim: it is a typical 
summary, whereby, the hierarchy is not crucial to its overall meaning.
One of the issues the participants address in the groups is that of ‘dominant 
attraction’ which, here refers to that part of the story that conspicuously captures 
the essence in every individual. “By selecting one image rather than another, an 
artist can give the reader cues, drawing attention to the particularly salient as-
pects of the story,” indicates Pratt (2009, p. 113).377 It also leads to the multiplicity 
in interpretation of any given literary text captured in the group’s insistence on the 
number of actors and objects. Next, on the group’s discovery is the tendency by 
narrative “to place the story in context” by helping artists know what happened 
before the story. The temporal-spatial mental events that precede any artistic initi-
ation are crucial in shaping the course of any art production. This phase includes, 
but not limited to intentionality and conceptualization processes. Thus, it shapes 
and materializes the concept and intention of the artwork and artists respectively, 
which later become integral in the production process. Furthermore, one of the 
group members observed that stories improve memory: “Like when someone tells 
you a story, you draw pictures in your mind, you see pictures in your mind, you 
cannot forget these pictures, even when you forget the story; the pictures remain 
in your mind.” This observation is supported by another declaration that narra-
tives facilitate a production of visions in the mind, “Whenever someone is telling 
you a story, every part, everything the person is talking about, you keep on like you 
are watching it in your mind, with that, it helps you to somehow bring more ideas; 
narrative helps you diversify the mind.”
In our act of the perceiving the world including pre-theoretical and theoretical 
knowledge, imagination plays a significant role (Freisen, 2006).378 Imagination is 
crucial to our engagement with narrative discourses. Indeed, narration is a pro-
creative process and well suited for images because its actualization is by creat-
ing mental pictures parallel to the narration, be it in words or letters. More so, 
a member of the same group mentions the expectancy that narrative builds up. 
“When someone is narrating, you want to know what is next; so you are attentive”. 
My study singled out expectancy as a necessary condition for accommodating story 
we already know the human morphology and thusly expect it to feature in a certain way.
377  An artist can leave objects out of the picture and make the relevant ones stand out to varying 
degrees by emphasizing their size and placement within the panel (Pratt, 2009). My comment is that 
comics are like any other pictorial narrative in representation.
378  This view contrasts with Nanay’s (2009) dismissing imagination as purely speculative in perceiving 
pictorial narrative.
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input.379 This is testimony to my own observations and projections on how stories 
build up dependencies in receiving organisms. Noteworthy though, is the exhibi-
tion of autonomy by Seven girls, seven pots, which is a profound revelation of the 
organizational power constituted by narrative structure. It means that, the op-
tions one has at disposal are limited and thus aids and improves decision-making. 
Decision-making is a fundamental element of arriving at meaning as it helps one 
to opt for a choice over the other. Decision is a constituent part of intention and 
action initiated under conscious awareness. Indeed, decision-making preexists in 
our perceptual processes otherwise choices would be very hard to make. Thus, the 
fewer and clearer the choices are, the quicker the decision is made, although not 
all the time. 
Metaphor
The second artwork that I chose came from group 3, headed by Gerald, entitled 
Divorce (see figure 26). The technical application of figurative language draws me to 
this artwork. The group uses a chain as a ‘traditional referent’ that raises questions 
about the relationship between the dog and the woman portrayed in the painting. 
They further portray the chain as a metaphor for prison, which visually translates 
the story quite effectively. Consider Somov’s (2006) remark on metaphors:
…metaphors exercising general functions appear in visual artworks as signs of other 
objects built in a picture (movement directions likened to lift, descent, or flight; icons 
of natural objects, people, animals, or tools), relating the text of a picture with external 
realities. …metaphors exercising functions inside a text of visual artwork usually pro-
mote the formation of unified systemities of denotations and connotations interrelated 
with basic signals (p. 153). 
Kant (cited in, Gibbons, 2008) disputed this analysis in his theory of the metaphor. 
Instead, we see the chain as causing a comparison between marriage and prison or 
confinement and marriage. Let me place Kant’s appraisal in context. The artwork 
presents an aesthetic idea of marriage as a prison. Namely, the content of the 
artwork causes our imagination initially to represent it empirically in its actual 
state, but because the object is a work or art, the imagination continues to reflect 
on that content and produce an aesthetic idea. Because this representation does not 
subscribe to the limitations of the determinate constraints or empirical intuitions, 
it can surpass those bounds and “aesthetically expand into an indeterminate inner 
intuition”380 (Gibbons, 2008, pp. 50-53). 
379  Expectancy is one of the emotions associated with narrative uptake and it is responsible for narra-
tive dependency.
380  “The indeterminate interactions between our subjective imaginings (aesthetic ideas) and our ob-
jective concepts (rational ideas) are one of the hallmarks of the aesthetic experience. Ideally, aesthetic 
ideas must be a kind of internal intuition suggested by a particular empirical artwork; if they were not 
internal, the aesthetic ideas would not be able to achieve their status as indeterminate. In case of aes-
thetic ideas, not only are they a different kind of intuition, namely an internal rather than an empirical 
Figure 26. Group work, Divorce (200 x 100 cm). 2007. Oil on canvass. 
Photo: Kabiito Richard
Figure 27. Group work, Karimojong marriage (200 x 100 cm). Oil on canvass. 
Photo: Kabiito Richard
Figure 28. Group work, Kato Kimera (200 x 100 cm). Oil on canvass. 
Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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Within the expansive array of the aesthetic attributes of the concept ‘marriage 
prison’ we have the kinships between the concepts ‘chain’ and ‘interlock,’ the im-
plication between the concepts ‘union’ and ‘entanglement,’ the kinship between 
‘divorce’ and ‘marriage freedom.’ The associations are numerous. Seeing the ‘bond-
ing chain’ one gets to subsume such an aesthetic idea under the concept ‘marriage 
prison’ since its exhibition of the chain is simply a multitude of aesthetic attri-
butes (conceptual links) that indeterminately fit the concept of ‘marriage prison’ 
unlike designate logical attributes suitably recognizable. This implies that the 
images exhibit expansive conceptual kinships that aesthetically countertype the 
indeterminate concept ‘marriage prison’. The rational ideas we may contemplate 
in this case are congenial desolation and freedom. 
Technically, this presentation lies in the attempt at idealization but at the 
same time retaining cognitive parts of the original that can together reconstitute 
a meaningful whole. Largely, meaning is accessible in case one was familiar with 
the story. Text significantly reduces the identification scope in visual artworks to 
specified information by linking characteristics with object classes in different 
ways to present a certain set of potential connotations. In this why an image pro-
duces riddles and links to enhance imagination by creating groups of characteris-
tics corresponding to different class objects that opens a set of identifications and 
ways of their visual actualization (Somov, 2006). Evidently, they are happy about 
their achievement because in their responses, they revealed that narrative was in-
strumental in their ability “to summarize their story into a small unit that can raise 
a hundred questions” (Sherry, 2008, personal communication). 
Narrative configuration, in other words, helps to ease the pressure of choice: 
what should be included and what should not be. Their explanation though is that 
“you get to see things from a different perspective: a story can have various mean-
ings; the moment you retell something, you get different angles of understanding, 
you can easily represent that visually.” Accordingly, narrative provides the artist 
with an overall overview of the story situation and summaries presented visually. 
The constricted summaries will normally have been carefully thought through and 
thus true representations of the temporal episodes. These operate like typical met-
aphors. Murdoch (cited in, Korsmeyer, 1998) recognizes their contribution in daily 
experience: “Metaphors are not peripheral decorations or even useful models, they 
are fundamental forms of our awareness of our condition: metaphors of space, 
metaphors of movement, [and] metaphors of vision” (p. 196).
The group members noted various interpretations of the painting and raised sev-
eral questions during its execution. “They would tell us a good number of stories and 
then we could say ‘yeah, we have succeeded,’” said Patrice, one of the group members. 
Some wondered why the woman was pulling the dog. In so doing, the group thought 
one, but also their possible subsumption cannot be guided by any determinate concept. Instead, we are 
left with an aesthetic idea (inner intuition) that we ponder over and reflect upon, but one that we can 
never determinately cognize” (Gibbons, 2008, pp. 50-53)
it was successful in their bid to work with narrative because people were able to see 
their story from different perspectives. They explained their findings to me “Even 
when we had not put some items like the pots, the gourds, you could find that the 
story was already told by the people who come to see: they question themselves; that 
questioning, people have [is] a trigger.” At one stage, it became emotional when an 
observer asked Patrice “You people, why are you punishing the dog?” Patrice sarcasti-
cally wound up by proclaiming, “I think he had many questions in his mind.” Snow 
(2002) posits, “Questions promote contemplation, imaginative variation and greater 
appreciation of what is being seen. They coax the mind into emphatic projection and 
understanding. They create a listening, communicative frame of mind” (p. 14).
Scene
“A picture can set up the setting or scene of a story and can guide the reader’s 
perception of spatial relationships within it,” writes Pratt (2009, p. 110) just as 
Karimojong marriage (see figure 27). Optimistically, Karimojong Marriage is not 
folklore or any other story genre, but a recount of the process by which Karimojong 
initiate marriage between a man and woman. On average, it is a 30% deletion of 
original content in retelling the story with no addition of particular content; the 
spear is only symbolically present and its signification contiguously performed. In 
Karimojong marriage, I interpreted the scene as such: the girl in the background with 
a broken pot is the bride, while the pot signals the effects of a fight that ensued, 
thus significant as an index. The lads in the foreground, clad in red-brown attire 
represent the groom’s side and the one with a hood is the groom. The colors and 
decorations are ‘typical’ of Karimojong dress. The spear signals the great throw 
initiated beyond the gathering and into the herds. Group 1 introduces the scene 
as constitutive of the story and capitalizes on the size of the herd to express the 
importance of the occasion. Thus, they perform deletions but then recover ground 
by constituting contiguities that pick up the lost parts. “The decorations of the 
men shows the colors the Karimojong love most” says Sonnies, a student in the 
group. 
Lead-on
Turning to another exciting artwork related to the above, a mysterious beginning 
marks a mysterious ending in a picture that moves from the right to the left with 
gradual build up of events culminating into a climax just before the activity recedes 
again into oblivion. Kato Kimera comes to rule Buganda, (see figure 28) produced by 
group 6, is a typical linear narrative that ‘leads on’ and suddenly culminates into 
a climax of activity, figuration, and signification. Its transformation characterizes 
deletions of approximately 30% of the story and simple additions to it: they 
eliminate scenes of infidelity while a new scene of ‘looking into the pot’ as a major 
signifier is added. The spear as part of royalty signifies kingship hidden in the 
pot; while the action of looking into the pot makes everyone feel like ‘looking into 
the pot’; it creates curiosity and thus leads on the viewer. It is also dramatic in the 
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strong desire to look into the pot yet in the story, the kid is not in the pot. The pot 
replaces the womb and thus becomes a metaphor for ‘motherhood’. It is a summary 
within a summary, a phenomenon typical of Ganda narrative, which renders the 
artwork strong in triggering and presupposition.
Comparatively, in the main art project, the second of the hierarchy in Kato Ki-
mera II (see figure 29) is dynamic and stimulating because of its lead-on, which is 
also evident in the same story executed by group 7 in the year II project.381 There 
are two different readings seen in this story: the one in the group project is a con-
tinuous viewing, whereas the one in my own production is sequential in viewing 
in time and space. One combines space and thus less time in viewing; the other 
separates space and heightens curiosity. The longer the viewing time, the higher 
the tension built up and the stronger the relief of ‘completion’.382  Although Pratt 
(2009) suggests that the longer the diegetic time between the gutters, the higher 
the potential difficulty in following the narrative, I say that in my artwork, the 
diegetic time is of little credence since we only have three scenes. The severance on 
its own is an expression of the tension of ‘reconnection’ that builds action both in 
viewing and perceptual completion. This is narratorial in its own sense as it builds 
goal-directed action. Within this interlude (gutter in comic terms) the reader 
gains and controls viewing time, which helps in narrative uptake and comprehen-
sion (Pratt, 2009, p. 115). 
Repetition and intensity
Ghost in the forest (see figure 30) is an artwork that builds intensity through 
reiterating the presence of the ghost woman dressed in green. The green color in 
itself reemphasizes the domicile of the ghost woman met in the forest. Although 
the group is not sensitive about scene as a narrative space, they do reactivate all 
episodes in the story. There are minimal deletions whatsoever, but contiguities 
build up in the reappearance of the woman in green–perhaps who comes to haunt 
the man later–but mostly, the woman as superhuman depicted as a mermaid at 
the far side. The basket and the axe symbolize domestic chores while the sun is a 
381  The story of Kato Kimera II builds chronology of events in real time and space. There is time cap-
tured and space achieved during its viewing. The spear, club, and cowhide are used as icons represent-
ing themselves and nothing beyond that unless otherwise. The spear as a symbol of power is also part 
of the King’s regalia. The horn is part of the cow and thus, it is iconic. Kalemera drapes bark cloth in an 
iconic application, while the king drapes his royal regalia with the crown presented with animal fur; it 
is symbolically used. The wife drapes burnt wood material used as an inherent medium. Kalemera only 
appears at the beginning of the story and although it is chronologically broken down, its narration does 
not account for the events preceding the pregnancy. The viewer can add on to the narrative build up, 
which makes it interactive. The king is strategically present because he is an actor in the story. There is 
one consistent character: the king’s wife. The narrative builds a dependency by accounting for signifi-
cant episodes so that the reader fills in the missing ones. The insignia prince Kalemera dons in the neck 
does not resurface because he passed away. The pot symbolizes pottery; but used as a metaphor for the 
womb that holds the child Kimera from then onwards. Therefore, we may attempt to subsume it as an 
aesthetic idea of a ‘motherly pot’ that may bring about rational ideas of parenthood.
382  This kind of climax subsists on a small scale in Kato Kintu whereby the interlude manipulates view-
ing time and space to heighten anxiety and build tension.
symbol of time in the artwork.383 They achieve consistency and emphasis through 
repetitions and their meaning through creating a scenario of many ghost women. It 
is dramatic in the way they regenerate through multiplications of the ghost woman 
who only appears once in the story line. It is also dramatic how they build up the 
narrative by introducing each main character, and later picking the same character 
such that the man ends up crying under the hot sun having started with scenes of 
daily duties. They build a sequence but in dramatic fashion and it ends up where 
the story started by building a network of contiguities. A cyclic sequence builds 
up in their visual narrative.384 “If an object is pleasant, repetition will increase its 
charm; if it expresses sorrow or pain, the repetition will intensify its melancholy. 
On the contrary, any subject that is peculiar or unpleasant becomes unbearable by 
repetition.  So repetition always acts to increase intensity,” notes Hodler (cited in, 
Chipp, 1968, pp. 60-65).
Character, material, and ornament constitute the much-needed consistency in 
Kato Kimera II (see figures 29a-29c). However, repetition of characters builds up the 
plot due to its serial construction, unlike in Ghost in the forest where the character 
reappears on the same plane. It opens up a void that keeps the mind reconstruct-
ing the rest of the story before the subsequent viewing. Pratt (2009) cited this phe-
nomenon earlier as ‘closure’ that refers to “mental processes whereby readers of 
comics bridge the temporal and spatial incompleteness of the diegesis that occurs 
in the gutters between panels, thereby participating in the creation of narrative” 
(p. 111). This view coincides with Barwell’s suggestion and my observation that we 
as readers must participate in creating a narrative text as an experiential phenom-
enon. Interaction occurs with the liberalism it affords to complete the story. In 
turn, this leaves the viewer hanging thus building a dependency. Wanyana re-ap-
pears to visit her son who dresses like his father to regain consistency and recap-
ture the rhythm. The king appears in figures 29a and 29b, and Kimera appears in 
figures 29b and 29c; Katumba appears only once in figure 29b. Wanyana appears 
in all three scenes (that is figures 29a-29c) as the unifying entity. I capture order of 
succession and consistency in actors and objects. 
Scenario10
“One day, a crocodile sat in a basin, one day a crocodile sat in a basin, 
One day a crocodile sat in a basin, one day, a crocodile sat in a basin. 
What a wonderful story!” 
Early Christmas Eve, December 24, 2007, Louie told the above story and in my 
reading, I wondered what she was going to tell me next. She kept her rhyme until 
she concluded by declaring the story wonderful. I asked her mother to listen in 
to Louie’s story. She replied, “Louie’s stories are like Kalvin’s (her cousin); they 
383  In Ganda beliefs, ghosts and spirits move in the hot afternoon sun.
384  When the man was going to the forest, goes the cycle, he met the ghost, then he lost his wife, and 
thus never got what he wanted. 
202 203
have no beginning, they have no end.” While Louie narrated her story, she kept on 
opening a DNA385 prepaid manual as her source of the story. She is acting under 
the pretext of narration, and in my analysis of her situation, it is a reflex action. 
There are those instinctual features that do not require our attention and indeed, 
in many cases we do not realize their presence in our daily activities (Macleod & 
Mathews, 1997). This kind of scenario confirms the remote presence of narrativity 
in a human mind. Ideally, Louie imitates storytellers on TV, but at that particular 
moment, she was the storyteller even though her story is a repetition of one phrase; 
it compels one to listen to it. She is not acting out of context; an inner necessity is 
pushing her into story telling because the human mind anxiously designates telling 
stories and sharing experiences and knowledge to ensure that species survive. 
One interesting observation is the remark her mother makes of the structure of 
storytelling: beginning, middle and end.386 In repeating her texts over again, Louie 
creates intensity that separates the narrative text from its surrounding texts. Such 
intensity is always present and needed in narrative because it instantiates meaning 
performance. 
Louie’s narrative this time around sounds flat as it only offers one option. It 
is a unitary form but lacks the verve and vigor to sustain it. A good story, then, is 
a collection of small but related episodes that provide the dependency it requires 
for resistance and sustainability. In visual images, a white flat wall is a gestalt, 
but is boring and flat: it has no dependency created by constructing various enti-
ties. Her mother’s observation that it has no beginning and no end, confirms the 
fact that narrative is a construction of various components joined together by 
space and time. The spatiality is comprised of its physical entities and the time 
created by its sequences–its incremental nature. Our interaction with its spatial/
temporal elements is the experience we gain from the narrative. When variety is 
absent, continuity is numb and expectancy is mute. However, what is interesting 
about Louie’s story is that it has an end, but the middle is absent which certainly 
weakens the narrative’s dependency. This is not true according to Nanay (2009) 
and Barwell (2009). What is important is our experience of it. “Nevertheless, ‘how 
events feel,’ the sequence by which we experience emotions as response to narra-
tive representations, need not a tripartite form whose last stage is a resolution,” 
notes Barwell (p. 55).
Objective transformation
One of the most astounding transformations emanates from group 8 with no 
apparent substitutions, and minimal deletions. The entire story, Kakama, Kahima, 
and Kahiru (see figure 31) fits within available space, using orientation as a major 
signifier for fullness, halfness, and emptiness of the pots. They omit the milk from 
385  DNA is mobile telecommunications company in Finland.
386  The story Louie tells above requires one to process it as a story because of her declaration that 
indeed it is a story. Secondly, it is apparent that causality may not be a sufficient condition for narration, 
rather our experience of it (narrative) counts.
Figure 29: Kato Kimera II. 2008. 
Wood, beads, animal skin, spears, 
mat, copper, brass, aluminum, and 
cattle horn.  
Photos: Kabiito Richard.
a)
b)
c)
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the constellation and only the pots in their symbolic positions remain. The narrator 
presents a story with no comment, leaving the reader with no guidance of explicit 
evaluation. Several authors and critics believe that ‘objective’, ‘impersonal’, or 
‘dramatic’ ways of narration naturally supersede modes that allow for the author’s 
direct appearances or his/her reliable spokesman (Boothe, 1983). The authors seem 
to tell rather than show in this disposition as there does not seem to be any apparent 
comment or subjective influence on the overall meaning of the story. Unlike Seven 
girls, seven pots, in Kakakama, Kahima, and Kahiru the pots play a major role in the 
triggering process irrespective of the presence of the three sons. The disposition 
represents an objective transformation that tells the story as it were in clear and 
simple terms with minimal deletions; no effects of scene could have hampered 
its essence. This artwork possesses resemblance with Kakama, Kahima, Kahiru II 
(see figure 40) executed at a later stage but with profound differences. The horns 
represent the cows that Kahima inherits, and the hoe is a metaphor of hard labor. 
We experience dissociation in this artwork and linkages constituted by external 
contiguity.387
In contrast, Kakama, Kahima, Kahiru II builds up anxiety within its sharply in-
cised leaf patterns and sharp edges with huge spaces, which build tensions of in-
terconnectedness. The tensions I assume as a narratee, build up within the inter-
locutors themselves and these isomorphic tensions transform into similar traits in 
the viewers’ own experience of the artwork. The entire story constructs a summary 
in one representation but time assumed diegetically. Height represents status but 
in an ironic way. Irony creates drama: Kakama is the smallest and Kahiru the big-
gest. The king named the youngest Kakama, the middle Kahima, and the eldest 
Kahiru. The eldest son did not become leader; instead, it was the young one.  The 
artwork builds meaning through orientation, size, and objects. Size did not affect 
age but orientation determined ordering: Kakama, Kahima, and Kahiru. Height 
symbolizes age: Kahiru the oldest, Kahima in the middle, and Kakama the young-
est. Double shapes of the pots constitute intensity, consistency, and organized se-
quence. Roundness is also symbolic of the fruits borne by the tree, but iconically 
they are pots. This artwork consists of an idiom ‘emiti emito’ (young trees) which 
is a metaphor for the child in the Ganda language use; the tree is a metaphor for 
fatherhood. The idiom deriving its attributes from a local saying that suggests 
continuity provides an aesthetic idea of ‘children tress’ probably from a metaphor 
children are trees leading to inner intuitions of humanity and perseverance.
Patch-ups
Significant deletions are quite significant in the painting Ganda cooking place by 
group 7, but also significant in additions by combinations have been expressed. 
The transformations however have failed to reconstitute an organized ‘whole’ 
387  Synecdoche in another explanation is a part standing for a whole or vice versa, while metonymy 
comes into place by external contiguities directly related to symbolism. However, this discussion is not 
relevant now that my position recognizes metonymy as constituting a part for a whole. 
Figure 30: Group work, Ghost in the forest (200 x 100 cm). Oil on canvass.  
Photo: Kabiito Richard
Figure 31: Group work, Kakama, Kahima, Kahiru 
(100 x 200 cm). 2007. Oil on canvass.  
Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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that maintains the original meaning of the text. Thus, there are patch-ups in 
reorganization, but the ‘fabric’ remains loosely connected: there is no sequential 
build up in the process, and thus, it may rely on constitutive judgment as a parameter 
of reconstituting the story. Visually though, the artwork is plausible because many 
elements are recognizable and hence traceable. However, the combinations of 
various visual elements are not logical enough to make-up for the transformations 
undertaken and thus weak to constitute an action token. Similarly, in The Eagle and the 
Hen, evidence of an ‘action token’ is weak such that, although there are recognizable 
elements, they create no lead to a wider conceptual build-up.388 
The result of the investigation into the virtual text and its significance to a 
transition written or oral texts to visual artworks with qualities of meaning per-
formance yielded several compelling realizations. Significant deletions, as in oral 
texts, are evident in the process of rereading the original texts and in some cases, 
because of the nature of the transform, additions or multiple effects were a result 
of substitution. These substitutions were responsible, in some cases, for the con-
figurations of the final visual disposition. After reciting the story of ‘Kintu and 
Nambi’ to a class of 74 students, a random sample was taken to ascertain the ex-
tent of transformation that took place through constricted virtual texts. Out of 
the 74 (seventy-four), 28 (twenty-eight) students were sampled, which constituted 
almost 38% of the total sample population. Only one student had a 49.4% deletion, 
two students had 50% and above deletion, 10 (ten) students had 60% and above 
deletion, 14% of the students had 70% and above deletion, and only one student hit 
the mark of 88% deletion of the original text. 
This technically meant that only critical elements remained and these were the 
episodes anchoring essences in the story, for a particular individual. The element 
of transformation is also evident in Lumu’s (in Kaswa, 1964) depiction of the story 
of Nsangi where he replaces a spear with a stick but maintains the essence of the 
story through retention of the main characters (see figure 33). Significantly, Lumu 
does undertake such a transformation in the same publication: one is the book 
cover and the other is in the main text. More so, since the statistics indicated that 
significant deletions characterized the virtual texts then what was absorbed was a 
summary of the original texts. Such a summary mainly constituted the dominant 
attraction in most cases, which coincided with the overall interpretation of the 
story–Bruner’s (1990) fabula. Eleven participants had both a ‘fabula’ and ‘dominant 
attraction’ and in these, nine responses corresponded while two were conflicting. 
This further confirms that on average, the dominant attraction prevails as a fabula 
for the overall text confirmed by the large number of responses that lacked a fabu-
la: 56 participants indicated that it constituted their inherent and subjective inter-
pretation of the story, while 11 participants did not respond to the question at all, 
or misunderstood it. As noted earlier, the nature of transformation determined 
the kind of representation produced and this is evident in the final group work. 
388  See, Arnheim (1994, p. 133) on order of accident.
Figure 32b: Group work, The eagle and the hen (200 x 100 cm). 2007. Oil on canvass. 
Photo: Kabiito Richard
Figure 32a: Group work, Ganda cooking place (200 x 100 cm). 2007. Oil on canvass.  
Photo: Kabiito Richard
Figure 33: Henry Lumu, Nsangi. 1964. Book illustration. Note how the artist narrating Nsangi 
swaps implements instantly within the same publication  but maintains  the main characters 
and thus the meaning of the story.
b)
a)
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In Kintu (see figure 34), for ex-
ample, meaning is enshrined in 
both Kintu and his cow. Psychologi-
cally the story of ‘Kintu the legend’ 
(see Appendix B) requires comple-
tion because it sets off the mind of 
the reader into a world of narration 
by subjecting it to filling in the re-
maining part of the story: “once 
upon a time…” is a narrative strat-
egy that gains time by reconstruct-
ing it and conditions the mind for 
reception. The narrative comprises 
of contours that create consisten-
cies to keep the picture together. Bi-
ographically the artwork describes 
Kintu the legend but introduces 
Kintu the actor in the story. These 
are acts of reinventing time. More 
so, it reconstructs the past through 
the present by presenting regular 
sandals that presumably, were ab-
sent at the time. Intensity on the 
garment is iconic in the sense that, 
leaves were the basic dressings at 
the time. Contrary to Ganda cooking 
place, Kintu is direct in its presenta-
tion and representation. Tectonic 
adjoinments and elongation builds 
tension that transforms the space 
and conditions the mind to receive 
the story at a higher level. Tensions 
transform into physical energy to produce expectancy and desire to continue to 
the next stage, which is internally constructed and filled up. Intensity of contours, 
materials, and layers characterize Kintu to create dependency. The overall concept 
of its significance relies on its encriptment of the idiom “baana ba Kintu” (Kintu’s 
children) translatable as “abaana ba Kintu muwemba” (Kintu’s children are sor-
ghum) in the patterns of sorghum grains on the lower garment. At first, the aes-
thetic idea one gets is a ‘cereal offspring’ later throwing one into the imagining of 
numerical meliority that leads to rational ideas of eternity. In this way, a metaphor 
develops because of the idiomaticity encrypted in the art production.
                                   
TYPES OF REPRESENTATION
 
The major types of representations found in the exhibits from the Year II study 
were in form of summaries of the actual texts that had variance:
Free flow summary
It is a gradual build up of events and concepts to constitute a formal communication 
linked in a serial sequence characterized by a lead-on of related events in an open 
configuration. The mind ‘wraps up’ the components to constitute the meaning by 
linking parts with each other. 
Set piece summary
It is a sudden build up of events and concepts designed for maximum impact 
in constituting a message characterized by a set of ideal patches of information 
juxtaposed in compact configuration. The formation is highly choreographed to 
activate time and space at the same level in a parallel sequence.389 The parts are 
packaged together and the mind unwraps the content into smaller units that could 
be read back to constitute a congruent whole. We need attention to join two parallel 
processes of identification and episodic characterization (Naish, 2005). 
Inbound summary 
This is a summary within a summary. As the story moves on, there is another 
constricted summary of the story moving along the same path at a much faster 
pace but leading to the same meaning. This accelerates essence formation.390 
Constricted summary 
This formation tells a full story with a single episode without patching or 
choreography. It depends heavily on the accuracy of its prologue–the title–to 
build up relations. Nanay’s (2009) view on pictorial representations suggests that 
a picture can represent more than one event even when it depicts only one event 
(Nanay, p. 121). Further still, Smuts (2009) suggest that we must retell certain 
stories in a particular way meaning that we cannot separate story (the what) from 
the discourse (the how) in some cases.  
 
389  Parallel activation requires the mind to fill up the untold parts with its own schemas so that the 
one views the story internally in its entirety. Linear activation presents us with a longer unit of events 
that do not require mental reconstruction or fill up. In linear construction, we keep discovering the parts 
to make up the whole from the sensual stimulus, whereas parallel activation requires that we keep on 
reinventing parts to fill up the whole through inner mental reconstructions. Reading of parallel or linear 
narrative therefore requires different mental processes to accommodate the texts. In this proposition, 
parallel narrative could be a more taxing text to read than a linear narrative and this explains why linear 
narrative has, and still is, revered in traditional communities.
390  Compare the inbound summary with the ‘narrative proverb’ discussed by Obiechina (1992). 
Figure 34. Kabiito Richard, Kintu (80 x 180 cm).  
Bark cloth, alligator skin, mats, cow hide on wood.  
Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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The verdict
Finally, during the transition process, the virtual texts, largely, were re-read 
subjectively and thus individuals or groups tended to include their own views of the 
story. This greatly affected the final disposition and the nature of transformation 
exercised on the texts. For example, the choice of language tropes heavily depended 
on the individual or group’s point of view, and not the point of view of the narrator. 
The subjective rereading in form of hypotheses that characterized all the virtual 
texts implied , on the other hand, that each individual had a personal interpretation 
that was concrete and thus a common meaning could not be achieved through 
individual viewing because of various attachments, background, and sensibility 
unless choreographed. The general interpretations were promise, admiration, 
love, disobedience, survival, death, life choices, marriage, discreteness, failure, 
carelessness, revenge, creation, supreme power, and hatred attributed to 
Walumbe. Some of the functions disclosed include simplification, serialization 
attributed to ordering, guide to content and ideation, sharpens creativity, creates 
mood, language functionality, summary, reconstructs time, hermeneutic by 
aiding interpretation, provides an overview, and stimulates imagination. Various 
participants expressed similar views and thus clustered as the ‘common views’ in 
the study. All groups revealed qualities of organization, however group 5 reveals 
the organizational forces, while group 3 only reveals the organization endowed in 
stories. The project thus wound up with formidable insights that helped steer the 
next phase of artistic production. The autonomy exhibited by Seven girls Seven pots 
and the constricted summaries, coupled with other concepts such as dominant 
attraction, contextualization, memory boost, multiple perspectives, figuration, 
and inquisition are necessary conditions for artistic production and reading in a 
particular localized setting. Pearse (cited in, Hutchens & Suggs, 1997) notes, “The 
irony for art educators is that the pluralist, decentered perspective engendered 
through postmodernism can serve to reconnect art and life in ways that can be 
meaningful to students while fostering critical reflective attitude” (p. 38).
To conclude this section, I present below evidence that meaning is at the end of 
communication as I posited earlier and that many of the images we produce with-
out clear signals and relevant input end up ambiguous and therefore meaning-
less. This also elevates the quality of expression above the intention of the speaker 
to constitute Dale’s insistence that it was grossly wrong to base meaning on the 
speaker rather than the expression. This happens quite often in the set piece sum-
mary where competence is very important.
Scenario11
Ambiguous patterns are combinations of various mutually exclusive structures that we 
should not confuse with complexity. The relative strength of the whole and the parts 
always creates a structural hierarchy, which is not ambiguous. However, two mutually 
exclusive but different conceptions with ambiguous coordination, overcome dependence 
when the unit of the whole is nearly as strong as the independence of the parts (Arnheim, 
1994). Consider a text message sent to ‘A’s mobile phone by another person ‘B’ who is 
with ‘C’ and C suspects that ‘A’ is having an affair with ‘B’; A and B are scheduled to meet 
and discuss academic matters, but somehow C meets B: “don’t come with her,” reads the 
message.391  A receives the message but thinks it was misdirected. B is surprised to see A 
appearing and yet B is with C who is not comfortable with the relationship between A 
and B. When they meet again, B complains to A claiming that she had sent a message, 
which was to stop A from meeting B. There was no communication in this sense, because 
the intended meaning was not received; the message intended was for A not to appear at 
the rendezvous because B was with C. Because the message is ambiguous, A continues to 
the rendezvous and finds B with C. I will demonstrate my claim. To make sense, perhaps 
the text would have read, “don’t come, am with her”.
391  Text message sent on, May 09, 2007 at 19:27 at Makerere. It is ironical in a sense that text messages 
are so cryptic most of the time, and decontexualized unless close communication like knowing the 
other, otherwise, text messages are often miscommunications. Also interesting, a story emanates about 
miscommunication, thus, a story exists in miscommunication.
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THE WAKALIGA EPISODE
 
I worked with ten metalworkers on this project namely Robbie, Freddy, 
Henrico, Saed, Mayun, Semba, Seru, Richo, Jo, and Damba all of whom hail 
from Kyamullibwa, Masaka District but now reside at Wakaliga in Kampala 
District.392 They have maintained their traditional values largely, despite residing 
in a cosmopolitan environment. They refer to each other as Jjajja, Kojja, Taata, 
although they are age mates, which is typical of Ganda family hierarchy and 
social relations. They maintain certain ways of doing things that is particular to 
where they come from.393 “Ffe tuli kukibumbe olwaleero” says one of the youths 
meaning that he and others were working on the sculpture/model.394 They stick 
to their traditional perception of phenomena. Perhaps, there is a possibility that 
any artwork that is three dimensional in the Ganda tradition assumes the title of 
‘ekibumbe.’ However, there are several other ways of referring to art in the Ganda 
dialect such as ‘ekifaananyi.’ They choose to refer to these three dimensional works 
as ‘ebibumbe’ that literally means ‘models’ made out of clay. What this implies is 
that these people still sway towards traditional values and have not taken on new 
forms of considering and looking at traditional phenomena. 
Intimacy of stories
While work on the two women carrying pots in Kaleeba (see figure 35) progressed, 
I asked Freddy to narrate any story about pots or any story with pots mentioned 
in it (personal communication, June 11, 2008).395 I had constructed that artwork 
392  The project spans 24 days from June 2 to 26, 2008 at Wakaliga, thereafter, Makerere University until 
July 22, 2008.
393  ‘Jjajja’ is a grandparent; ‘Kojja’ is uncle; ‘Taata’ is father.
394  ‘Kibumbe’ in Luganda means ‘sculpture’ but typically one made out of clay. However, there is a 
tendency of referring to any other lifelike sculpture, not necessarily clay, as ekibumbe. ‘Kubumba’ means 
modeling out of clay or any other earthenware like cement or mud.
395  Kaleeba gains time by reconstructing it. It builds up consistencies by action, objects while it 
animates space and time. The garments used iconically, signal specificity and reinvention of time; they 
also provide us with perceptual chronology. However, on the metallic pot it is functional since it cre-
ates surface quality and revitalizes the rather dull area. The familiarity of objects specify locality: pots 
and Kitengi that is widely used in many Ugandan communities. It incorporates mental chronology like 
with a conscience and conviction that 
there is a story in my childhood that had 
‘ensumbi’ in it. My mind kept on racing 
around our childhood story time but could 
not specifically locate the actual story. 
However, Freddy was quick to tell me about 
the “Maama yatuzaala musanvu, natuwa 
obusuwa musanvu,” (Mummy gave birth to 
the seven of us, and she gave us seven pots) 
talking about “Seven girls, seven pots.”396 
The story that crosses Freddy’s mind at a 
glance though was “akanyonyi kali kuluzi” 
(a bird is at the well) then I interjected, after 
he paused, with “Ee, kaleeba.” Two things 
unfold in Freddy’s action: ‘memorable’ 
stories and their proximity to human 
action that there is a story connected to 
what we do all the time and that stories are 
easily accessible to human memory. This I 
may attribute to the function of metonymy. 
Furthermore, my action demonstrates how 
remotely stories can act upon the human 
mind, even when they are absent or obscure 
in our active memory. In her anthology 
about storytelling, Rosenberg (1997) notes 
that, stories “strike chords deep within us that continue to resonate because they 
deal with profound human issues” (p. xvii).
It is amazing how Freddy could remember instantly a story that had pots in 
it. It is interesting too that I could construct an art work based on a remote sen-
sibility of a story encountered in the past, and not only did I encounter such a 
in Kato Kintu into the expectancy of turbulence at the point of stability: It is dramatic because in the 
story we encounter instability. Prevalence is symbolic by the more than one figure which builds illusion 
of expectancy in the action to come or which might never come. The pots reemphasize the meaning 
enshrined in their presence–fragility: the actual pot is a belief value to let us into believing that the 
pots are real and thus, the story is worthy. This is goal-directed in other words and predicts an action 
token. Concentric circles on the fabric are functional and structural: they form perceptual gestalts that 
contrast with the figure in the background. The wrapper and the cloth of the background figure have 
intensity of form. The three intensities form a gestalt that eventually directs the narrative towards the 
central signifiers–pots. The action does not directly represent the meaning although it contributes to 
its construction in the buildup. The objects in themselves do not as well supply holistic meaning in the 
narrative because they only precede events that constitute the meaning. Thus, a symbiosis between the 
imminent action and the objects ensues. Meaning blossoms through a contiguous relationship of the 
objects and intended action.
396  When I looked at the work I had constructed, it did not suit such a story because mine were only 
two pots. Besides, before encountering the story in a class I conducted earlier on in this campaign, I had 
never heard of the story, although I knew there was a story in relation to pots. Most of all, I constructed 
this artwork form a point of view of human plight in peripheral communities where traditionalism was 
still emphatically alive and active.
9 / Epilogue 
Figure 35. Kabiito Richard, Kaleeba (180 x 
80 cm). 2008. Fabrics, clay, and copper on 
Metal. Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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story, but it also reflected human life. Therefore, when it comes to the story in 
the artwork, the human condition draws Freddy closer. He proceeds to narrate  to 
me that a bird which sang so well interfered with everyone getting water from the 
well because every time one turned back to see it, the pot one was carrying fell and 
broke, so they all failed to return home with water. Most notable, Freddy kept on 
singing the song of Kaleeba as he worked on the girls with pots, which made the 
story part of his lived experience at the time. Secondly, the story, although gone, 
continues to linger in Freddy’s mind, through the song, so that it extends itself 
in time and space. This is also an indication that stories sip into our mind un-
consciously sometimes and they continue to operate even when they are no lon-
ger present. Furthermore, stories continue to operate under the threshold of our 
consciousness so that we become part of them, and vice versa. This confirms my 
earlier claim that songs become an extension of the story and thus the meaning we 
physically inherit from narratives.
The intimacy and rapport that stories build up within us, is quite useful in 
constructing meaning in visual texts. The interaction event of our cognitive sys-
tems with exterior stimuli, always define the meaning of an object or person (Best, 
1986). Implicationally, because they form meaningful wholes, they tend to stick 
in the mind more than disjointed texts like conversations. The memorability of 
stories makes them meaningful to us, and there re-experience is always a new ex-
perience. Freddy re-experiences Kaleeba as he participates in its construction. He 
discovers a new form of experiencing his childhood story, and captivated by its 
presence such that even after we seize the conversation, he continues to sing the 
song.397 The story continues to unravel in the song because music brings another 
dimension to storytelling. Songs are another form of text that is memorable be-
cause of their psychological impact on the human intellect. They are soothing, 
calming, enjoyable and captivating; they are another way of getting into the sto-
ries and interpreting their essences. It is also a way of extending the story so that 
after narration, the song remains as the binding factor between mind and narra-
tive. Notably, stories occur in a public sphere and thus their enjoyment always ex-
perienced in a public space. However, if they become personal for a reason, then 
we subjectively enjoy them. Music is one of those aspects that personalize stories 
in the Ganda oral culture. This continues the story within individuals and makes 
them more intimate because the songs become personal things people can enjoy 
on their own. This personalization of narrative texts helps in building rapport 
with individuals that it becomes a human condition and thence, our re-experience 
of such a phenomenon is always exciting and affective. 
 
397  Stories have clearly defined entry points; a conversation has no particular entry point and therefore 
does not tend to leave a significant and traceable path that we can retell or recollect unless really 
required. Stories leave trails by which we can track-them-back and recollect the entire sequence of their 
narration. On the other hand, re-experience provides multiples of the same experience to make it a 
familiar thing. 
Remote ordering and goal-directed actions 
In addition to determinism portrayed by narrative technique, remote ordering is 
also evident in visual narrative. Feelings of symmetries, rhythms, directions of 
signal changes and hierarchies of their meanings, as structures of information 
depend on information produced by organizing codes. They in other words, act 
as systemities of visual signals/direction, axes, lines, focus points, geometrical 
similarities, whole color configurations, and systemities of designates constructed 
by pictures in cultural codes of visual communication (Somov, 2006). Similarly, 
when we work with stories on our mind, our sense of what will form part of the 
dispensation remotely gains order by that story the mind focuses on. This remote 
ordering also reveals itself in reading visual narrative texts as well. Because Freddy 
sees a woman carrying a basket, he thinks that she was carrying Nkoliimbo from 
the fields. When he sees two women carrying pots he thinks of Kaleeba or Seven girls 
seven pots on the second attempt. Dohrn (2009) categorically states, “In cognition, 
imagination presents the concrete individual object to which concepts apply, and 
understanding provides the concepts” (p. 39). The visual element thus influences 
the line of thinking–a true element of ordering. There is ordering evident in the 
constructor’s point of view and the reader’s point of view. Expressly, it is (the 
ordering) reserved in the first instance: we enter it at the end of the queue because 
its available meaning is not yet determined. 
However, on the second attempt it is farfetched because he cannot instantly see 
the phenomenon of the seven girls and seven pots. Sometimes we may depict an 
action preceding the moment shown in the picture, which calls for awareness of 
the action prior to our engagement with the narrative. Further, we do not necessar-
ily need to depict the character of whose action we are aware. Additionally, none 
of the characters has to perform, will perform, or performed the action of which 
we are aware. Lastly, “[t]he actions we are aware of while engaging with pictorial 
narratives are likely to be goal-directed actions,” observes Nanay (2009, p. 125). 
This is where the power of narrative dwells and operates at maximum strength. 
That there must be commensu-
rate phenomena for a story to 
mean what it normally means 
because its meaning is prede-
termined. Hence, I cannot mean 
Seven girls, seven pots with only 
two pots unless it is elevated to 
a higher level of signification.
Interestingly, Kaleeba skips 
the main action and plays on the 
imagining of the next action.398 
Semukazi (see figure 36) demon-
398  We cannot of course think about the scenario of the characters having passed the birds because, 
according to the story, only the leper passed the stage of breaking the pots.  
Figure 36. Henry Lumu, Semukazi. 1967. Book illustration.
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strates a depiction of actual gist of the narrative where the action of ‘falling ob-
jects’ forms the core attraction in the story. In other words, this scene precedes my 
own depiction of Kaleeba in pictorial form. Nevertheless, perception is a process 
that is not static and thus we cannot fixate on one particular action at the expense 
of the entire constellation. Secondly, our ability to view a narrative in its entirety 
helps us in predetermining meaning and thus deciding the order of events in nar-
rative pictures. On the other hand, Kaleeba fits in well because it is about carrying 
pots, although no broken pots are evident. Implicationally, stories organize them-
selves into meaningful units that help us to predetermine meaning. We implicitly 
develop an internal order of events due to goal-directed actions in a narrative pic-
ture. Predetermined meaning is the key to understanding of phenomena because 
it conditions the mind for correctly reading particular texts and provides initial 
clues towards capturing the wider essences. Lepper and Hubberd (cited in, Ma-
cleod & Mathews, 1997) report, “People often seem to cling to their initial beliefs, 
even when the evidence on which they were originally based has been totally dis-
credited” (p. 193).
Evolution of Stories
 Despite various attempts to answer questions left behind by the narrator, the story 
keeps on changing form and as indicated in an earlier claim that stories are dynamic 
entities. We can never fully discover them and hence they will always be a source 
of inspiration. Not only can they be inspirational, but they can also be constant 
puzzles and I believe if there was nothing to wonder about them, they would 
seize to function. When I was working on Kaleeba, I depicted one of the women as 
wearing a ‘Busuuti’ and the other, a dress. Robbie (June 15, 2008) at one time asks 
me, “Naye ezo engoye ze bambadde zaaliwo edda?” He is wondering whether the 
garments the characters donned were present in the olden days. Robbie’s puzzle 
lies in what I would call ‘evolution’ of stories. As I have indicated before, stories 
are dynamic units that can and are capable of taking on various forms to suit given 
circumstances. 
When I listen to a story of the olden days, it is very hard for me to assimilate 
it using elements of the past because I am not familiar with them.399 The Busuuti 
came to Buganda for example when Arabs first made contact with the interior 
from the coast of Mombasa and Malindi in 1849 almost 150 years from today. How-
ever, the period of these stories dates far back beyond the coming of this dress 
code. Meaning that probably the period the stories came into place warranted 
garments made out of leaves and perhaps even no garment at all. However, in my 
reading of the Kaleeba story, although people were still carrying water in pots and 
birds communicating directly with them–consider the song of the bird–I could 
only imagine a woman wearing a Busuuti with a huge ‘kitambaala’ tied around her 
399  On top of the familiarity, I was not present in these times so that I can reformulate such instances 
using images of the time. I can only base on imagination or rely on accessible information.
waist, and another wearing a patterned dress with slight jewelry.400 This is possible 
because I can only see the story and the episodes that take place in it through my 
own scheme of perception. My scheme of perception assumes control from what 
I can access presently, but within this scheme, I can also access the past without 
interfering with its essences.  
This is also evident when a visitor to the workshop recognizes the Busuuti 
wrapper: “Kino kitambaala?” he asks. The conversation that ensues after words is 
immaterial now; however, his comments are useful to this passage. Although he 
is not aware that it is a story about Kaleeba, he recognizes the wrapper because 
it is within his scheme of perception. The story, in the process, adapts itself to 
the times and thus seen as an evolution within the narrative. While working on 
“Ssewandeku” (June 15, 2008), Henrico inadvertently cut off the headgear (inter-
preted as a pot). One of the welders said that “enkofiira agitemyeeko” meaning, 
“He has cut off the hat”. Although they were aware that I was working on stories, 
which they deemed to be in the past, they still refer to the articles in them within 
the present–not because of the naming, but because of their scheme of percep-
tion. Well, their scheme of perception could be that a hat is a headgear and it is 
acceptable. Anyhow, this could also symbolize an inherent evolution of oral nar-
rative that keeps stories around because we can see them through a contemporary 
eye. Damba confirms that stories evolve inherently when he comments on Kaleeba 
that, “Yesazze Gomesi; ateddeko n’ekitambaala” (She is wearing gomesi; she also 
includes a wrapper). He is using contemporary slang to assimilate and adapt the 
story to our times, or even, his own times. ‘Y’esazze’ is a slang recently coined to 
mean “draped” or “dressed” in some attire that is especially eye- catching.  Kaleeba 
therefore denotes the past seen within the present but retaining its essences.401 
Point of view 
The style of depicting Kintu comes from my own experience and hence personal 
perceptual scheme. This implies that we all reconstruct the stories differently, 
depending on our point of view. My imagination of a woman carrying a pot does 
not base on the olden paradigm of women wrapping bark cloth around their chests, 
but that of women wearing busuuti and the younger girls wearing long patterned 
dresses, which in most cases were stitched out of off-cuts from their mothers’ 
busuuti fabric materials. Through this evolution, stories ably maintain their place 
400  ‘Kitambaala’ is a belt-like wrapper worn around the waist by Baganda women to hold the busuuti 
together.
401  This is not so with Kintu. From the time I listened to Kintu’s story, I always saw a man draping 
leaves and stayed in the jungle. Particularly, I always, figured out, and still do, a man wandering in 
the fields just behind my home, through which we went to fetch water, and collect firewood. I always 
figured him out as a lonely man sometimes wearing a sack and leaning against his herding stick. When 
I sat down to construct a representation of Kintu and his cow, that is what crossed my mind, and that 
is precisely what was in mind. Here, I am looking at Kintu within that environment of the wild and the 
abandoned. Perhaps I adopted this image of Kintu from the Balaalo who were traditional herders in my 
home village who dressed skimpily with wattle material and light sandals. Hence, my mental formula-
tion of Kintu and his cow bases on my experience of the Balaalo.
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within a plethora of significant texts. Secondly, because we construe stories from 
a personal point of view, then they are subjective entities of human nature and 
therefore part of humanity. Because they are part of humanity, they continue to 
exist as they unfold in several different ways that are meaningful to each individual 
and within that individual.402 Because stories evolve and can even mutate into new 
entities, they can also adapt to various forms, but within a certain context, and 
particular confines. Robbie for example, shifts his mindset instantly but within 
a confined context to align his own thoughts with the story at hand and typically, 
this is the way in which traditions work.
First, he aligns with the Nkoliimbo story because the woman in the picture car-
ries a basket with fruits in it. In the first instance, he constructs his essences based 
on the contents of the basket. However, I interject by wondering whether Nambi 
was the one who was carrying the nkoliimbo. I also inform him that unless he 
wanted to view the woman as Nambi, it was not correct to claim so. He immediate-
ly realizes that actually Nambi could have carried millet, so he tells me that he was 
‘seeing’ Nambi carrying millet for her chicken. The whole essence and the shifts 
Robbie makes in his judgment of the work hinge on action (Yettisse) and content 
(millet/enkoliimbo). Noteworthy, Robbie can ably shift from one essence to anoth-
er without losing track of the action. Secondly, the story is able to adjust and adapt 
itself to different situations–that of Nambi (see figure 42) and Nkoliimbo–within 
the same context.403  Much as Robert can see ‘enkoliimbo’ in the action of carrying 
fruits in a basket he can equally and ably transfer another essence of Nambi carry-
ing millet within the same action using the same entry points. This makes stories 
very adaptive but, as I have maintained, within a confined context. 
In conclusion, the story can evolve from one set of signification to another but 
remains intact and true to its own internal structures. The artwork itself remains 
constant in its construction but can adroitly emit variant signals to its readers, 
implying that it can adapt itself to new situations just as the story itself. Due to the 
internal structures, the artwork can take on more than one essence but not many 
because of the organizing limitations of stories. The stories evolve through adap-
402  This claim could be supported by Robbie’s view of my artwork I originally called Basket but saw it 
as Nkoliimbo.
403  Nambi delineates a snapshot: a typical summary that only serves to highlight specific moments in 
the story. The meaning is direct, enshrined in the action and the object–object versus human. Intensity 
in the foreground tactically introduced, creates balance. The action of leaning to gain support expresses 
the weight of the basket, but also exposes human frailty, videlicet, Nambi was not strong enough to 
resist the temptation of returning to heaven, but also that she, as a human, forgot to carry the millet. 
Intensity on the basket reiterates connotation of weight and the meaning embedded in its content. 
Garments: cloth collage enriches the meaning in an iconic sense. Nimbi’s dress code reconstructs time 
through its reliance on contemporary fashion. Nambi, like other pictorial depictions in this study thrives 
on the narrative time contrasted with subjective, phenomenal time, sometimes referred to as time-
consciousness. Narrative time is the time internal to the narrative, multiplicationally implying, external 
engagement with the narrative, which itself takes place in time. Prior to event E in the narrative, we can 
conceive a narrative of event C, which took place earlier as a narrative of what is past or future (Goldie, 
2009). Thus, we can see the time scheme in Nambi even within a single episode of the representation 
by representing in the mind antecedent events or ascendant to those in the narrative. The roots in the 
foreground metonymically connote source of problems but also expressing metaphorically, sprouting.
tation in visual images. This adaptability is a powerful tool in meaning making 
processes because it allows negotiation. When working with stories in visual rep-
resentation such limitations are rife. However, the olive leaf suffices through the 
dynamism of stories and their adaptability. I will demonstrate this claim. Robbie 
asked me (June 6, 2008), “Naye ako nsuumbi; nsuwa?” I replied him by noting that 
“Anti ensumbi n’ensuwa byonna bisena mazzi. Si kyo?” Robbie replies, “Yee” (Rob-
bie wonders whether the pot I had used in Kaleeba was a small water pot or a regu-
lar pot for fetching water. I responded by noting that both big pots (ensuwa) and 
small water pots (ensumbi) can all draw water. He was in agreement with me).404 
My interpretation of this dialogue about the pots and their functions is that 
whether a pot is for drinking water or collecting water from the well, what one is 
capable of using it for can supersede its basic principal of functionality. Because 
the internal structures are the same, they can be adapted to new situations. In my 
case, and in the story’s case, the water pot fetched water from the well. However, 
this does not deny it of its basic essence of being a water pot. It depends on our 
point of view in many cases that we may reinterpret a tradition. Similarly, even 
when stories adapt to new situations, they retain their internal organizing struc-
tures that are responsible for safeguarding their essences. Besides, this adaptation 
process gains control from the internal structures of the story and thus externality 
could lead to loss of essence. In this way, a story maintains its form as a tradition 
and the recurrence of the features it holds together will invoke our recurrent con-
dition of an expression that means.
Traditional referent and familiarity
During the construction of the metal artwork Ssewandeku (see figure 37), a 
conversation ensues between Saed, Mayun and friends who were visiting the 
workshop (June 19, 2008).405 They looked at the artwork and attempted to figure 
out what it represented; or in other words, its meaning. “Ono Yettisse nsuwa” 
(This one is carrying a pot) says one of them. “Aah, gwe oyiinza okukwaata ensuwa 
n’omukono ogumu!” (Aah, can you carry a pot with one hand!), wonders one of 
404  ‘Ensuwa’ is ideally a normal pot used for storing and carrying water from the well. ‘Ensuumbi’ is 
specifically a small pot with a long neck used to store drinking water in the traditional Ganda society. In 
Kaleeba, the big pot is the conventional utility pot. The appropriated pot is the ‘Nsuumbi’ actually nar-
rated in the story as the kind that people were using fetch water from the well. The Baganda treasured 
these pots.
405  The artwork Sewandeku is inspired by a local village story is dramatic with its descriptions of hero-
ics and defeatism: it is comparative in an ironic sense of description ‘hero’. The hero leans on the ‘weak’ 
foe. The change of roles in biological and social strata is ironic too. The artwork itself presupposes, by 
an empty semicircular structure at the top, carrying of a pot. Its uptake prevails by entanglement, provi-
dence, abandonment, motherhood and encumbrance and thus, any missing object distorts the mean-
ing. The cloth introduces color and drama: metal against fabric. It also employs the service of idioms 
representing “ebizibu bindi mubulago” (problems are around my neck) that is intuited by the neck scarf 
(similar to the English idiom, ‘on my neck’). The idiom expresses fragility, bewilderment, impasse rooted 
knot and rope as metaphors of gloom and death. The male figure expresses weariness, while the female 
expresses focus, vigor, and vitality. Reemphasis of the shape of the gourd and the actual gourd specify 
locality and intensify comprehension. The fabrics reemphasize and animate the dress that is iconically 
applied. Meaning in this artwork is enshrined in the objects and action whereas expression reigns in the 
entanglement at the base. The basket is symbolic of providence while the gourd relates to alcoholism.
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Mayun’s friends. In the first place, there is a slight 
confusion between the act of carrying on the head 
and holding with the hands. This signaled that 
the conversation at this stage geared towards 
establishing the content of the artwork. They 
are trying to link the action with the objects in 
the artwork; they link ‘ensuwa’ to the action of 
carrying. Hence, the pot is a signifier in this case 
of an action that constitutes the signified–yettise. 
The group eventually arrives at the interpretation 
stage: “Abantu b’edda bakolanga”, continues 
Mayun, “bettikanga ensuwa, nasiba omwana ku 
mugongo, nakwata n’endeku mungalo” (People of 
the olden days used to work hard: they carried a 
pot on the head, tied a child on the back and held a 
gourd in the hands). The combined signified action 
of “asitudde”, “yettisse”, and “aweese” bring them 
to a conclusion that people in the past used to ‘work 
hard’ probably in comparison to the present.406 
There is a clear path towards locating the mean-
ing of the artwork by this group of young men. 
They are tracking it through linking the objects to 
the corresponding action portrayed in the artwork. The meaning of this particular 
artwork, in the eyes of the viewer, rides on the relationship between the sign ‘pot’, 
and the signified ‘action’. The process they use to account for their deficiency in 
linking action with objects requires the traditional referent in Drout’s (2006a) ac-
count. Like narrative, the articles they try to link to action have their source in their 
manner of storage in memory, and duly, to access the host of associations therein, 
they needed to find recognizable elements capable of rekindling their memory or 
knowledge of these articles in relation to the action.407 In his Greek Oral Poetry and 
Vase-painting, Mackay (1995) clarifies Drout’ traditional referntiality thus and thus:
The inclusion of the kithara-player may be a clue to the specifically divine nature of the 
occasion: he is usually represented as a youth, often with incised locks of hair hang-
ing before his ear, and so it is difficult not to perceive him as Apollo. Such tendency to 
automatic identification usefully illustrates the way in which traditional referentiality 
works in vase-painting408 (p. 298).
406  ‘Asittudde’ designates the action of carrying in the hands; ‘yettise’ means carrying on the head; 
‘aweese’ implies carrying on the back. Note that intensity of action shows through the various forms of 
‘carrying’ inherent within Ganda society. These become entry points to the narrative and forming the 
extra narrative and traditional referent.
407  Drout (2006a) clearly indicates that to recognize the part as a part of a certain whole requires that 
we should have repeated the whole at one time.
Mayun continues to interpret the elements of the artwork at yet another lev-
el: commenting on the woman’s dress he says, “Kano nno kali k’esibye bulungi” 
meaning that the woman was properly dressed. At this level, he includes personal 
opinion and judgment based on traditional values of well dressedness, which is 
a summation of the entire scene. He is now at the third level of signification that 
requires external input in order to keep track of what he infers to this artwork. He 
is commenting, in my opinion, on current trends in the fashion industry where 
young girls have taken on the habit of wearing skimpy outfits that contravene tra-
ditional and cultural values of where he hails from.409 What Mayun engages in, is 
negotiating the meaning in the artwork by reconstructing it through the iconic, 
indexical, and symbolic levels of signification. What is important to note, is that, 
Mayun has a starting point of interpretation grounded in the objects and later 
on, in the action. They are starting points because they are recognizable as part 
of some whole. The physical construction of the artwork allows him space to in-
ternalize its significance. That is, there are elements both visible and imaginable 
that guide him in this meaning making process. Augmenting the physical, for ex-
ample, structure forms the backbone for constructing meaning in oral narrative 
texts that rely on the totality of tradition to create precise meaning, “All the stories 
and narratives heard by listeners contribute to the creation of every character, ev-
ery action, and every narrative motif ” (Goyet, 2008, p. 15). Structure and role of the 
text develops “real options for the listeners and opposing them to each other, in 
confrontation that allow definition, understanding, and judgment” (Goyet, p. 19). 
That is, the story itself forms the vehicle for intellectual debate.
The group is in consensus that the figure in this artwork is representing time 
and appropriate dressing, which are significant entities of their own values.410 In-
terestingly, this group of metalworkers is composed of low literacy levels to the 
extent that writing is a problem to some of them while their interpretation of vi-
sual images is significantly representative of the grassroots communities. Their 
interpretation of visual images is highly dependent on iconic levels of significa-
tion. Any lack of recognizable elements means that these young men will not in-
fer meaning to any of the images in my art constructions. It is evident then that 
meaning performance begins at the first level of signification–iconic level–and 
it culminates into many other interpretations of hard work or dress code and or 
cultural values at the higher level. The three ways an artwork may contribute to 
cognition are, (a) by helping in tuning patterns of salience in order to appreciate 
worldly facts adequately (b) it may suggest generalizations and their relationships 
408  See, van Eijck’s (2005) discussion of identity and belief coherence in his Discourse Representation 
Theory. 
409  This is another indicator that these young men are still deeply entrenched in their own cultural 
values.
410  Meaning in the artwork by these young men prevails through a negotiated and collective process 
whereby each other’s view contributes to the overall understanding of the story. What this implies is 
they all gain the same meaning because of the values they attach to it as a group with the same back-
ground.
Figure 37. Kabiito Richard,  
Ssewandeku (180 x 80 cm). 2008. 
Fabric, bark cloth, and gourd on 
metal. Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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to perceptual phenomena that form a testable theory in the actual world, and (c) 
discovering modal truths through fiction (Dohrn, 2009).411  This is a case of narra-
tive engagement.
Subsequently, as a result, Fred is able to identify a story for the pots because he 
is familiar with them. Mayun and the rest are able to detect action in Sewandeku 
because they are familiar with the objects that signify the action and even the ac-
tion itself.412 Although they are not able to identify the second person in the art-
work, and therefore missing the precise interpretations, they adroitly draw their 
own meanings. Mayun and company are not too far off from the message put for-
ward because at least they talk about hard work, and they pay little attention to 
alcoholism because they did not recognize the gourd.413 However, the position of 
the ‘ndeku,’ the child, and the implied pot, are good enough to initiate the feeling 
of action towards the construction of meaning in the artwork. The conversation 
turns out to be an entirely new experience in the understanding of an expression 
that means something whenever a similar condition arises. 
Imagery and imagining
Amid laughter, Robbie acknowledges that, “Naye engero ezo zanyumiranga. Mbu 
akakookolo. Naye akakookolo ako oba kafaanananga katya!” he wonders (June 
12, 2008). “Tebakakubako mu kifaanayi?” he asks. Robbie raises two issues in 
this conversation: (a) he acknowledges that he used to enjoy such stories in his 
childhood as Kaleeba and he is particularly excited by the name ‘Kakookolo’:  ‘leper’ 
in the local dialect; (b) he wonders how such creatures looked like and he goes on 
to ask whether such images were ever represented visually. The first observation 
is purely emotional and Robbie was evidently excited and happy to rekindle such 
memories–of old childhood tales. He particularly wonders how the Kakookolo 
looked like. Once again, wonder appears as we visualize internal images of the story. 
“We tell the stories with emotion” quotes a CNN advert. The content of the story 
might not necessarily be emotional; however, the way one transmits and receives 
them may include some basic emotions that the story holds.414 Nevertheless, the 
second observation is cognitive than being purely emotional: he is trying to figure 
out the likeness of ‘akakookolo’. This leads to the claim that we absorb narrative by 
reconstructing it. By reconstructing the narrative, we are figuring out its likeness 
in the objects of representation used. This confirms the discovery made in ‘Seven 
girls, seven pots’ that whenever one attends to a story, one keeps on watching it in 
411  Consider Lewis’s (cited in, Dohrn, 2009) analogy of a dignified beggar, whose existence we can only 
prove by a story.
412  Sewandeku recounts a local village man nicknamed ‘Ndo’ because of his drinking habits. He left 
the work to his wife: to tend for the children and look after the family as he spent all day in a bar. Most 
interestingly, Ndo only had three biological children out of the eight because of alcoholism.
413  I did not prompt them about the second image of the drunken man because I thought it would 
preempt their own interpretation.
414  Subsidiary emotions like fear, anger, disappointment or joy, are in the extra narrative bit of the 
story. Wonder for example is a ground emotion that other emotions come to be rooted. 
the mind and in the process, more ideas develop thereby diversifying the mind.
For example, Robbie could have figured out a grotesque human creature with 
wounds all over its body and stinking so that it is entirely an outcast (I am too, 
only imagining what Robbie could have tried to figure out). Perhaps to him, aka-
kookolo was a funny figure and that makes him excited by merely mentioning it. 
With the visualization of the story, Robbie obtains a lifetime service of experienc-
ing it visually; it would be an exciting moment for him to figure out visually the 
true nature of the creature he craved to understand. Not only does Robbie raise an 
issue of figuration, but he also points at the issue of the need for a visual represen-
tation of such stories; it could afford many people a lifetime experience because 
our construal of such stories is diverse and far between. A text’s narrative struc-
ture is comparable to the identifiable shape of an object in visual work as a neces-
sary cognitive category for the proper understanding of a work (Chung, 1998). I 
would never have for example, imagined akakookolo to be a funny creature just as 
Robbie insinuates; I would detest it, just as I have always done. The story provides 
a new angle to it making it imaginable in a sense that we can see it in our mind. 
Most importantly is that, the excitement Robbie achieves is responsible for insti-
tuting a concrete dependency in visual images based on localized stories because 
they mean a lot to such communities from where they emanate. Secondly, Robbie 
emphasizes the point that working with stories could be a worthwhile alternative 
in performing meaning in visual images. 
Truth and leveling
During our work process, with these metal artisans, they continue to talk about 
the stories the work depicts and they give names to the images, such as “Oyo 
Nnamugerwa omumaze?” (Have you finished Namugerwa?) Damba asks.415 By 
naming one of the images likewise, Damba re-experiences such an episode (June 
24, 2008). Notwithstanding though, Saed has his own views about stories. “Ebyo 
byaali byadda”: ‘those are things of the past’, in reference to Robbie’s admiration 
of stories. He does not believe anymore in stories told a long time ago. He finds 
them too hard to believe in and even wonders how we are able to believe in them. 
Of course, it is normal to outgrow certain situations and mind-sets. However, it is 
not possible to outgrow certain human functions such as stories. The settings of 
such stories that, during this conversation, viewed as real were real to us then. For 
example, Freddy, Robbie and Saed reminisce about the relationships between the 
characters depicted in these stories particularly Wakayima and Kakookolo. Notably, 
Saed the skeptic engages in reminiscence about the characters in the stories, 
which, portrays a side of him that still admires the stories.416 On the other hand, 
415  Namugerwa is a name probably that is symbolic of an episode particular to Damba. On a similar 
note, Damba is raising the issue of leveling and lifelikeness of images. When he talks of ‘Oyo Nnamuger-
wa’, he is personalizing the image and thus elevating it to his own level of actual life experience. Alterna-
tively, he aligns himself with the image so that they live in the same world and thus they can both share 
the same life. 
416  This is a great indicator of leveling effects in narrative uptake.
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reminiscence itself is part of understanding the essences of the story. By engaging 
in such an activity, Saed is still trying to negotiate what these characters stood for. 
Even then, use of animal characters in place of human beings is still an ongoing 
phenomenon in contemporary story telling such as cartoons. The differences in the 
stories we heard then are that (a) they have no visuals for one to meet the characters 
visually; (b) we had no idea of some of the characters so we had to construct our 
own as we absorbed the narratives. Suitably, it looks more believable now than it 
was before, but this is only superficial.417 The major lock-up in Saed’s dilemma is 
the mode of narration: oral versus visual. Caroll, Smyth and Dryden (2004) consider 
the image as the nearest one can get to the true nature of reality.
Scenario12 
Reminiscing about the film Last King of Scotland, Joseph remarks, “Amin bamusala 
enamba; guy yateekayo. Oba yabayitako atya?” That Nicholas duped Amin and Jose 
wonders how he beat the security (personal communication, July 26, 2008). His remarks 
clearly attempt to reconstruct time-space relationships. He is trying to figure out the 
security positioning; their whereabouts or location in the movie itself from the time 
they left Nicholas for the dead to the time he boards the plane. His mind reconstructs 
the time factor in his actual experience and relates it to the spatial distance between the 
terminal and the plane. More so, not only does he wonder how Nicholas escaped in actual 
experience, Joseph experiences Amin’s times and does not believe that this canny doctor 
still duped his former employer. During this process, we reconstruct the mind to suit that 
experience in a mediated space as well as linking it to his contemporaneous state. This is 
a case of leveling in that one ought to stay at the same level of the narrative in order not 
to see Amin as Whitaker, but as Amin in the 1970’s.418 The film takes him back in time 
although he is in the present. Not only the time, but also the space because of the setting 
that allows him to wander through the film’s spatial construction: the hotel room, the 
village setting, the airport, the hospital, state house, and so on. 
Firstly, as a function, narrative invents one time scheme in terms of another 
time scheme yet, its temporality as written text is to some extent conditional 
or instrumental. Of course, as a product in time, we consume literary narrative 
in space and time needed for crossing or traversing it, like a road or a field, and 
thus, from its own reading, the narrative text, like every other text, metonymically 
borrows temporality (Genette, 1980). Secondly, what is notable in this session 
of reminiscing about the film is that our emotional bias seems to dictate our 
starting point of reconstructing the movie, and extracting our common essences. 
Emotional import and emotional response in narrative thinking arise either as 
417  Louie still wants to re-visualize her favorite characters in her cartoon stories even though she has 
visual replicas of the referents.
418  It seems to me that Joseph was inside the life of the filmic structure in order to experience the 
physicality; if one is watching the movie outside its own life, then one cannot experience such physical-
ity or the emotion it evokes. This is proof that the story elevates the readers to its own level in order to 
become part of the action. 
an ‘internal’ part of the narrative, integral to it or they can arise as a response to 
what is narrated, and in this sense be ‘external’ to the narrative (Goldie, 2009). I 
realized my point of departure remained at Amin introducing Nicholas to his wife 
as a man who ‘saved his life’. It based its entry points on a purely emotional input–
amusement external to it. 
When Jose was retelling this movie, a few months earlier, his narration hinged 
on Amin being treated for ‘Air spaces’ and he ends up farting. It was such an amuse-
ment to Jose. The character of Amin impresses Reye, with whom we watched the 
film, by the way in which Whitaker flourishes in that role. His assessment rotates 
around contentment and satisfaction by the success of role performance, which is 
internal to the narrative. A summation, contributes to the overall meaning of the 
movie and the means of reconstructing it. In other words, our spatial–temporal 
visualization of a story largely, depends too, on the emotion experienced during 
viewing. Secondly, imagination and truthfulness of a story depend on the level at 
which uptake of the narrative occurs. That is, if we manage to elevate ourselves to 
the level of the narrative, it does not count the degree of falsity of truthfulness, 
instead, the unconscious imperative takes over and we subsume the story as if it 
were a real phenomenon. 
 
MAKERERE EPISODE
 
Character
As we assembled the artwork Matyansi Butyampa (see figure 38) JB exclaimed, “Eh, 
mukyaali ku musajjawo Matyansi!” (April 15, 2008).419  Literary, he was surprised 
that we were still working on my ‘man’ Matyansi.420 Not only does the story gain 
its meaning through the character of Matyansi rather than the action, but also 
characters gain associations of real life situations: Matyansi’s diegetic life and that 
of his character on earth. Matyansi becomes my associate in a real life scenario 
thereby attaining an interface between the two different life situations. The two 
419  This phase of the project started in February to end of May 2008 mainly comprising of wooden 
artwork. Matyansi Butyampa is comic despite its despicable semantic dimension. Thus, people could 
refer to death as comic because of the preceding action of defiance. It is a typical linear narrative setup 
chronologically in a triptych with figures and objects overlapping. It rotates on characters to draw 
meaning. Intensity succeeds through the formal qualities of the leaf pattern while the use of clubs and 
spears specify locality and create formal variance. One of the dogs carries decorations with a necklace 
as a dramatic gimmick before it meets its demise. The mats are purely aesthetic and functional as they 
form the garments. They also specify locality while animal skin used iconically forms animal fur in the 
artwork just as the spears. The action of stubbing presupposes the demise of Butyampa and his dogs. 
The artwork mainly builds on action and actors as meaning making units. Matyansi is a typical Ganda 
tale that is linear and straight to the point. Intensity reflects in the leaf patterns and plant growth to 
reemphasize the brutal scene. The scene is at the bridge and we show Golooba as retreating. The nar-
rative progresses from the beginning to the end. This is ideal for the local communities because of its 
directness.
420  ‘Musajjawo’ is a derivative of ‘musajja’ that means ‘man’. ‘Your man’ is an idiomatic use for close 
acquaintance with another person who is a male. Thus, ‘your’ designates the proximity and relationship 
there is. In other words, musajjawo means ‘your friend’.
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other characters only feature in a distant supporting role. Although the story is 
tragic, everyone who visits our ‘working scene’ tends to over look the tragedy and 
instead finds humor in the character of Matyansi who, after all, in the story is 
depicted with a big head. The big head here bears metaphoricality accruing from the 
idiom “omutwe omunene” (big headedness) also present in the English language. 
Its connotations in Ganda cultural dialect point at stubbornness and obstinacy, 
although in another sense, it could imply daftness or thickness and stupidity as 
Emmanuel thinks. Our subsumption of its meaning is through metaphor; we get 
to think about the size of the head and its content in relation to his character leads 
to a metaphor such as vastness is character. Our continued imagination of 
a ‘sizeable scalp of substrate wit’ (aesthetic idea) and ego (rational idea) causes 
a vast array of associations that we can never determinately subsume under the 
prevailing circumstances. 
To continue with my discussion, the character becomes the timeless element 
in the story rather than the action intended to avail its essences. Currie (2009) dis-
tinguished between character as a person and character as property of a person. A 
character (person) in a story might have a very clearly drawn or interesting charac-
ter (property), yet there are stories with characters in them, but are not narratives 
of character (property)–narratives that give some explanatory role to the notion of 
character (property). To start with, Matyansi had developed into the lead charac-
ter and actually, the story has taken on the title of “Matyansi”. Consequently, the 
entire story rotates around Matyansi Butyampa and it is evident in the visual rep-
resentation that Emmanuel makes him physically larger than the other two char-
acters. Furthermore, the meaning of the story rotates around Matyansi and this is 
a major finding: that the lead characters normally are the anchors of meaning in 
any storyline. For example, during our work, we kept on referring to the artwork 
as Matyansi and actually, his name mentioned the most times. The murderer who 
has no name is least talked about, and Emma comes up with a characteristic make-
shift nomenclature–Omutujju (terrorist). On the contrary, in Kato Kimera where 
there is no apparent lead character, no name or actor takes on the meaning of the 
story; it is a ‘joint venture’ whereby every character adds surmountable energy 
to the meaning of the story. Currie confirms that narrative suitably represents 
character due to its richly individuated temporal and causal connections between 
motivation, decision, and circumstances in ways unmatched by other represen-
tational forms. This is exciting to note because we see how the work develops and 
how characters shape up and gain autonomy and their own identities. 
Crucially too, the story builds up character as it progresses. The mind mulls 
over the characters and identifies the one that matters most in the story and quali-
fies him as the lead character; we have not agreed that we all refer to the story as 
‘Matyansi’; it only comes intuitively and we refer to it as such. As we process our 
visual representations, the mind processes the characters and identifies the un-
derlying timeless fabula of the story through the lead characters. In plot, charac-
ter functions as a facilitator of counterfactual robustness of the plot’s events by 
turning unlikely results that depend on accident into events with dramatic inevi-
tability (Currie, 2009). As I reconstructed Emmanuel’s narrative for example, I did 
not realize that I gave Matyansi glowing colors just to make him stand out from 
the rest.421 At this stage, no one had laid emphasis on the action yet, apart from 
the characters. Even after placing the spears in the picture, no one comments on 
them as part of the action, and therefore as anchors of meaning in the story.422 Our 
conversations and those of the visitors centered on the characters rather than the 
action or weapons quite evident in the visual texts. Because stories draw on life 
situations, we normally see them through actual life situations. By returning the 
projection back to their real-world prototypes, fictional characters benefit from 
cognition by our projection of actual-world structures onto them as well as con-
tributing to our understanding of actual-world configurations (Newman, 2009).423 
More interesting, the more we called the characters by their names, the more the 
‘others’ were drawn into the story for example Sega, a resident sculptor at MTSIFA, 
had not heard of the story since childhood. He also joined in to narrate the story of 
Matyansi Butyampa and his friend Golooba Bidandi.424 
421  Emmanuel, one of the two students I worked with on this project, authored the artwork Matyansi 
Butyampa as part of this project. He left this artwork at the stage of preliminary drawing or sketch form 
and I executed it to suit the context of the research.
422  Anchors in this text are part of my terminology to refer to the traditional referent in Droutian 
(2006a) terms.
423  “Characters do this by eliciting, from audiences who are bent on critically understanding them, 
puzzle-solving procedures that become paradigmatic for illuminating aspects of human reality,” ex-
plains Newman (ibid, 73).
424  We pre-occupied ourselves with the contextualization of the stories: creating right scenes and char-
acters of brevity, cowardice, and cruelty. Nevertheless, when Fred and Sega (April 18, 2008) encounter 
a physical visualization of the story, they realize their own dilemmas that faced them during childhood 
and because they now meet Golooba Bidandi and Matyansi Butyampa on their way to Kooki and the 
murder at the bridge, the scenario becomes more vivid and comprehensive. It is just as if they had been 
present at the bridge, probably hiding in the willows or caught in the crossfire to witness the murder. 
This is another form of leveling whereby we feel present when we interface with narrative action so that 
Figure 38. Kabiito Richard, Matyansi Butyampa (220 x 100 cm). 2008. Cow hides, mats, bark cloth, beads, cowry 
shells, and copper on wood. Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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When Fred tackles the story of ‘Matyansi Butyampa’, he has some memories of 
its contexts and location and he reminds me of old school times when life was just 
at its infancy. The memory visibly moves him as he attempts to recover its recital. 
Sega is equally excited about the use of stories especially ‘Matyansi Butyampa’ 
which he was “fond of as a child.” He also attempts to reconstruct it but the bits 
and pieces are lost although the characters and fabula of the story are still present. 
There is evidence of re-experience of infancy by attempting to reconstruct the sto-
ries in their actual form and context. Fred and Sega are visibly excited by the recol-
lection of childhood stories and scenarios that they keep on tracking the progress 
of the artwork; the reconstruction of time that occurs briefly refreshes their minds 
and cuts of the woes of adulthood. Reye who has been following the progress of 
our work is equally excited about the idea of working with stories to re-create time 
in visual images. He also knows about ‘Matyansi Butyampa’ and others but he had 
not heard of the story in a long time. I had not heard of ‘Matyansi Butyampa’ either 
in about 20 years until a student came up with it in a class exercise. It is important 
to note how stories cut across generations. More so, such a visual record is anoth-
er way of continuing the dialogue across generations. The dialogue we engage in 
now about the story would probably be the same years to come, although the con-
texts would be different. Hence, stories tend to attract those who know about then 
because they feel obliged to retell their own experience of the story, and the stories 
in turn soon spread out to ‘others’. Stories, at the end, become part of conversation 
and talking points once remembered.425 In so doing, as work on the stories con-
tinues, we extend them both in time and space as we reminisce. A movie watched 
in a cinema hall extends to bar space, home space, classroom space–as it regains 
time during the retelling. Eventually, it was a work of art representing Matyansi 
Butyampa, the lead character and no longer the story of a gruesome murder at a 
bridge. Similarly, as we talk about the characters, objects and scenes in the two 
stories, we are extending its attributes spatial-temporally and thereby continuing 
its presence. On top of being extensive in space, stories regain time and hence use-
ful as temporal constructs.426  
we are part of the scenario as witnesses or actors. It creates a dependency because of its elicitation 
of buried life episodes, and the desire to realize how it shapes up. Indeed, Matyansi Butyampa built a 
strong dependency of viewers during its construction because of its affinity.
425  Further still, some characters could become dominant thereby becoming the key anchors in the 
story.
426  This transpires as an informative gimmick as well as a mode of reconstituting and resolving our 
personal dilemmas. Tom, on the one hand, saw the clubs in Matyansi Butyampa with burnt stripes and 
commented likewise, “Ogwo omugo ewaffe waliyo abatagukwaatako; Bwa gukwaatako alwaala” (no 
touches that stick in our home; whoever touches it, falls sick), referring to a certain clan in Western 
Uganda. The artwork in this instance takes on the role of an informer. It taps information from its view-
ers, which becomes an inquiry in itself. In visual inquiry then, the artwork we produce is capable of elicit-
ing information from various sources and transmits it to the reader or producer. In so doing, the artwork 
becomes a source of knowledge and bank for cultural texts. Emmanuel, in an interview about his work 
Matyansi Butyampa, notes that stories are his bank for ideas. Similarly, artworks with cultural texts are 
custodians of culture and therefore continue indigenous knowledge. Perhaps our major concern at that 
time was to visualize the stories and attempt to create mental or physical scenarios that would allow us 
experience such stories.
 
Traditional referent and the action token 
When I asked Joy to tell me about my work Njabala (see figure 39), she said she 
could not make out the meaning (May 9, 2008).427 However, she could tell that there 
was a woman in the artwork but what she was doing was unclear when I asked 
her to look critically at the coffee beans, she still could not make out anything. I 
eventually told her that it was a coffee-picker. She then recognized the action. She 
told me that she could not make out the meaning because the action was not clear; 
she expected a hand that was perhaps holding the coffee beans rather than one flat-
out and only the beans loosely attached.428 She did not specifically make-out the 
loose coffee beans and the spread-out hand to constitute an act of picking coffee 
and as such telling a story about coffee picking or a lazy child. The meaning was 
emphatically enshrined in the ‘action’ of picking the coffee rather than the articles 
within the artwork.429 When I turned round the piece of art and put it up right, she 
claimed it was clearer to her but then immediately confessed that it is because I 
had told her the title. Hence, the meaning was enshrined in the title for her, but its 
construction in the action. To transpose a story (retelling it in a different medium), 
we must ably distinguish between story and presentation. “If what constitutes a 
story is sometimes dependent on what elements the presentation emphasizes, 
then one worry is that a new presentation could make new elements not present 
in the original salient,” writes Smuts (2009, p. 10). In other words, she did not have 
enough background knowledge to instigate the search for things that could lead to 
think in a particular way about the action.
Joy could not decode this disposition, however, because of her lack of exten-
sive knowledge about coffee picking and the idiom used to express the action. 
Caroll et al (2004) advise that for visual communication, the image must possess 
both ‘clarity and strength’ for effectiveness, whereby ‘strength’ concerns the abil-
ity to attract the viewer’s attention by the image whereas ‘clarity’ entails the im-
age’s ability to keep the viewer’s interest. Coffee picking takes place in rural ar-
427  Although Njabala is my favorite in terms of structure and form, it is passive and innate; indeed, it 
expresses ‘laziness’ and ignominy while it animates well the idiom it adopts in the process. In this art-
work, I use copper and gold to presuppose wealth, well-being, and hard work. Furthermore, the artwork 
builds abstract hierarchies through internal reconstruction of the entire text to fit in the new depic-
tion. Specificity sits in the picking technique, Ganda mat patterns, and the busuuti. Drama operates in 
the negative attitude of the picking technique, animated by a local Ganda idiom “Okwanjala engalo” 
(sprawling fingers). This metaphorically implies nothingness in language use and its meaning achieved 
at a higher level of interpretation whereby it implies empty handedness or nothingness, which is a com-
plete opposite of the luxurious depiction. It develops into an indirect speech act at the level of linguistic 
use and this is where its power lies. It implies that there is a possibility of transforming the coffee beans 
into money with hard work: it dwells on the eventuality of ‘would be’.
428  This is an effect of using idiomatic language that specifically known by the sender and receiver. The 
action points towards reemphasizing poor technique of picking coffee beans. I expressed this however, 
symbolically to show attitude. The idiom used “Okwanjala engalo” is an animation of attitude Njabala 
had towards work. The name Njabala is also the title of the story meaning that the character dissemi-
nates the meaning.
429  In the ideation process of Njabala, I considered it as an activity of the traditional coffee harvest-
ing technique of the Baganda, and never did I anticipate that it could represent the story of Njabala. 
Therefore, its subsequent naming was a result of Joy’s intervention in the interpretation process that I 
realized it was a deeper story than merely depicting coffee picking.
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eas where traditional values are still rife. Joy 
suggested that since it was a village scene, 
the necklace should possess beads because it 
was more village-like. As she engages in this 
conversation, dialogue ensues between her 
and the artwork, which creates dependency. 
I then explained to her that loose dispensa-
tion of the action was directly expressing a 
picking technique whereby the beans have 
to fall freely rather than hold them in one’s 
palm. Significantly, the contradiction is that 
Njabala uses a basket other than a spread-
out fabric on the floor to trap the rampaging 
beans, which is dramatic in a sense and cre-
ates dependency. Bruner (1990) holds forth: 
“Dramatism in Burke’s sense focuses upon 
deviations from the canonical that have 
moral consequences–deviations related to 
legitimacy, moral commitment, and values” 
(p. 50). Citing Bradley, Currie (2009) reminds 
us that seldom, we can best explain a char-
acter’s action by noting that the drama re-
quires it. 
On another front, this picture of the cof-
fee-picker brews a story of a lazy girl called 
“Njabala” who could not do anything for 
herself due to poor upbringing. The ghost of her dead mother would come up to 
help her whenever there is a crisis. In this artwork, Joy’s concern of a less becom-
ing act, instead gives a new insight of narrative construction–and presence: it 
tells me that art works that are instinctively narrative in construction breed their 
own lines of narration that come to characterize their own dependencies. In my 
construction of this artwork together with Kaleeba and Ssewandeku, I have no par-
ticular story I am following not even Nambi (see figure 42). These artworks sim-
ply construct their own stories and thereby gain their identity by the visual signs 
embedded within them by action or form.430 Robbie (one of the guys at the weld-
ing cite) first sees ‘enkoliimbo’ in my ‘Collector’, but after my intervention, he sees 
‘Nambi’ carrying millet for her chicken; another case of auxiliary narrative in the 
making, but also another revelation that artworks themselves can breed their own 
narratives.431Freddy also sees Kaleeba in the artwork of the ‘Pots’ that I created with-
430  In Ssewandeku, I had at the back of my mind a typical traditional Ganda male that drunk all day 
and left the wife to tend to the home. However, in the end she becomes the pillar he leans on.
431  I intervened by reminding him that the ‘enkoliimbo’ were tackled in the previous project we had 
dealt with. Immediately it occurred to him that it was Nambi carrying millet. It is also crucial to note 
out reference to any particular story but had faith that it could indeed develop its 
own line of narration and create a dependency out of such minds that consider it a 
story. This power on the one hand, comes from the ability of the artwork to exhibit 
tendencies of narration and the ability of the perceiving mind to identify it as a 
narrative.432 Such an artwork therefore endows the power of transition, ordering 
and re-experience, which are peculiar with a certain genre of story. Thus, Njabala 
can represent a technique of picking coffee or alternatively a lavish way of picking; 
in one meaning lies in the action, the other in form respectively.433 
However, this does not declare stories as open-ended in meaning performance; 
stories retain strict and definitive entry points into their essences, which is vital 
in the construction of meaningful expressions. Perhaps one could claim that Fred-
dy’s view of the Pots as Kaleeba and Robbie’s view of Basket as Nambi could have 
meant very different things in another setting–probably a fruit basket or collect-
ing water from a rural well.434 That would work well too. Nevertheless, Freddy and 
Robbie already immersed into the storyline attempt to align their own imagina-
tion and experience with that of the artwork. If they were not aware that the art 
works they we working on were born out of stories, they probably could not have 
thought likewise. The alignment that these two readers and creators engage in is 
a powerful tool for comprehending visual images. The mind being able to align 
itself with the basic signifiers drawn from actual experience creates the kind of 
understanding or comprehension of such images. Hence, the information that 
Freddy and Robbie utilize to assign meaning to my artwork provides them with 
the much-needed confidence that is necessary in decision-making. 
Sometimes and on many occasions, non-meaning is a result of indecision, lack 
of the cutting edge in decision making. Narrative is decisive in that we already 
know what it is about and hence we have made a decision about what it means to 
that at this, before Robbie’s intervention, Njabala bore the title of Collector. Due to the intervention of 
others, the process of shifting positions, as I tried to interpret and understand the artwork, equally af-
fected me.
432  Freddy springs from the desire to know a story that has pots in it. However, Freddy immediately 
cited ‘Kaleeba’ and ‘Seven girls, seven pots’. This means that the artwork had a very strong signal for ac-
tivating thought in that particular direction. Freddy is aware too, of the fact that it is a story and thus he 
can ably locate it in his repertory. Secondly, Freddy assisted me in interpreting Pots (as I had originally 
named it), as representing the story of ‘Kaleeba’ and thus its subsequent title as Kaleeba.
433  The action of laziness is expressed by attitude and handling of the coffee beans. The ‘elaborate’ 
emphasizes attitude, but indicates what she could be–just a mental image. Idiomatic in that it relies 
heavily on mental imagery described earlier on. It is dramatic because it does not show the actual 
events in the story; it relies on sarcasm built into metonymy. The alligator skin is an index of wealth. 
Intensity on the garments and the basket builds dependency at both the material and immaterial levels. 
Bruner (1990,) further rants: “There is another feature of well-formed narrative, what I have called 
elsewhere its “dual landscape” (pp. 51-53). That is to say, events and actions in a putative “real world” 
occur concurrently with mental events in the consciousness of the protagonists. Stories have to do with 
how protagonists interpret things, what things mean to them. It begins to be clear why narrative is such 
a natural vehicle for folk psychology. “It deals with the stuff of human action and human intentionality. 
It mediates between the canonical world of culture and the more idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires, 
and hopes. It renders the exceptional comprehensible and keeps the uncanny at bay…” (Bruner, ibid).
434  Similarly, in both Freddy and Robbie, only two stories emerge meaning that after all, stories are not 
extravagantly open-ended.
Figure 39. Kabiito Richard, Njabala  
(180 x 80 cm). Copper, mats, aluminum, 
beads, fabrics, and bark cloth on wood. 
Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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us. Such confidence building is vital in meaning making processes because it curbs 
ambiguities and intervening factors that would otherwise derail us. When Robbie 
asks “Oyo Nambi?” he has already decided that it is Nambi carrying millet for her 
chicken and he confirms his decision with concrete confidence, “Anti ndaba yet-
tisse obulo bwenkoko ye” (personal communication, June 12, 2008).435 It is true that 
if we know about the theme or topic of an artwork, we will be obliged to think along 
the lines of its signification. Similarly, when Freddy sees my artwork as Nambi, he 
remembers the story of ‘enkoliimbo’, which we had earlier worked on.436 However, 
for us to make any lasting meaning out of such artwork we need to be decisive and 
confident. Working with stories offers us this extra quality of meaning perfor-
mance, because we have already decided on what the story means to us.
Visual adaptation and inquiry 
Experiencing art making
I realized that we had re-interpreted and reinvigorated our original idea and a new 
one took over the way we should handle this wooden artwork. It emerged that in 
visual inquiry there are many alternatives and always the best alternative suffices.437 
Kakama, Kahima, Kairu (see figure 40), kept on reorganizing itself in a manner that 
continued to dispense its various dimensions of tackling. In this sense, the artwork 
itself becomes a source of inspiration and it gains the capacity and mandate to 
dictate and determine its own destiny. Nevertheless, it has to stick to the basic 
tenets of the storyline. For this is the very reason, I observed that in visual inquiry 
we have no definite position because at some stage during the working process, 
the artwork itself takes over the course of events: it keeps on modifying itself into 
a new entity that requires a fresh mind as well. To tell a story we have to assemble 
information into a coherent structure–narrative–while the story turns out as the 
irreducible substance making narrative a means of understanding and organizing 
experience that draws together aspects of spatial, temporal, and causal perception 
(Carol et al, 2004). However, causality alone cannot constitute narrative as already 
indicated because we can have structures without necessarily being causal or 
temporal. After all, all speech is temporal in its physical construction, but it is 
within the mind though that we experience the story developing, which may not 
be necessarily temporal or causal.
 
435  Is that Nambi? “But I can see she is carrying millet for her chicken.” This seemingly determinate 
subsumption of the story stems from the ‘Unconscious Imperative’ instituted by our subliminal reaction 
to stimuli we traditionally know.
436  Although the activation signals have changed, the alternative signal is still able to activate a similar 
reading, although the entry point is now different. The entry point here is the basket, yet in Nkoliimbo, it 
is the facial expression and the motor.
437  As one works, new ideas keep on emerging and it is, therefore, always uncertain of how our final 
product will look like. More so, we can never be certain of how long it is going to take us to complete 
an artwork. A continuous process, keeps on refreshing itself whenever we look like hitting a dead end. 
Hence, the best way of representation keeps the inquirer in a state of equilibrium where the mind is 
open to new or emerging ideas that come together to constitute a visual representation.
An excursion into the possibility of vi-
sual narrative poses several challenges 
to the artist as a result because the nar-
rative continues to change shape as it 
develops into a complete understand-
able unit.438 A point probably a number 
of artists could miss noticing is ‘deci-
siveness’ in visual inquiry. Being deci-
sive in visual inquiry creates tranquil-
ity and progression. An element of risk 
and compromise is unavoidable after 
all as one tries to negotiate the best 
positioning of a representation. As the 
picture transforms itself, it portrays 
the dynamic sense of narrative because 
it keeps on adapting itself to new en-
vironments and contexts. Just as in 
narrative, the artwork together with 
the artist attempt to negotiate mean-
ing in trying out various options or 
hypotheses. Kakama, Kahima and Kairu 
had to transform its self into an adapt-
able unit because its dependency relied 
entirely on its ability to generate new 
ways of reconstructing it. Kato Kimera 
and Matyansi Butyampa did not cre-
ate a lot of maneuvering tasks because 
their reconstruction did not require 
adaptation as a tool; they created a dependency straight away at the ideation phase 
through action. Kakama, Kahima, Kahiru has eminent indicators that see it through 
the meaning making process smoothly because it relies mainly on the second and 
third levels of signification; for it to create a dependency it must transform itself 
in the reconstruction process and that is what happens exactly.
Dynamic picture 
In the era of postmodernism, transience has become the order of the day as in 
performances, installations, environmental art, site specifics and many other forms 
of non-permanent art. In this transition, I deduce a narrative situation that is only 
present as it transforms itself into a story. Beyond that, we only have memories of its 
438  For example, certain connection points reserved for stability later interfere with visual balance and 
the main actors in the story. I decided to risk the compaction of the physical structure in bid to have the 
message clear. Both internal and external debates present themselves during such an inquiry and each 
one of them supports the other. After eliminating the extras, I achieve visual balance and a clear mes-
sage.
Figure 40. Kabiito Richard, Kakama, Kahima, 
Kahiru (180 x 80 cm). Aluminum, mats, and beads 
on wood. Photo: Kabiito Richard.
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presence and perhaps its effects on us. This implies that narrative is dynamic and 
transient as much as contemporary art is dynamic and transient. When I mention 
contemporary art, I mean the art that is produced, driven by the conceptual basis, 
rather than its form because contemporaenity is dynamic itself. Just as one could 
claim that postmodernism is a historical phenomenon, contemporaenity is not any 
different from such a phenomenon. Getting back to the point, not all art produced 
today is postmodern simply because its mode of construction does not embrace 
the requirements that make it so. Hence, contemporary in its dictionary or literal 
sense might be misleading in this instance. Contemporary then, in this present 
text, will refer to art produced basing on recent trends of art production mainly 
concept driven. 
Why pursue such a discussion at this stage of the text?
As I worked on my stories with natural color and form, I discovered something 
interesting and unique. Some of the materials are not static; they are dynamic in 
a sense that they may require replacement or replenishing after some time due to 
the demands of the day. For example, I used cloth, locally produced using the tie-
and-dye method combined with screen-printing. The cloth bear locally inspired 
patterns, hence generated, and probably give the work a local ingredient anyway. 
However, I asked myself what would happen if the cloth got dirty or if not needed 
anymore. At first, I had no answer to such a question in case posed by a skeptic. 
Then I later realized that it is the dynamism encountered in stories: stories keep on 
changing form and pattern although they retain their basic structures. The cloth 
becomes the dynamic element of the picture to make it changeable as and when re-
quired. It renders the picture dynamic in form and pattern thereby enhancing the 
dynamics of storytelling. This also demystifies the concept of permanence as the 
goal of art production and replaces it with transience. The story thence, manifests 
itself in the art work in two forms: the timelessness of the fabula and the changing 
physical form of the visual component; what it looked like today, might be absent 
tomorrow and what is still present is the basic structure of the intended meaning 
and form. Thus, I discover through practice, a way of achieving and keeping tran-
sience in permanent art forms.
Visual Citation and co authorship
Emmanuel, the author of Matyansi Butyampa and Kato Kimera II marvels at the way 
his work or idea develops and changes, as it undergoes transformation (April 24, 
2008). In my experience, and what I learn from this is that in visual inquiry we 
can also quote texts of other artists and fit them within our own desired goals. 
Emmanuel, as the author of the artwork, is merely designing an artwork for later 
reproduction although he relies on the subject of using stories. I only implement 
his idea by picking it up and attempting to fit it in my own work scheme. I 
reconstruct it further by adding other elements like cultural paraphernalia using 
various materials like wood or metal, thereby re-visualizing it. In re-visualizing 
it, I adopt a text that originally belonged to another author and I transform it to 
suit new contexts or forms that based on personal needs. This equates to literature 
citation in conventional writing where, one appropriates and adjusts texts of other 
authors to suit one’s own texts or scenarios. “Texts give birth to other texts […] 
and the more widely disseminated the greater likelihood that the output will leave 
a lasting imprint,” writes Sigurdsson (1998, p. 259). In this way, the concept of 
intertextuality surfaces in visual inquiry in a new way. 
My own reconstructions of the two stories gain their meanings from what Em-
manuel has already created–his texts. After all, I had not realized certain elements 
of Emmanuel’s creations until he exposed me to a glimpse of his mind. In Kato 
Kimera II, I had not realized that there were five characters; instead, I thought of 
three characters and this information helped me to reconstruct the story appro-
priately. In Matyansi Butyampa, I had not realized the essence of making Matyansi 
the bigger figure than I made the others until Emmanuel exclaimed with amuse-
ment, “This Matyansi already looks like Matyansi. Even before one tells you about 
the story, he already looks stupid”. He continues: “I wonder how images commu-
nicate so easily”.439 After a while, as he peruses through the remix version of his 
work, Emmanuel again, with laughter, exclaims, “the big head”, as he points at 
Matyansi. “Eeh! The big head because he is bigheaded.” I interjected with acknowl-
edgement amid laughter. The work builds up co-experience in its understanding 
and reading. On another note, more people are bound to know about its meaning 
rather than the individual work done inside ‘closed doors’. 
It is interesting to learn how the picture itself becomes a source of conversa-
tion and even dialogue. Anyone who bothers to know about its meaning engages 
in some sort of conversation because the artwork itself develops a character of its 
own. This character is that of referring or citation: that in visual inquiry we adopt 
other people’s texts and make them ours. Even those who create conversation out 
of my work or Emmanuel’s idea are referencing and that is how reading visual 
texts that have cause for citation becomes exciting. In visual citation, we build pil-
lars for collective meaning and experience: the way the author knows his creation 
passes on in the same way to build a meaningful expression in visual knowing. 
Importantly, in coauthoring, we build collective meaning, associations, and un-
derstanding of works of art. We can thus experience the artwork in a similar way 
that is comparable to ‘traditional meaning’ and thereby multiplying artistic experi-
ence.
Artist as active agent
The mind becomes a familiar thing because it shares with other familiar minds its 
properties of having similar thoughts about objects used in the visual stories. The 
people thus share-in within a familiar mind working with a local mind of things 
and objects of use and communication specific to his environment. Because I am an 
active agent in the artwork, it reads into my own mind demanding for things of its 
439  Once again, wonder comes into the picture of visual readings and narrative.
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own being; as material, I have capacity to transform its being. In so doing, I become 
the mind of the art work with which it manipulates and dictates its own destiny. 
Through me, it realizes its own face and sense of belonging: our beings fuse up and 
it becomes a continuous flow of pulses between the artwork and me. Because I have 
no control at one time of what it demands to be, I am equally surprised at how it 
turns out at the end. It dictates its own destiny just as Kaleeba, Njabala, Nambi, and 
Kintu dictate their own names by virtue of what they demand to be, and not what 
we want them to be. This is a pure phenomenon.
The artwork and the narrative have a significant transformation in my own ex-
perience as an agent of change. As a local being within my community, I avail my-
self to the artwork as a material by which their locality and placement is achieved. 
My locally specific material–the body and acculturated mind–undergoes transfor-
mation in the process of art production and at the end; phenomena turn out more 
understandable and integrated in my own self. A new being with a new form of 
knowing and understanding caused by offering itself as a material of engendering 
meaning making in the artistic work. The art itself became a source of informa-
tion in the artistic process as it solicited information I was never to know if I was 
not its material for realizing its ontology. My choice of objects and materials that 
compose the artwork depends on my knowledge of the local and familiar: I am 
thus both local and familiar agent in the transformative process of the artwork 
(see figure 41). The familiar and local form a synthesis that is vital for bringing 
specific and common understanding of visual texts. 
Notwithstanding, the job of the artist is to analyze and represent issues. The 
artist is an analyzer who is, as per our definition, an abstractionist because his or 
her duty is to identify essentials for representation.440 For example, if one wants 
to depict a scene of a fight, in the visual ‘still’ arts we are not able to capture the 
entire action. All we can do is selecting elements that are typical of a fight. We 
then depict such elements of the fight as representatives of the entire scenario as 
a summary. The artist is then identifying essentials and eliminating other com-
ponents that may not add up to the depiction of a fight. By so doing, the artist is 
abstracting the scene of the fight and whether he used lifelike elements or simpli-
fied forms, he abstracts his depictions by default. Therefore, if one considers the 
definition of abstraction as a reduction to essentials, all art is abstract, and at the 
same time real. This experience the artist realizes as s/he works; that he had to 
reduce the story of ‘Matyansi Butyampa and Golooba Bidandi’ to basic essentials: 
three characters, two dogs, and implements used in the fight, the place at a bridge 
and the act of stabbing. Hence, the artist had to restrict himself to basic elements 
that would create an impression of his message legible. This implies that the artist 
is an abstractionist by default, although he must create an expression that means.
440  The word abstraction in this text applies in many different ways because in its orientation, it is 
polysemous and thus can mean so many things ranging from unreal, inconcrete, immaterial, incompre-
hensible, inaccessibility by human sensibility, to grotesque figurine images and simplicity.
Wonder and other emotions
Wonder is an emotion evoked by awe or admiration of something extraordinarily 
beautiful or unusually surprisingly mingled with curiosity (Encarta Dictionary, 
2006; Word reference, 2008). The explanation of the emotion `wonder’, reveals that 
there is an element of admiration and curiosity in the act of appreciating visual 
arts. Eaton (1998) reflects on Kris and Kurz demonstration that ‘the myth of the 
artist’ reflects the fact that people value special creative talent focusing also how 
it came to be aspects of cause as well as effect because what we value often lies 
largely beyond the created object. On the other hand, Strugielska and Alonso 
(2007) acknowledge that emotion is one of the most central and pervasive aspect 
of human experience whose cognitive veracity invades human language, behavior, 
and physiology. Patrick an employee of computer point and a friend who works 
with Patronics,441 use the word ‘wonder’ as a leading force in their admiration of 
Kakama, Kahima, Kairu as they viewed it (July 23, 2008). They both wonder how I 
came up with such an idea of the general composition. They further wonder how 
I was able to cut through the wood with much precision. They still wonder how 
another human being can produce what others cannot.  Patrick indeed comments 
that what I had done was beyond going to school but something extra-ordinary 
that I possessed on my own. They also exhibit curiosity in trying to discover how I 
did all the work Kakama, Kahima, Kahiru, how long it took me, and the tools I used. 
Clearly, for any artwork to capture one’s attention, it must be able to evoke 
emotions of at least wonder, expectancy, and anxiety or curiosity. Robinson (cit-
ed in, Barwell, 2009) argues that a core of an emotion is perception (an affective 
appraisal) and physiological changes that that perception initiates sometimes 
felt. “Mystery provokes wonder, awe, poetry, and resists explanation. Allowing 
mystery to embody one’s lived images, honors and energizes their meaning and 
441  Patronics is a Ugandan company that deals in importation of electronics and installations.
Figure 41. The artist is an active agent in the process of art making. Photo: Kabiito Richard.
(a) Sketching onto wood panels. (b) Cultural paraphernalia as material for art making.
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value,” indicates Snow (2002, p. 22).  We can only experience such emotions if we 
can get absorbed into the mysterious forces and energies emitted by the artwork 
itself.442 These forces and energies entangled in a web of tensions create curiosity, 
anxiety and expectancies that are responsible for dependencies in art apprecia-
tion. Color, texture, line, movement, rhythm are some of the elements that emit 
energetic forces that interact with our own mortar and kinesthetic energies to cre-
ate tensions responsible for any compulsions that may accrue during the viewing 
process. These tensions, forces, and energies interact in a situation whereby our 
own expectations should match with the expectations of the artist. In this case, 
there must be clues, or revelations landmarks that lead us in the direction of the 
artist’s intentions so that we can initiate an interactive process with our own ex-
pectations.
Scenario13  
Work continues on Kakama, Kahima and Kairu (see figure 46a). It has entered its 11th day. 
I am nearing the finishing stages and one of my tasks is to curve out the pots to give them 
a feeling of roundness.443 An external student of casting (a local artisan who was training 
in metal casting), finds me curving the pots and observes me for some time. He finally 
asks me “Bino biki?” (What are these?) I replied “pots” (May 6, 2008). Then he went on 
to ask me why I was working with pots. I informed him that I was working on a story of 
three sons of a king given tasks to keep their milk in the pots, and on this task, the king 
would find a way of assigning them roles. He mused at the visualization of a story. He 
then asked me to narrate the story. I particularly narrated the story but after sometime, 
he came back and asked me whether anyone of the sons retained any milk in the pots. I 
showed him the different pots by touching them: “Eno yali nzijuvu, eno yasigazaamu 
kitundu, eno teyasigazaamu” (This one was full, this one had a half, and this one had 
nothing left). 444 
442  “Jenefer Robinson further suggests that an emotional response is a response set off by a noncogni-
tive affective appraisal which sets off physiological changes that register the event in a bodily way and 
get the agent ready to respond appropriately,” writes Barwell (2009, p.57).
443  Roundness in Kakama, Kahima, and Kahiru is a tool used for reemphasis. The oval shapes of the 
pots and the mouths are already indicative of the pots. To accentuate this form of roundness, the pots 
are curved out to reemphasize the feeling of roundness so that experiencing it becomes totalizing.
444  He confessed to never to have conceived art as capable of containing embedded meaning or even 
depict stories. I was describing the sons by the pots, which were the only accessible part of their pres-
ence. In this, we find separation of constituent parts, which renders the representation a synecdoche. 
Secondly, this comment is typical of the local communities’ attitude towards ‘academic’ art. It is far 
away from their ‘Knowing’ and thus there are things they find unbelievable or even unconceivable. 
Important to note is the fact that it seems unconceivable in the public domain that ‘trained’ artists can 
produce work full of meaning. More so, that visualization of stories is possible from an artistic point 
of view. This is a profound revelation that art produced within the circles of formal training tends to 
distance itself from the community. Further still, it is unconceivable that such art could even bear any 
meaning to the public. Indeed this student confesses that “okutambula kulaba,” a saying in Luganda 
meaning that we can only discover new things if we move around. For him to have the ‘opportunity’ to 
train at an art institution attached to a major university is a revelation: that the art produced there bears 
meaning after all. (“Okutambula kulaba” is short form of a proverb designating movement as a source of 
knowledge: thus, its short form unveils as a metaphor – walking is seeing. When we get out of our box, 
we gain knowledge).
From a narrative perspective, when I narrate the story in bits, this man keeps 
on asking for more until he finally discovers what happened in the end. This is 
typical of the ‘completion’ phenomenon. Until information is ‘completed’, material 
remains in the ‘active memory’, as lingering in conscious representations (Macleod 
& Mathews, 1997). It is also typical of the retelling nature of narrative; that stories 
continue both in time and in space after retelling them: when I told him that it was 
a story I was working with, he quickly asked me what the story was. He could not 
wait to hear about the story. It is also proof that visual narrative can instigate story 
telling thereby creating a dependency. This man sticks around for some time trying 
to tally the vocal with the visual. This is a dependency created by the artwork and 
this is its ‘attractive’ side. On a good day, when the viewer had an advantage, he could 
recognize the artwork. On a bad day, the viewer tangles between the urge to know 
and the desire to re-discover himself within the artwork. So is the nature of visual 
narrative. Because the plot had not fully developed, he needed more information 
to build up meaning. This confirms–as it may seem–Bruner’s observation that we 
extract meaning from the plot build-up, but this is only and only if emplotment is 
the most significant part in the narrative. In this case, he only discovered an action 
token and needed to exploit its overall experience.
The Breakthrough
Rosa finds Nambi the most exciting of all the metallic artworks because she 
understands it most. “Kali Kekasiinze okunsanyusa” says Rosa about Nambi (see 
figure 42). “Oba kensiinga okutegeera,” she wonders (personal communication, 
July 22, 2008).445 In my research, this proved triumphant because all along I argued 
that we could only appreciate an artwork if it is meaningful to us. I would link her 
feeling to aesthetic pleasure suggested by Dohrn (2009), “Aesthetic pleasure may 
not only depend on but also contribute to a calibration of imaginative, sensory, 
and conceptual responses” (p. 45). The meaning it imposes on us is material or 
immaterial, physiological or psychological. As we viewed Ssewandeku after 
installing it in its designated space, one of the people we were with said that, 
“this must be a hardworking woman.” In my interpretation of such a comment, 
I envision empathy as the means by which the commenter derives meaning from 
this artwork. It could be psychological, but it can also be physiological in the 
sense that it can move someone physically, by feeling sorry, for example. It seems 
empathy is a paradigm of self-oriented response whereby one empathizes with 
another, one inevitably experiences the other’s mental states in a sense as if they 
were one’s (Giovannelli, 2009).446                                           
445  ‘Okutegeera’ is ‘to understand; ‘kutegeera’ means ‘understanding’ in the Ganda language.
446  While empathy equates to feeling with someone, sympathy amounts to feeling for him/her. Re-
sponding sympathetically seems to emphasize the other’s experiences and situation, often perceived as 
different from one’s own. Nevertheless, empathizing always leads to sympathy in that normally, repre-
senting to oneself another’s experience leads to sympathizing him /her. This suggests an understanding 
or concern that amounts to “the adoption, in imagination, of the target’s relevant goals” (Giovanelli, 
2009, p. 83-91). 
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In Rosa’s case, she is excited and I could 
see a smile on her face as she comments. The 
meaning she gains translates into kinesthetic 
energy that makes her smile. May be she is 
attracted by what the woman in the artwork 
does, but also could be excited by gender rela-
tions, or things like color and fabric.447 As we 
empathize with someone, “we imaginatively 
represent to ourselves among other things, 
some of the target’s evaluations and desires 
with respect to the situation,” explains Gio-
vanelli (pp. 88-89). In so doing, we adopt the 
target’s evaluations and desires as our own. 
Kirui (August 25, 2008) too, is visibly excited at 
recognizing the woman picking coffee in Nja-
bala and perhaps curing his curiosity relieves 
him. What is interesting about all these obser-
vations is the ability to work out some kind of 
clue that gives the viewers an entry point into 
the artworks. There is also the realization that 
`difficult’ things do not offer much because 
we might never be able to overcome them. 
Complex things create `wonder’, an emotion 
together with others, responsible for depen-
dencies in the visual arts. In the event of complex or `difficult’ things as Aggie put 
it, interfacing is quite problematic because the interaction is initiated by what the 
reader is able to grasp at a glance. If there is no entry point into the web of intrica-
cies, the interactive process breaks down, and the result is non-meaning. 
This observation leads to my claim that art is a basic psychological entity of our 
daily activities and largely driven by emotional input. This is also the reason narrative 
enhances our understanding of visual elements because it is too, psychological and a 
daily tool for invoking meaning driven by things of which we have a clue, or capable 
of exhibiting clues leading to their comprehension. Incidentally, by emending one’s 
understanding of sympathy one augments his/her appreciation of the significance 
and power that narratives contain in bringing about ‘an enlargement of our being.’ 
Such a state partly radiates from our sympathetic responses, “through the stories we 
encounter as perceivers of narratives and as people who live our own lives and, in a 
sense, live those of our fellow humans” (Giovannelli, 2009, p. 92). Consequently, nar-
ratives provide their perceivers with opportunities for deep rich engagements that in 
447  The meaning Rosa gains centers on her action and that is how she materializes it. The corporeal 
body materializes embodied meaning. Internal linkages that are not accessible to any of our senses 
materialize inferential meaning.
real life occur only in those rare cases when we can closely connect to a situation.448
The connection is guarantee that communication is successful and as such, 
meaning achieved. Enlargement of being connects the perceiver with the percept 
and thus crucial in meaning-making. This emerged from the excitement partici-
pants displayed for having achieved meaning from their respective objects of per-
ception–the artwork. Connection lacked when Joy, Robbie, and Freddy did not see 
what they expected–they did not have the connection between their modes of per-
ception and the percepts. This enlargement of being is describable under both the 
‘enduring emotion’ and the ‘unconscious imperative’ linked with the ‘traditional 
referent.’ In turn, the traditional referent is the technical tool predominant in 
meaning making and ‘enlargement of being’ as the overall experience of meaning-
making. All through the text, one encounters episodes of enlargement of being 
and traditional referentiality as overarching themes in the process of meaning-
making, for example incidents experienced by Louie, Rosa, Emmanuel, and JB.
Studies suggest that direct experience of perceptions form human experience, 
and only secondary by sensations. We experience the world as sensations con-
structed by perception: “people do not consciously experience raw sensations, that 
by the time a sensation has made it through to consciousness it has been modified 
by cognitive, social, or neural mechanisms that turn the sensation into percep-
tion” (Brummet, 2003, p. 26).449 
We then view the world as a constructed whole through active usage that re-
lates things to each other through active linkages taking place during our percep-
tion of the world. On another footing, perception means, “a construction built 
up out of sense data” (p. 26). To perceive a thing as a chair, we pull together and 
interpret many sensations. The implication is, as a constructed world of percep-
tions, we experience it “as formed or patterned rather than random”450 (p. 26).  The 
construction of patterning resulting into perceptions is abstraction, “or sorting 
together of sensations that we deem to be similar”451 (p. 26). Experience in itself, is 
characteristic of recurrence–yet, recurrence is part of perception–in the sense that 
“it comes to us more or less in uniform contexts” (p. 27). Thus, in perception, the 
most important part to note is “recurrences (a group of data) in experience and to 
construct abstract categories that treat every new experience as being a particu-
448  This can happen is situations when someone we know especially well takes time to share with us 
his or her experiences (by telling us his/her ‘story’), or when we think back to important events that af-
fected us (by telling ourselves our ‘story’). 
449  Essentially, meaningful, are the structures of Sense-Data and experience. What we consider a 
‘fact’–in this case reality representation, and simulation–is a complex notion conceived as the “source 
and context of signs to which we react successfully.” Our perception of facts or reality naturally serves 
our interests of creating ‘success’ in everyday experience.
450  It is not a collection of fragments nor an amalgam of pieces, we feel it in its totality or whole- as a 
constructed whole.
451  A particular impression is already a product of concrescence. Behind, or in it, there has been a 
coming together of sortings.” (p. 27). Whenever we ‘perceive’ what we name ‘chair’, we are interpreting 
a certain group of data. We ought to interpret what we experience, although interpretations too recur, 
never unique in their psychological context. Dale’s (2006a) meaning is not devoid of psychology as it 
involves cognition and interpretation.
Figure 42. Kabiito Richard, Nambi  
200 x 90 cm). Copper, brass, fabric, 
and aluminum on metal. Photo: Kabiito 
Richard.
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lar type.” There is proof now that perception is the reworking of sensation into 
categories, sorting, abstractions, and patterns emerging “in consciousness in a 
constructed form, different from how it began” (p. 27). In other words, “percep-
tion is the re-presentation of sensation.” This also means that experience bases on 
representation of sensory data.
Percepts are representations, in mind, the objects of perception. Many times 
people may perceive an object without necessarily connecting with it. Many times, 
too, such percepts decay and thus discarded from our objects of perception. That 
is, if perceivers do not connect with their percepts, they immediately decay. Thus, 
Robbie had no connection with Nkoliimbo and Kato Kimera I at their time of incep-
tion and his to them as ‘those things’ provides evidence for his disconnection and 
subsequent indifference. The second super-ordinate I will mention now is the ‘en-
largement of being’ that we continue to evidence through the study.
Summary
I have to vindicate my choice to work with a phenomenological method, in that, I 
got to access meaning at an experiential level. I indicate too, that artistic research 
as a practical tool not only involves the artist as an active agent in the research 
process, but also surpasses scientific methods in instituting credible and novel 
data. As a follow up on the search for meaning, I then chose to involve indigenous 
knowledge as a general tool for reconnecting contemporary art practice with 
connatural community where ways of life still rely on ancient tradition. In my 
discussion, I show that communities locally own IK and for that reason, adapted 
to local conditions. Furthermore, unlike the general conception that tradition 
prohibits, it may suffice at the individual level, and not the group. However, even at 
individual level, within tradition, the individual interprets conditions as suitable 
for application of a tradition. Secondly, we cannot avoid tradition and therefore 
many of our activities depend on tradition and as such, IK is enormously useful 
to contemporary knowledge. Thus, meaning in this suffices on the auspices of 
tradition as suggested in Dale’s (2006a) account of meaning where we encounter a 
recurrent condition that means. In this account too, we discover why things mean 
what they do in general, other than providing sufficient and necessary conditions 
because after all, things mean for the same reasons. 
We understand and identify things through subjecting them to the processes 
of meaning making, a creative process as Laber (2008) suggests, “[s]someone who 
has done art can easily make out images, but there are also people who are creative 
and can easily make out meaning.”452 Narrative being a basic linguistic structure 
that has served the purpose of communicating for generations provides a strong 
point of departure towards reinstating meaning in the local visual arts. Art will 
bear meaning in people’s lives today if we redefine its institutionalized and mac-
adamized cultural form to have a wider role, meaning, and immediacy in contem-
porary life situations (Halkinhal, 1999, p. 67). Mayun, Robbie, Freddy and the rest, 
by virtue of being traditionally oriented even though they stay in a different loca-
tion and context of domicile, still collaborate in meaning-making activities espe-
452  Personal interview, July 11, 2008 at Makerere Art Gallery. 
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cially so in the arts. Apparently, the group of students in the Year II Project had in-
dividual interpretations and sure that interpretation of the ‘Kintu’ story was clear, 
true and binding, unlike the traditional or less knowledgeable group of artisans; 
they only unified their interpretation when working in groups. This is so because 
each individual learnt, through training to interpret sophisticated visual data or 
information to extract meaning, which is evidently absent in the rural communi-
ties. Ideally, rural sub-cultures tend to suffer from the tendency by urban elites to 
take literacy for granted while communicating to them (Zimmer & Zimmer, op 
cit, p. 31). However, we need a more understandable visual language today since 
cultural groups no longer live in isolation bearing in mind that, historically, man 
developed means of non-verbal communication in need to communicate (Giard, 
op cit, p. b. 2).
Bearing in mind that Baganda people consumed art experientially, rather than 
inferentially, it meant that every experience was common to each member dur-
ing and after the process of production of the artifacts. In experience, when we 
separate artistic objects from their conditions of origin while operation as their 
general significance with which aesthetic theory deals, becomes almost invisible 
(Dewey, op cit). Participation in a culture where the symbolic systems used by in-
dividuals in constructing meaning were already in place and deeply entrenched 
in the language, render meaning public and shared (Bruner, 1990, pp. 11-13). Be-
cause, the meaning of the symbols and their usage and thus experience belonged 
together, the Ganda people achieved meaning communally in what we call ‘art ap-
preciation’ in conventional terms. Due to hierarchy and the Ganda reverence of 
the supreme, these signs remain unchanged and thus mean the same things each 
time they occur. Thus introducing new or alien art forms not ably experienced and 
thus consumed the same way, as art in the Ganda society, is tantamount to disen-
franchisement of the individual and the group. The key to [art] work that affects 
people does not come from dialogue between artists that defines the art world, 
but from the dialogue of communication (Colombo, 1999, p. 50). More so, since we 
cannot turn back the clock, we can only work within existing structures to rearm 
the communities with one of their most revered and essential tools of human per-
severance. 
Art should be useful rather than serving as an unrelated accompaniment to 
life, by interweaving with an intensifying human experience, making it profound, 
rich, clear, and coherent  (Davis, in Chipp, op cit, p. 473). Art of the past, as viewed 
by art history, falls in categories constituting a hierarchy of art forms based on 
stratified system of values whereby painting and sculpture enjoy a high profile 
while traditional art appears as ‘applied’, ‘decorative’ or ‘lesser.’453 The degree of 
utility and skill coupled with attributes of minimal intellectual input support 
453  In chapter six, I demonstrate and discuss some of the issues that affected art during its prove-
nience in Buganda and it is clear that the present generation of artists still work along modernist pillars. 
This meant that art produced since then, became personal devoid of communal values. This is because 
one of modernism’s key vices was to break with the past and further accentuating the divide between 
what art is and is not.
this hierarchy (Parker & Pollock, in Korsmeyer, 1998, p. 44). The traditional arts 
in which the communities derived a livelihood and pleasure disintegrated to the 
periphery and so did the pleasure of experiencing them. Muziri and Enoch por-
tray the plight of Ugandan art while Aggie and Billy show what we lost as trained 
artist and how this affects our appreciation of art today respectively. Rather than 
facilitation of creativity as expected, schools inhibit it through ritualistic proce-
dure and demands for conformity to existing rules, well as seldom punishing cre-
ative behavior instead of reward it decries Shaw (1971, p. 372). In respect with this 
observation, the intention of the artist then, is far different from the intention of 
the artist today. Similarly, the consumption of art then differs greatly from the 
consumption of art today. The artist doubled as consumer and producer whereas 
we as artists only produce today, without consuming our own art because it is not 
for our society or even consumption.454  
After analyzing Ganda stories and producing practical work along structure, 
evidence emerged indicating that stories contain both internal and external mean-
ing making qualities. Organization, affect, and persuasion were some of the quali-
ties identified in narrative structure useful for production and comprehending 
visual images. The qualities of specificity and familiarity inherent in the internal 
structures within Ganda folklore provide the transformative power to reconnect 
the arts with the people. I identified such qualities as enriching in art production 
in the African House Project, Mugalaasi Project, Year II Project and the Makerere 
and Wakaliga episodes.455 Fred demonstrated in my study that prompting, as sug-
gested by Nanay, significantly increases the chances that we will engage a text nar-
ratively. In the Nkoliimbo and Kato Kimera I studies, participants demonstrated that 
priming or pre-knowledge of a text as a narrative increased the probability that we 
will engage such a text narratively.456
Remix aesthetics on its part solicited information during the study as demon-
strated in the three phases of art production. Together with the presence of sto-
ries, it became a major attraction for incepting dialogue and dependency during 
and after the production of the artwork. In particular, it drew involvement, and 
dependency due to its association of familiarity and accessibility (locality) or pres-
ence within the vicinities in which I produced the works of art. People reacted, 
told stories about the articles for example the clubs, and reminisced about the sto-
ries in the artwork while exhibiting emotions such as joy, anger, and most of all, 
wonder–the emotion behind appreciating Sewandeku and Kama, Kahima, Kahiru 
as examples. This because an individual’s emotional behavior is visible to others 
(though not perfectly), can ably communicate one’s emotional status including 
454  This claim only refers to the artists who work within Buganda region. 
455  Qualities of organization, summary, utility, negotiation, dominant attraction, decision making, 
combination and sequence, intensity, and scene were identified and singled out as factors contributed 
by the presence of story structure in the art work.
456  This does not explain however, why we deal with a text narratively without prompting or pre-
knowledge.
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physiological responses such as sweating when anxious or heart racing when agi-
tated or excited (Yiend & Mackintosh, 2005, pp. 464-468).457 
Conclusions 
Preamble 
Robbie, so do Tomah, Pat, Kasule, and Miki among others, reveal that objects, 
once removed from their contexts, could retain their identity under the concept 
of remix. Robbie identifies fabrics in Kato Kimera I with their own names and 
practical use, and figures of humans as man or woman. Further, sharing common 
knowledge leads to communal meaning and this is specific to particular groups as 
demonstrated in the Wakaliga group, in contrast to the Year II group, and thus, such 
meaning becomes specific to that group. Familiar and accessible things are crucial 
to meaning-making. While discussing Nkoliimbo, the Wakaliga group was totally 
disconnected from its (the artwork) form, and thus, referred to it as a ‘obuntu obwo’ 
(those things). One of the group members confessed that in case they had no means 
of deciphering meaning, they would just ‘look on.’ This meant that they needed a 
reference point, which, of course, requires a ‘traditional referent.’ However, the 
presence of stories in the artwork excited many participants including Robbie, 
Freddy, Freddie, Fred, Sega, and Reye. Through the process of metonymy, these 
participants reformulated their childhood and thereby relived or re-experienced. 
This built dependency in the artwork. The averseness to things that did not make 
sense as portrayed by Robbie calls for recontextualizing visual culture to suit its 
communities.
During the tour of an exhibition, Louie interests herself with only exhibits 
containing content of which she had prior knowledge, certainly, experience. Most 
profoundly, the child expresses attraction and excitement to those things that 
were most meaningful to it. At first impression, Nkoliimbo is sad, and this is the 
point from which Ramah begins her interpretation of the exhibit. The mood it 
creates, gives an instant impression from which the viewer builds his/her under-
standing of the image. In Ramah’s revelation, we access the meaning immediately, 
and begin assessment, thereafter, for clues to prove the initial projection. Such 
clues depend on what we expect or know from similar conditions, directly refer-
ring back to the ‘traditional referent.’
Remix on the other hand, places the artwork in context. Context is a crucial 
component of the condition proposed in the theory of meaning that guide analysis 
457  Conversely, feelings are private and subjective states of experiential awareness by definition. This 
in turn meant that we consume art and stories indeed, partially, emotionally and most of the depen-
dencies exhibited, had emotional bases–wonder. Similarly, the articles made meaning making units or 
anchors in my study that also exhibit themselves in the narrative trajectory. These make entry points to 
the story and in the artwork to provide it with essence. Fred and Sega connect with Matyansi Butyampa, 
so does Tomah with Balaalo, Gregory connects with Balaalo; Freddy connects with Kaleeba, Rosa with 
Nambi, and Kirui connects with Sewandeku. The apprentice, additionally, connects with Kakama, Ka-
hima, Kahiru and the story continues. All these connections bear different entry points and thus variant 
experiences. The bottom-line is, whether elite or not, we have some kind of connection and that was the 
paramount notion in the search for meaning.
of this study’s results. This also implies, in Sherry’s view, that adopting meaning 
from other sources, rather than the artwork itself, blurs the actual meaning, and 
readability in general. We should radiate from the context of the artwork outwards 
towards its properties to create meaning in conjunction with our lived experience. 
Kato Kimera I creates a flat mood because of its regal attributes, leaving an impres-
sion that people normally do not associate with what they are not familiar with in 
actual experience. Kinghood does not occur to everybody, and as such, it does not 
inspire as much reaction as does Nkoliimbo that deals with inherently a life con-
dition. Lille thinks that working with stories will interest anyone because, in my 
interpretation, stories affect everybody. The key point in this though, is the level 
of accessibility that people have to their object of appreciation. 
Reye reaffirms that artists in Uganda neglected community in favor of self-
expression thereby creating a take-it-or-live-it situation. This is because they con-
centrate on expressing personal feelings. Mona reacts to familiar things as she 
sets out to interpret the meaning of Nkoliimbo and Kato Kimera. She tries to look 
for any condition instigated by the artwork that would aid her comprehension. 
Karimojong, on its part, lacks a quality in an expression that helps one detect its 
(the expression) recurrence to performing a meaningful interpretation, in regard 
to the content. The ‘dominant attraction’ emerges as a unit of meaning-making 
experience directly linked to the ‘first impression’ suggested by Ramah. 
Narrative also provides context for a meaningful event to take place, as evi-
denced in Sherry’s group. The spatial mental events that precede any artistic initi-
ation are crucial in shaping the course of any art production. Crucially, this group 
discovers that whenever someone tells a story, it seems as though one is watching 
it his/her mind, which helps bring more ideas and diversity of mind. Narrative 
exhibits organizational qualities through the ‘kernel’ whereby depiction becomes 
autonomous. This improves decision-making as a fundamental element of arriv-
ing at meaning.
Metaphor raises questions; it stimulates awareness form the artwork Divorce. 
Narrative eases the pressure of choice by enabling summary of various meanings 
into smaller units. Further, one gains an overview of a given text and as such, could 
have various entry points. Narrative creates dependency in images considering the 
set up of Ghost in the forest. Repetitiveness of the ghost-woman creates traditional 
referentiality that enables consistency and reference in the reading of the picture. 
The climax of the study is when Rosa singles out her favorite art work (Nambi) 
because it is the one she understood the most. Recognizing a woman picking cof-
fee in Njabala excites Kirui. The viewers evidently work out clues, as traditional 
referents, that enable them to interpret the work. By appreciating the artwork and 
identify with it, perceivers experience ‘enlargement of being.’ This is a function of 
narrative which provides a sense of living one’s life and living that of others in a 
story context through sympathetic responses engendered by the story. This nor-
mally occurs when we can closely connect to a situation. 
By connecting to a situation, through affect provided by narrative, also linked 
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to Emannuel’s ‘enduring emotion’, we enlarge our being through connecting with 
others. In other words, when we connect with a meaningful event, we also live the 
life of the other’s life of meaning, on top of ours. We can also connect with one 
another by being drawn together by the story. Freddy’s experience with Kaleeba, 
where he connects with his own former lived experience that is part of his social 
world, attests to this observation. He continues to sing the song long after the 
story had ended. He still living his own life, but also living that of the characters 
in the story. The enlargement of being is conspicuous in the intimacy and rapport 
created by narrative situations, and thus, re-experiencing story episodes extends 
our being, within space and time. With these observations and emanating from 
both participation and art making, there is belief that the questions raised at the 
beginning of this study receive an emphatic answer. 
Statement of conclusions
The experience of working with narrative and remix aesthetics in the process of 
art making with the intention of understanding how people make meaning in 
visual culture is an aggregate of smaller units of experience that provide a holistic 
understanding of meaning-making. From this experience of art making with the 
use of narrative and remix aesthetics, I conclude as such:
Narrative engenders affect that connects us with our percepts so as to enlarge 1. 
our being. This connection is crucial in the process of meaning-making. 
Second, through metaphor (metonymy), narrative stimulates insight into 
specific objects of perception. Narrative therefore, should be incorporated 
into the process of art making within specific locales.
Remix, on the other hand, provides rich cultural resources on which the 2. 
traditional referent thrives as evidenced throughout the study. Narrative on 
its own is too fluid to do so given that many narratives reappear in different 
communities, societies, and nations throughout the world. Second, the 
concept of ‘sampling’ of ‘cut and paste’ as appropriation means that exhibits 
retain cultural and historical traces, this making remix a grounding tool. 
Finally, remix critiques old traditions in order to create new ones and this 
promotes the idea of ‘difference’ that is crucial in the process of continuity.
With the above two conclusions, I now state the third: a synthesis of remix 3. 
and narrative would encourage and foster meaning-making in visual culture 
within specific locales.
I would thus, have reason to believe that whenever a member of the Ganda 
community tells a story of Matyansi Butyampa in a work of art using indigenous 
local artifacts, I would come to believe that person said ‘Matyansi is a big head’, 
even if, I never saw that artwork before. That is, upon contextual information, I 
interpret that the member’s interest in getting me recognize his intention to have 
me consider that ‘Matyansi is a big head’ is, in fact, to have me get to recognize 
his intention to have me believe that ‘Matyansi is a big head’ and thereby get to 
believe it. 
Lastly, a synthesis of narrative and remix aesthetics transformed into a success 
story during the artistic process and in my recommendation, areas into narrative 
discourse, emotionality, dream narratives, and trivialities within the narrative 
need further investigation.458  In reiteration, by making the story and artifact use-
ful again, its lifespan extends. By revisiting and getting back to its basics, mean-
ing thrives in both the realm of the spoken and the seen. 
Ability to see what we see
I will sum up this discussion by providing an analysis of the children art to 
demonstrate what we lost when we trained as artists. This will go a long way 
to explain why art took a very different route from what it was destined. “They 
normally look for real art. They are tired of abstract I think. They come looking for 
real art and works that are not expensive” (Ravine, personal communication, May 
31, 2008). Ravine459 is supervisor at the Makerere Art Gallery where she has spent 
three years and she knows that Ugandan art is expensive for the local art lovers who 
always visit looking for gifts, ceramics, paintings, and fabrics. Although some 
gallery goers buy the abstract pieces, they still prefer “the realism–real art.” This 
in her view is “because they don’t understand the abstract pieces.” She particularly 
singles out the ‘SOS children’s Exhibition’ that was running at the time and she 
notes that local art lovers would like it because of its more ‘realistic’ approach. On 
his part, Jumna, an art teacher at the SOS Hermann Gmeiner Secondary School, 
reckons that his students “are very direct in what they express. When you put the 
picture, you cannot figure out what they are saying. But when you call them and 
ask them, they know the story inside them.” Aged 14 – 16, these children work freely 
with the material they have (as narrated by Jumna) and they represent an idea in 
the way the mind represents it internally; the directness in their representations 
is intrinsic volition to tell something. When we finally externalize it, what we see 
is what it is internally; anything beyond is a concoction of what it is that we saw 
inside us. The world thereafter confers upon that image a style or genre designed 
to contextualize it and fit it in its diverse networks of concoctions. 
The children are direct and able to explain the story backwards because they 
still see, in their representation, the same ‘thing’ that they saw inside them–that is 
what they directly expressed (see figure 43). The primitive and naïve still see their 
externalities as representing what was inside them and thus satisfied that they 
see the same thing you and I see. These internalities however, rely on the external 
world and the artist, after contemplating them, decides to reintegrate them in a 
new form that emanates from within him/her so that they reenter the mainstream 
of concepts and things. Ability is only a social construction engendered by phi-
458  Chatman (cited in, Smuts, 2009, p.9) refers to Satellite events as minor events omittable without 
destroying the ‘narrative logic’.
459  Ravine is an art graduate from Michael Angelo Academy of Art affiliated to Kyambogo University.
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losophy and contaminated with extra externalities that discredit the internality 
of the creative mind by the time it reaches the primitive. The children are “think-
ing that this is what I want. They will pick color and put it there. They have no 
external influence of a style that influences them,” Jumna remarks. Ann and Barry 
(op cit, p. 80) do not consider the child’s image or a cave painting ‘primitive’ as be-
ing crude. Instead, they are equally “complex and sophisticated as [the] perceptual 
process itself, and all show a profound grasp of the essential characteristics of the 
thing, revealing no more detail than is necessary to make the point, and including 
only that detail that is meaningful within the context of the action or situation.”
It is the biological need to gain access to the outer world through communica-
tion, not only psychological, but also physiological that gives us access to socially 
constructed networks, which enable us to belong together as humans. One way by 
which we can communicate is by externalizing what we see inside by making it 
available to other externalities for developing interpersonal networks, with com-
mon goals by common beings. The systems that develop through the interaction 
of externalities come to constitute a language that is able to link all externalities 
uniformly and thus the language we seek in visual arts, oral cultures, and bodily 
practices. The belongingness we seek for human survival is the urge we have to 
communicate. Language is a biological need and so is expression. An average per-
son with a sound mind and purpose will always attempt to express him/herself in 
the best way possible. The claim to nothingness in communicative behavior and 
intention is a feigned reality that defeats humanity. There is no intention about 
nothingness; thus, nothingness does not exist in the realm of intention. When we 
train as artists, we lose a part of us that we can never regain because our new sensi-
bility cannot allow us to gain full control of the older one; in the process, the thing 
we lose is the ability to see what we see. 
Dramatically too, sometimes we have a conflict between what we see inter-
nally, and how we externalize it, which is certainly at a more sophisticated level 
of deliberation that the ‘raw’ mind is free from. During their practice, the chil-
dren work freely and are not encouraged to copy; when they are limited, they try to 
copy. “When you limit them, they get away from their freedom. It is like they don’t 
think on their own.” Copying creates conflict in the mind because it is no longer 
free although sometimes, copying is a priming factor in recognition and shap-
ing abilities. These internal conflicts occur when we are no longer confident that 
what we see inside us is what we can externalize. The same confusion perpetuates 
a dichotomy between realism and abstraction because we have lost that purity of 
interaction between the internal self and outer social world. When closely exam-
ined, these children indeed had biographical internal connections with the world 
in their exhibits. Moreover, what they used to express it was the everyday language 
of the common person: no sophisticated vocabularies, no implied nothingness. “It 
is in the end our ability to create meaning out of raw experience of life that makes 
us human,” observes Chung (1998).
“When you ask, they will tell a story, it becomes real, and that’s how it works”.
Figure 43. Sos children’s art exhibition. 2008. Note the ‘directness’ of pictorial expression in the art produced by 
children. Photos: Kabiito Richard.
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APPENDIX A 
assessment form/feedback form
Your comments on the course help us improve it and make sure that you get the 
best training we can offer. Please mark the sliding scale with a circle.
Your objectives:
What were you hoping to learn from this course?
How much of this did you actually learn?
Nothing   Enough    All
Usefulness to you:
How useful did you find this course?
Not useful  Enough   Very useful
Presentation of the course:
Was the course material presented at the right speed?
Much too slow  About right  Much too much
Was there enough technical material?
Much too little  About right  Much too Much
Was the technical material easy enough?
Much too simple  About right  Much too difficult
Course Organization:
Was the course administration efficient?
Very bad Adequate  Very good
Was the course material (handouts, documentation) useful?
Not Useful  Adequate  Very useful
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General comments:
What did you like about the course?
What did you like least about the course?
Which other subjects should have been covered?
Which subjects should have been left out?
Please add any other comments you wish.
Thank for your comments
questionnaire on meaning
Dear participant, please respond to the questions as objectively as possible. This 
study is about meaning in art and its proximity to localized communities. Please 
answer accordingly.
How often do you visit an art gallery, museum or exhibition?
Do you normally have particular expectations from the art you intend to see in a 
gallery? What are these expectations?
How often are these expectations fulfilled?
Does most of the art you see in the galleries often make any meaning to you?
What kind of art would you like to see in the galleries that makes meaning to you?
Which factors in an artwork do help you to perform meaning?
Do you normally encounter the art that you identify with? What kind of art is it?
In your opinion, does the art produced in Uganda today have any bearing to its 
communities?
Suggest ways in which art can get closer to its communities?
APPENDIX B
A Story about the Wild Nuts (Nkoliimbo)
Once upon a time there was man who married a wife. They gave birth to twins 
twice namely: Nakato, Babirye, Wasswa and Kato. When wide spread famine befell 
them, their father (Ssalongo) went to cultivate food.
There was a pumpkin at the back of the house, which was taken by the twins 
and cooked for a meal. They did not take long to send Nakato to go and fetch their 
father to get back home for lunch. A large bird asked her, “You Nakato, where are 
you going?”
 Am going over to the other hill to inspect the wild nuts,
 However the wild nuts yielded nothing but lies
So the bird told her that, “Repeat so that I can hear”. So she repeated:
 Am going over to the other hill to inspect the wild nuts,
 However the wild nuts yielded nothing but lies
So the bird told her to stand still. Nakato, too, stood still.
However, her siblings realizing that she was taking too long to return, they 
sent Babirye. Babirye told her that, “You Nakato, you were sent a long time ago but 
you are just standing there still!” Then Nakato said, “There is a big bird which has 
stopped me from walking”. The bird said immediately that, “You Babirye, where 
are you going?”
 Am going over to the other hill to inspect the wild nuts,
 However the wild nuts yielded nothing but lies
The bird told her, “Say it again and I hear”:
 Am going over to the other hill to inspect the wild nuts,
 However the wild nuts yielded nothing but lies
So the bird told her to stand still too.
The people at home then sent Wasswa. When he saw Babirye, “You were sent a 
long time ago but you are standing here!” The bird asked him too, “Where are you 
going?”
 Am going over to the other hill to inspect the wild nuts,
 However the wild nuts yielded nothing but lies
So the bird told him too to stand where he was. So he also stood still as the others. 
After Kato realized that his siblings were not returning, he followed them. When 
Kato saw them he said, “You people were sent a long time ago but you are just 
standing there!” They told him there was a bird that had prohibited them from 
moving. He was asked too by the bird that, “You Kato, where are you going?”
 Am going over to the other hill to inspect the wild nuts,
 However the wild nuts yielded nothing but lies
As they were all standing there, Ssaalongo came back from where he had been 
cultivating crops. As soon as the bird saw him, it asked him, “You Ssaalongo where 
are going?”
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 Am from the other hill to inspect the wild nuts,
 However the wild nuts yielded nothing but lies
He too was told by the bird, “You stand there too”. Soon after the bird went and ate 
all the food they had prepared and left nothing. When it got back to where it left 
them, it told them that, “You may go now”. So they went. When they arrived home 
there was no food at all yet they were so hungry. 
End of the story.
Kato Kimera comes to rule Buganda
King Chwa I of Buganda had a son, Kalemera, who loved him so much that he could 
not move away from him. The King got fed up and made plans to send his son to 
exile in Bunyoro. While in Bunyoro, Kalemera fell deeply in love with one of the 
King’s wives and made her pregnant. Knowing this, Kalemera was afraid that the 
King would kill him with his people. He made plans with his friend Katumba to tell 
the King that a sorcerer had sent a message to him from the well that if he hears 
that one of his wives is Pregnant, he should not go to see her; he should throw the 
baby into the pit. 
Then Kalemera left Bunyoro for Buganda but he failed to reach; he died on the 
way. The king did as instructed and Katumbe took the baby boy from the pit to his 
wife to nurse. 
The baby was named Kimera. He grew up believing that Katumba was his fa-
ther
In Buganda, King Chwa I had disappeared and his only son Kalemera had died. 
So there was no King in Buganda. 
When the chiefs learnt that Kalemera had a son and he was alive, they made 
plans to bring him and make him a King. With the help of King Chwa’s two wives, 
Kimera returned and overthrew Sebwana, a commoner King. Once again Buganda 
was under the true descendant of the Royal Family. He did not forget Katumba; he 
made him a great chief and titled him “Mugema”: the father of Kabaka (King of 
Buganda).
Kintu the Legend
Long long ago, Kintu was the only person on the earth. He lived alone with his 
cow, which he tended lovingly. Ggulu the creator of all things lived up in heaven 
with his many children and other property. From time to time, Ggulu’s children 
would come down to earth to play. On one such occasion, Ggulu’s daughter Nambi 
and some of her brothers encountered Kintu who was with his cow in Buganda. 
Nambi was very fascinated with Kintu and she felt pity for him because he was 
living alone. She resolved to marry him and stay with him despite the opposition 
from her brothers. But because of her brothers’ pleading, she decided to return to 
heaven with Kintu and ask for her father’s permission for the union. 
Ggulu was not pleased that his daughter wanted to get married to a human 
being and live with him on the earth. But Nambi pleaded with her father until she 
persuaded him to bless the union. After Ggulu decided to allow the marriage to 
proceed, he advised Kintu and Nambi to leave heaven secretly. He advised them 
to pack lightly and that on no condition were they to return to heaven even if they 
forgot anything. This admonition was so that Walumbe, one of Nambi’s brothers 
should not find out about the marriage until they had left, otherwise he would in-
sist on going with them and bring them misery ( walumbe means that which causes 
sickness and death). Kintu was very pleased to have been given a wife and together 
they followed Ggulu’s instructions. Among the few things that Nambi packed, was 
her chicken. They set out for earth early the next morning. 
But while they were descending, Nambi remembered that she had forgotten to 
bring the millet that her chicken would feed on. “I have left my chickens’ millet 
on the porch, let me return and fetch it,” she begged Kintu. But Kintu refused and 
said, “Don’t go back. If you do, you will meet Walumbe and he will surely insist 
on coming with you.” Nambi, however, did not listen to her husband, and leaving 
him on the way she returned to fetch the millet. When she reached the house, she 
took the millet from the porch, but on her way back, she suddenly met Walumbe 
who asked: “My sister, where are you going so early in the morning? Nambi did 
not know what to say. Filled with curiosity, Walumbe insisted on going with her. 
Therefore Kintu and Nambi were forced to go to earth together with Walumbe. 
It did not take long for Kintu and Nambi to get children. One day, Walumbe 
went to Kintu’s home and asked his brother-in-law to give him a child to help him 
with the chores in his (Walumbe’s) house. But remembering Ggulu’s warning, Kin-
tu would not hear of it. Walumbe became very angry with Kintu for refusing him 
the simple favor he had asked. That very night, he went and killed Kintu’s son. Nat-
urally, this caused a deep rift between them. Kintu went back to heaven to report 
Walumbe’s actions to Ggulu. Ggulu rebuked Kintu, reminding him of the original 
warning he had disregarded. Kintu blamed Nambi for returning to get the millet. 
Ggulu then sent another of his sons, Kayikuuzi, to go back to earth with Kintu and 
try to persuade Walumbe to return to heaven or if necessary return him by force. 
On reaching earth, Kayikuuzi tried to persuade Walumbe to go back to heaven 
but Walumbe would not hear of it. “I like it here on earth and I am not coming 
back with you” he said. Kayikuuzi decided to capture Walumbe by force, and a 
great fight broke out between them. But as Walumbe was about to be overpowered, 
he escaped and disappeared into the ground. Kayikuuzi went after him, digging 
huge holes in the ground to try and find his brother. When Kayikuuzi got to where 
he was hiding, Walumbe run back out to the earth. Further struggle between the 
brothers ensued but once again Walumbe escaped into the ground. The famous 
caves that are found today at Ttanda in Ssingo are said to be the ones that were dug 
by Kayikuuzi in the fight with his brother Walumbe. (Kayikuuzi means he who digs 
holes). 
The struggle went on for several days and by now, Kayikuuzi was close to ex-
haustion. So he went and talked to Kintu and Nambi as follows: “I am going back 
into the ground one more time to get Walumbe. You and your children must stay 
268
indoors. You must strictly enjoin your children not to make a sound if they see 
Walumbe. I know he is also getting tired so when he comes out of the ground, I will 
come upon him secretly and grab him.” Kintu and Nambi went into their house, 
but some of the kids did not go in. Kayikuuzi once again went underground to find 
Walumbe. After a struggle, Walumbe came back out to the surface with Kayikuuzi 
in pursuit. Kintu’s children who were outside at the time saw Walumbe coming 
and sreamed in terror. On hearing the screams, Walumbe went underground once 
again. Kayikuuzi was furious with Kintu and Nambi for not having followed his 
instructions. He told them that if they did not care to do the simple thing he had 
asked of them, he was also giving up the fight. Kintu in his embarrassment had 
nothing more to say. So he told Kayikuuzi “You return to heaven. If Walumbe 
wants to kill my children, let him do so, I will keep having more. The more he kills, 
the more I will get and he will never be able to kill off all my children”. Ttanda, 
where the fight between Walumbe and Kayikuuzi allegedly took place is figura-
tively referred to as the place of death (i.e. Walumbe’s place). 
So that is the legend of creation, and how sickness and death started. None-
theless, Kintu’s descendants will always remain as Kintu said in his last words to 
Kayikuuzi. Hence the Kiganda saying “Abaana ba Kintu tebalifa kuggwaawo”. Which 
means that Kintu’s children (i.e. the Baganda), will never be wiped off the face of 
the earth. 
Kato Kintu the first king used this saying to his advantage, by taking on the 
name of the reputed father of all people in Buganda. However Kintu the legend and 
Kato Kintu the first king are distinct and should not be confused with one another. 
Kintu the legend was reputedly the first person on earth and therefore could not 
have been a king since he had no people to rule over! 
